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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is structured into two main parts to investigate the role of financial 
IOH[LELOLW\LQILUPV¶OLTXLGLW\DQGILQDQFLQJPDQDJHPHQW)LQDQFLDOIOH[LELOLW\LVWKHPRVW
important practical determinant to managers when they make financing decisions. This 
missing link, financial flexibility, is identified by practitioners and used in this thesis to 
fill the missing gap between theory and practice in corporate finance. Part A of this 
WKHVLVDQDO\VHVWKHWUHQGVLQILUPV¶internal financial flexibility and examines the role of 
this internal flexibility on investment behaviour of firms. Part B of this thesis then move 
on to examine the role of both internal and external financial flexibility RQ ILUPV¶
financing behaviour. 
Part A examines the relationship between debt capacity and cash as part of 
ILUPV¶ LQWHUQDO ILQDQFLDO IOH[LELOLW\)LUPVXVHERWKGHEWFDSDFLW\DQGFDVKKROGLQJV IRU
their internal flexibility management; and debt capacity is used here to explain the 
trends observed in cash holdings. Debt capacity is the most important determinant of 
cash holdings and has better ability to predict cash level compared to conventional cash 
GHWHUPLQDQWV 7RJHWKHU ERWK GHEW FDSDFLW\ DQG FDVK FRQWULEXWH WR ILUPV¶ LQWHUQDO
financial flexibility and are able to e[SODLQ PRVWRI ILUPV¶ investment behaviour, even 
during a recession period. 
Part B examines the role of financial flexibility in capital structure decisions. 
Financial flexibility is measured internally as cash and debt capacity, and externally as 
equity liquidity using a novel external equity flexibility index based on common equity 
liquidity measures. The conventional pecking order and trade-off models are used to 
PHDVXUHWKHLPSDFWRIILQDQFLDOIOH[LELOLW\RQILUPV¶FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH7KHSHFNLQJRUGHU
tKHRU\LVFRQWLQJHQWXSRQILUPV¶LQWHUQDOIOH[LELOLW\± debt capacity. Finally, supporting 
the notion that financial flexibility is the most important consideration in financing 
decisions, debt capacity and external equity flexibility are shown to be the most 
important determinants of leverage.  
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ABSTRACT A 
 
Using a sample of public US firms over the period 1980 to 2008, the relationship 
EHWZHHQ GHEW FDSDFLW\ DQG FRUSRUDWH FDVK KROGLQJV DV SDUWRI ILUPV¶ LQWHUQDO ILQDQFLDO
flexibility is examined. Evidence found substantial substitution effect between debt 
capacity and cash, and the historical trend of cash appears to mirror that of debt 
capacity. The negative relationship between debt capacity and cash is robust even after 
considering conventional cash determinants such as firm size and idiosyncratic risk. 
Debt capacity is the most important cash determinant and the relationship between cash 
and conventional variables is weakened once debt capacity is considered. When 
financial constraints are considered, it is found that previous cash determinants are only 
useful in explaining cash holdings of constrained firms, while debt capacity remains a 
significant variable for both constrained and unconstrained firms. Furthermore, debt 
capacity is found to have better predictive ability for cash holdings. The relationship 
between cash and debt capacity is proven robust even across different industry groups. 
Together, both debt capacity and cash are found to explain most of the changes in 
investment behaviour. However, during a recession, debt capacity increases firm value 
by increasing firPV¶ DELOLW\ WR LQYHVW GXULQJ WKH UHFHVVLRQ ZKLOH FDVK PD\ WDNH RQ D
more precautionary role, for operational requirements rather than investment need, by 
cushioning the drop in cash flows during the recession. 
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CHAPTER A1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Practical determinants of capital structure have been under the spotlight since the 
survey of 392 CFOs of the top US corporations by Graham and Harvey (2001). 
According to this survey, the most important debt policy factors are (1) financial 
flexibility (60%), (2) credit rating (57%), (3) earnings and cash flow volatility (47%), 
and (4) insufficient internal funds (46%). These top four factors are all UHODWHGWRILUPV¶
liquidity, cash flow and the ability to secure future funds. Subsequent surveys in the 
European context (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004, Brounen et al., 2004) found similar 
LPSRUWDQFHRIOLTXLGLW\IDFWRUVLQILUP¶VILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQV0RUHUHFHQWVXUYH\VVWXG\
ILUPV¶LQWHUQDOIOH[LELOLW\PDQDJHPHQWGLUHFWO\E\ORRNLQJDWWKHXVHRIFDVKDQGFUHGLW
facilities, and the practical considerations and interactions between them in face of crisis 
and external shocks (Bancel and Mittoo, 2011, Campello et al., 2011, Lins et al., 2010). 
,QJHQHUDOWHUPVILQDQFLDOIOH[LELOLW\UHODWHVWRDILUP¶VRYHUDOOILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXUH
and whether there is sufficient flexibility to take advantage of or counter unforeseen 
opportunities or conditions. In order to value flexibility, Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
defined LWDV WKH³ability of a firm to access and restructure its financing at a low cost; 
these firms are able to avoid financial distress in the face of negative shocks, and to fund 
investment readily when profitable opportunities arise.´ )OH[LELOLW\ HQDEOHV Iirms to 
respond in a timely manner to maximise firm value (Byoun, May 2008). 
The two most common proxies used to measure internal financial flexibility are 
cash-on-hand and leverage in terms of used/unused credit line and debt capacity. This 
internal component is influenced by the volatility of cash and earnings, and managerial 
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GLVFUHWLRQDQGSUHIHUHQFHRYHUDILUP¶VOLTXLGLW\SRVLWLRQ In general, cash holdings and 
H[SHFWHGIXWXUHFDVKIORZDUHXVHGWRDVVHVVILUPV¶DELOLW\WRPHHWGRZQVLGHULVNZKLle 
FUHGLW OLQH DQG GHEW FDSDFLW\ DUH XVHG LQ DSSUDLVLQJ ILUPV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH WKURXJK WKHLU
investment ability at the upside. However, past studies examine cash and debt capacity 
separately and little is known about the interaction between the two most important 
components of internal liquidity. Both cash and debt capacity provide reliable sources of 
OLTXLGLW\IRUILUPVEXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHPLV³QHLWKHUVLPSOHQRUPHFKDQLFDO´
(Lins et al., 2010). While papers studying cash policies have surged in recent corporate 
finance research (e.g. Almeida et al., 2004, Bates et al., 2009, Denis and Sibilkov, 2010, 
Faulkender and Wang, 2006), credit line and debt capacity are not in the limelight for 
the practical reason of data unavailability1 and measurement difficulty2 respectively. 
Recent studies on lines of credit include Sufi (2009) and Acharya et al. (Feb 2012). Sufi 
(2009) analysed the interaction between cash and bank lines of credit (both total credit 
and unused credit) and finds that the relationship between the two is influenced by a 
ILUP¶VFDVKIORZDQGFDVKIORZYRODWLOLW\3 In other words, although the two instruments 
are used in internal liquidity management, cash and bank credit are not perfect 
VXEVWLWXWHVIRUHDFKRWKHUGHSHQGLQJRQILUP¶VFDVKIORZSRVLWLRQ 
For the cash component, Bates et al. (2009) provided evidence of a significant 
increase in cash holdings over time. Increase in idiosyncratic risks is found to be the 
main driver behind the increase in cash, with a precautionary motive. However, 
according to the internal financial flexibility hypothesis, this trend may possibly be 
                                                             
1
 Data on lines of credit are only available on the 7KRPVRQ5HXWHUV¶'HDOVFDQGDWDEDVHDQGare limited to large firms 
which report their total and unused committed credit line in their financial reports.  
2
 There are variations in the measurement of debt capacity in the literature. Proxies for debt capacity include credit 
rating, lagged leverage level, total assets, financial distress measures, and financial constraints index, e.g. Whited and 
Wu (2006). 
3
 Due to data availability, the sample used in Sufi (2009) is limited to larger firms. 
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explained by the fall in debt capacity over time. Due to the change in nature of business 
formed, average debt capacity of US firms fell over time. As such, firms have to hold 
more cash. The general trend of increased cash holdings over time may be due to 
increased credit constraints faced by firms. Eliminating the periodic trend, firms with 
lower debt capacities are found to hold greater cash at any particular point in time. 
)LUPV¶ GHFOLQLQJ ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ may be due to (1) debt requiring higher risk 
premium such that more collateral is required for each unit of debt raised, or (2) a 
change in business asset structure such that firms now hold fewer tangible assets 
compared to the past. The latter conjecture is supported by the negative relationship 
between cash and debt capacity, where firms are found to have lower debt capacities 
and, consequently, greater cash holdings. At the same time, firms are found to exhibit 
increasing dispersion in their internal characteristics. Instead of behaving like their peers 
and appearing in clusters, firms are more dissimilar over time.  
The relationship between cash and debt capacity is important because it 
contributes to the dynamics of internal financial flexibility. Debt capacity is dependent 
RQWKHQDWXUHRIILUPV¶DVVHWVDQGFRQVLGHUHGDPRUHVWDEOH and predictable characteristic 
of a firm. On the other hand, cash is easily varied periodically and is more susceptible to 
change according to changes to cash flow and profitability. Since cash and debt capacity 
are partial substitutes for each other, firms often make decisions to balance between the 
two; and since level of cash is more changeable compared to debt capacity, it is 
hypothesized that the amount of cash held depends largely on debt capacity in the same 
period. This effectively makes debt capacity an important determinant of cash holdings.  
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The sample used in this thesis is first matched with the Bates, Khale and Stulz 
(2009) (henceforth BKS) sample. In order to understand the internal flexibility 
dynamics, time series analysis of cash and debt capacity is first performed. Similar to 
BKS, a significant increased in cash holdings since 1970s is reported. During the same 
period, debt capacity follows a falling trend which almost mirrors that of cash holdings 
in the opposite direction. Subsequent analyses on the interaction between cash and debt 
capacity clearly show a negative substitution effect between the two instruments. 
Following BKS, firm size, cash flow and idiosyncratic risks (measured using industry 
cash flow volatility) are used to help explain the trend in cash holdings. However, when 
debt capacity is included, these conventional firm characteristics do not remain robust in 
terms of their impact on cash holdings.  
After supportive univariate evidence, the base cash model adapted from BKS is 
performed and results support the transactional, firm value and strategic motives of 
holding cash. Precautionary cash holdings are no longer important once firm and year 
fixed effects are considered. Following on, debt capacity is included in the cash model 
and has the greatest impact on cash holdings (even more than industry cash flow 
volatility). While BKS showed that increased in cash holdings in due mainly to changes 
in net working capital, cash flow volatility, capital expenditure and research and 
development expenses, these variables no longer significantly predict cash holdings 
once debt capacity is considered. There is a large substitution effect present between 
cash and debt capacity for a firm¶V precautionary purposes. In the lagged cash model, 
evidence suggests that cash decisions are current decisions made by managers based on 
existing firm conditions.  
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As both debt capacity and industry cash flow volatility are found to be important 
cash determinants, further tests are performed using orthogonalized cash regressions to 
distinguish the actual effect of each variable on cash. The orthogonalized regressions 
provide evidence to show that debt capacity has greater impact on cash compared to 
volatility. Volatility has reduced impact on cash holdings after controlling for debt 
capacity, suggesting that the impact of volatility on cash holdings is partially dependent 
on the level of debt capacity. To investigate the actual impact of debt capacity and 
volatility on cash further, additional tests are performed with an interaction term 
between debt capacity and volatility. Results from the interaction term show that debt 
capacity is important in cash management, while cash flow volatility may only be an 
important determinant under certain conditions, for instance lower debt capacity.  
Chapter A5 moves to split the sample via commonly used financial constraint 
criteria. Division of firms into credit constrained and unconstrained categories allow us 
to examine the effect of financial constraints on the relationship between cash and debt 
capacity. The sample and financial constraint criterion is first matched with Campello et 
al. (2011). The cash models performed across firms with varying financial constraints 
show that industry cash flow volatility is a more important cash determinant for 
constrained firms. Evidence suggests that constrained firms consider funding from 
leverage and cash as substitutes for each other more than unconstrained firms; and 
investments are funded proportionately more by cash in constrained firms. When debt 
capacity is considered, previous important cash determinants ± cash flow volatility, net 
working capital, and capital expenditure - are no longer significant in explaining cash 
level in unconstrained firms, while debt capacity and research and development 
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expenses remain significant (although of different magnitude) for all firms. The 
substitution effect between debt capacity and cash is larger when firms have greater 
financial constraints.  
Moving on, the modified cash model is used in Chapter A6 to predict cash 
holdings in order to determine if the new model predicts cash holdings better than the 
original BKS model. The original BKS model is found to predict cash holdings better 
for constrained firms. The modified model (with debt capacity) performs better and 
reports predicted cash holdings that are closer to actual ratios. The estimated 
contribution from the determinants in the modified model matches the actual change in 
cash better, where the change in cash over time is largely explained by corresponding 
change in debt capacity alone. The results confirm that debt capacity is an important 
determinant of cash, helps predict cash holdings better and has the ability to replace 
previous determinants and explain a substantial part of the variance in cash. 
After the series of cash regressions and the proven trade-off between cash and 
debt capacity, Chapter A7 performs the reverse model using debt capacity as the 
dependent variable because the bivariate Granger test shows a significant feedback 
relationship between cash and debt capacity. The debt capacity model is adapted from 
Campello et al. (2011) and Sufi (2009). Unused debt capacity is further used to test the 
reverse-causality effect between cash and debt capacity.   
Cash flow, previously identified as an important determinant of debt capacity, is 
found to have little impact on debt capacity when cash and cash flow risk are 
considered, since the bulk of the variance is explained by the latter two variables. The 
impact of cash holdings on debt capacity remains similar for constrained and 
Part A  Chapter A1. Introduction 
17 
 
unconstrained firms. Results support the hypothesis that debt capacity is a first-level 
variable that exhibits less periodic changes compared to the second-level variable cash 
which can be monitored and adjusted in each period. Results from the unused debt 
capacity models support the trade-off between cash and debt capacity as firms use less 
of their borrowing capacity when cash holdings are higher; while less use of debt 
capacity cannot cause firms to have greater cash on hand, reverse-causality is 
eliminated. The reverse causality problem is also more prominent for constrained firms, 
since the use of debt capacity is more likely to add positively to cash holdings because 
constrained firms have less ability to preserve capacity without restrictions.  
In the final series of cash and debt capacity analysis in Chapter A8, industry 
effect is considered because univariate analysis shows significant variation in the level 
of cash and debt capacity held by firms across different industries, The time trend 
analysis of average cash over time shows cash increasing at a significant rate only for 
certain industries. The substitution effect is the greatest in software, biotechnology and 
manufacturing industries because high technology industry has large intangibles and 
UHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQWDFWLYLWLHV WKDWFRQWULEXWH OLWWOH WR ILUPV¶ ERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\
and cash is an important source of funding for investments, while the manufacturing 
firms hold higher cash for competitive reasons to prevent losing valuable investment 
opportunities and market share (Haushalter et al., 2007).  
Finally, Chapter A9 investigates the effect of cash and debt capacity on 
investments over the entire sample and during recessionary periods. Earlier studies have 
found that firms with greater unused borrowing capacity perform better in the long run 
because they can invest more (Denis and McKeon, March 2012, Marchica and Mura, 
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2010). In the face of negative shocks, firms with greater financial flexibility are able to 
withstand external shocks and perform better with greater pools of cash (Campello et al., 
2011, Harford et al., April 2003) and unused debt capacity (Arslana et al., 2011). Results 
from the investment model show that cash and debt capacity account for most of the 
changes in investment, while other variables exhibit trivial impact. Supporting the credit 
multiplier effect (Almeida and Campello, 2007), debt capacity is found to have greater 
impact on investment compared to cash. The results are extended to the investment 
model with recessionary impact as debt capacity is found to positively impact 
investment during recession, but cash is not found to positively influence investment 
during recession.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The next Chapter reviews 
the internal flexibility theories, describes the measurements for cash and debt capacity, 
and reports the sample and detailed variable definitions. Chapter A3 gives basic 
descriptive statistics of the data and analyses the periodic and cross-sectional trend of 
cash and debt capacity. Chapter A4 presents the cash regression specifications and 
results to investigate the determinants of cash. Chapter A5 investigates the interaction 
between internal flexibility and financial constraints; and Chapter A6 uses the adapted 
model to predict cash holdings. Chapter A7 presents the debt capacity models and 
results to examine the reverse causality between debt capacity and cash. Chapter A8 
investigates the interaction of internal flexibility with industry effect, and Chapter A9 
investigates the use of cash and debt capacity in investment activities. Finally, Chapter 
A10 concludes the thesis.   
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CHAPTER A2. INTERNAL FLEXIBILITY: DEBT 
CAPACITY AND CASH HOLDINGS 
In practice, liquidity constraints play a critical role in financing decisions 
because managers are forward-looking and consider the expected liquidity position of 
their firms in future periods when making financing decisions. Forward-looking 
financing decisions involve consideration of the opportunity cost of the consequent 
future inability to borrow if a decision to borrow is made in the current period 
(DeAngelo et al., 2011). This suggests that a borrowing cost incurred by firms not only 
includes the usual floatation cost but also the opportunity cost, which is the main reason 
why firms preserve debt capacity and hold more cash. Recent survey evidence 
(Campello et al., 2010) supports the view that managers preserve debt capacity both for 
future use and to maintain a strong reputation. This preserves untapped credit lines and 
avoids potential denial of new sources of funding or new investors. During the most 
recent financial crisis, 81% of the surveyed constrained firms have limited access to 
credit with more than half having problems finding new sources of funds, thereby 
resulting in heavy usage of internal funds, both cash holdings and new cash flows 
(Campello et al., 2010). Evidently, practical constraints affect financing decisions and 
even more so during a credit crisis. Preserving financial flexibility thus becomes a first 
order consideration. 
A2.1 Internal flexibility motives 
Conventionally, there are four motives of firms holding cash ± precautionary, 
transaction, tax and agency. These motives may be used in a similar manner for 
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preservation of debt capacity. Here, we theoretically identify and differentiate the 
different factors behind holding cash and debt capacity. In addition to the four 
conventional motives, we list the recent grounds for cash and debt capacity to explain 
collectively the purpose of preserving internal flexibility. 
A2.1.1 Precautionary motive 
Precautionary purpose is probably the most important practical reason behind 
holding cash. In the literature, many papers have identified firms which are more likely 
to hold extra cash, e.g. firms with low and/or more volatile cash flow (Bates et al., 2009, 
Han and Qiu, 2007, Opler et al., 1999), poor access to external capital (Opler et al., 
1999), undervalued equity (Acharya et al., 2007, Almeida et al., 2004), greater yet 
financially constrained investment opportunities (Denis and Sibilkov, 2010), or 
consistent dividend payout policies (Lins et al., 2010). With the exception of dividend 
paying firms, the above effectively characterise financially constrained firms. More cash 
is held when firms are financially constrained. Notwithstanding the numerous measures 
for financial constraints in the literature (e.g. firm size, credit rating, dividend policy, 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, cash flow sensitivity of cash), firms with greater 
constraints and higher probability of distress are found to hold cash for flexibility 
because debt capacity is a poor substitute for cash in these firms (Sufi, 2009). On the 
RWKHUKDQGGHEWFDSDFLW\LVPDLQWDLQHGE\ILQDQFLDOO\XQFRQVWUDLQHGILUPVWRµVDIHJXDUG¶
investment opportunities and fund future growth options (Lins et al., 2010). The debt 
capacity precautionary motive preserves a ILUP¶V DELOLW\ WR LQYHVW DQG UHGXFHV WKH
opportunity costs involved when valuable projects are missed due to insufficient funds.  
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A2.1.2 Transaction motive 
Conventional models of finance advocate the importance of transaction costs in 
ILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJGHFLsions. Due to the cost in converting non-cash assets into cash, firms 
hold cash for liquidity purposes and this is more prominent in smaller firms because 
large firms enjoy economies of scale in the conversion of assets (Baumol, 1952, 
Meltzer, 1963, Miller and Orr, 1966). Accordingly, operational cash holdings should 
make up a substantial portion of cash held by firms to avoid transaction costs because 
ad-hoc non-operational cash requirements are difficult to predict, and holding cash for 
non-operational purposes incurs substantial costs (e.g. tax and agency costs). Debt 
capacity, on the other hand, may be preserved for non-operational purposes and tapped 
only when funds are needed. Debt is generally less expensive than equity; and private 
issues are cheaper than public issues. As such, firms preserve debt capacity to avoid 
expensive public issues. Similar to the transactional motive for cash, smaller firms have 
greater tendency to maintain debt capacity, because these firms have limited access to 
the capital market and less negotiating power with underwriters and banks. In general, 
the transaction motive of holding cash and preserving debt capacity is important because 
it prevents unnecessary fire sales of assets which generate lower than true value cash 
and result in invHVWRUV¶ QHJDWLYH VHQWLPHQW DQG VLJQDOOLQJ 5HFHQW HPSLULFDO HYLGHQFH
VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH SUHVHQFH RI WUDQVDFWLRQDO FRVWV DOWHUV ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDO SROLF\ EHFDXVH
firms owners prefer lower fixed costs when sourcing for funds (Faulkender and Wang, 
2006). 
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A2.1.3 Tax motive 
Multinational firms hold greater cash to avoid higher tax rates when repatriating 
their foreign earnings. This is more prominent for financially unconstrained firms and 
technology intensive multinational firms (Foley et al., 2007). However, for the majority 
of domestic firms, holding large amounts of cash involves taxes on interest income, 
while debt allows for deductible interest payments (Demiroglua and James, 2011, 
Riddick and Whited, 2009). Thus, some firms prefer using credit line or debt capacity 
instead of cash for internal liquidity management. The tax argument effectively puts 
cash and debt capacity as substitutes for each other.  
A2.1.4 Agency motive 
0DQDJHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFH IRU ODUJH FDVK-on-hand is the conventional agency 
argument of the high cash holdings held by firms. Jensen (1986) argues that entrenched 
managers prefer retaining cash within the firm rather than increasing dividend payments 
to shareholders. Cash holdings are larger when the agency problem is greater. The 
agency argument for holding large amount of cash within firms has been extensively 
researched (e.g. Blanchard and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1994, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 
2007, Dittmar et al., 2003, Harford, 1999, Harford et al., 2008, Kalcheva and Lins, 
2007, Opler et al., 1999, Pinkowitz et al., 2006). On the other hand, the agency problem 
may also be used to explain the large debt capacity preserved by firms. Entrenched 
managers are more likely to resist debt financing, thereby keeping a larger portion of 
GHEW FDSDFLW\ XQXVHG EHFDXVH GHEW LQVWUXPHQWV FRQVWUDLQ PDQDJHUV¶ EHKDYLRXU DQG
actions. Zweibel (1996) reported that firms with high equity value or recent equity issue 
are likely to resist debt financing. Furthermore, lines of credit reduce the agency 
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problem caused by large cash holdings because the bank imposes covenants and closer 
monitoring when committed credit lines have been issued (Demiroglua and James, 
2011, Sufi, 2009, Yun, 2009). Following this argument, entrenched managers would try 
to reduce the level of committed credit and prefer to keep a larger portion of debt 
capacity unused yet conditional. This conditional form of liquidity is then exercised 
when the firm is performing well enough to satisfy covenant restrictions (Sufi, 2009).  
A2.1.5 Firm value motive   
Maintenance of financial flexibility directly affects a ILUP¶V ILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQV
(Graham and Harvey, 2001). Financial flexibility has positive impact on firm value, 
especially for firms with low capital or low profitability (younger or financially 
constrained firms) (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Unused debt capacity ERRVWV ILUPV¶
financial flexibility, allowing them to make better investments and add positively to firm 
value (Marchica and Mura, 2010), even more so compared to investments made using 
cash-on-hand (Demiroglua and James, 2011). Similarly, firms with high cash and 
conservative leverage policy are found to perform better due to their ability to invest 
better (Arslana et al., 2011), and firms with excess cash and better investments have 
greater stock returns (Simutin, 2010). Therefore, the firm value motive may be a 
SUDFWLFDO UHDVRQ EHKLQG ILUPV¶ KLJK FDVK DQG ORZ OHYHUDJH LH KLJK GHEW FDSDFLW\
policy because such policy adds to firm value through valuable financial flexibility. 
A2.1.6 Strategic motive 
Firms gain competitive edge against competitors when they have more credit 
lines because this borrowing capacity lowers expansion costs (Maksimovic, 1990). 
Strategic benefits of flexibility from both cash and debt capacity suggest that firms may 
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PDNHOLTXLGLW\FKRLFHVEDVHGRQFRPSHWLWRUV¶LQWHUQDOIOH[LELOLW\SRVLWLRQHYHQPRUHVR
in more competitive industries (Lins et al., 2010). Haushalter et al. (2007) find that 
ILUPV¶ SUHGDWRU\ EHKDYLRXU FDXVHs them to hold more cash in order to prevent loss of 
valuable growth opportunities and market share to their rivals. Although this motive is 
not theoretically determined, empirical evidence suggests that the strategic motive for 
holding more cash and debt capacity exists, because strategic benefits from better 
liquidity management enable firms to handle crises and shocks to cash flow better, and 
to seize investment opportunities in a timely manner.  
The above motives postulate that firms actively manage their cash and debt 
capacity level to maintain sufficient internal flexibility to handle negative shocks and 
embrace positive opportunities. The relationship between cash and debt capacity thus 
becomes important because it contributes to the dynamics of internal financial 
flexibility. Theoretically, debt capacity and cash are perfect substitutes of liquidity for 
each other. However, debt capacity is subject to the availability of credit and liquidity in 
external capital markets. Some papers (e.g. Demiroglua and James, 2011, Sufi, 2009) 
report evidence that debt capacity may not be a viable substitute of cash for all firms; 
while others report supportive evidence for the trade-off between cash and debt capacity 
(e.g. Campello et al., 2011, Lins et al., 2010). These mixed results motivate further 
investigation to determine the relationship between debt capacity and cash holdings.   
A2.2 Internal flexibility measures 
As defined, internal flexibility comprises of two main components ± (1) liquid 
assets and cash holdings, and (2) credit lines and debt capacity. Inflexibility is caused by 
the existence of issuance costs, distress costs and financing constraints (mainly a result 
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of asset tangibility) because these costs cause firms to face difficulty or higher costs in 
seeking external funds when internal funds are insufficient in bad times or for 
unexpected growth opportunities. Hence, firms seek to preserve flexibility in order to 
avoid higher costs. Flexibility, however, cannot be attained by holding large internal 
funds because there are both tax disincentives and agency costs in holding cash. There is 
tax disincentive to hold cash because interest on cash is taxed at a (higher) corporate 
level rather than personal level (Gamba and Triantis, 2008); and the tax costs involved 
in repatriating foreign income are considerably higher (Foley et al., 2007). Agency 
theory postulates that non-value adding investments using excess cash is harmful to 
shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, there is also an 
opportunity cost of cash since greater cash holdings reduces current positive investment, 
(Almeida et al., 2004). Other than cash, firms use debt capacity to maintain internal 
flexibility. Evidence on preserved unused debt capacity is provided by Sufi (2009), 
where firms are found to have unused lines of credit twice the size of existing credit. 
Firms are also found to limit the use of debt to maintain specific credit rating or avoid 
any change in credit rating (Kisgen, 2007), because the access to capital and choice of 
debt is related to credit history and current credit quality of firm (Denis and Mihov, 
2003). 
While both cash and debt capacity provide internal flexibility to firms, their 
YDOXHV WR ILUPV GLIIHU DFFRUGLQJ WR ILUPV¶ FXUUHQW ILQDQFLDO SRVLWLRQ 5HFRJQLVLQJ WKH
differential cash and debt values, Faulkender and Wang (2006) examine the value of 
cash holdings with respect to corporate financing using three cash regimes, where the 
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value of cash depends largely on the purpose of each additional dollar of cash held.4 
Marginal value of cash holdings differ significantly across firms with different cash 
holdings, leverage levels, and access to capital market.  
As Almeida and Campello (2007) describes the capacity for external finance 
JHQHUDWHGE\ QHZ LQYHVWPHQW LVDSRVLWLYH IXQFWLRQRI WKH WDQJLELOLW\RI ILUPV¶DVVHWV5 
Lambrecht and Myers (2008) model a positive relationship between target debt level and 
closure (book) value of firm explicitly and suggest that debt level is determined by the 
OLTXLGLW\RIILUP¶VDVVHWVDWFORVXUHDQG, if book value approximates closure value, debt 
level will be close to book leverage target. Accordingly, there is a close relationship 
between the nature and value of assets and debt capacity. Debt capacity is measured as 
the maximum borrowing capacity of firm, estimated by the value of its assets in 
liquidation. Since debt capacity and optimal debt levels are constrained by asset 
illiquidity, the redeployability of assets in times of distress here measures assets¶ 
liquidation value (i.e. capacity to command additional debt) instead of the usual 
accounting measure of tangible assets. The proxy construed for the tangibility measure 
scaled by total assets is a firm-level measure of expected asset liquidation value from 
Berger et al. (1996), and used in Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hahn and Lee 
(2009). 
Total debt capacity = Estimated tangibility/Total assets  
 = [0.715*Receivables (RECT[2]) + 0.547*Inventory (INVT[3]) + 0.535*Property Plant 
and Equipment (PPE) (PPENT[8]) + Cash holdings (CHE[1])] / (AT[6])6 
                                                             
4
 Cash is held by firms for one of the following three purposes - (1) Distribution to equity holders in the form of 
dividends, (2) Servicing of debt or liabilities, and (3) Investment and raising internal funds to reduce the level of debt 
and equity issue. 
5
 Rationale behind the firm-level credit multiplier and the effect of tangibility can be sourced from the following four 
arguments ± (1) Inalienability of human capital and creditor bargaining power, (2) Information asymmetry, (3) 
Agency costs, and (4) Moral hazard in project choice (Almeida and Campello, 2007). 
6
 The initials beside each parenthesis represent the variable labels in CRSP/Compustat Fundamentals Annual database 
and its relevant item number in the square brackets. Many papers use the Industrial Annual instead of Fundamentals 
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Previous studies (Almeida and Campello, 2007, Hahn and Lee, 2009) use the 
above tangibility measure of existing assets as a proxy for tangibility of new investment. 
Rather than using the measure as a proxy, it is implicitly assumed here that it is in fact 
the tangibility of existing assets that matters because they provide collateral for total 
firm debt. Due to the hypothesized negative relationship between cash and debt 
capacity, it is important to separate them into two distinct measures. This also helps to 
reduce the positive bias in debt capacity since it represents the maximum borrowing 
capacity if lenders have perfect information. In the imperfect market, actual borrowing 
capacity is likely to be lower. Debt capacity is measured as follows. 
Debt capacity, DC = Tangibility/Total assets  
= [0.715*Receivables (RECT[2]) + 0.547*Inventory (INVT[3])  
+ 0.535*PPE (PPENT[8])] / (AT[6]) 
 Cash, by itself, plays a vital role in dictating total internal capacity.7 However, 
cash is an imperfect substitute for debt capacity (Bates et al., 2009, Sufi, 2009). 
Nevertheless, it gives flexibility to firms with differential access to external markets and 
different levels of risks. BKS document a dramatic two-fold increase in the average cash 
ratio for the period 1980 to 2006 in the US,8 and the precautionary motive to hold cash 
is the most important determinant of demand of cash because firms face risks that may 
not be hedged appropriately with little cost.   
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Annual database, and represent data items using numbers, e.g. long term debt = Item 9 + Item 34 and total assets = 
item 6. The variable item number is no longer updated and used by CRSP and Compustat after fiscal year 2006, when 
the sample data are extracted from the Fundamentals Annual database in the Xpressfeed format. As such, relevant 
variable labels are documented alongside with their old data item numbers. It should be noted that after the change in 
variable identification, there are some variables which are no longer available as they are combined with other items 
in the financial statements. Similarly, there are additional new variables which were conventionally reported as part of 
the variable in the old format, now report separately as individual items. 
7
 Cash holdings, CASH, (CHE[1])] equals cash and cash equivalents (marketable securities) reported in the balance 
sheet of the financial statements. 
8
 The four main reasons documented for such significant increase is the fall of inventories and capital expenditure, 
and increase in cash flow risk and research and development expenses. 
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Froot et al. (1993) suggest that insufficient internal funds result in two costly 
alternatives ± (1) increasing cost of financing as external funds are sought to maintain 
investment level, or (2) costly suboptimal investment as external funds are not sought 
and investment opportunities are forgone (Copeland et al., 2005). Hence, internal funds 
(cash) should be maintained at an optimal level where the value of flexibility from cash 
holdings trades off exactly the sum of tax disincentive and agency costs (between 
managers and shareholders).  
In addition, internal flexibility is a result of strategic decisions relating to capital 
structure, liquidity and investment whilst taking into account corporate and personal tax 
rates and liquidity value of capital. As such, financially flexible firms should be valued 
at a premium, (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Adapting the prior theoretical and empirical 
evidence (Chan and Chen, 1991, Hahn and Lee, 2009, Lamont et al., 2001, Livdan et al., 
2009, Whited and Wu, 2006), it is implicitly assumed that financial inflexibility is a 
priced risk. As such, pro-active management of internal liquidity has the potential to 
increase firm value. This impact is relatively larger when there is significant upside 
growth opportunity or poor performance. Since internal flexibility enables firms to 
weather exogenous shocks, flexible firms are better equipped to weather recessions and 
shocks in the credit market. Hence, analysing whether flexibility truly protect firms 
during a slump and/or boost firms during a boom would substantiate the empirical 
evidence for the value of internal flexibility that is not well-documented in the literature.  
A2.3 Sample and variable definitions 
The sample is taken from the WRDS merged CRSP/Compustat files for the 
period 1980 to 2008. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-
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6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government and non-profitable (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms, because these firms may face different regulations and have capital requirements 
that may not be solely due to economic or business motives. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets (Compustat data item AT[6]) and total sales (Compustat data item 
SALE[12]) are excluded. Firms that have undergone mergers and acquisitions or have 
major changes in sales (where footnote of total sales Compustat data item SALE[12] in 
WKHILQDQFLDOVWDWHPHQWKDVWKHFRGH³$%´DUHH[FOXGHG 
Outliers for firm variables are winsorized in standard format following BKS and 
Bharath et al. (2009). Cash ratio is censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made 
equal to one, and ratio less than zero equals zero. Debt capacity is censored at the top 
tier where ratio more than one is made equal to one.9 Cash flow ratio (CFe) and net 
working capital (NWC) ratio are winsorized at the bottom 1% level. Q (market-to-book) 
ratio is winsorized at the top 1% level. The rest of the ratios (net cash flow to assets 
(CFcf), R&D to sales, R&D to assets, acquisitions to assets, industry cash flow 
volatility10, capital expenditure to assets, and logarithm of cash to net assets) are 
winsorized at both the top and bottom 1% level. Due to extreme values, gross 
investment to capital stock and net investment to total assets are winsorized at the top 
and bottom 5% level.  
Computation of variables used in the thesis is as follows. 
                                                             
9
 No negative debt capacity is reported in the sample. 
10
 Industry cash flow volatility is computed according to BKS and winsorized at the top and bottom 1% after all 
computations are performed (standard deviation of cash flow ratio and averaging of standard deviations across 
industries). Slight variation in the computation of volatility is trialled ± (1) standard deviation of cash flow is 
computed after the cash flow ratio is being treated for outliers (winsorized at the bottom 1%), then average across 
different industries are taken, or (2) standard deviation of cash flow is computed first and winsorisation is performed 
on the standard deviations, then average is taken across different industries. These variations in measurements 
produce the same qualitative results (both univariate and multivariate) and thus are not reported. As specific 
winsorisation process is not specified in previous papers, the measurement that matches previous results most closely 
is selected and used for comparison and testing purpose.  
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1. Cash holdings, CASH, (CHE[1])] equals cash and cash equivalents (marketable 
securities) reported in the balance sheet of financial statements. 
2. Debt capacity (DC) is measured as the maximum borrowing capacity of firm, 
estimated by the firm-level measure of expected asset liquidation value (less cash 
holdings) following Berger et al. (1996). Measurement of debt capacity implicitly 
assumes that it is in fact the tangibility of existing assets that matters because they 
provide collateral for total firm debt. 
Debt capacity, DC  = Tangibility/Total assets  
= [0.715*Receivables (RECT[2]) + 0.547*Inventory (INVT[3])  
+ 0.535*PPE (PPENT[8]) / (AT[6])11 
3. Unused debt capacity (UDC) is computed by netting leverage from debt capacity as 
follow. 
UDC = DC ±BKDEBT 
= DC ± [Long-term debt (DLTT[9]) + Long-term portion of current debt 
(DLC[34])]/(AT[6]) 
UDC is computed only if value of DC is available. By construction, UDC has a 
minimum value of negative one and maximum value of one.  
4. Industry cash flow volatility, INDSTDCF, measurement follows BKS and is 
computed as the standard deviation of industry cash flow to assets. First, standard 
deviation of cash flow to assets is computed for each firm-year observations with a 
minimum requirement of three observations up to the past ten years. Firms are then 
                                                             
11
 The initials beside each parenthesis represent the variable labels in CRSP/Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
database and its relevant item number in the square brackets. Many past papers used the Industrial Annual instead of 
Fundamentals Annual database, and represent data items using numbers, e.g. long term debt = Item 9 + Item 34 and 
total assets = item 6. The variable item number is no longer updated and used by CRSP and Compustat after fiscal 
year 2006 when the sample data are extracted from the Fundamentals Annual database in the Xpressfeed format. 
Relevant variable labels are documented alongside with their old data item numbers. It should be noted that after the 
change in variable identification, there are some variables which are no longer available as they are combined with 
other items in the financial statements. Similarly, there are additional new variables which were conventionally 
reported as part of the variable in the old format, now report separately as individual items. 
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divided into different industries using two-GLJLW 6,& FRGH $YHUDJH RI HDFK ILUP¶V
standard deviation of cash flow is taken each year in each industry group. Industry 
cash flow volatility is used to measure precautionary motive of cash holdings where 
firms with greater industry idiosyncratic risk hold more cash. 
5. Cash flow to assets (earnings method), CFe, is predicted to have a negative 
relationship with cash because firms with greater cash flow require less cash on hand 
for payments and investments. Following BKS, CF is measured by the following 
CFe = [Earnings(EBITDA[13]) - Interest (XINT[15]) - Tax (TXT[16])  
- Common dividend (DVC[21])] / Total assets (AT[6])  
6. Net cash flow to assets (CFcf) can be measured as follow using the cash flow 
method following Frank and Goyal (2003). There are variations to the measurement 
of cash flow in the literature and the most popular and commonly used two methods 
are chosen. 
CFcf = [Income before extraordinary items(IBC[123]) + Depreciation and 
amortization (DPC[125]) + Extra items and discontinued operations (XIDOC[124]) 
+ Deferred tax (TXDC[126]) + Equity in net loss(earnings) (ESUBC[106]) + Gains 
(loss) from sale of property, plant and equipment, and investment (SSPIC[213]) + 
Other] / Total assets (AT[6]) 
7. Q ratio measures growth opportunities of firm. Firms with greater Q ratio have more 
growth opportunities and tend to keep more cash for investments. Q ratio is also the 
market-to-book value of assets ratio following Bates et al. (2009), computed as such. 
Q = [Total assets (AT[6]) ± Book value equity (CEQ[60])  
+ Market value equity (PRCC_F[199]*CSHO[25])] / Total assets (AT[6]) 
8. Firm size (LNAT) is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets (AT[6]). 
Larger firms may hold less cash since borrowing is easy for reputable and large 
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firms. However, larger firms have greater profitability and more ability to maintain a 
larger cash pool compared to smaller firms. The latter reason is similar to 
³HFRQRPLHVRIVFDOHLQKROGLQJFDVK´%DWHVHWDO., 2009, p1999).  
9. Net working capital, NWC, is predicted to have negative relationship with cash as 
working capital represents alternative to cash holdings and is readily convertible to 
cash. NWC is computed as follows. 
NWC = Working Capital (WCAD[179]) - Cash (CHE[1]) / Total assets (AT[6]) 
10. Capital expenditure, CAPEX, measures FXUUHQWSHULRGDGGLWLRQWRILUP¶VWDQJLELOLW\
and may be used as collaterals for additional borrowings, thereby reducing the need 
to hold cash. The multiplier effect of new capital investment on a ILUP¶V GHEW
capacity is proven in Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hahn and Lee (2009). On 
the other hand, cash in the current period may be used for investments and capital 
expenses, as Riddick and Whited (2009) found cash and capital expenses to be 
positively related. CAPEX is measured using capital expenditure (CAPX[128]) to 
total assets (AT[6]). 
11. Similar to capital expenditure above, book value of debt (BKDEBT) may have both 
positive and negative relationship with cash depending on the current level of debt. 
BKDEBT is measured as follow, 
BKDEBT = Long term debt (DLTT[9]) + Debt in current liabilities (DLC[34])  
 / Total assets (AT[6]) 
12. Acquisitions to assets (ACQUI) is measured by acquisitions (AQC[129]) to total 
assets (AT[6]). Predicted sign for acquisition may be positive or negative as cash 
may be kept for acquisition purpose in the near term or cash may be used up in the 
current period for acquisition.  
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13. Dividend dummy, DIVDUM, is set equal to one when a firm issues common 
dividend (DVC[21]), and zero otherwise. Dividend payers are generally larger firms 
with lower risk and greater ability to borrow, thereby tending to hold less cash. 
However, if dividends declared are due in cash, greater cash may be maintained. 
14. Research and Development (RD_SALE) to sales is measured by research and 
development expenses (XRD) to total sales (SALE[12]). Similar to Q ratio above, 
R&D expenses have a predicted positive relationship with cash. 
15. 1HWHTXLW\LVVXHVWRWRWDODVVHWV¨(QUITY) is measured by the sale of common and 
preferred equity (SSTK[108]) less purchase of common and preferred equity 
(PRSTKC[115]) divided by total assets. 
16. 1HW GHEW LVVXHV ¨'EBT) to total assets is measured by long-term debt issue 
(DLTIS[111]) less reduction in long-term debt (DLTR[114]) divided by total assets. 
17. Gross investment (INVTMT) is computed as the ratio of investment in fixed assets 
(CAPX[128]) to beginning period capital stock (PPENT[8]) following Almeida and 
Campello (2007) and Marchica and Mura (2010). 
18. Net investment (NINVTMT) is computed as the sum of capital expenditure 
(CAPX[128]), acquisitions (AQC[129]), increase in investment (IVCH[113]) less 
sale of property plant and equipment and sale of investment (SSPIV[213]) to 
beginning period total assets (AT[6]) following Lemmon and Roberts (2010).
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CHAPTER A3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A3.1 Summary statistics  
As shown in Figure A1, from 1970 onwards cash holdings exhibit a continuous 
increasing trend until year 2008 where there is a slight dip in cash holdings, coinciding 
with the credit crisis. Campello et al. (2011) report significant use of cash by managers, 
especially for credit constrained firms, during the credit crunch. From 1950 to 1970, 
cash holdings decreased. At the same time, debt capacity remained at a fixed range until 
1980, when debt capacity started to decrease significantly. When  average cash holdings 
are computed for firms split into deciles of debt capacity, cash level monotonically 
decreases over each rank, where firms with the least debt capacity are found to hold the 
most cash, and vice versa. Figure A2 SORWV LQGLYLGXDO ILUP¶V FDVK Dnd debt capacity 
ratios; a clear triangular region is formed across the graph. Figure 2 provides strong 
evidence for the substitution effect between the two internal flexibility components and 
shows that firms almost always lie in the black triangular region of the plot, trading off 
cash and debt capacity as few firms hold large amount of cash and debt capacity at the 
same time. To prevent masking important time effects when average cash holdings are 
computed by pooling together values over the whole sample period, Figure A3 reports 
cash holdings of firms in each debt capacity quintile for each financial year. Over the 
entire sample period, firms in the top debt capacity quintile hold the least cash, and the 
trend is the same in each year. Notably, the difference in average cash holdings of each 
quintile grows over time, indicating that firms are increasingly more dispersed in terms 
of their liquidity management.  
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Figure A1 Average cash holdings and debt capacity to total assets, 1951-2008.  
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial 
(SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to total 
assets. Debt capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets; 
and unused debt capacity is debt capacity less debt only computed when firms report a positive debt capacity. Cash 
and debt capacity ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. 
 
 
Figure A2 
Figure A2 Cash holdings to assets against debt capacity to total assets across sample period, 1951-
2008. 
)LJXUH$SORWV LQGLYLGXDO ILUP¶V FDVK WR WRWDO DVVHWVUDWLR DQGGHEW FDSDFLW\ WR WRWDO DVVHWVRYHU WKHHQWLUHVDPSOH
period. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
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Figure A3 Average cash holdings in each debt capacity quintile over time, 1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by quintiles of debt capacity, with quintile 1 
having the least debt capacity and quintile 5 having the most debt capacity. Average cash holdings are computed for 
every debt capacity quintile in each financial year. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
 
To match our sample with BKS, we report cash to total assets and debt to total 
assets ratios from 1980 onwards in Table A1.12 Both cash and debt levels are shown to 
follow an increasing and decreasing trend respectively. Cash holdings peak in 2004 and 
2005 at 24%, while debt falls to its lowest level, to 19% over the same years. A 
comparable trend is shown in Figure A4 and A5, where yearly means and medians of 
cash and debt ratios are plotted along the same axis. BKS noted the trend of negative net 
debt in the recent years, where the amount of cash held by firms can more than repay the 
existing leverage. Here, negative net debt is observed from 2002 to 2007 and reverts 
back to positive in 2008 (due to the financial crisis). However, the prevalence of 
negative net debt does not, in practice, mean falling use of leverage because cash is not 
used to net off existing long-term obligations. Furthermore, net debt is seldom used to 
measure leverage in the literature because it might mask important differences between 
                                                             
12
 For comparison purposes, Table A1 and A2 only report statistics from 1980 to 2008. Statistics from 1950 to 1980 is 
reported in Appendix A-II and A-III for reference purposes.  
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debt and cash usage (Welch, 2008). While cash is used more for operations needs, debt 
is used more for investment purposes. Hence, the prevalence of negative net debt should 
not be alarming.  
Average cash flow and debt capacities ratios are reported in Table A2. Cash 
flows are measured using two methods ± earnings and cash flow methods following 
BKS and Frank and Goyal (2003) respectively. Both cash flows show a decreasing trend 
from 1980 to 2008. The lowest cash flow is recorded in 2001 and fluctuates thereafter. 
Both debt capacity and unused debt capacity show decreasing trends over the entire 
period ± debt capacity falls from 47% to 29% while the unused portion falls more than 
two fold from 21% to 6%, indicating that the fall in leverage is more than the fall in debt 
capacity.  
To identify if there is significant time varying trends, simple regressions are 
performed for cash and debt capacity with time variable as the single independent 
variable (see Table A3). In the regression of average debt capacity, the time variable has 
a significant coefficient of -0.68% and a very high R-squared of 97%, and results remain 
robust for median debt capacity. The unused portion of debt capacity also reports a 
statistically significant decreasing trend. The simple regression results show that the 
time series trend of both total and unused debt capacity over the sample period is 
statistically significant and even larger in magnitude than that of cash holdings. Finally, 
to test whether debt capacity has a significant influence over cash in the same period 
while controlling for time factor, cash is regressed against debt capacity and time. 
Results are summarised in Table A3. Debt capacity is an important determinant of cash 
holdings over time and the time variable measured in years remains significant at 
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approximately similar coefficient values. R-squared increases for both mean and median 
cash holdings regressions. This shows the existence of (an)other important factor(s) 
influencing the level of cash holding kept by firms. Even though predictions are not to 
be made from these simple regressions, the results show that there exists an important 
relationship between debt capacity and cash holdings not subsumed by the time factor. 
Simple correlation coefficients reported in Table A4 confirm the highly negative 
relationship between cash and debt capacity of more than 60% - this is even larger than 
the relationship between total and unused debt capacity, and between debt capacity and 
leverage. Although debt capacity is an indication of the level of debt firms have, firms in 
normal times will not utilise all or even a substantial portion of the total capacity due to 
the fear of credit rating adjustments (Kisgen, 2006) and the intention of maintaining 
credit rating and spare capacity for use when opportunities arise (Graham and Harvey, 
2001). Alternatively, the relationship between credit line and cash is more important 
EHFDXVHLWDIIHFWVILUPV¶DELOLW\WRLQYHVW, since firms with low credit capacity are forced 
to substitute cash savings for investments (Campello et al., 2011), which has an ultimate 
impact on future firm value. This partly explains the high negative correlation between 
cash and debt capacity as firms set the level of cash according to expected debt capacity 
in each period. On the other hand, total and unused debt capacities have positive 
correlations with both measures of cash flow, confirming the findings of Sufi (2009), 
where cash flow adds SRVLWLYHO\ WR ILUPV¶FUHGLW OLQHV $V H[SHFWHGGHEWFDSDFLW\DQG 
cash holdings are highly correlated over time with correlation coefficients of more than 
0.80 with their own lagged values. Whilst debt capacity and cash flows are correlated 
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over time, the correlations are significantly lower compared to debt capacity and cash 
holdings, due to the high volatility of cash flow. 
 
Table A1 Average cash and debt variables compared to Bates et al. (2009) 
This table compares the CRSP/Compustat sample used in this work with Bates et al. (2009) Compustat sample. The 
number of observations and proportions are reported in a similar manner for ease of comparison. All public firms (i.e. 
share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales 
are excluded. Cash holdings is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to total assets; and debt is the sum 
of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Cash and debt ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio 
more than one is made equal to one. 
  Bates et al. (2009) Compustat sample   CRSP/Compustat sample 
Year N 
Mean cash 
holdings Mean debt   N 
Mean cash 
holdings 
Mean debt 
ratio 
1980 3519 0.105 0.269 
 
3394 0.103 0.2645 
1981 3748 0.121 0.253 
 
3599 0.118 0.2519 
1982 3752 0.121 0.261 
 
3661 0.119 0.2594 
1983 4120 0.159 0.246 
 
3945 0.153 0.2408 
1984 4172 0.14 0.254 
 
4018 0.136 0.2517 
1985 4127 0.142 0.27 
 
3985 0.139 0.2651 
1986 4261 0.157 0.273 
 
4092 0.155 0.269 
1987 4407 0.156 0.273 
 
4193 0.153 0.271 
1988 
 
4237 0.141 0.28 
 
4065 0.140 0.275 
1989 4095 0.138 0.286 
 
3933 0.136 0.281 
1990 4042 0.134 0.282 
 
3885 0.132 0.276 
1991 4137 0.155 0.259 
 
3962 0.154 0.251 
1992 4307 0.163 0.245 
 
4107 0.161 0.232 
1993 4713 0.171 0.225 
 
4474 0.169 0.220 
1994 4985 0.155 0.23 
 
4757 0.153 0.224 
1995 5165 0.171 0.23 
 
4985 0.167 0.225 
1996 5568 0.193 0.222 
 
5344 0.189 0.217 
1997 5605 0.191 0.236 
 
5425 0.190 0.228 
1998 5263 0.178 0.289 
 
5102 0.176 0.247 
1999 4971 0.194 0.247 
 
4898 0.195 0.241 
2000 4947 0.208 0.242 
 
4698 0.205 0.227 
2001 4540 0.214 0.268 
 
4258 0.217 0.227 
2002 4233 0.214 0.258 
 
3925 0.218 0.216 
2003 3992 0.227 0.235 
 
3652 0.231 0.201 
2004 3693 0.24 0.225 
 
3583 0.239 0.189 
2005 3549 0.237 0.219 
 
3493 0.238 0.187 
2006 3297 0.232 0.221 
 
3404 0.233 0.193 
2007  -   -   -  
 
3256 0.230 0.203 
2008  -   -   -  
 
2568 0.210 0.232 
Average 4350 0.172 0.252   4092 0.153 0.239 
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Table A2 Summary statistics of cash flow and debt capacities ratios 
This table reports the summary statistics of cash flows and debt capacities. Cash flow computed using earnings method (CFe) is the ratio of the sum of earnings less interest, tax 
and common dividend to total assets computed according to Bates et al. (2009). Net cash flow computed based on cash flow method (CFcf) is the ratio of net cash flow to total 
assets, computed according to Frank and Goyal (2009). Debt capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets; and unused 
debt capacity is debt capacity less debt only computed when firms report a positive debt capacity. Cash flows (CFe and CFcf) are winsorized at the bottom 1%. Debt capacity ratio 
is censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
  
CFe : Earnings method              
(Bates et al., 2009)   
CFcf: Cash flow method           
(Frank and Goyal, 2009)   DC   UDC 
Year Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std 
1980 0.047 0.065 0.115 
 
0.109 0.112 0.175 
 
0.471 0.496 0.098 
 
0.212 0.240 0.191 
1981 0.032 0.059 0.134 
 
0.095 0.110 0.154 
 
0.459 0.488 0.106 
 
0.212 0.237 0.189 
1982 0.012 0.049 0.157 
 
0.098 0.105 0.776 
 
0.452 0.478 0.104 
 
0.197 0.227 0.199 
1983 0.016 0.052 0.146 
 
0.092 0.104 0.407 
 
0.430 0.462 0.119 
 
0.194 0.230 0.203 
1984 0.005 0.057 0.188 
 
0.070 0.106 0.211 
 
0.438 0.469 0.116 
 
0.191 0.226 0.208 
1985 -0.015 0.050 0.239 
 
0.058 0.099 0.264 
 
0.430 0.460 0.119 
 
0.169 0.211 0.225 
1986 -0.016 0.047 0.229 
 
0.076 0.098 0.272 
 
0.414 0.446 0.126 
 
0.151 0.188 0.230 
1987 -0.007 0.050 0.216 
 
0.067 0.096 0.292 
 
0.412 0.443 0.128 
 
0.148 0.190 0.232 
1988 -0.005 0.055 0.230 
 
0.033 0.081 0.225 
 
0.416 0.445 0.126 
 
0.143 0.187 0.239 
1989 -0.006 0.052 0.232 
 
0.030 0.078 0.220 
 
0.417 0.448 0.125 
 
0.138 0.175 0.237 
1990 0.002 0.054 0.231 
 
0.038 0.079 0.229 
 
0.416 0.447 0.125 
 
0.141 0.179 0.239 
1991 0.009 0.054 0.193 
 
0.041 0.078 0.184 
 
0.401 0.432 0.133 
 
0.150 0.185 0.229 
1992 0.014 0.064 0.203 
 
0.043 0.085 0.192 
 
0.391 0.423 0.135 
 
0.160 0.192 0.221 
1993 0.008 0.065 0.228 
 
0.032 0.084 0.218 
 
0.382 0.411 0.135 
 
0.164 0.189 0.214 
1994 0.007 0.071 0.240 
 
0.033 0.090 0.230 
 
0.387 0.413 0.131 
 
0.164 0.196 0.218 
1995 0.012 0.069 0.220 
 
0.039 0.085 0.205 
 
0.377 0.406 0.137 
 
0.154 0.185 0.220 
1996 -0.003 0.067 0.246 
 
0.027 0.084 0.236 
 
0.363 0.391 0.141 
 
0.148 0.176 0.220 
1997 -0.021 0.065 0.282 
 
0.010 0.081 0.258 
 
0.358 0.382 0.140 
 
0.131 0.168 0.236 
1998 -0.027 0.064 0.307 
 
0.007 0.077 0.270 
 
0.355 0.378 0.137 
 
0.109 0.149 0.246 
1999 -0.027 0.055 0.277 
 
0.007 0.070 0.241 
 
0.333 0.357 0.147 
 
0.094 0.124 0.239 
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Table A2 Summary statistics of cash flow and debt capacities ratios (continued) 
  
CFe : Earnings method              
(Bates et al., 2009)   
CFcf: Cash flow method           
(Frank and Goyal, 2009)   DC   UDC 
Year Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std 
2000 -0.060 0.049 0.330 
 
-0.016 0.064 0.285 
 
0.320 0.342 0.152 
 
0.095 0.121 0.235 
2001 -0.073 0.046 0.363 
 
-0.036 0.060 0.326 
 
0.310 0.325 0.148 
 
0.083 0.117 0.243 
2002 -0.041 0.052 0.302 
 
-0.004 0.068 0.270 
 
0.309 0.323 0.146 
 
0.095 0.125 0.237 
2003 0.000 0.059 0.231 
 
0.035 0.077 0.200 
 
0.299 0.307 0.146 
 
0.099 0.126 0.231 
2004 0.008 0.068 0.233 
 
0.040 0.085 0.215 
 
0.293 0.299 0.147 
 
0.105 0.131 0.233 
2005 0.001 0.065 0.244 
 
0.032 0.084 0.224 
 
0.289 0.292 0.145 
 
0.103 0.134 0.235 
2006 -0.014 0.063 0.277 
 
0.035 0.088 0.228 
 
0.289 0.292 0.146 
 
0.096 0.126 0.239 
2007 -0.018 0.059 0.267 
 
0.033 0.086 0.223 
 
0.285 0.286 0.146 
 
0.083 0.121 0.245 
2008 -0.029 0.064 0.330   0.021 0.087 0.288   0.293 0.295 0.143   0.061 0.106 0.259 
Average 0.012 0.062 0.216   0.051 0.092 0.263   0.399 0.438 0.138   0.162 0.196 0.223 
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Figure A4 Mean cash and debt ratios compared with Bates et al. (2009). 
The figure plots the mean statistics reported in Table A1 for cash holdings and debt ratio from 1980 to 2008 with 
the statistics from Bates et al. (2009). Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure A5 Median cash and debt ratios compared with Bates et al. (2009). 
The figure plots the median statistics reported in Table A1 for cash holdings and debt ratio from 1980 to 2008 with 
the statistics from Bates et al. (2009). Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
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Table A3 Summary results of regressions of cash against debt capacity and time 
This table summarises the results of simple pooled OLS performed on cash and debt capacities with time variable 
measured in years from 1980 to 2008. Regressions are performed as follow: Cashit = Timeit İit , Debt capacityit = 
Timeit  İit, and Unused debt capacityit = Timeit  İit. Mean and median of cash and debt capacity ratios are 
computed in each financial year before OLS regressions are performed. Sample and variable specifications are 
provided in Chapter A2.3. 
Dependent variable Coefficient of time 
variable 
Coefficient of debt 
capacity 
Adjusted R-
squared 
Mean of cash to total assets 0.0045*** - 89% 
Median of cash to total assets 
0.0029*** - 67% 
    
Mean debt capacity to total assets -0.0068*** - 97% 
Median debt capacity to total assets -0.0079*** - 96% 
    
Mean unused debt capacity to total assets -0.0045*** - 85% 
Median unused debt capacity to total assets -0.0046*** - 86% 
    
Mean of cash to total assets -0.0044*** -1.3015*** 98% 
Median of cash to total assets -0.0058*** -1.1020*** 90% 
Cash to total assets -0.0030*** -1.0864*** 50% 
*** Indicates significance at 1% level (p-value of less than 0.01) 
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Table A4 Correlations of key variables from 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of the key financial flexibility variables. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.All 
correlation coefficients exhibit statistical significance at 1% (two-tail) test level. 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 DC UDC LAGDC LAGUDC BKDEBT CASH LAG CASH Cfe LAG CFe CFcf LAG CFcf IND STDCF 
DC 1                       
UDC 0.408 1           
LAGDC 0.889 0.350 1          
LAGUDC 0.370 0.830 0.417 1         
BKDEBT 0.232 -0.794 0.204 -0.647 1        
CASH -0.699 -0.048 -0.613 -0.036 -0.415 1       
LAGCASH -0.607 -0.021 -0.710 -0.064 -0.373 0.844 1      
Cfe 0.260 0.220 0.290 0.170 -0.059 -0.280 -0.323 1     
LAGCFe 0.259 0.204 0.280 0.216 -0.048 -0.284 -0.302 0.705 1    
CFcf 0.194 0.176 0.223 0.116 -0.054 -0.201 -0.253 0.698 0.509 1   
LAGCFcf 0.227 0.190 0.245 0.202 -0.051 -0.245 -0.255 0.613 0.812 0.514 1  
INDSTDCF -0.363 -0.107 -0.366 -0.110 -0.132 0.324 0.330 -0.200 -0.208 -0.164 -0.201 1 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 DC UDC LAGDC LAGUDC BKDEBT CASH LAG CASH Cfe LAG CFe CFcf LAG CFcf IND STDCF 
DC 1            
UDC 0.416 1           
LAGDC 0.879 0.348 1          
LAGUDC 0.368 0.831 0.421 1         
BKDEBT 0.310 -0.673 0.281 -0.555 1        
CASH -0.614 0.044 -0.527 0.045 -0.545 1       
LAGCASH -0.523 0.070 -0.621 0.032 -0.497 0.809 1      
Cfe 0.201 0.296 0.199 0.241 -0.093 -0.137 -0.152 1     
LAGCFe 0.168 0.260 0.206 0.297 -0.092 -0.120 -0.139 0.750 1    
CFcf 0.170 0.297 0.173 0.231 -0.116 -0.072 -0.101 0.830 0.653 1   
LAGCFcf 0.145 0.265 0.173 0.298 -0.112 -0.066 -0.072 0.654 0.823 0.702 1  
INDSTDCF -0.364 -0.088 -0.365 -0.090 -0.224 0.308 0.309 -0.132 -0.135 -0.166 -0.168 1 
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A3.2 Analysing the increasing cash holdings trend 
A3.2.1 Firm size 
As in BKS, we divide firms into quintiles of firm size and industry cash flow 
volatility, and IPO cohorts to examine whether the increase in cash holdings is pervasive 
across different characteristics of firms. Further analysis is performed to determine 
whether debt capacity influences the relationship between cash holdings and the three 
firm characteristics above, by dividing firms into five quintiles in each financial year 
according to their debt capacities.  
First, firms are divided according to firm size measured by the book value of 
total assets at the close of each financial year. Small firms are expected to have higher 
cash-on-hand due to the greater difficulty faced in borrowing and issuing bonds or 
equity in the capital market. This is shown in Figure A6 where firms with the lowest 
total assets consistently have greater cash holdings over the sample period. Smaller 
firms (in the bottom two quintiles) increase cash holdings from approximately 10% cash 
to total assets in 1970 to more than 30% in 2008 (more than three-fold increase); the 
largest firms hold about 6% of cash to total assets in 1970 and gradually increase cash-
on-hand to the peak of 12% in 2004 and 10% in 2008 (less than two-fold increase). This 
suggests that firms are increasingly more dispersed in their liquidity management, i.e. 
decreased herding behaviour over time. To find out whether the same trend is observed 
for firms with different levels of debt capacity, firms are then divided into five groups 
according to level of debt capacity. In each group, firms are ranked according to firm 
size in each financial year. Figure A7 reports the trends for five subsamples. The 
widening gap between cash holdings of large and small firms is observed for all five 
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groups but with varying degree. Firms in the lowest debt capacity quintile (Q_DC=1) 
show greatest dispersion - from 10% cash for small firms to 25% cash for large firms in 
1970, to 20% to 60% in 2008. This dispersion decreases monotonically and firms in the 
highest debt capacity quintile show only mild change in cash holdings ranging from 3% 
to 5% in the 1970s and 3% to 8% in 2000s. Even the smallest firm size quintile in the 
largest debt capacity group (Q_DC=5) had a peak of only 8% cash holdings in 2005. 
The trends observed in Figure A7 show that relationship between cash holdings and firm 
size varies when debt capacity changes. 
 
Figure A6 Average cash holdings in each size quintile, 1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by firm size quintiles in each financial year, with 
quintile 1 having the lowest total assets and quintile 5 having the most total assets. Firm size is measured by the 
logarithm of book value of total assets in the previous financial year. Average cash holdings are computed for every 
size quintile in each financial year. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
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Figure A7 Average cash holdings in each size quintile according to debt capacity groups, 1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by firm size quintiles in each debt capacity 
groups. Firms are first ranked and divided into five groups according to their current period debt capacity level. Debt 
capacity group 1 (Q_DC=1) represents firms with the lowest debt capacity and group 5 (Q_DC=5) represents firms 
with the highest debt capacity in each financial year. For each debt capacity group, average cash holdings are 
computed for every size quintile in each financial year, with quintile 1 having the lowest firm size and quintile 5 
having the largest firm size. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
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A3.2.2 Idiosyncratic risk (the IPO effect)  
Firms with varying level of idiosyncratic risks hold different amounts of cash for 
precautionary purposes. It is observed that the change in nature of newly listed firms has 
been a major factor in the increasing trend of cash holdings over time. To investigate 
whether newly listed firms have higher idiosyncratic risk (and pay fewer dividends) and 
hold more cash (Brown and Kapadia, 2007), firms are divided into different IPO cohorts 
according to their listing year.13  As observed in BKS, firms in the more recent IPO 
cohorts are found to have greater average cash holdings and the increase in average cash 
holdings is monotonic to the listing date. While cash holdings increase gradually over 
the sample period, the increase is significantly sharper after year 2000. Cash holdings, 
however, peak at 2005 and fall sharply thereafter. The fall in cash holdings is more 
prominent for younger firms in the later cohorts.  BKS noted that, at the same lifecycle 
stage, firms in the later cohorts hold more cash than firms in earlier cohorts. Firms in the 
later cohorts, however, use up much more cash than earlier cohorts, with the exception 
of the 1975 cohort. On the whole, younger firms in the later cohorts tend to have more 
fluctuations in their cash holdings ± suggesting that younger firms in the later cohort 
utilise cash more than older firms in the earlier cohort, while older firms may rely more 
on cash flow, borrowings or equity issues for financing. Alternatively, differences in 
cash levels may also be due to greater investment opportunities for younger firms, and 
greater stability in cash flow for older firms. 
                                                             
13
 IPO cohort classification follows that of Bates et al. (2009). Firms with IPO listing before 1970 are classified under 
the 1960s cohort. 1970s cohort includes firms listed from 1970 to 1974, and 1975s cohort includes firms listed from 
1975 to 1980, and henceforth for every 5-year period up to the 2000s cohort that includes firms listed from 2000 to 
2005. Firms listed in the final three years of the sample are not considered as they are within the first three years of 
IPO and have more opportunity and access to greater cash holdings that potentially bias the cash holdings trend 
positively. 
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Figure A8 Average cash holdings in each IPO cohort, 1980-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by IPO cohorts according to Bates et al. (2009). 
Average cash holdings are computed for each IPO cohort in each financial year. Sample and variable specifications 
are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
 
The increasing trend in cash holdings may be due to a change in nature of newly 
listed firms and changing industry proportions over time. To identify whether the 
change in cash holdings is due to the changing nature of assets within firms (instead of 
across firms through IPO cohorts), firms are divided into five quintiles of debt capacity. 
In each debt capacity subsample, firms are then divided into different IPO cohorts 
according to their listing year and average cash holdings are computed for each cohort in 
each year. Figure A9 reports the IPO trend in the five subsamples of debt capacity. It is 
clear that the consistent trend observed in Figure A8 is no longer present after debt 
capacity is considered, and the relationship between idiosyncratic risks (measured using 
IPO listing date) and cash holdings breaks down. This suggests that increase in cash 
holdings is probably due to the changing nature of firms internally and across all 
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industries, instead of the greater proportions of firms in specific industries. For instance, 
manufacturing firms now hold fewer fixed assets but rely more on leased assets 
compared to the past and the change in composition of assets within firms influences the 
level of cash holdings held by firms.   
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Figure A9 Average cash holdings in each IPO cohort according to debt capacity groups, 1951-2008. 
The figure summarises the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by IPO cohorts in each debt capacity 
groups. Firms are first ranked and divided into five groups according to their current period debt capacity level. Debt 
capacity group 1 (Q_DC=1) represents firms with the lowest debt capacity and group 5 (Q_DC=5) represents firms 
with the highest debt capacity in each financial year. For each debt capacity group, average cash are computed for 
each IPO cohort in each financial year. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.  
Part A  Chapter A3. Descriptive statistics 
52 
 
A3.2.3 Industry effects  
The increasing trend in cash holdings is attributed to the change in nature of 
newly listed firms, but the increase in proportion of technology firms is not the driving 
force of the increased cash holdings {and decreased leverage} (Bates et al., 2009). BKS 
divided the sample into two groups and examines only technology and non-technology 
firms broadly. To ensure no industry effect is influencing the trend of cash holdings (and 
debt capacity) over time, firms are split into ten industry groups following Campello et 
al. (2011). Proportions of the ten industries are charted in Figure A10 with the top graph 
showing the proportions of all ten industries for the entire sample period. Since 
manufacturing firms (IND=2) make up a substantial portion of the entire firm sample, 
these are taken out and plotted separately. The bottom two charts start from year 1952 as 
the small number (34) of firms in 1951 may be unrepresentative of firm proportions. 
Some important trends are noted. First, the proportion of manufacturing firms falls 
sharply from 78% to 48% from the 1950s to the 2000s. Second, the proportion of 
service and software/biotech firms increases sharply from 1960 and 1980 onwards. 
Third, there is a spike in the proportion of mining firms in the early 1980s but the 
percentage returns to its original level in the mid 1980s. While there are significant 
changes in industry proportions over time, the amounts of cash held in each industry are 
not known. Figures A11 and A12 then plot the average cash holdings and debt capacity 
of firms in each industry group for each year. Considerable increase in cash is noted for 
software and biotechnology firms from 10% in the 1980s to 45% in the 2000s. This 
coincides with the largest decrease (from 48% to 16% in the period 1980 to 2008) in 
debt capacity for the same industry group in Figure A12. For the other industries, a  
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Figure A10 Industry proportions over time, 1951-2008. 
The figure summarises the proportion of number of firms in each industry to total number of firms in each financial 
year. Firms are first sorted into ten industry groups adapted from Campello et al. (2010). Industry groups are sorted 
according to their SIC codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 
5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, 9=Others, and 10=Utilities firms. Sample and 
variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.  
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Figure A11 Average cash holdings in each industry group, 1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms in each industry group in each financial year. Firms are 
first sorted into ten industry groups adapted from Campello et al. (2010). Industry groups are sorted according to their 
SIC codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 
6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, 9=Others, and 10=Utilities firms. Cash holdings is the ratio of 
cash holdings and marketable securities to total assets. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter 
A2.3.   
 
 
Figure A12 Average debt capacity in each industry group, 1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average debt capacity to total assets ratio for firms in each industry group in each financial year. 
Firms are first sorted into ten industry groups adapted from Campello et al. (2010). Industry groups are sorted 
according to their SIC codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 
5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, 9=Others, and 10=Utilities firms. Debt 
capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets. Sample and 
variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
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general increase in cash and decrease in debt capacity is observed, and there is an 
additional trend of increased dispersion of firms in different industries. This increased 
dispersion is also noted when firms are divided into different debt capacity quintiles. 
To ensure the increase in cash and decrease in debt capacity are not driven by 
software and biotechnology firms, Figure A13 shows the average cash and debt capacity 
computed every year for sample of firms without industry group 6. Averages of the 
entire sample are included for purpose of comparison. There is no significant difference 
in trends of both firm liquidity characteristics when industry group 6 is excluded. To 
investigate the significance of change in cash over time across industries, the mean of 
cash is regressed against time variable for each industry group and a positive significant 
estimate for time factor is reported only for half of the industry groups (not reported in 
detail here), i.e. increase in cash holdings is statistically significant for only half of the 
industry groups.14 While BKS did not find industry effect the main driver of cash 
holdings over time, and all firms (industry group 1 to 9) can be pooled together for 
further tests, the same is not found here and consideration for fixed firm and industry 
effects is suggested for subsequent multivariate tests. 
7R XQGHUVWDQG EHWWHU WKH LQGXVWU\ LQIOXHQFH RQ ILUPV¶ OLTXLGLW\ PDQDJHPHQW
Table A5 reports average statistics of key variables across the ten industries. A negative 
relationship between cash and debt capacity is evident in the statistics where utilities 
firms have the largest debt capacity and hold the least cash, and software and 
biotechnology firms have the least debt capacity and the most cash. The same trend is 
                                                             
14
 Mean of cash is computed yearly for each industry group. Time variable is measured as the number of years from 
the start of the sample period, 1980 (e.g. Financial year 1980 and 1981 will have Time variable equals to 0 and 1 
respectively).  Yearly means of cash are regressed against time variable for each industry group.  Estimated 
coefficients for time variable are found to be insignificant in Industry 1, 8, 9 and 10, and negative in Industry 3. The 
proportion of firms in the above mentioned industries is about 35% of the total number of firms (43,605 out of 
124,662). 
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reported for the other industries. Finally, to show that debt capacity used here is a good 
proxy for credit line (credit line is a subset of total debt capacity), statistics for year 
2008 is reported in Table A6 to match with Campello et al. (2011) sample. Similar to 
Campello et al. (2011), substantial industry variations are identified in Table A6. 
Specifically, the previous authors highlighted that almost all (92%) the transportation 
firms have lines of credit while only half (52%) of healthcare firms have such 
committed credit, and the corresponding cash policies follow the level of lines of credit 
negatively.15 Similar to the survey results, transportation firms are found to hold the 
least cash because they have one of the largest levels of unused debt capacity. Retailers 
and wholesalers are also found to exhibit similar liquidity policies as transport firms. 
Conversely, firms in the software and biotechnology sectors are found to hold 
significantly high levels of cash (44% of total assets) as they have the lowest debt 
capacities. Our results correspond to previous survey results where software and 
biotechnology sectors have the second largest cash savings and least credit lines. Debt 
capacity in our sample here may potentially be a good proxy for lines of credit because a 
similar trend and relationship with cash policy is observed. Substantial industry 
variation is evident and the substitution effect between cash and both debt capacities is 
present after controlling for industry. It is predicted that substitution effects between the 
two internal flexibility variables across industries may not be equal. Further multivariate 
tests and results are reported in Chapter A4 onwards. 
                                                             
15
 Transportation firms hold the least cash (5.7%) while healthcare firms have cash savings that are almost three-fold 
(16.9%) of the former. 
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Figure A13 Average cash holdings and debt capacity over time with industry group 6 excluded, 
1951-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio and average debt capacity to total assets ratio for firms all firms 
and sample with industry group 6 excluded. Industry group 6 includes firms in software and biotechnology sector. 
Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.   
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Table A5 Descriptive statistics of key variables across industries 
This table reports the summary statistics of key flexibility variables across ten industries. Sample and variable 
specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3. 
FY1980-2008 Pooled statistics 
IND TYPE SIC Code N CASH CFe CFcf DC UDC BKDEBT 
1 Retail/Wholesale 4000-5999 14977 0.102 0.036 0.068 0.425 0.162 0.264 
2 Manufacturing 2000-3999 60739 0.172 -0.005 0.034 0.386 0.166 0.220 
3 Mining 1000-1499 6702 0.115 0.014 0.103 0.436 0.154 0.283 
4 Transportation 4000-4799 3221 0.106 0.055 0.095 0.420 0.106 0.317 
5 Communication 4800-4899 3712 0.131 -0.023 0.034 0.282 -0.125 0.407 
6 Software/Biotech 
5045, 5734, 
7372, 8731, 
2836 7895 0.406 -0.141 -0.085 0.232 0.111 0.121 
7 Services 7000-8999 15287 0.193 -0.002 0.042 0.328 0.099 0.235 
8 Healthcare 8000-8099 2630 0.149 0.024 0.070 0.332 0.024 0.307 
9 Others 
All others 
(0100-0999, 
1500-1799) 3536 0.143 -0.054 0.021 0.385 0.115 0.293 
10 Utilities 4900-4999 6002 0.041 0.032 0.073 0.440 0.076 0.365 
 
Table A6 Comparison of descriptive statistics of key variables across industries for 2008  
This table compares the CRSP/Compustat sample used in this thesis with Campello et al. (2009) Compustat sample. 
Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.   
  
Campello et al. (2009) survey 
statistics before crisis* 
 
Current sample 
 
IND   
Proportion of 
firms with LC 
Credit 
Lines Cash   DC UDC Cash SIC Code 
1 Retail/Wholesale 83% 0.303 0.090 
 
0.370 0.082 0.109 4000-5999 
2 Manufacturing 87% 0.224 0.083 
 
0.303 -0.393 0.216 2000-3999 
3 Mining 78% 0.168 0.188 
 
0.409 -0.130 0.156 1000-1499 
4 Transportation 92% 0.207 0.057 
 
0.382 0.020 0.103 4000-4799 
5 Communication 60% 0.290 0.109 
 
0.261 -0.289 0.129 4800-4899 
6 Software/Biotech 54% 0.168 0.152 
 
0.161 -0.475 0.444 5045, 5734, 7372, 8731, 2836 
7 Services 78% 0.278 0.121 
 
0.261 -1.071 0.215 7000-8999 
8 Healthcare 52% 0.291 0.169   0.261 -0.071 0.155 8000-8099 
*General trend of statistics is the same after crisis and thus not reported 
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A3.2.4 Idiosyncratic risk (industry cash flow volatility) 
Using a more direct measure of idiosyncratic risk, Figure A14 plots the average 
cash holdings of firms sorted according to their specific industry cash flow volatilit ies. 
Firms with higher industry cash flow volatility are expected to hold more cash due to 
greater difficulty in estimating future cash flow and access to external funds. Following 
BKS, firms are sorted according to the level of industry cash flow volatility over the 
entire sample period 1980 to 2008 (i.e. sorting is not performed every financial year). 
However, as the volatility level varies substantially over the sample period16, sorting is 
performed over two periods ± before and after 1990. Firms in the top volatility quintile 
are reported to be more than half in proportion to the entire sample and comparable with 
BKS.17 The cash holdings trend shown in Figure A14 is similar to BKS where firms 
with higher idiosyncratic risks (i.e. higher industry cash flow volatility) hold more cash, 
and this trend decreases monotonically across the five quintiles. To ensure the trend 
observed is not due to the way firms are divided, volatility quintiles are computed in 
each financial year, and average cash is computed for each quintile and plotted against 
time (see Figure A15). The overall trend remains where firms with greater idiosyncratic 
risk hold more cash, with the exception of years before 1985 and year 2002. Before 
1985, the third and fourth quintile of firms hold more cash than the top (fifth) quintile, 
while in year 2002, the position of the third and fourth quintile is switched. Although the 
two exceptions do not affect the overall influence of idiosyncratic risk on cash holdings, 
                                                             
16
 Industry cash flow volatility in the top quintile (value at the 80th percentile is 5.0%) in 1980 belongs to the lowest 
quintile in 1990 (value at the 20th percentile is 5.9%).  
17
 Average cash holdings according to industry cash flow volatility quintiles sorted over the entire sample (i.e. non-
truncated criteria) are reported in Appendix A-I. General trend remains the same with the exception of the 1980s 
where there are no firms in the top volatility quintile before 1983. The cash holdings pattern before 1988 is disordered 
and not consistent with expectations. 
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it is important to note the sensitivity of the risk-cash relationship to sorting and sub-
sampling.  
To identify whether the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and cash is 
consistent over the other measure of flexibility, firms are divided into five groups 
according to their level of debt capacity. Average cash is plotted for each volatility 
quintile of firms over time in each debt capacity group (see Figure A16). While the 
bottom two quintiles of firms (firms with lower volatility) consistently hold the least 
cash over the five debt capacity groups, the trend for the rest of the quintiles is not 
obvious and the positive risk-cash relationship is not robust after debt capacity is taken 
into account.  
On the whole, the analyses above show that the selected two important 
determinants of cash (firm size and idiosyncratic risk) exhibit positive influence on cash 
holdings. However, once debt capacity is considered, positive relationships do not hold 
for all firms in the sample. Furthermore, it is found that although industry affects the 
level of cash held by firms, no single industry is the main driver of the increasing trend 
in cash over time. Conversely, the negative relationship between cash and debt capacity 
is observed even when firms are divided into different industries. This supports the 
hypothesis that industries dictate the nature of assets held by firms; and the nature of 
assets determine the amount of debt capacity owned by firms and thereby directly 
control the amount of cash held. 
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Figure A14 Average cash holdings in each industry cash flow volatility quintile, 1980-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by industry cash flow volatility quintiles, with 
quintile 1 having the lowest volatility and quintile 5 having the highest volatility. Average cash holdings are 
computed for every volatility quintile in each financial year. Industry cash flow volatility is measured as the average 
of standard deviation of cash flow of firms for the past 3 to 10 years in each industry sorted by two digit SIC code. 
Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.   
 
 
Figure A15 Average cash holdings by industry cash flow volatility quintiles sorted each financial 
year, 1980-2008. 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by industry cash flow volatility quintiles in each 
financial year, with quintile 1 having the lowest volatility and quintile 5 having the highest volatility. Volatility 
sorting is done each financial year and firms are divided into 5 groups each year. Average cash holdings are computed 
for every volatility quintile in each financial year. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.   
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Figure A16 Average cash holdings in each industry cash flow quintile according to debt capacity 
groups, 1951-2008 
The figure plots the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by industry cash flow volatility quintiles, with 
quintile 1 having the lowest volatility and quintile 5 having the highest volatility. Firms are first ranked and divided 
into five groups according to their current period debt capacity level. Debt capacity group 1 (Q_DC=1) represents 
firms with the lowest debt capacity and group 5 (Q_DC=5) represents firms with the highest debt capacity. For each 
debt capacity group, average cash holdings are computed for each industry cash flow volatility quintile in each 
financial year. Sample and variable specifications are provided in Chapter A2.3.  
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CHAPTER A4. THE DETERMINANTS OF CASH 
HOLDINGS 
A4.1 Cash model specifications 
In order to examine the interaction between various firm characteristics and cash 
holdings, the following base cash model is adapted from Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999). Potential determinants of cash are based on the transactional and 
precautionary theory of cash. BKS use the model to identify major determinants of cash 
holdings and to test whether there is a shift in the demand for cash holdings. Here, the 
model is adapted to measure the impact of debt capacity on cash holdings demand curve 
intercept and slope.  
For comparability with previous results, the base model (a) is estimated from 
1980 to 2006 using nine different regression models. Regression estimates are reported 
in Table A7. The rest of the models uses sample from 1980 to 2008.  
Cashi,t  FĮ1INDSTDCFi,t Į2Qi,t Į3LNATi,t  Į4CFei,t Į5NWCi,t Į6CAPEXi,t 
Į7BKDEBTi,t Į8RD_SALEi,t Į9DIVDUMi,t Į10ACQUIi,t İi    (a) 
  
In the modified cash model, debt capacity is added to the base model and 
estimated using the same period and same methods to compare the results with model 
(a) (results are reported in Table A7). 
Cashi,t  FĮ1DCi,t Į2INDSTDCFi,t Į3Qi,t Į4LNATi,t  Į5CFei,t Į6NWCi,t  
Į7CAPEXi,t Į8BKDEBTi,t Į9RD_SALEi,t Į10DIVDUMi,t Į11ACQUIi,t İi (b) 
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To avoid potential multicollinearity problem, estimation is repeated with NWC 
and Capex excluded and subsequent industry cash flow volatility is excluded as 
follow.18 
Cashi,t  FĮ1DCi,t Į2INDSTDCFi,t Į3Qi,t Į4LNATi,t  Į5CFei,t Į6BKDEBTi,t   
Į7RD_SALEi,t Į8DIVDUMi,t Į9ACQUIi,t İi  (c) 
 
Cashi,t  FĮ1DCi,t Į2Qi,t Į3LNAT i,t  Į4CFei,t Į5BKDEBTi,t Į6RD_SALEi,t + 
Į7DIVDUMi,t Į8ACQUIi,t İi  (d) 
 
To test whether previous period industry cash flow volatility and debt capacity 
have significant impact on current period cash holdings, model (c) is repeated with all 
independent variable lagged one period. It is expected that the previous period debt 
capDFLW\ KDV VLPLODU QHJDWLYH LPSDFWRQ FXUUHQWSHULRG¶V FDVK KROGLQJV EXWRI D ORZHU
magnitude. 
Cashi,t  FĮ1DCi,t-1 Į2INDSTDCFi,t-1 Į3Qi,t-1 Į4LNATi,t-1  Į5CFei,t-1  
Į6BKDEBTi,t-1 Į7RD_SALEi,t-1 Į8DIVDUMi,t-1 Į9ACQUIi,t-1 İi  (e) 
 
As industry cash flow volatility and debt capacity are highly correlated with each 
other, the two computationally different ratios potentially measure a common factor and 
influence cash holdings in a similar respect, resulting in a positive bias in the above 
models (a), (b), (c) and (e). To control the effect of one variable on the other, the base 
model is orthogonalized to differentiate the influence of the two variables on cash 
holdings. The extent to which both variables are measuring the same component is 
                                                             
18
 To test the severity of multicollinearity problem, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is computed based on models 
(b) to (d) using OLS regression. A VIF of 1 means that there is no correlation among the xth predictor and the 
remaining predictor variables. The largest VIF recorded from the modified cash model (b) is 1.81 (for DC), indicating 
no serious multicollinearity problem even though the standard error for the coefficient of DC is mildly inflated. 
Excluding NWC and CAPEX in model (c) reduces the VIF by a fair proportion to 1.45, and further exclusion of 
INDSTDCF in model (d) only reduces VIF to 1.38. Although multicolleanarity problem is not severe, models (c) and 
(d) are performed for robustness purpose.   
Part A Chapter A4. The determinants of cash holdings 
65 
 
netted off using orthogonalized regression. The first version of the orthogonalized 
regression extracts the debt capacity residuals, R_DC, in the following two-step 
regression.   
The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses debt capacity against 
volatility in each financial year and obtains a debt capacity residual for each firm in each 
year. By construction, debt capacity residuals are uncorrelated with industry cash flow 
volatility. This resolves the potential multicollinearity problem between the two 
YDULDEOHVDQGDOORZVHDFKYDULDEOH¶VQHWLPSDFWRQFDVKKROGLQJVWREHPHDVXUDEOH Debt 
capacity residuals are then put into the base model with other determinants of cash in the 
second step estimation.  
First step: DCi,t  FĮ1INDSTDCFi,t + R_DCi,t  
  
Second step: Cashi,t  FĮ1R_DCi,t Į2INDSTDCFi,t Į3Qi,t Į4LNAT i,t  Į5CFei,t  
Į6BKDEBTi,t Į7RD_SALEi,t Į10DIVDUMi,t Į11ACQUIi,t İi   (f) 
To cater for lagged effect as described before, the second step is repeated using 
lagged independent variables. Finally, the orthogonalized regression is repeated but uses 
industry cash flow volatility residuals instead of debt capacity residuals.  
First step: INDSTDCFi,t = c + Į1DCi,t + R_INDSTDCFi,t   
           
Second step: Cashi,t = c + Į1 R_INDSTDCFi,t + Į2INDSTDCFi,t + Į3Qi,t + Į4LNATi,t   
+ Į5CFei,t + Į6BKDEBTi,t + Į7RD_SALEi,t + Į10DIVDUMi,t + Į11ACQUIi,t + İi        (g) 
Cash flow is found to have direct positive effect on access to lines of credit 
(Campello et al., 2010). Although this impact is not significant for firms with high cash 
holdings, the positive relationship between cash flow and borrowing capacity implies a 
negative relationship between cash flow risk and debt capacity, where firms with more 
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volatile cash flow have lower debt capacity, all else being equal. To model the impact of 
cash flow risk on debt capacity and the impact of debt capacity on cash, an interaction 
term between volatility and debt capacity is added to cash model (b) as follows. 
Cashi,t  FĮ1DCi,t Į2INDSTDCFi,t Į3DC*INDSTDCFi,t Į4Qi,t Į5LNATi,t   
Į6CFei,t Į7NWCi,t Į8CAPEXi,t Į9BKDEBTi,t Į10RD_SALEi,t  
Į11DIVDUMi,t Į12ACQUIi,t İi     (h) 
 
A4.2 Cash model regression results 
A4.2.1 Base cash model regression results  
 
The base cash model results are reported in Table A7. Regression estimates are 
similar BKS with the following exceptions: (1) industry cash flow volatility is 
insignificant in the 1980 Fama MacBeth regression (model 7) and the fixed effects 
regression (model 9), (2) logarithm of total assets (LNAT), net working capital (NWC) 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) have lower coefficient estimates compared to BKS, 
(3) capital expenditure (CAPEX) is not sensitive to the measurement of cash holdings, 
and (4) indicator variables for 1990s and 2000s trends yield slightly different signs in 
estimates compared to BKS. These differences, however, do not alter the interpretation 
of the cash model that is based on transactional and precautionary motives.19 First, 
notwithstanding the insignificance of the variable in model 7 and 9, industry cash flow 
volatility remains the most important determinant of cash holdings in the base cash 
model, supporting the precautionary motive of holding cash. Second, transactional 
motive is supported by the highly significant estimates for net working capital, capital 
                                                             
19
 The model used is adapted originally from Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999). Bates, Kahle and Stulz 
XVHGWKH236:PRGHOWRWHVWZKHWKHU³FDVKholdings changed because firms moved along the demand curve 
IRUFDVKRUEHFDXVHWKHGHPDQGFXUYHVKLIWHG´RYHUWime (Bates et al., 2009, p1987). 
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expenditure, and acquisition expense because these tangibility variables measures ILUPV¶
economies of scale when converting noncash assets into cash.20 Although the three 
measures have reduced importance in the models here compared to BKS, they are the 
most important determinants of cash along with volatility and debt. Furthermore, capital 
expenditure is insensitive to the measurement of cash holdings and is significant in all 
models. Together with the negative significance of cash flow (in all 9 models)21 which 
suggests the importance of transaction motive of holding cash since greater cash flow 
generally indicates lower transactional costs due to less need in the conversion of 
noncash assets into cash, overall results provide evidence to support the transactional 
motive for cash.  
Other than the difference above, the remaining results obtained are either similar 
to BKS or support the findings in the literature. First, models 3 and 6 provide evidence 
suggesting that the impact of firm characteristics on cash holdings is changing over 
time. The models measure the flow concept of cash and use changes in cash holdings as 
dependent variable. Total assets yield a positive but zero estimate, suggesting it is 
unimportant in determining changes in cash holdings. Cash flows in models 3 and 6 
obtain a positive estimate, measuring the positive impact of cash flows to cash holdings 
in each period.  
Second, there is higher cash holdings in the most recent period compared to the 
period before year 2000. Modifying the base cash model slightly, models 4 to 6 include 
dummy variables for 1990s and 2000s (Dummy1990 and Dummy2000) to measure 
                                                             
20
 Supporting the transactional motive of holding cash, Beltz and Frank (1996), Mulligan (1997), and Bover and 
Watson (2005) found evidence of economies of scale in cash holdings. 
21
 The cash regressions results reported significance of cash flow in seven out of nine models. Cash flow is found to 
be insignificant determinant of year-to-year changes in cash holdings (Model 3 and 6). 
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changes in trend over two different periods (from 1990 to 2008 and 2000 to 2008 
respectively). Estimates for both dummies (with the exception of Dummy2000 in model 
5) support previous findings that cash holdings in the 2000s increased significantly 
compared to the period before 2000. Dummy2000 is positive for model 4 and 6 which 
indicates that there is a part of the variance (increase) of cash holdings not explained by 
firm characteristics in the 2000s period. Model 5 reports a negative coefficient for 
Dummy2000 but the variable is larger than the estimate for 1990s, again suggesting 
larger cash holdings in 2000s. The Fama-MacBeth regressions performed over two 
periods, before and after 1990 (model 7 and 8) support the findings of a change in 
intercept of cash holding model over time. Similar to BKS, the intercepts for regressions 
in the 1990s and 2000s have lower magnitude compared to the 1980s ± supporting the 
claim that intercept of cash model changes over time and there may be predictors of 
cash holdings not included in the model. According to the internal flexibility hypothesis, 
the suggested missing predictor of cash holdings is debt capacity, which will be tested 
and analysed in Table A8. 
Third, it is suggested that firms with IPOs within the last five years potentially 
affect the fixed effects regression results since new firms generally have higher 
idiosyncratic risks, thus influencing the amount of cash held. In addition, firms with 
recent IPOs may hold more cash. Thus, the fixed effects regression (model 9) excludes 
firms with IPOs in the last five years. The fixed effects model yield results that are 
comparable to BKS. Coefficient estimates for industry cash flow volatility and firm size 
become insignificant after controlling for firm and year fixed effects. Supporting the 
transactional motive of holding cash, all other independent variables remain significant 
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but have lower estimated coefficients. A strong fixed effects impact is evident due to 
large and highly significant intercepts reported in models 1 to 8, suggesting that there 
may be an important cash holdings determinant excluded from the base model.  
Finally, a robustness check is performed for the base cash model to ensure the 
accuracy of results reported. Whilst t-values of estimated coefficients are not reported in 
BKS, they are relatively large (i.e. estimates are highly significant) in the reported 
regressions. To ensure that the t-values obtained are appropriate, a portion of the sample 
is matched to Opler et al. (1999). The results obtained are comparable with Opler et al. 
(1999) and reported in Appendix A-IV. It is noted that t-values are sensitive to the 
measure of dependent variable and the type of regression ± t-values obtained for the 
dependent variable is larger for cash to total assets compared to the logarithm of cash 
ratio and change in cash ratio; and t-values for simple OLS regressions are generally 
larger compared to Fama-MacBeth and fixed effects regression.  
To sum up, the transaction motive of cash holdings is supported even after 
controlling for fixed effects because net working capital, capital expenditure, acquisition 
expenses and debt remain the most important determinants of cash holdings. The 
importance of these value-DGGLQJ H[SHQVHV LQ ILUPV¶ FDVK GHFLVLRQV DOVR VXSSRUWs the 
new cash holdings theory of firm-value and strategic motives as firms hold more cash to 
invest more efficiently and effectively (cost-effectiveness due to lower transaction costs) 
in profitable projects. On the other hand, the precautionary motive of cash measured 
using cash flow volatility is no longer an important factor of cash after fixed effects are 
considered. This also suggests that, after controlling for fixed effects, there is evidence 
in support of firms using cash holdings for upside opportunistic motives instead of 
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serving as a cushion for downside risks as documented in the literature (e.g. Bates et al., 
2009). However, it is noted that the fixed effects regression (Model 9) excludes firms 
with IPOs during the last five years (i.e. younger and smaller firms). It is expected that, 
after inclusion of these firms, volatility and cash flow will become important in 
determining the level of cash because these firms hold cash primarily for precautionary 
purposes to cushion any negative cash flow shocks. This expectation is confirmed in an 
extra regression (not reported in detail here) and it is found that cash flow volatility 
becomes significant when small and young firms are included. This suggests that 
volatility is an important determinant of cash holdings only for smaller or younger firms. 
Further analysis on the determinants of cash for constrained and unconstrained firms 
will be documented in Chapter A5. 
 
A4.2.2 Modified cash model regression results  
Table A8 reports the modified cash model (with debt capacity) for the period 
1980 to 2008.22 Inclusion of debt capacity as an additional explanatory variable for cash 
holdings generates important results. First, the coefficient estimates of industry cash 
flow volatility reduces significantly after debt capacity is included ± a significant 
decrease from 0.387 to 0.094 for model 1. Furthermore, cash flow volatility becomes 
sensitive to whether debt capacity is included in the Fama-MacBeth and fixed effects 
regression. In the 1980s Fama-MacBeth estimation, cash flow volatility is significant 
only when debt capacity is included in the regression. In the fixed effects regression, the 
sign for the volatility estimate changes to negative when debt capacity is added. This 
                                                             
22
 The same modified cash model with debt capacity for the period from 1980 to 2006 yields similar results as 
regression using the sample period 1980 to 2008. As such the larger sample period will be used for subsequent tests. 
Table of coefficients for the sample period 1980 to 2006 is reported in Appendix A-V for reference and comparison 
purposes.  
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shows that cash flow volatility is sensitive to the estimation method when debt capacity 
is included in the model.  
Second, after considering debt capacity, NWC no longer significantly predicts 
cash holdings in all the models, becoming insignificant in four (out of nine) models, and 
is sensitive to the estimation methods. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for NWC falls 
sharply for all models. While BKS found NWC the most important firm characteristic 
that contributed to the increase in cash holdings, it is found here that its importance is 
subjected to the consideration of debt capacity. Third, similar evidence is observed for 
Capex when debt capacity is considered. The coefficient estimate is not only sensitive to 
the measurement of cash holdings (as reported in the previous study), it is sensitive to 
the type of modelling. The sign for the Capex coefficient changes when there is a 
change in regression model and cash measurement. Fourth, lower coefficient estimates 
for Q, cash flow, debt, dividend and R&D ratios across all nine models indicate 
decreased importance of these variables when debt capacity is included. Cash flow ratio 
becomes insignificant for models 7 and 8, suggesting the instability of cash flow as an 
important determinant of cash holdings after debt capacity is accounted for.  Fifth, year 
dummies do not show that intercepts of the models change over time. Both coefficients 
for dummy variables of 1990s and 2000s are negative, suggesting no shift in the 
intercepts. Furthermore, Dummy2000 has a lower magnitude than Dummy1990 in two 
out of the three models, suggesting that intercept for the more recent decade have not 
increased. The results imply that demand for cash may not have shifted over time. 
Finally, there is considerable increase in R-squared across all nine models (e.g. increase 
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from 0.430 to 0.634 for model 1), suggesting an overall increase in model fit when debt 
capacity is taken into account. 
On the whole, the results above indicate that debt capacity has the greater impact 
on cash holdings compared to industry cash flow volatility; while BKS showed that 
increased in cash holdings is due mainly to changes in NWC, cash flow volatility, Capex 
and R&D expense, these variables no longer significantly predict cash holdings once 
debt capacity is considered. The high negative coefficient estimate (e.g. -0.882 for 
model 1) provides evidence for the substitution between cash and debt capacity for 
precautionary purposes. Although cash and debt capacity are not perfect substitutes for 
each other in the imperfect capital market, they both serve the precautionary function in 
ILUPV¶ OLTXLGLW\ PDQDJHPHQW /LQV HW DO (2010) provide evidence for different 
precautionary roles of cash and debt capacity ± excess (non-operating purpose) cash 
holdings is used to cushion bad times when cash flow are inadequate, while credit lines 
are used to fund business opportunities in good times. Further evidence on the different 
precautionary functions for cash and debt capacity is given in subsequent models and 
results.  
A4.2.3 Robustness tests 
A4.2.3.1 Net working capital and capital expenditure 
The sensitivities of variables reported in the previous table may be due to the 
high correlations between explanatory variables. To avoid a potential multicollinearity 
problem due to model specification, NWC and Capex are excluded from the regressions 
- results are reported in Table A9. The constructioQ RI GHEW FDSDFLW\ LQFOXGHV ILUPV¶
receivables, inventory, and property plant and equipment (PPE) in pre-specified 
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weights. The first two components of debt capacity are included in net working capital, 
and Capex measures single period capital expense that adds to the total amount of PPE. 
By construction, higher correlations are expected between NWC and debt capacity, and 
Capex and debt capacity ± reported as 0.366 and 0.241 respectively.23 Notwithstanding 
that there are no similar components in their construction, cash flow volatility is found 
to have high correlation with debt capacity (-0.363). This will be investigated further in 
Table A10 when volatility is excluded from the model. 
The modified model in Table A9 (with NWC and Capex excluded) produces 
estimates that are very similar to results reported in Table A8. Furthermore, excluding 
the two variables (NWC and Capex) does not reduce the model fit. Thus, debt capacity 
can be used to replace the two variables with little impact on the model ± supporting the 
findings from Table A8.   
A4.2.3.2 Industry cash flow volatility  
In the next modified cash model, industry cash flow volatility is excluded from 
the model (reported in Table A10). Contrary to previous findings and expectations, 
excluding industry cash flow volatility does not reduce the model fit; i.e. R-squared 
remains at the same level. Estimated coefficients for debt capacity increase slightly, 
while the other estimations are relatively similar to the previous reported tables. One 
noteworthy point is the evidence on the shift in demand for cash (i.e. change in intercept 
over time) from the Fama-MacBeth regressions. Intercepts for the 1980s and 1990s 
regression remain relatively the same with only an insignificant drop of less than 1%. 
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 Correlations between independent variables are reported in Appendix A-VI.  
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This gives further support to the supposition that the intercept of the model may not 
have changed over time, but the slope of the model has become steeper.  
A4.2.3.3 Lagged independent variable effect  
7RH[DPLQHZKHWKHUFDVKKROGLQJVLVLQIOXHQFHGE\SUHYLRXV\HDU¶VYRODWLOLW\DQG
firm characteristics, all determinants of cash holdings are lagged one period and 
reported in Table A11. The model examines whether previous period debt capacity and 
industry FDVK IORZ YRODWLOLW\ KDV JUHDWHU LPSDFW RQ FXUUHQW SHULRG¶V FDVK KROGLQJV
According to Lins et al. (2010), cash holdings are held to cushion bad times when cash 
flows are inadequate. Furthermore, there is evidence of firms artificially managing 
financial flexibility to prepare for recession (Ang and Smedema, 2011). Previous period 
cash flow and volatility may have greater explanatory power on current level of cash 
holdings because managers will adjust current cash level accordingly.  
Accordingly, estimates from Table A11 provide evidence that previous period 
industry cash flow volatility has a greater impact on cash holdings, e.g. coefficient of 
volatility for model 1 increases from 0.091 (from Table A9) to 0.232. Although cash 
flow variable reports higher coefficient for some models, the increase is not significant 
and constant across different estimation techniques. Nevertheless, evidence from lagged 
industry cash flow volatility is consistent with Ang and Smedema (2011) and Lins et al. 
(2010) that cash holdings are used to hedge against idiosyncratic risk and unexpected 
negative shocks, even prior negative shocks are experienced.  
Lagged variables representing investment opportunities (Q ratio, R&D expenses, 
acquisition expenses) are expected to have little or no change in their impact for cash 
holdings because investment opportunities are generally funded by lines of credit 
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(proxied using debt capacity) instead of cash-on-hand. There is, however, no conclusive 
evidence since coefficient estimates of lagged Q ratio and R&D expenses are similar to 
those reported in Table A9. The lagged acquisition variable yields lower estimates 
compared to the current period estimate. This may be due to depletion of cash holdings 
in the previous period when acquisition activity has taken place, resulting in a lower 
OHYHO RI FDVK KHOG LQ WKH FXUUHQW SHULRG )XUWKHU HYLGHQFH RQ GHEW FDSDFLW\¶V
precautionary role is documented in Chapter A7 for the debt capacity regressions.  
On the whROH ZLWK WKH H[FHSWLRQ RI GHEW FDSDFLW\ DQG YRODWLOLW\ WKH µODJJHG
PRGHO¶ GRHV QRW SHUIRUP DV ZHOO DV WKH µFXUUHQW¶ FDVK PRGHO ZKLFK LPSOLHV WKDW FDVK
decisions are current decisions made by managers based on existing firm conditions. 
This is reasonable because we expect managers to have insider information and make 
GHFLVLRQV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKHLU H[SHFWDWLRQV IRU WKH FXUUHQW SHULRG¶V UHTXLUHPHQWV UDWKHU
than the previous reported figures. Thus, a cash model with the FXUUHQW SHULRG¶V ILUP
characteristics (not lagged in independent variables) may be more appropriate, with the 
exception of industry cash flow volatility which is not known in the current period when 
managers make cash decisions. Whilst managers make use of current (unreported) firm 
conditions and statistics in cash decisions, they can only look at previous the SHULRG¶V
reported industry figures. Hence, it becomes intuitively reasonable to lag only the 
volatility variable while keeping the rest of the variables at the current period. 
Accordingly, the estimation performed with lagged volatility reports slightly higher 
coefficient estimates for volatility but does not differ significantly from Table A11 for 
other variables and model fit. Results are reported in Appendix A-VII for reference 
purposes. Although the robustness check does not indicate that the lagged volatility 
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measure has much greater influence on cash compared to the current value of volatility, 
this presumption will be further tested in the orthogonalized regression in the next 
section.  
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Table A7 Regressions of base cash model (a) for period 1980 to 2006 
This table reports the base cash model regression (following BKS) results using a CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2006. The 
results and models used are reported in a similar manner as BKS for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the exception 
of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative 
total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable specifications are reported in Chapter A2.3. The final sample has 112,038 firm-
year observations for the base cash model OLS regressions. Following Bates et al. (2009), firms with IPOs in the last 5 years are 
excluded in the fixed effects regression and the last model uses 67,247 observations. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio 
computed as cash to total asset except for the following models: Models 2 and 5 use the natural logarithm of ratio cash to net asset 
(LNCASH_NETASSET), where net asset is computed as total asset less cash holdings; and Models 3 and 6 use the period-to-period 
change in cash holdings (DCASH) computed as Casht ± Casht-1. Models 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Models 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for 
observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Models 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 
10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.261*** 0.151*** 0.074*** 0.266*** 0.153*** 0.078*** 0.283*** 0.245*** 
 
        . (141.28) (41.24) (57.44) (141.29) (40.97) (59.05) (30.48) (32.85) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.082*** 
  
-0.083*** 
   
        . 
  
(-27.66) 
  
(-27.93) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.284*** 
  
-0.285*** 
   
        . 
  
(-145.98) 
  
(-146.50) 
   INDSTDCF 0.387*** 0.423*** 0.101*** 0.391*** 0.459*** 0.099*** 0.103 0.505*** 0.016 
        . (45.17) (24.94) (18.17) (43.73) (25.89) (17.02) (1.67) (12.04) (1.52) 
Q 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 
        . (71.33) (33.30) (31.45) (72.30) (33.43) (32.44) (7.67) (10.68) (23.51) 
LNAT -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.000** -0.005*** -0.003*** 0.000** -0.010*** -0.005*** 0.001 
        . (-18.21) (-7.99) (2.04) (-15.49) (-4.71) (1.97) (-8.30) (-3.97) (1.22) 
CFe -0.046*** -0.053*** 0.050*** -0.045*** -0.055*** 0.050*** 0.035* -0.020 0.013*** 
        . (-18.93) (-11.03) (30.80) (-18.69) (-11.39) (31.13) (2.11) (-1.07) (4.34) 
NWC -0.171*** -0.198*** -0.071*** -0.172*** -0.200*** -0.071*** -0.171*** -0.189*** -0.158*** 
        . (-79.83) (-46.50) (-50.62) (-79.83) (-46.91) (-50.47) (-15.25) (-10.92) (-53.39) 
CAPEX -0.326*** -0.519*** -0.312*** -0.331*** -0.531*** -0.312*** -0.250*** -0.453*** -0.268*** 
        . (-51.43) (-41.26) (-72.45) (-51.64) (-41.86) (-71.86) (-15.81) (-5.91) (-31.94) 
BKDEBT -0.390*** -0.288*** -0.099*** -0.392*** -0.293*** -0.099*** -0.345*** -0.377*** -0.223*** 
        . (-163.05) (-60.70) (-58.22) (-162.18) (-61.12) (-57.97) (-53.94) (-44.45) (-72.56) 
RD_SALE 0.027*** 0.086*** 0.009*** 0.027*** 0.086*** 0.009*** 0.216*** 0.052*** 0.006*** 
        . (73.95) (118.00) (35.59) (73.90) (118.11) (35.51) (8.41) (2.97) (10.98) 
DIVDUM -0.049*** -0.038*** -0.009*** -0.052*** -0.043*** -0.010*** -0.025*** -0.061*** 0.004** 
        . (-41.53) (-16.31) (-11.30) (-41.95) (-17.60) (-11.98) (-6.24) (-9.19) (2.28) 
ACQUI -0.210*** -0.275*** -0.369*** -0.205*** -0.273*** -0.366*** -0.102*** -0.271*** -0.160*** 
        . (-24.48) (-16.15) (-64.63) (-23.92) (-16.04) (-64.10) (-5.61) (-7.08) (-21.08) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
-0.015*** -0.012*** -0.009*** 
   
        . 
   
(-13.23) (-5.00) (-11.63) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
0.011*** -0.009*** 0.009*** 
   
        . 
   
(8.83) (-3.68) (11.27) 
   R-Sq 0.430 0.263 0.272 0.431 0.263 0.274 0.358 0.469 
 Adj R-Sq 0.430 0.263 0.272 0.431 0.263 0.274 0.357 0.468 
 Obs 112038 112052 102832 112038 112052 102832 38528 73510 67247 
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Table A8 Regressions of base cash model (b) with debt capacity for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the base cash model regression results after inclusion of debt capacity as additional independent variable  from 
1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in 
Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for model specifications. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance 
at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.593*** 0.537*** 0.255*** 0.605*** 0.550*** 0.264*** 0.579*** 0.559*** 
 
        . (302.17) (117.17) (140.68) (304.47) (118.17) (143.06) (50.94) (93.27) 
 LAGDCASH 
 
-0.053*** 
  
-0.051*** 
   
        . 
  
(-19.50) 
  
(-19.01) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.404*** 
  
-0.408*** 
   
        . 
  
(-201.48) 
  
(-203.27) 
   DC -0.882*** -1.025*** -0.393*** -0.897*** -1.052*** -0.402*** -0.883*** -0.851*** -0.824*** 
        . (-251.21) (-125.06) (-129.86) (-254.71) (-127.56) (-131.63) (-40.20) (-41.67) (-162.00) 
INDSTDCF 0.094*** 0.102*** 0.014*** 0.159*** 0.210*** 0.043*** 0.142*** 0.219*** -0.008 
        . (13.88) (6.49) (2.87) (22.88) (12.87) (8.24) (3.26) (9.07) (-0.94) 
Q 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (45.52) (13.55) (22.27) (46.00) (12.94) (23.36) (4.53) (6.34) (23.43) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
        . (-64.53) (-30.17) (-29.80) (-46.40) (-18.77) (-20.30) (-10.36) (-11.40) (-23.69) 
CFe -0.007*** -0.013*** 0.051*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 0.050*** 0.021 0.004 0.031*** 
        . (-3.35) (-2.77) (34.15) (-4.92) (-4.13) (33.35) (1.60) (0.31) (11.71) 
NWC 0.006*** 0.010** -0.011*** 0.002 0.005 -0.012*** -0.007 -0.022 -0.034*** 
        . (2.80) (2.16) (-7.40) (0.99) (1.14) (-8.54) (-0.61) (-1.70) (-12.80) 
CAPEX 0.047*** -0.089*** -0.141*** 0.025*** -0.120*** -0.151*** 0.028* 0.052*** -0.050*** 
        . (8.75) (-7.08) (-33.33) (4.65) (-9.53) (-35.51) (1.76) (3.68) (-6.82) 
BKDEBT -0.218*** -0.088*** -0.070*** -0.225*** -0.099*** -0.074*** -0.211*** -0.230*** -0.135*** 
        . (-107.83) (-18.66) (-44.93) (-111.53) (-20.88) (-47.44) (-19.58) (-43.90) (-51.22) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.064*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (59.26) (108.35) (32.80) (59.45) (108.61) (32.96) (3.24) (3.10) (8.50) 
DIVDUM -0.005*** 0.015*** 0.004*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.016*** -0.020*** 0.009*** 
        . (-5.09) (6.49) (6.19) (-13.92) (0.99) (-0.15) (-6.37) (-12.51) (6.85) 
ACQUI -0.466*** -0.574*** -0.458*** -0.465*** -0.579*** -0.456*** -0.436*** -0.491*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.43) (-36.16) (-88.82) (-68.67) (-36.54) (-88.73) (-13.61) (-20.74) (-36.25) 
DUMMY-1990 
  
-0.027*** -0.024*** -0.015*** 
   
        . 
   
(-28.02) (-10.86) (-21.39) 
   DUMMY-2000 
  
-0.016*** -0.044*** -0.004*** 
   
        . 
   
(-16.42) (-18.76) (-5.66) 
   R-Sq   0.634   0.351   0.372   0.639   0.354   0.376   0.641   0.639   0.837 
Adj R-Sq   0.634   0.351   0.372   0.639   0.354   0.376   0.639   0.638 
 Obs     115681     115692     106501     115681     115692     106501     115681      78147      66083 
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Table A9 Regressions of modified cash model (c) with debt capacity less NWC and CAPEX  
This table reports the modified cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for  ease of 
comparison. . Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for model specifications. The table 
reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.594*** 0.536*** 0.259*** 0.606*** 0.548*** 0.268*** 0.577*** 0.557*** 
 
        . (302.68) (117.04) (142.71) (305.25) (117.88) (144.27) (49.02) (81.02) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.049*** 
   
        . 
  
(-18.30) 
  
(-17.83) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.414*** 
  
-0.418*** 
   
        . 
  
(-207.40) 
  
(-208.85) 
   DC -0.873*** -1.031*** -0.425*** -0.893*** -1.064*** -0.435*** -0.879*** -0.854*** -0.849*** 
        . (-276.86) (-140.10) (-154.83) (-280.31) (-142.51) (-155.36) (-47.49) (-52.36) (-178.07) 
INDSTDCF 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.022*** 0.159*** 0.211*** 0.047*** 0.140*** 0.221*** -0.006 
        . (13.43) (6.71) (4.47) (22.80) (12.97) (9.06) (3.10) (8.46) (-0.66) 
Q 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (46.80) (12.66) (19.12) (46.86) (11.78) (19.97) (4.27) (6.31) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
        . (-65.02) (-30.69) (-31.16) (-46.44) (-19.47) (-22.69) (-12.37) (-13.47) (-24.75) 
CFe -0.005** -0.012*** 0.046*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.000 0.024*** 
        . (-2.55) (-2.60) (31.33) (-4.70) (-4.24) (30.29) (1.29) (0.00) (9.35) 
BKDEBT -0.219*** -0.093*** -0.071*** -0.225*** -0.102*** -0.074*** -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.125*** 
        . (-114.93) (-20.89) (-47.60) (-118.53) (-22.91) (-49.66) (-24.59) (-58.90) (-49.38) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.065*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (59.61) (108.47) (32.34) (59.66) (108.63) (32.42) (3.20) (3.08) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.005*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.014*** 0.004 0.001 -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 
        . (-5.37) (6.85) (6.99) (-14.22) (1.63) (1.51) (-5.83) (-11.18) (6.44) 
ACQUI -0.468*** -0.566*** -0.450*** -0.466*** -0.570*** -0.449*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.90) (-35.71) (-87.19) (-69.04) (-36.01) (-87.00) (-12.75) (-19.69) (-36.21) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
-0.027*** -0.022*** -0.013*** 
   
        . 
   
(-28.51) (-10.15) (-18.92) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
-0.017*** -0.043*** -0.003*** 
   
        . 
   
(-16.64) (-18.36) (-4.15) 
   R-Sq   0.634   0.350   0.366   0.638   0.354   0.368   0.639   0.637   0.837 
Adj R-Sq   0.634   0.350   0.366   0.638   0.354   0.368   0.638   0.637 
 Obs     115681     115692     106501     115681     115692     106501     115681      78147      66083 
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Table A10 Regressions of modified cash model (d) with debt capacity  
less INDSTDCF, NWC and CAPEX  
This table reports the modified cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for  ease 
of comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for model specifications. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 
10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash 
LnCash_ 
netasset DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.606*** 0.550*** 0.262*** 0.625*** 0.573*** 0.272*** 0.599*** 0.590*** 
 
        . (350.34) (136.36) (154.14) (344.75) (135.22) (153.28) (88.30) (112.46) 
 LAG-
DCASH 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.050*** 
   
        . 
  
(-18.51) 
  
(-18.31) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.413*** 
  
-0.416*** 
   
        . 
  
(-207.60) 
  
(-208.82) 
   DC -0.883*** -1.042*** -0.427*** -0.905*** -1.080*** -0.438*** -0.893*** -0.874*** -0.849*** 
        . (-287.13) (-145.36) (-157.97) (-287.43) (-146.58) (-157.19) (-55.72) (-57.65) (-178.11) 
Q 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 
        . (47.56) (13.04) (19.43) (48.20) (12.57) (20.53) (4.18) (6.13) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
        . (-64.23) (-30.31) (-30.95) (-47.39) (-20.05) (-23.05) (-12.09) (-14.11) (-24.78) 
CFe -0.007*** -0.014*** 0.045*** -0.011*** -0.022*** 0.044*** 0.018 -0.003 0.024*** 
        . (-3.55) (-3.11) (31.13) (-5.91) (-4.93) (29.98) (1.11) (-0.16) (9.36) 
BKDEBT -0.221*** -0.095*** -0.071*** -0.227*** -0.105*** -0.075*** -0.213*** -0.228*** -0.125*** 
        . (-116.19) (-21.45) (-47.88) (-119.53) (-23.56) (-49.81) (-23.58) (-61.36) (-49.39) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.068*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.068*** 0.007*** 0.066*** 0.031*** 0.004*** 
        . (61.46) (109.90) (32.92) (62.39) (110.64) (33.37) (3.28) (3.15) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.007*** 0.013*** 0.004*** -0.016*** 0.001 0.001 -0.018*** -0.023*** 0.008*** 
        . (-7.39) (5.94) (6.42) (-15.98) (0.64) (0.87) (-5.59) (-10.51) (6.44) 
ACQUI -0.468*** -0.566*** -0.450*** -0.466*** -0.570*** -0.449*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.87) (-35.71) (-87.18) (-68.88) (-35.98) (-86.96) (-12.84) (-20.29) (-36.21) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
-0.024*** -0.019*** -0.013*** 
   
        . 
   
(-25.60) (-8.47) (-17.88) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
-0.012*** -0.037*** -0.002** 
   
        . 
   
(-12.56) (-16.20) (-2.55) 
   R-Sq 0.633*** 0.350*** 0.366*** 0.637*** 0.353*** 0.368*** 0.637*** 0.634*** 0.837*** 
Adj R-Sq   0.633   0.350   0.366   0.637   0.353   0.368   0.636   0.633 
 Obs  115681  115692  106501  115681  115692  106501  115681 78147 66083 
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Table A11 Regressions of modified cash model (e) with lagged independent variables  
This table reports the modified cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for  ease of 
comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for model specifications. All 
independent variables are lagged one period, except for Dummy1990 and Dummy2000. The table reports coefficient estimates where 
*** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in 
the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.478*** 0.353*** 0.031*** 0.486*** 0.359*** 0.029*** 0.458*** 0.457*** 
 
           . (212.32) (78.43) (13.35) (212.77) (78.60) (12.18) (43.30) (29.64) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.096*** 
  
-0.097*** 
   
           . 
  
(-30.03) 
  
(-30.57) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.256*** 
  
-0.252*** 
   
           . 
  
(-96.99) 
  
(-94.93) 
   LAGDC -0.669*** -0.685*** -0.021*** -0.678*** -0.698*** -0.010*** -0.658*** -0.667*** -0.445*** 
           . (-183.98) (-94.29) (-5.89) (-183.89) (-94.62) (-2.86) (-42.81) (-36.34) (-76.74) 
LAG-
INDSTDCF 0.232*** 0.296*** 0.179*** 0.272*** 0.346*** 0.155*** 0.228*** 0.328*** 0.018* 
           . (29.35) (18.74) (29.92) (32.96) (20.96) (24.83) (3.79) (11.40) (1.65) 
LAGQ 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (33.18) (5.18) (4.48) (34.02) (5.54) (4.12) (5.02) (7.07) (19.69) 
LAGLNAT -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.000** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.018*** 
           . (-42.33) (-20.53) (2.18) (-33.34) (-15.14) (-2.78) (-10.05) (-9.34) (-23.55) 
LAGCFe -0.025*** -0.085*** -0.009*** -0.026*** -0.086*** -0.007*** 0.019 -0.014 0.010*** 
           . (-10.56) (-17.83) (-4.82) (-10.92) (-18.19) (-3.97) (0.85) (-0.70) (3.08) 
LAGBKDEBT -0.201*** -0.075*** -0.036*** -0.203*** -0.079*** -0.034*** -0.186*** -0.204*** -0.085*** 
           . (-89.45) (-16.85) (-20.19) (-90.61) (-17.55) (-18.81) (-16.40) (-23.35) (-27.38) 
LAGRD_ 
SALE 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.068*** 0.035*** 0.002*** 
           . (55.19) (99.77) (21.51) (54.97) (99.67) (21.32) (3.07) (2.94) (2.62) 
LAG 
DIVDUM -0.010*** 0.012*** -0.006*** -0.015*** 0.006*** -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.000 
           . (-9.18) (5.42) (-7.58) (-13.49) (2.73) (-4.93) (-4.25) (-9.67) (0.23) 
LAGACQUI -0.405*** -0.403*** -0.092*** -0.401*** -0.401*** -0.090*** -0.363*** -0.426*** -0.157*** 
           . (-52.11) (-25.96) (-15.15) (-51.74) (-25.84) (-14.77) (-9.38) (-13.90) (-20.06) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.021*** -0.016*** -0.002** 
   
           . 
   
(-19.49) (-7.27) (-2.19) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.001 -0.012*** 0.015*** 
   
           . 
   
(-0.72) (-5.35) (17.71) 
   R-Sq   0.513   0.288   0.165   0.515   0.289   0.168   0.491   0.535   0.762 
Adj R-Sq   0.513   0.288   0.165   0.515   0.289   0.168   0.490   0.534 
 Obs     106483     106516     106474     106483     106516     106474     106483      72471      66014 
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A4.3 Orthogonalized cash model regression results 
As debt capacity and industry cash flow volatility are both significant 
determinants of cash holdings and have a relatively high correlation (see Appendix A-
VI), this section uses the orthogonalized regression method to distinguish between the 
true effect of each determinant on cash. Table A12 reports orthogonalized cash model 
with debt capacity residuals computed yearly using OLS regression. To ensure the 
estimation technique in the first step of the orthogonalized regressions do not have any 
significant impact or bias on the final results, other techniques are used to estimate debt 
capacity residuals. Pooled OLS regression and fixed effects regression are used in the 
first level estimation. The final results are not affected by the first level estimation 
technique. Estimations based on residuals computed using pooled OLS regression are 
reported Appendix A-VIII and A-IX for reference purpose. Residuals of debt capacity 
measure the net effect of debt capacity on cash holdings after controlling for industry 
cash flow volatility.  
Volatility remains an important variable when the uncorrelated debt capacity 
residual is included in the model. The orthogonalized model provides evidence that both 
debt capacity and industry cash flow volatility have important impact on cash holdings ± 
very high and significant coefficient estimates, e.g. 0.87 for debt capacity and -0.77 for 
volatility. However, the volatility estimate falls significantly when firm and year fixed 
effects are taken into account in model 9. As this is consistent with previous estimates of 
volatility in fixed effects regressions, volatility is less important when specific firm 
characteristics are controlled for. 
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In another estimation (unreported in detail here), the model above is recast with 
volatility excluded. The impact of debt capacity on cash holdings is still highly 
significant (coefficient estimate=-0.81) and model fit remains high (R-squared=0.58). 
Results add to previous evidence in Table A9 and further show that the impact of debt 
capacity on cash holdings is not affected by the presence of industry cash flow volatility 
and the former remains an important determinant of cash even after volatility has been 
controlled for. Additionally, the high model fit shows debt capacity may be a greater 
determining factor affecting cash decisions compared to volatility, supporting the results 
in Table A9.  
The orthogonalized estimations are repeated with the cash determinants lagged 
by one period (reported in Table A13). The lagged model increases the estimate for 
industry cash flow volatility but reduces that for debt capacity. Although both variables 
remain highly significant, this suggests reduced (increased) importance of debt capacity 
(industry cash flow volatility) in the previous period. This is consistent with earlier 
findings that (1) cash holdings depend more on the SUHYLRXVSHULRG¶VFash flow volatility 
because managers are unable to observe the current period industry performance (a low 
volatility in the previous period will result in lower expected negative shocks and hence 
less cash held in current period); and (2) cash decisions are made based on the current 
SHULRG¶VGHEWFDSDFLW\ UDWKHU WKDQSUHYLRXVEHFDXVH PDQDJHUVZLWK LQVLGHU LQIRUPDWLRQ
make cash decisions promptly based on current unreported expectations. Other than the 
general increasing trend in volatility and decreasing trend in debt capacity, the rest of 
the variables in Table A13 do not appear to show significant variation from the original 
estimation. However, R-squared is noted to fall by more than 10% in model 1 when the 
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variables are lagged, suggesting a fall in model fit which is consistent with earlier results 
that cash holdings are based more on the FXUUHQW SHULRG¶V ILUP VWDWLVWLFV DQG QRW the 
previous period) because managers make cash decisions with current private 
information that may not be reported and publicly available.  
In the next stage of regression analysis, the orthogonalized estimation is repeated 
with industry cash flow volatility residuals, R_INDSTDCF, computed in the first level 
regression (see Table A14). R_INDSTDCF measures the residual effect of volatility 
after taking into account debt capacity and is uncorrelated with debt capacity by 
construction. While volatility and debt capacity residuals both have large coefficients in 
the previous orthogonalized estimation, this is not the case for volatility residuals. 
Although they remain significant, coefficients for volatility residuals are much lower 
compared to that of debt capacity. Similar findings are reported when the orthogonalized 
estimation is performed using different methods ± (1) pooled OLS estimation (over the 
entire sample) in the first step regression, (2) pooled OLS estimation in the first step 
regression with lagged independent variables in the second step regression, and (3) 
yearly OLS estimation in the first step regression with lagged independent variables in 
the second step regression (reported in Appendix A-X to A-XII). Results are robust to 
different modelling and estimation methods. This means that volatility has reduced 
impact on cash holdings after controlling for debt capacity; suggesting that the impact of 
volatility on cash holdings is partially dependent on the level of debt capacity. To 
investigate this further, an interaction term between debt capacity and volatility is 
created and put into the model in the next section. 
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Table A12 Regressions of orthogonalized cash model (f) with debt capacity residuals (yearly OLS) 
This table reports the orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for 
ease of comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The first step of the orthogonalized estimation 
regresses debt capacity against industry cash flow volatility in each financial year to obtain debt capacity residuals, R_DC, for each 
firm-year observation. R_DC are then put into the regression models with other cash determinants in the second step estimation. 
Results from the second step estimation are reported as follow. Models 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Models 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for 
observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Models 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using 
Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.172*** 0.037*** 0.053*** 0.175*** 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.188*** 0.190*** 
 
        . (131.15) (12.38) (50.31) (130.57) (11.29) (51.89) (20.20) (14.01) 
 LAG-
DCASH 
  
-0.052*** 
  
-0.053*** 
   
        . 
  
(-18.82) 
  
(-19.27) 
   LAG-
CASH 
  
-0.403*** 
  
-0.407*** 
   
        . 
  
(-202.00) 
  
(-204.27) 
   R_DC -0.866*** -1.032*** -0.413*** -0.873*** -1.039*** -0.419*** -0.879*** -0.854*** -0.825*** 
        . (-266.02) (-137.49) (-147.79) (-268.72) (-138.10) (-149.99) (-47.49) (-52.36) (-173.44) 
IND-
STDCF 0.769*** 0.909*** 0.342*** 0.699*** 0.854*** 0.302*** 0.733*** 0.898*** 0.287*** 
        . (114.17) (58.59) (66.55) (99.52) (52.57) (56.85) (7.46) (16.93) (31.25) 
Q 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (52.81) (15.87) (23.10) (53.16) (15.36) (23.41) (4.27) (6.31) (23.16) 
LNAT -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.003*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
        . (-28.24) (-12.33) (-7.60) (-39.42) (-16.13) (-18.09) (-12.37) (-13.47) (-23.57) 
CFe -0.022*** -0.031*** 0.039*** -0.015*** -0.026*** 0.043*** 0.020 0.000 0.023*** 
        . (-11.67) (-7.11) (26.31) (-7.71) (-5.84) (29.11) (1.29) (0.00) (8.59) 
BKDEBT -0.246*** -0.124*** -0.082*** -0.237*** -0.116*** -0.077*** -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.128*** 
        . (-128.65) (-28.11) (-54.55) (-123.05) (-26.04) (-51.17) (-24.59) (-58.90) (-49.96) 
RD_SALE 0.017*** 0.068*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.068*** 0.007*** 0.065*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (63.05) (110.42) (33.88) (62.56) (110.25) (33.67) (3.20) (3.08) (8.36) 
DIVDUM -0.027*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.019*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 
        . (-27.61) (-4.33) (-7.86) (-18.71) (-0.81) (-1.10) (-5.83) (-11.18) (6.21) 
ACQUI -0.432*** -0.526*** -0.432*** -0.437*** -0.534*** -0.435*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.227*** 
        . (-62.82) (-33.20) (-83.11) (-63.73) (-33.68) (-83.86) (-12.75) (-19.69) (-35.30) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
0.009*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 
           . 
   
(9.15) (9.02) (5.43) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
0.030*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 
           . 
   
(29.36) (5.16) (26.03) 
   R-Sq   0.622   0.347   0.355   0.626   0.348   0.360   0.639   0.637   0.834 
Adj R-Sq   0.622   0.347   0.355   0.626   0.348   0.360   0.638   0.637 
 Obs     115681     115692     106501     115681     115692     106501     115681      78147      66083 
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Table A13 Regressions of lagged orthogonalized cash model  (f) with debt capacity residuals  
(yearly OLS) 
This table reports the orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for 
ease of comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The first step of the orthogonalized estimation 
regresses debt capacity against industry cash flow volatility in each financial year to obtain debt capacity residuals, R_DC,  for each 
firm-year observation. R_DC are then put into the regression models with other cash determinants in the second step estimation. All 
variables are lagged one period in the second step estimation. Results from the second step estimation are reported as specified in 
Table A12. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents 
significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.150*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.157*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.165*** 0.168*** 
 
           . (101.30) (5.85) (15.93) (103.17) (6.84) (18.93) (14.61) (9.78) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.096*** 
  
-0.097*** 
   
           . 
  
(-30.16) 
  
(-30.63) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.246*** 
  
-0.250*** 
   
           . 
  
(-94.36) 
  
(-95.73) 
   LAGR_DC -0.652*** -0.669*** 0.001 -0.660*** -0.677*** -0.006 -0.658*** -0.666*** -0.429*** 
           . (-174.24) (-90.41) (0.35) (-176.79) (-91.19) (-1.53) (-43.36) (-36.97) (-70.48) 
LAG 
INDSTDCF 0.775*** 0.853*** 0.184*** 0.700*** 0.786*** 0.159*** 0.665*** 0.854*** 0.168*** 
           . (98.38) (54.68) (29.53) (84.80) (47.89) (24.65) (6.18) (14.90) (14.63) 
LAGQ 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (38.57) (8.08) (4.75) (36.89) (7.21) (4.19) (5.00) (7.03) (18.19) 
LAGLNAT -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.001** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.018*** 
           . (-17.83) (-8.06) (4.11) (-28.62) (-12.76) (-2.49) (-10.13) (-9.40) (-21.98) 
LAGCFe -0.039*** -0.098*** -0.010*** -0.031*** -0.092*** -0.008*** 0.019 -0.014 0.011*** 
           . (-16.11) (-20.73) (-5.71) (-13.16) (-19.43) (-4.16) (0.86) (-0.69) (3.04) 
LAG 
BKDEBT -0.223*** -0.098*** -0.036*** -0.214*** -0.090*** -0.034*** -0.187*** -0.205*** -0.087*** 
           . (-99.16) (-22.02) (-20.05) (-95.02) (-20.16) (-18.77) (-16.24) (-22.96) (-26.14) 
LAGRD 
_SALE 0.019*** 0.066*** 0.005*** 0.019*** 0.066*** 0.005*** 0.068*** 0.035*** 0.002*** 
           . (57.99) (101.35) (21.30) (57.64) (101.18) (21.28) (3.07) (2.95) (2.66) 
LAG 
DIVDUM -0.027*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.019*** 0.002 -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.000 
           . (-24.97) (-2.64) (-8.59) (-17.01) (0.81) (-5.09) (-4.24) (-9.57) (0.03) 
LAGACQUI -0.370*** -0.368*** -0.083*** -0.377*** -0.376*** -0.087*** -0.362*** -0.425*** -0.157*** 
           . (-47.26) (-23.74) (-13.76) (-48.34) (-24.21) (-14.49) (-9.41) (-13.99) (-19.21) 
DUMMY1990 
   
0.002** 0.008*** -0.001* 
   
           . 
   
(2.11) (3.83) (-1.82) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
0.036*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 
   
           . 
   
(31.83) (11.46) (18.37) 
   R-Sq   0.501   0.284   0.165   0.506   0.285   0.168   0.491   0.535   0.759 
Adj R-Sq   0.501   0.284   0.165   0.506   0.285   0.168   0.490   0.534 
 Obs     106483     106516     106474     106483     106516     106474     106483      72471      58724 
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Table A14 Regressions of orthogonalized cash model (g) with industry cash flow volatility residuals 
(yearly OLS) 
This table reports the orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for 
ease of comparison. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The first step of the orthogonalized estimation 
regresses industry cash flow volatility against debt capacity in each financial year to obtain volatility residuals, R_INDSTDCF, for 
each firm-year observation. R_ INDSTDCF are then put into the regression models with other cash determinants in the second step 
estimation. Results from the second step estimation are reported as specified in Table A12. The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are 
reported in the parentheses. 
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.606*** 0.551*** 0.263*** 0.625*** 0.574*** 0.273*** 0.601*** 0.592*** 
 
        . (351.31) (136.52) (154.50) (345.86) (135.43) (153.66) (92.39) (121.23) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.049*** 
  
-0.049*** 
   
        . 
  
(-18.09) 
  
(-17.87) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.415*** 
  
-0.418*** 
   
        . 
  
(-207.76) 
  
(-209.00) 
   R_ 
INDSTCF 0.165*** 0.187*** 0.051*** 0.170*** 0.196*** 0.053*** 0.140*** 0.221*** 0.010 
        . (23.03) (11.16) (9.56) (23.77) (11.70) (9.88) (3.10) (8.46) (1.08) 
DC -0.888*** -1.048*** -0.429*** -0.911*** -1.087*** -0.441*** -0.900*** -0.884*** -0.850*** 
        . (-288.70) (-145.86) (-158.19) (-289.10) (-147.13) (-157.44) (-60.21) (-60.34) (-176.04) 
Q 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (46.08) (12.30) (18.77) (46.66) (11.78) (19.86) (4.27) (6.31) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
        . (-62.77) (-29.55) (-30.40) (-45.78) (-19.22) (-22.43) (-12.37) (-13.47) (-24.79) 
CFe -0.005** -0.012*** 0.046*** -0.009*** -0.020*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.000 0.024*** 
        . (-2.55) (-2.62) (31.40) (-4.94) (-4.45) (30.24) (1.29) (0.00) (9.37) 
BKDEBT -0.219*** -0.093*** -0.071*** -0.225*** -0.102*** -0.074*** -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.125*** 
        . (-115.07) (-20.84) (-47.66) (-118.46) (-22.95) (-49.62) (-24.59) (-58.90) (-49.39) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.065*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (59.07) (108.35) (32.05) (59.95) (109.05) (32.48) (3.20) (3.08) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.006*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.014*** 0.003 0.001 -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 
        . (-6.01) (6.60) (6.94) (-14.73) (1.26) (1.33) (-5.83) (-11.18) (6.46) 
ACQUI -0.467*** -0.565*** -0.450*** -0.465*** -0.568*** -0.449*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.88) (-35.66) (-87.18) (-68.91) (-35.94) (-86.96) (-12.75) (-19.69) (-36.21) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
-0.024*** -0.019*** -0.013*** 
   
        . 
   
(-25.74) (-8.51) (-17.94) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
-0.013*** -0.038*** -0.002*** 
   
        . 
   
(-13.13) (-16.47) (-2.74) 
   R-Sq   0.635   0.351   0.366   0.639   0.353   0.368   0.639   0.637   0.837 
Adj R-Sq   0.635   0.351   0.366   0.639   0.353   0.368   0.638   0.637 
 Obs     115681     115692     106501     115681     115692     106501     115681      78147      66083 
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A4.4 Cash model with interaction regression results 
The final cash model includes an interaction term between debt capacity and 
industry cash flow volatility reported in Table A15. By construction, including the 
interaction term means that debt capacity and volatility are assumed to be conditional 
upon each other, which to some extent may be true due to (1) high negative correlation 
found between the two variables in the univariate tests, and (2) previous findings 
supporting the relationship between debt capacity and cash flow, and assuming that cash 
flow volatility has similar relationship to debt capacity (Campello et al., 2011). Table 
A15 shows that the estimates for cash flow volatility increase significantly and a large 
estimate is reported for the interaction term. In these models, the coefficients of 
volatility and debt capacity have to be interpreted together with the interaction term. For 
the first OLS regression, the impact of volatility and debt capacity on cash is high at 
0.749 and -0.666 respectively, conditional upon the other variable being equal to zero. If 
a firm has no debt capacity at all, its cash flow volatility will play a significant role (up 
to 0.749) on the level of cash held. However, if the firm has sufficiently high debt 
capacity, volatility will play little or no role in affecting cash holdings. For instance, for 
a firm with debt capacity 38% of total assets, change in volatility will not lead to any 
change in cash holdings.24 The average debt capacity over the period 1980 to 2008 is 
38% of total assets which means that, on average, change in volatility minimally impact 
cash-on-hand over the sample period. However, debt capacity decreased during the 
sample period, and this may mean that cash flow volatility have increasing influence 
RYHUFDVKKROGLQJVRYHUWLPH7RSUHYHQWDQ\VKRFNVLQSURILWDELOLW\LQDIIHFWLQJDILUP¶V
                                                             
24
 At average debt capacity to total assets of 38%, impact of change in volatility on cash is computed as 0.749 - 
1.979*0.38 = 0 ± a zero impact of change in volatility on cash holdings.  
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liquidity, firms may choose to maintain a high debt capacity if at all possible. This, 
however, may not be critical because the impact of volatility on cash holdings is small. 
In the last two years, volatility increases 0.7% from 0.127 to 0.134. With the average 
debt capacity of 29% of total assets in 2008, actual increase in cash holdings from the 
change in volatility is only 0.12% ± contributing to only 6% of the total increase in cash 
of 2% of total assets from 2007 to 2008. 
On the other hand, for debt capacity to have net zero impact on cash holdings, 
volatility needs to be -0.337, which is not possible by construction because the mean of 
standard deviations of cash flow is always positive and at the minimum is equal to zero. 
At the minimum volatility, the least impact of debt capacity on cash is -0.666, and any 
increase in volatility will lead to a greater negative relationship between debt capacity 
and cash. The results remain largely similar for Models 1 to 8. For Model 9, much 
smaller coefficients are reported for volatility and interaction terms. The interpretation 
of results from Model 9 is, nevertheless, similar to the other models, where volatility 
SOD\VOLWWOHUROHLQILUPV¶FDVKPDQDJHPHQWZKHQDGHEWFDSDFLW\LVDERYHRIWRWDO
assets, the minimum effect of debt capacity on cash remains high at -0.769. The rest of 
the variables yield estimates that are similar to the previously reported results. 
The findings above show that, whilst debt capacity is important in cash 
management, cash flow volatility may only be important under certain conditions, for 
LQVWDQFH ORZHU GHEW FDSDFLW\ 6LQFH GHEW FDSDFLW\ PHDVXUHV ILUPV¶ DELOLW\ WR ERUURZ
ZKHQ QHHGHG WKH YDULDEOH LQGLUHFWO\ PHDVXUHV ILUPV¶ GHEW FRQVWUDLQWV ± where 
financially constrained firms have greater difficulty in obtaining loans. This implies that 
cash flow volatility may only have a positive impact on cash when firms are financially 
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or debt constrained. Similar findings are found in Campello et al. (2011) where cash 
flows are found to impact positively credit lines (debt capacity) only when firms are 
cash constrained. Supporting the previous findings, the level of constraints faced by 
firms may play a significant role in determining the relationship between cash, debt 
capacity and cash flow volatility. To investigate this further, the following Chapter will 
perform analysis across firms with varying financial constraints. 
To sum up the findings of this Chapter, previous studies and initial cash models 
found the impact of firm characteristics on cash and intercept of cash function change 
over time, and the presence of large fixed effects or unaccounted firm characteristics. 
These, however, are no longer present when debt capacity is introduced as an additional 
cash determinant. Debt capacity is found to have the greatest impact on level of cash. 
After considering the impact of debt capacity, (1) industry cash flow volatility has a 
lower significance and becomes unstable (i.e. sensitive to estimation methods), (2) net 
working capital is no longer a significant determinant of cash, (3) capital expenditure is 
sensitive to the estimation method and measurement of dependent variable,  (4) all other 
cash determinants exhibit lower estimates, and (5) no evidence of change in the 
intercepts of cash function is found. In the robustness test, the modified cash model 
(with debt capacity) results further confirm that debt capacity can replace net working 
capital and capital expenditure in explaining the level of cash, and the cash function may 
not have shifted over time but its slope becomes steeper. Finally, managers are found to 
be using current period firm condition to make cash decisions rather than previous 
reported figures because they are assumed to have inside information that may not be 
publicly reported yet. 
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Table A15 Regressions of base cash model (h) with debt capacity and interaction effect  
for period 1980 to2008 
This table reports the cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of 
comparison. Interaction term (DC*INDSTDCF) is computed as the product of debt capacity ratio and industry cash flow volatility 
for each firm-year observation. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for model 
specifications. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents 
significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
 
Variable MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.516*** 0.788*** 0.221*** 0.529*** 1.014*** 0.231*** 0.485*** 0.430*** 
 
           . (204.22) (29.95) (104.11) (205.81) (37.96) (106.35) (15.80) (41.51) 
 LAG-
DCASH 
  
-0.051*** 
  
-0.049*** 
   
           . 
  
(-18.72) 
  
(-18.24) 
   LAG- 
CASH 
  
-0.412*** 
  
-0.415*** 
   
           . 
  
(-204.62) 
  
(-206.10) 
   DC -0.666*** -6.342*** -0.292*** -0.687*** -6.636*** -0.306*** -0.625*** -0.492*** -0.769*** 
           . (-115.95) (-106.08) (-65.55) (-119.55) (-111.12) (-68.21) (-8.47) (-16.50) (-99.44) 
INDSTDCF 0.749*** 2.618*** 0.336*** 0.793*** 2.762*** 0.348*** 0.938*** 1.290*** 0.172*** 
           . (48.84) (16.39) (28.91) (51.47) (17.26) (29.72) (4.38) (10.36) (8.07) 
DC* 
INDSTDCF -1.979*** -5.083*** -0.958*** -1.918*** -3.576*** -0.911*** -2.278*** -3.125*** -0.479*** 
           . (-47.47) (-11.71) (-30.63) (-46.00) (-8.25) (-29.03) (-4.63) (-13.00) (-8.74) 
Q 0.010*** 0.074*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.078*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 
           . (46.45) (33.86) (23.01) (46.49) (35.57) (23.81) (4.56) (6.45) (25.73) 
LNAT -0.015*** -0.113*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.080*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.017*** 
           . (-67.17) (-50.31) (-31.56) (-49.17) (-33.17) (-22.16) (-10.48) (-12.19) (-27.33) 
CFe -0.003 0.080*** 0.052*** -0.006*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.022* 0.006 0.030*** 
           . (-1.35) (3.96) (35.06) (-3.06) (2.75) (34.17) (1.83) (0.53) (11.66) 
NWC 0.003 -0.043** -0.012*** -0.000 -0.084*** -0.013*** -0.005 -0.018 -0.033*** 
           . (1.51) (-2.14) (-8.22) (-0.12) (-4.16) (-9.22) (-0.45) (-1.61) (-12.52) 
CAPEX 0.055*** 0.937*** -0.135*** 0.034*** 0.682*** -0.145*** 0.040** 0.072*** -0.046*** 
           . (10.28) (16.89) (-32.06) (6.38) (12.30) (-34.14) (2.25) (5.72) (-6.37) 
BKDEBT -0.216*** -2.473*** -0.071*** -0.223*** -2.551*** -0.075*** -0.207*** -0.225*** -0.136*** 
           . (-108.17) (-118.68) (-45.85) (-111.66) (-122.81) (-48.17) (-20.61) (-45.38) (-52.88) 
RD_SALE 0.013*** 0.064*** 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.066*** 0.005*** 0.059*** 0.023** 0.004*** 
           . (46.20) (22.75) (25.22) (46.69) (23.52) (25.69) (2.90) (2.87) (10.77) 
DIVDUM -0.006*** 0.008 0.003*** -0.014*** -0.092*** -0.001 -0.015*** -0.019*** 0.010*** 
           . (-6.61) (0.77) (4.95) (-14.77) (-9.06) (-0.85) (-6.67) (-12.11) (7.67) 
ACQUI -0.452*** -3.536*** -0.451*** -0.453*** -3.498*** -0.451*** -0.424*** -0.474*** -0.232*** 
           . (-67.03) (-50.34) (-87.84) (-67.48) (-50.16) (-87.89) (-13.82) (-18.35) (-37.97) 
DUMMY-
1990 
   
-0.022*** -0.387*** -0.013*** 
   
           . 
   
(-23.39) (-39.49) (-18.28) 
   DUMMY-
2000 
   
-0.019*** -0.051*** -0.006*** 
   
           . 
   
(-19.40) (-4.94) (-7.51) 
   Adj R-Sq   0.641   0.518   0.378   0.645   0.526   0.381   0.647   0.649   
Obs 115681 115692 106501 115681 115692 106501 115681 78147 70552 
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CHAPTER A5. DEBT CAPACITY, CASH HOLDINGS AND 
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey (2011) find that firms with more internal 
liquidity (cash and credit line) have greater ability to invest and are subjected to lower 
costs of debt (commitment fee and actual fees). The survey observed the following 
interaction between internal flexibility and investment. First, at low level of lines of 
credit, firms choose to save cash rather than invest. This suggests that firms with high 
levels of lines of credit can avoid giving up valuable investment opportunities for cash 
savings.25 In other words, financially constrained firms will prefer saving cash to 
LQYHVWLQJ 6HFRQG ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW DQG OLQHV RI FUHGLW DUH SRVLWLYHO\ UHODWHG WR HDFK
other only at high level of cash holdings, i.e. lines of credit are value-adding to firms 
only when their cash holdings are sufficiently high. Finally, the interactions between 
cash and credit line are dependent on whether firms are financially constrained. The 
substitution effect between cash and lines of credit is higher for constrained firms. Firms 
are classified as credit constrained if they are small, private, of non-investment grade, 
have limited access to credit lines and have negative cash flow (Campello et al., 2011). 
Constrained firms are found to use more (42%-64% compared to 21%-33% of 
unconstrained firms) of their committed credit lines during the crisis. They face greater 
difficulties when renewing or initiating new lines of credit and, when they do so 
successfully, the terms of credit change unfavourably.  
Flannery and Lockhart (September 2009) find opposite evidence such that cash and 
credit lines are not good substitutes for constrained firms. In view of imperfect capital 
                                                             
25
 This relationship is not observed when the opportunity cost of investment is large. In such circumstances, firms will 
still opt to invest rather than save, regardless of the level of credit and cash savings. 
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market and transaction costs, cash and debt capacity are not perfect substitutes for each 
other (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Here, a perfect trade-off between cash and debt 
capacity is not found; rather some form of substitution between the two instruments is 
evident (supporting evidence in Chapter A4). This is further analysed to determine 
whether the trade-off varies for firms with different financial constraints. 
In Table A16, the Compustat firm sample is matched with Campello et al. (2011) 
and similar trends are reported for year 2008. The difference in reported proportion is 
due to the difference in numbers of firms and slight variation in variable measurement. 
Campello et al. (2011) report 5000 firms at the end of fiscal year 2008 and these firms 
are required to be active in the first quarter of 2009. Due to the time frame, the previous 
Compustat sample reported only consists of firms with fiscal year-end in December 
2008. Our sample consists of 5,460 firms, including firms with fiscal year-end other 
than December 2008. Whilst cash flow is measured using return on assets, an income 
statement method of computation in Campello et al. (2011), it is measured here as net 
cash flow ± a cash-flow statement method of computation following Frank and Goyal 
(2003) (see Chapter A2.3 Sample and variable specifications for details). The proportion 
of firms classified as constrained (i.e. small, non-investment grade, non-dividend payer 
and negative cash flow) is larger in our sample because we need not require firms to be 
active in the next fiscal year. Notwithstanding the above minor differences, the general 
trend is similar and, accordingly, firms are classified into constrained and unconstrained 
groups for further analyses.  
The last two columns report proportions and statistics for firms from 1980 to 
2008. Taking the entire sample as a whole, smaller firms form a greater proportion 
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possibly because a larger number of firms is considered. The proportion of firms of 
investment grade is higher, suggesting that recent firms may have lower credit rating 
compared to the past. The proportions of firms paying dividends and reporting negative 
cash flows remain similar to year 2008. Ironically, average returns to assets are 
considerably larger (69%) compared to year 2008 (6%) ± this is possibly due to two 
factors: (1) greater profitability of firms in past years, and (2) the recent credit crunch. 
Taking the entire sample as a whole, debt capacity, unused debt capacity and leverage 
increase, while cash holdings and net cash flow decrease. For comparability, private 
firms are included in the computation of sample proportions in Table A17.26 However, 
since private firms have different disclosure requirements, and statistics are not entirely 
available over the entire sample, they are excluded from the sample in subsequent tests.  
The classification criteria are modified from Campello et al. (2011) for the 
Compustat sample of public firms (see Table A17). There are four constraint criteria 
XVHG WR FODVVLI\ ILUPV DV µVPDOO¶ µQRQ-LQYHVWPHQW JUDGHG¶ µXQSURILWDEOH¶ DQG µQRQ-
GLYLGHQGSD\HU¶'LYLVLRQRIILUPVLQWRFUHGLWFRQVWUDLQHGDQGXQFRQVWUDLQHGDOORZVIRU
the analysis on whether constraints affect interaction between cash and debt capacity. 
For comparability, Panel A in Table A18 reports the Compustat/CRSP sample of public 
firms for financial year 2008. The survey sample includes both private and public firms, 
and firms have lower cash holdings and debt capacity, and are smaller in size compared 
to our sample of public firms. Since the number of firms is significantly smaller in the 
survey, it is more insightful to compare the median statistics rather than the mean 
figures. The other statistics are largely similar with median values of net cash flow, 
                                                             
26
 Private firms have missing share code (SHRCD) in the Compustat/CRSP database. The sample includes only firms 
with share code 11and 12. 
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investment grading and bank dependence reporting the same median statistics. Panel B 
reports the same firm characteristics for the entire sample from 1980 to 2008. Similar 
figures are obtained when computation of statistics is done by pooling the entire sample 
or by averaging yearly. As expected, after taking into account the entire sample, firms in 
the earlier sample period hold less cash, are larger in size, and have greater debt 
capacities, debt and bank dependence.  
After the initial matching to ensure the comparability of sample with Campello 
et al. (2011), firms are then divided into constrained and unconstrained according to the 
four criteria listed in Table A17. OLS and fixed effects regressions of base cash model 
(a) and model with debt capacity (c) are performed for the two groups of firms. The 
purpose of separating firms into constrained and unconstrained categories is to examine 
the use of cash and debt capacity for the two groups of firms and determine whether the 
negative relationship between cash and debt capacity is different across firms. In an 
unreported two-sample means test, means of cash and debt capacity ratios are 
significantly different between constrained and unconstrained firms for all constraint 
criteria. There is significant difference in the use of cash and debt capacity for firms 
with varying constraints. It is expected that constrained firms will have a higher negative 
cash-DC relationship because of greater need to substitute any drop in cash or debt 
capacity with another instrument. Results will be used to support the findings of 
Campello et al. (2010), and confirm the possibility that debt capacity may be a good 
proxy for credit line and thus a good alternative to measuring financial constraint.27 
  
                                                             
27
 Campello et al. (July 2010) finds (1) substitution between cash savings and investments when firms have low debt 
capacity (i.e. lines of credit), (2) cash is used to substitute credit lines when credit is unavailable, and (3) greater credit 
line allow firms to invest more only when there are sufficient cash on hand. 
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Table A16 FY2008 sample proportion breakdown according constraints criteria 
This table compares the CRSP/Compustat sample used in this thesis with the Compustat sample of Campello et al. 
(2009). The number of observations and proportions are reported in a similar manner for ease of comparison. Basic 
descriptive statistics on cash holdings, return on assets, net cash flow, debt capacity and unused debt capacity are 
reported with the former two compared to Campello et al. (2009). All firms are included with the exception of 
financial (SIC=69000-6999) and government (SIC=9100) firms. The last two columns report firms in 
CRSP/Compustat from 1980 to 2008 with the exception of investment grade which is only reported from 1985 to 
2008 due to data unavailability. Small firms have total sales of less than $1billion, and large firms have total sales 
equal or more than $1billion. Investment grade firms are as defined in Campello et al. (2009) as firms with S&P long-
term credit rating of BBB- or higher. Dividend is the total (common and preferred) dividend declared by firms in 
each financial year. Net cash flow is the ratio of net cash flow to total assets, computed according to Frank and Goyal 
(2009); and cash holdings is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to total assets. Return on assets is the 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. Debt capacity is the ratio of 
the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets; and unused debt capacity is debt 
capacity less debt only computed when firms report a positive debt capacity.  Debt is the sum of long term debt and 
debt in current liabilities to total assets. Cash, debt and debt capacity ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more 
than one is made equal to one. Cash flow and return on assets ratios are winsorized at its top and bottom three 
interquartile range. Winsorisation method is different because both private and public firms are included, and taking 
arbitrary 1% or 5% away may distort sample statistics. 
  
Campello et al. (2009) 
Compustat sample   Sample for FY2008    
Sample for  
FY1980-2008  
Firm types N Frequency 
 
N Frequency 
 
N Frequency 
Small 3647 68% 
 
3772 69% 
 
161011 85% 
Large 1698 32% 
 
1688 31% 
 
29486 15% 
  5345   
 
5460   
 
190497   
Non-investment grade 997 52% 
 
1050 55% 
 
16156 46% 
Investment grade 907 48% 
 
845 45% 
 
19070 54% 
  1904   
 
1895   
 
35226   
Non-dividend payer 2667 55% 
 
3472 64% 
 
114141 60% 
Dividend payer 2173 45% 
 
1988 36% 
 
76356 40% 
 
4840 
  
5460 
  
190497 
 Negative cash flow (CFcf) 1152 23% 
 
977 19% 
 
51179 27% 
Positive cash flow (CFcf) 3875 77% 
 
4086 81% 
 
139305 73% 
  5027   
 
5063   
 
190484   
Negative unused debt capacity  -   -  
 
1828 33% 
 
48839 26% 
Positive unused debt capacity  -   - 
 
3632 67% 
 
137280 74% 
    
5460   
 
186119   
  Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Cash holdings 0.178 0.078 
 
0.185 0.095 
 
0.157 0.065 
ROA 0.044 0.082 
 
0.049 0.063 
 
0.044 0.058 
Net cash flow (CFcf)  -   -  
 
0.072 0.086 
 
0.070 0.086 
Debt capacity  -   -  
 
0.316 0.331 
 
0.380 0.415 
Unused debt capacity  -   -  
 
0.054 0.104 
 
0.102 0.146 
Debt  -   -    0.263 0.211   0.280 0.240 
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Table A17 Key constraint criteria comparison 
Constraint criteria Campello et al. (2009) Modified criteria used 
Small firms Sales less than $1billion Sales less than $1billion 
Non-public firms Private firms with the exception of 
financial and non-profitable organisation 
NIL  
(sample only public firms with the exception of 
financial and non-profitable organisations 
firms) 
Non-investment grade S&P Long-term credit rating below 
BBB- or unrated 
S&P Long-term credit rating below BBB- or 
unrated 
 
Limited access to 
lines of credit 
Firms at the bottom 30% lines of credit 
from the survey data 
NIL 
(Firms at the bottom 30% of unused debt 
capacity may be used as a criteria, but because 
debt capacity is used as an explanatory variable 
in subsequent cash regressions, this 
classification is omitted to prevent problem of 
biasness)  
Unprofitable (negative 
cash flow) 
Negative return on assets  Negative net cash flow (CFcf) following Frank 
and Goyal (2009) 
Non-dividend payer NIL Zero common dividend issued 
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Table A18 Descriptive statistics of internal flexibility and constraint variables in comparison with Campello et al. (2009) 
This table compares the summary statistics of flexibility and constraint variables with Campello et al. (2009). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are 
included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999) and government (SIC=9100) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Cash 
holdings is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to total assets; and net cash flow (CFcf) is the ratio of net cash flow to total assets, computed according to Frank and 
Goyal (2009). Debt capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets; and unused debt capacity is debt capacity less debt only 
computed when firms report a positive debt capacity.  Debt is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Large variable equals to one when total sales is 
larger than $1billion; investment grade variable equals to one when firms have long-term credit rating of BBB- and above; and bank dependent variable equals to one when firm is 
reported to have a rating. Cash, debt and debt capacity ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. Net cash flow is winsorized at the bottom 1%. 
Panel A 
  Campello et al. (2009) survey sample for 2008   Sample for FY2008 (for public firms only) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 (Median) Q3 N 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 (Median) Q3 N 
Cash holdings 0.122 0.157 0.020 0.055 0.160 334 
 
0.202 0.225 0.033 0.110 0.298 2689 
Net cash flow 0.090 0.171 0.030 0.080 0.150 338 
 
0.023 0.284 0.028 0.085 0.136 2689 
Debt capacity 0.239   0.210  0.100 0.200   0.330  287  
 
0.297 0.142 0.185 0.303 0.415 2652 
Unused debt capacity  -   -   -   -   -   -  
 
0.060 0.255 -0.061 0.100 0.234 2644 
Debt    -   -   -   -   -   -  
 
0.237 0.235 0.018 0.192 0.368 2681 
Large 0.220 0.420 0.000 0.000 0.000 397 
 
0.340 0.474 0.000 0.000 1.000 2689 
Investment grade 0.180 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 397 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2689 
Bank dependent 0.720 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000 397   0.711 0.453 0.000 1.000 1.000 2689 
Panel B 
  FY1980-2008 Pooled statistics   FY1980-2008 Average (by year) statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Q2 (Median) Q3 N 
 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Q1 Q2 (Median) Q3 N 
Cash holdings 0.167 0.210 0.021 0.076 0.234 124662 
 
0.168 0.203 0.023 0.082 0.242 4299 
Net cash flow 0.039 0.274 0.019 0.085 0.138 124701 
 
0.041 0.254 0.018 0.085 0.137 4300 
Debt capacity 0.376 0.143 0.281 0.409 0.491 122344 
 
0.375 0.131 0.291 0.398 0.476 4219 
Unused debt capacity 0.135 0.228 0.025 0.164 0.294 122112 
 
0.134 0.224 0.025 0.163 0.289 4211 
Debt   0.243 0.217 0.049 0.212 0.374 124461 
 
0.243 0.215 0.054 0.208 0.371 4292 
Large 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 124701 
 
0.171 0.368 0.000 0.000 0.172 4300 
Investment grade 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 124701 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 4300 
Bank dependent 0.829 0.377 1.000 1.000 1.000 124701   0.828 0.335 0.793 1.000 1.000 4300 
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Base cash model regressions for constrained and unconstrained firms are 
reported in Table A19. Results show that industry cash flow volatility has reduced 
importance in its effect on cash holdings for unconstrained firms ± magnitude of 
coefficient estimate for volatility falls dramatically for all four subsamples of 
unconstrained firms (e.g. from 0.433 to 0.038 for non-investment graded and investment 
graded firms respectively). Industry cash flow volatility has greater impact on cash 
holdings only when firms are financially constrained. This supports the precautionary 
motive of saving cash (Keynes, 1936) as firms increase cash holdings in face of greater 
cash flow risks that are undiversifiable. Han and Qiu (2007) find a significant 
relationship between cash and cash flow volatility for constrained firms, while the same 
relationship for unconstrained firms is insignificant. There may be a herding effect 
where constrained firms monitor the cash flow volatility of their peers when deciding 
how much cash to retain because constrained firms are more prone to credit rejection 
and managers tend not to put their source of external financing at risk by falling below 
the industry mean. The herding behaviour may be more apparent in competitive 
industries for strategic reasons (Lins et al., 2010). Previous studies (e.g. Bates et al., 
2009, Froot et al., 1993, Minton and Schrandb, 1999, Smith and Stulz, 1985) show that 
deadweight costs of financial distress increase with cash flow volatility. As constrained 
firms have higher probability of distress, these costs matter much more to them; 
resulting in greater impact of volatility on cash holdings where an increase in volatility 
will lead to a significantly larger increase in cash. Furthermore, cash flow is 
insignificant for investment graded firms, where addition to cash holdings from cash 
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flow is of little impact to total amount of cash held because these firms have little 
difficulty in sourcing alternative financing.  
The rest of the variables show the expected trend for firms with varying levels of 
constraints. Leverage, net working capital and capital expenditure have larger impact on 
cash holdings for constrained firms ± an increase in leverage, net working capital or 
capital expenditure will lead to a larger decrease in cash holdings of constrained firms. 
Larger coefficient for leverage implies constrained firms treat financing from leverage 
and cash as substitutes for each other more than their unconstrained counterparts; 
possibly due to greater difficulty in sourcing funds. Thus, financing used for operations 
and investment purpose are not clearly distinguished and firms utilise funds wherever 
sourced as long as they are available when needed. This is further supported by the 
larger coefficient estimates for net working capital (operation purpose) and capital 
expenditure (investment purpose) for constrained firms, where (1) the same increase in 
inventory and account receivables leads to a larger fall in cash; and (2) the same amount 
of capital investment made is funded proportionally more by cash when firms are 
financially constrained. This is partially supported by Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
where cash has a greater marginal value for constrained firms because these firms make 
greater use of cash for investment purposes. On the other hand, investment in research 
and development are largely funded by cash when firms are less constrained, i.e. 
unconstrained research intensive firms hold greater cash when research expenses 
increase. Since constrained firms have less capability to keep aside cash for investment 
purposes, the reported positive relationship between cash and research expenses is much 
lower. The results support Campello et al. (2009) where constrained firms invest less 
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(and save more in terms of cash), and a weaker relationship between cash and 
investment is expected. 
Table A20 reports regression estimates with debt capacity included as additional 
independent variable. Results further support findings from the base cash model, and 
show that industry cash flow volatility is a significant cash determinant only for 
constrained firms. When debt capacity is considered, coefficient estimate for volatility 
of unconstrained firms falls significantly and becomes statistically insignificant.  For 
unconstrained firms sorted by credit rating and dividends, the estimate for volatility 
becomes unstable and estimated relationship changes from negative to positive. 
Although debt capacity has a larger estimated coefficient for constrained firms, it 
remains a significant and important cash determinant for unconstrained firms. The 
smallest coefficient magnitude for unconstrained firms is 0.162 (investment graded 
firms), where a unit increase in debt capacity will lead to a 16.2% fall in cash holdings. 
This is comparatively larger compared to other coefficients, showing that debt capacity 
remains important in cash management for both constrained and unconstrained firms. 
For research and development expenses, results correspond to findings in Table A19 
where unconstrained research intensive firms hold significantly more cash to finance 
such expenses. 
In Table A19, leverage, net working capital and capital expenditure are found to 
have greater impact on cash holdings for constrained firms. This finding is, however, not 
supported after debt capacity is included in Table A20. The impact of leverage, net 
working capital and capital expenditure on cash holdings are no longer dependent on the 
level of constraints faced by firms. Furthermore, the relationship between net working 
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capital and cash, and capital expenditure and cash are no longer stable with coefficients 
reporting both positive and negative relationship, and coefficients magnitude decreasing 
significantly. Supporting the initial findings in Table A8, industry cash flow volatility, 
net working capital and capital expenditure no longer remain important cash 
determinants after debt capacity is included. While debt capacity, and research and 
development expenses continue to predict cash holdings across firms with varying level 
of financial constraints.  Firms with lower debt capacity tend to hold greater cash; this 
effect is greater for small size, non-investment graded, unprofitable and non-dividend 
paying firms, i.e. financial constrained firms. The opposite is reported for research and 
development expenses where firms keep more cash if research and development 
expenses are higher, and that unconstrained research-intensive firms hold greater cash 
compared to their constrained counterparts. 
The last part of this Chapter sums up the findings of the cash models performed 
across firms with varying financial constraints. First, industry cash flow volatility is a 
more important cash determinant for constrained firms because of herding behaviour in 
competitive industries (Lins et al., 2010) and the increased intensity of deadweight costs 
of financial distress for constrained firms (e.g. Bates et al., 2009, Froot et al., 1993, 
Minton and Schrandb, 1999, Smith and Stulz, 1985). Second, constrained firms consider 
funding from leverage and cash as substitutes of each other more than unconstrained 
firms. This indicates that funding used for operations and investments might not be 
clearly distinguished all the time. Third, supporting Faulkender and Wang (2006), cash 
has a higher marginal value because it is used proportionately more in funding 
investments of constrained firms. Finally and most importantly, in the modified cash 
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model (when debt capacity is included as additional determinant), previous important 
cash determinants ± cash flow volatility, net working capital, and capital expenditure are 
no longer significant in explaining cash level of unconstrained firms, while debt 
capacity and research and development expenses remain significant (although of 
different magnitude) for both constrained and unconstrained firms. The substitution 
effect between debt capacity and cash is larger when firms have greater financial 
constraints. On the other hand, research and development expenses increase the level of 
cash holdings and even more so for unconstrained firms.  
 
Part A  Chapter A5. Internal flexibility and financial constraints 
104 
 
Table A19 Regressions of base cash model (a) for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to2008 
This table reports the base cash model results for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-
6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Firms are sorted according to 
four financial constraint criteria ± firm size, cash flow, investment grade and dividend. Constrained firms have sales less than US$1billion, report negative net cash flow, are not of 
investment grade (rating below BBB- or unrated), and do not pay common dividends in the applicable financial year; and conversely for unconstrained firms. Variable 
specifications are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total asset. The first model (OLS) is estimated using OLS regression 
with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. The second model (FM) is based on Fama-MacBeth regressions performed yearly from 1980 to 2008 using Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 
5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Intercept 0.234*** 0.225*** 
 
0.200*** 0.191*** 
 
0.189*** 0.199*** 
 
0.271*** 0.268*** 
        . (109.55) (14.79) 
 
(42.29) (38.39) 
 
(39.83) (6.79) 
 
(149.96) (47.55) 
INDSTDCF 0.433*** 0.429*** 
 
0.074*** 0.068* 
 
0.708*** 0.585*** 
 
0.213*** 0.141*** 
        . (44.71) (4.38) 
 
(7.63) (1.91) 
 
(31.82) (3.05) 
 
(26.75) (5.36) 
Q 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 
0.022*** 0.028*** 
 
0.017*** 0.013*** 
 
0.026*** 0.025*** 
        . (67.98) (7.97) 
 
(36.15) (7.86) 
 
(32.91) (6.36) 
 
(81.30) (9.71) 
LNAT 0.004*** 0.003 
 
-0.010*** -0.010*** 
 
0.021*** 0.013** 
 
-0.010*** -0.012*** 
        . (11.95) (1.05) 
 
(-18.24) (-17.82) 
 
(24.08) (2.26) 
 
(-42.35) (-24.21) 
CFe -0.063*** -0.018 
 
-0.019*** -0.026** 
 
-0.034*** 0.016 
 
-0.099*** -0.085*** 
        . (-24.35) (-0.94) 
 
(-3.04) (-2.68) 
 
(-7.07) (0.89) 
 
(-22.75) (-6.67) 
NWC -0.190*** -0.201*** 
 
-0.093*** -0.102*** 
 
-0.148*** -0.155*** 
 
-0.181*** -0.187*** 
        . (-79.53) (-14.22) 
 
(-29.81) (-7.26) 
 
(-26.30) (-13.70) 
 
(-87.70) (-17.10) 
CAPEX -0.357*** -0.436*** 
 
-0.168*** -0.179*** 
 
-0.269*** -0.337*** 
 
-0.329*** -0.344*** 
        . (-52.43) (-5.82) 
 
(-13.93) (-5.81) 
 
(-16.03) (-4.11) 
 
(-54.06) (-9.41) 
BKDEBT -0.415*** -0.388*** 
 
-0.167*** -0.165*** 
 
-0.455*** -0.402*** 
 
-0.341*** -0.315*** 
        . (-159.16) (-36.30) 
 
(-44.47) (-26.71) 
 
(-82.83) (-27.77) 
 
(-140.75) (-59.87) 
RD_SALE 0.022*** 0.104*** 
 
0.547*** 0.451*** 
 
0.019*** 0.121** 
 
0.145*** 0.402*** 
        . (65.78) (3.18) 
 
(37.52) (8.56) 
 
(42.39) (2.67) 
 
(47.16) (10.47) 
DIVDUM -0.045*** -0.045*** 
 
-0.037*** -0.037*** 
 
-0.089*** -0.068*** 
 
-0.033*** -0.029*** 
        . (-32.58) (-6.83) 
 
(-27.51) (-14.84) 
 
(-12.39) (-6.12) 
 
(-32.03) (-7.60) 
ACQUI -0.262*** -0.265*** 
 
-0.165*** -0.145*** 
 
-0.347*** -0.290*** 
 
-0.179*** -0.189*** 
        . (-27.51) (-4.97)   (-15.12) (-7.08)   (-11.62) (-4.24)   (-23.89) (-6.76) 
Adj R-Sq   0.431   0.424 
 
  0.369   0.337 
 
  0.433   0.425 
 
  0.398   0.415 
Obs      99470      65131       18370      14181       26585      19395       91255      59917 
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Table A19 (continued) 
Panel B 
  Non-investment graded   Investment graded   Non-dividend paying   Dividend paying 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Intercept 0.244*** 0.242***   0.183*** 0.187***   0.231*** 0.229***   0.288*** 0.287*** 
        . (124.72) (18.54) 
 
(29.44) (9.68) 
 
(100.39) (16.54) 
 
(115.03) (49.86) 
INDSTDCF 0.433*** 0.410*** 
 
0.038*** 0.099 
 
0.478*** 0.473*** 
 
0.127*** 0.082*** 
        . (48.90) (4.41) 
 
(3.05) (1.60) 
 
(45.75) (4.18) 
 
(11.70) (4.76) 
Q 0.019*** 0.017*** 
 
0.016*** 0.021*** 
 
0.019*** 0.017*** 
 
0.024*** 0.025*** 
        . (71.79) (7.51) 
 
(19.93) (10.33) 
 
(63.97) (7.99) 
 
(44.11) (11.87) 
LNAT -0.000 -0.002 
 
-0.008*** -0.009*** 
 
0.002*** 0.000 
 
-0.019*** -0.019*** 
        . (-1.41) (-1.09) 
 
(-13.24) (-8.52) 
 
(5.76) (0.12) 
 
(-62.45) (-22.54) 
CFe -0.056*** -0.010 
 
-0.013* -0.019 
 
-0.056*** -0.008 
 
-0.121*** -0.129*** 
        . (-22.64) (-0.55) 
 
(-1.65) (-1.01) 
 
(-20.21) (-0.53) 
 
(-21.28) (-7.64) 
NWC -0.184*** -0.195*** 
 
-0.072*** -0.081*** 
 
-0.187*** -0.199*** 
 
-0.164*** -0.167*** 
        . (-81.94) (-13.68) 
 
(-18.59) (-5.42) 
 
(-69.05) (-12.39) 
 
(-59.30) (-13.58) 
CAPEX -0.349*** -0.411*** 
 
-0.192*** -0.206*** 
 
-0.335*** -0.391*** 
 
-0.360*** -0.383*** 
        . (-53.61) (-6.24) 
 
(-12.63) (-6.23) 
 
(-43.94) (-5.80) 
 
(-37.58) (-14.91) 
BKDEBT -0.398*** -0.372*** 
 
-0.156*** -0.158*** 
 
-0.412*** -0.383*** 
 
-0.280*** -0.274*** 
        . (-163.37) (-38.83) 
 
(-25.62) (-12.13) 
 
(-144.06) (-47.04) 
 
(-77.59) (-57.74) 
RD_SALE 0.023*** 0.105*** 
 
0.456*** 0.394*** 
 
0.023*** 0.106*** 
 
0.035*** 0.300*** 
        . (69.57) (3.20) 
 
(22.04) (4.78) 
 
(63.21) (3.15) 
 
(6.75) (7.07) 
DIVDUMMY -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 
-0.030*** -0.041*** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
        . (-35.54) (-6.70) 
 
(-13.96) (-3.49) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
ACQUI -0.240*** -0.237*** 
 
-0.135*** -0.131*** 
 
-0.265*** -0.255*** 
 
-0.148*** -0.162*** 
        . (-27.06) (-5.43)   (-9.54) (-5.33)   (-24.79) (-5.49)   (-14.00) (-9.01) 
Adj R-Sq   0.431   0.427 
 
  0.291   0.321 
 
  0.423   0.424 
 
  0.367   0.386 
Obs     108785      71921         9055       7391        82331      59482        35509      19830 
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Table A20 Regressions of cash model (c) for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to2008 
This table reports results from modified cash model with debt capacity for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008. Sample and variable specifications are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A19 for model specifications. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * 
represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Intercept 0.598*** 0.576*** 
 
0.339*** 0.337*** 
 
0.598*** 0.565*** 
 
0.556*** 0.547*** 
        . (264.26) (47.15) 
 
(61.19) (25.73) 
 
(124.28) (40.53) 
 
(268.79) (26.45) 
DC_NOCASH -0.940*** -0.933*** 
 
-0.282*** -0.316*** 
 
-1.080*** -1.039*** 
 
-0.742*** -0.761*** 
        . (-241.49) (-65.44) 
 
(-42.48) (-9.26) 
 
(-132.37) (-28.40) 
 
(-198.58) (-14.99) 
INDSTDCF 0.109*** 0.186*** 
 
0.014 -0.010 
 
0.236*** 0.268*** 
 
0.003 0.015 
        . (13.88) (3.82) 
 
(1.48) (-0.27) 
 
(13.35) (3.24) 
 
(0.49) (0.60) 
Q 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
0.016*** 0.020*** 
 
0.007*** 0.005*** 
 
0.014*** 0.014*** 
        . (42.40) (4.81) 
 
(26.97) (7.94) 
 
(18.75) (3.23) 
 
(53.69) (4.73) 
LNAT -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 
-0.015*** -0.013*** 
 
-0.000 0.001 
 
-0.017*** -0.014*** 
        . (-33.23) (-11.46) 
 
(-27.09) (-11.94) 
 
(-0.12) (0.91) 
 
(-80.27) (-11.86) 
CFe -0.009*** 0.015 
 
-0.019*** 0.007 
 
-0.011*** 0.001 
 
-0.039*** -0.012 
        . (-4.20) (1.13) 
 
(-2.76) (0.42) 
 
(-3.04) (0.11) 
 
(-9.92) (-0.64) 
NWC 0.015*** 0.001 
 
-0.066*** -0.068*** 
 
0.059*** 0.048*** 
 
-0.033*** -0.035** 
 
(6.81) (0.19) 
 
(-20.39) (-4.86) 
 
(12.37) (6.57) 
 
(-15.93) (-2.22) 
CAPEX 0.041*** 0.024* 
 
0.029** -0.024 
 
0.090*** 0.088*** 
 
0.004 -0.012 
 
(7.08) (1.71) 
 
(2.30) (-0.86) 
 
(6.69) (4.83) 
 
(0.73) (-1.04) 
BKDEBT -0.213*** -0.214*** 
 
-0.159*** -0.145*** 
 
-0.181*** -0.178*** 
 
-0.225*** -0.209*** 
        . (-94.98) (-20.01) 
 
(-43.92) (-15.44) 
 
(-38.04) (-17.42) 
 
(-105.65) (-21.24) 
RD_SALE 0.014*** 0.062*** 
 
0.468*** 0.400*** 
 
0.011*** 0.065** 
 
0.093*** 0.264*** 
        . (52.27) (3.14) 
 
(33.30) (9.87) 
 
(29.82) (2.63) 
 
(36.21) (9.20) 
DIVDUM -0.000 -0.012*** 
 
-0.025*** -0.028*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.002* -0.009*** 
        . (-0.00) (-6.93) 
 
(-18.46) (-12.28) 
 
(-3.82) (-5.34) 
 
(-1.74) (-5.55) 
ACQUI -0.509*** -0.482*** 
 
-0.233*** -0.212*** 
 
-0.600*** -0.522*** 
 
-0.396*** -0.380*** 
        . (-66.55) (-11.17) 
 
(-22.10) (-11.55) 
 
(-25.84) (-10.42) 
 
(-62.26) (-19.53) 
Adj R-Sq   0.646   0.643 
 
  0.428   0.416 
 
  0.659   0.644 
 
  0.587   0.611 
Obs      97625      64220       18056      13927       26212      19157       89469      58990 
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Table A20 (continued) 
Panel B 
  Non-investment graded   Investment graded   Non-dividend paying   Dividend paying 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Intercept 0.594*** 0.576*** 
 
0.256*** 0.258*** 
 
0.598*** 0.575*** 
 
0.525*** 0.517*** 
        . (283.34) (47.06) 
 
(36.84) (8.27) 
 
(239.99) (47.88) 
 
(173.29) (22.52) 
DC_NOCASH -0.916*** -0.911*** 
 
-0.189*** -0.203*** 
 
-0.941*** -0.934*** 
 
-0.594*** -0.619*** 
        . (-248.91) (-50.32) 
 
(-22.51) (-4.21) 
 
(-216.65) (-46.74) 
 
(-109.88) (-11.75) 
INDSTDCF 0.102*** 0.164*** 
 
-0.004 0.025 
 
0.136*** 0.213*** 
 
-0.031*** -0.005 
        . (14.17) (3.38) 
 
(-0.36) (0.54) 
 
(16.02) (4.36) 
 
(-3.32) (-0.21) 
Q 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
0.014*** 0.017*** 
 
0.010*** 0.009*** 
 
0.013*** 0.014*** 
        . (44.52) (4.60) 
 
(17.44) (8.76) 
 
(40.34) (4.96) 
 
(25.98) (6.19) 
LNAT -0.011*** -0.009*** 
 
-0.010*** -0.009*** 
 
-0.012*** -0.008*** 
 
-0.020*** -0.018*** 
        . (-46.02) (-10.81) 
 
(-16.50) (-12.64) 
 
(-39.78) (-4.55) 
 
(-75.20) (-20.84) 
CFe -0.008*** 0.017 
 
-0.014 -0.005 
 
-0.002 0.020* 
 
-0.092*** -0.073*** 
        . (-4.21) (1.30) 
 
(-1.44) (-0.21) 
 
(-1.05) (1.74) 
 
(-17.36) (-4.24) 
NWC 0.010*** -0.004 
 
-0.052*** -0.054*** 
 
0.014*** 0.001 
 
-0.055*** -0.058*** 
 
(4.56) (-0.36) 
 
(-13.26) (-4.40) 
 
(5.69) (0.06) 
 
(-19.81) (-4.58) 
CAPEX 0.042*** 0.022 
 
-0.030* -0.065* 
 
0.058*** 0.042** 
 
-0.040*** -0.064*** 
 
(7.60) (1.55) 
 
(-1.79) (-1.97) 
 
(9.02) (2.68) 
 
(-4.47) (-3.22) 
BKDEBT -0.216*** -0.212*** 
 
-0.140*** -0.136*** 
 
-0.212*** -0.209*** 
 
-0.217*** -0.207*** 
        . (-103.05) (-19.61) 
 
(-23.39) (-10.44) 
 
(-85.63) (-22.28) 
 
(-67.80) (-17.10) 
RD_SALE 0.015*** 0.063*** 
 
0.426*** 0.392*** 
 
0.015*** 0.061*** 
 
0.013*** 0.185*** 
        . (55.43) (3.17) 
 
(21.20) (5.28) 
 
(49.77) (3.20) 
 
(2.92) (5.97) 
DIVDUM -0.000 -0.012*** 
 
-0.019*** -0.028*** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
        . (-0.22) (-6.80) 
 
(-8.92) (-3.06) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
ACQUI -0.490*** -0.458*** 
 
-0.180*** -0.177*** 
 
-0.517*** -0.479*** 
 
-0.303*** -0.302*** 
        . (-68.48) (-12.46) 
 
(-12.96) (-8.91) 
 
(-59.97) (-12.73) 
 
(-32.78) (-20.62) 
Adj R-Sq   0.642   0.643 
 
  0.330   0.364 
 
  0.636   0.642 
 
  0.536   0.556 
Obs 106778 70868 
 
8903 7279 
 
80750 58604 
 
34931 19543 
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CHAPTER A6. CAN DEBT CAPACITY PREDICT CASH 
HOLDINGS LEVEL 
 
To determine which firm characteristics contribute most to the more than two-
fold increase in cash holdings, the following model is first estimated using Fama-
MacBeth regressions performed yearly from 1980 to 1989 (1980s). 28 The model 
assembled for predicted cash holdings includes net equity issue and net debt issue to 
take into account any increase in cash from external financing. The coefficient estimates 
are comparable to the estimates obtained in BKS.29 
Predicted Cash, CashP = 0.326 + 0.361 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.026 Q ratio - 
0.009 Log size - 0.007 Cash flow/Assets - 0.163 Net working capital/Assets - 0.404 
CAPEX - 0.253 Leverage/Assets + 0.109 RD/Sales + 0.005 Dividend dummy - 0.243 
Acquisitions/Assets + 0.148 Net equity/Assets + 0.134 Net debt/Assets 
Using the estimates above, predicted cash holdings (CashP) are first computed 
yearly from 1990 to 2008 and compared with the actual cash ratio (CashA) reported in 
Table A21. Second, the actual and predicted comparison is performed for constrained 
and unconstrained firms to determine if there is any difference in predictability of cash 
across different subsamples of firms. Third, differences in the average firm 
characteristics between the 1980s and 2000s are reported and multiplied by the 
regression coefficient estimates to determine which firm features contribute most to the 
increase in cash holdings. Averages of each firm ratio are computed yearly (e.g. 1980 to 
                                                             
28
 The model estimated for predicted cash holdings computation uses industry cash flow volatility computed using the 
mean of standard deviations of cash flow to total assets over ten years. This is to ensure the coefficient estimates 
reflect the true long-term relationship between cash holdings and industry cash flow volatility without any influence 
of short-term links in the short-run. To prevent any extreme firm characteristics from biasing the estimates, 
regressions are performed only for firms with non-missing standard deviations of cash flow and reasonable changes in 
equity holdings (i.e. net equity issue equals or between zero and one). 
29
 Appendix A-XIII reports details of the coefficient estimates and comparison with BKS.  
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characteristic value of each period (e.g. 1980s). Fourth, the breakdown of determinants 
of changes in predicted cash is reported for constrained and unconstrained firms to 
identify differences in impact from each determinant over time. 
Table A21 reports the actual and predicted cash ratios for the whole sample. The 
difference in the fourth column is computed as the actual less predicted ratio. Except for 
year 2002 and 2003, the model consistently over predicts cash holdings from 1990 to 
2008. Predicted cash ratio matches the actual ratio for year 2002; and for year 2003, the 
difference between actual and predicted cash holdings is relatively small at 0.4% of 
assets. The model predicts cash holdings better in the 2000s as the difference between 
actual and predicted ratio is not found to be significantly more than zero in most years of 
the 2000s period. The largest difference is recorded in 1999 when the model over 
predicts cash ratio by 3.1% of assets.30 To examine whether constraints affect the 
PRGHO¶VSHUformance in predicting cash ratio, Table A22 reports the predicted cash ratio 
and difference (actual less predicted ratio) for constrained and unconstrained firms 
sorted according to the four constraint criteria.  
  
                                                             
30
 Deviation between predicted and actual cash holdings is close to that previously reported. The difference between 
the largest (actual less predicted) deviation reported in this paper and BKS is 0.6% of total assets.  
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Table A21 Comparison of actual and predicted cash holdings from 1990 to 2008 using BKS model 
This table summarizes the actual (CashA) and predicted cash ratios (Cashp), and the difference between the two ratios 
of sample firms from 1990 through 2008. Predicted cash ratio for each firm is computed from the following Fama-
MacBeth regression estimates. CashP = 0.326 + 0.361 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.026 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size - 
0.007 Cash flow/Assets - 0.163 Net working capital/Assets - 0.404 CAPEX - 0.253 Leverage/Assets + 0.109 
RD/Sales + 0.005 Dividend dummy - 0.243 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.148 Net equity/Assets + 0.134 Net debt/Assets. 
Average Cashp is then computed yearly and reported by year for the sample of 67,203 firms. t-value, degrees of 
freedom (DF) and probability reported are test results from the independent t-test performed for the actual and 
predicted ratios yearly. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Chapter A2.3. 
FYEAR 
Average 
CashA 
Average 
CashP 
Difference  
(CashA - CashP) tValue DF Probt 
1990 0.133 0.152 -0.019 -5.180 6800 0.042 
1991 0.155 0.177 -0.022 -5.383 7066 0.009 
1992 0.160 0.183 -0.023 -5.411 7380 0.003 
1993 0.169 0.194 -0.024 -5.634 8018 0.000 
1994 0.154 0.181 -0.027 -6.722 8524 0.000 
1995 0.166 0.190 -0.024 -5.696 8760 0.000 
1996 0.182 0.207 -0.024 -4.736 8872 0.003 
1997 0.180 0.193 -0.013 -2.854 8746 0.273 
1998 0.168 0.176 -0.008 -1.778 8276 0.668 
1999 0.183 0.213 -0.031 -5.589 7826 0.000 
2000 0.192 0.204 -0.012 -2.286 7462 0.812 
2001 0.211 0.229 -0.019 -2.690 6768 0.848 
2002 0.212 0.208 0.004 0.738 6326 0.002 
2003 0.219 0.219 0.000 -0.002 5974 0.030 
2004 0.227 0.233 -0.006 -0.842 5854 0.763 
2005 0.228 0.233 -0.005 -0.616 5834 0.993 
2006 0.219 0.237 -0.018 -1.982 5752 0.095 
2007 0.219 0.226 -0.007 -0.855 5622 0.574 
2008 0.205 0.210 -0.005 -0.483 4484 0.977 
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Table A22 Comparison of actual and predicted cash holdings for firms sorted by constraints (BKS model) 
This table summarizes the predicted cash ratio (Cashp), and difference (CashA - Cashp) between the actual and predicted ratios of sample firms from 1990 through 2008. Predicted 
cash ratio for each firm is computed from the following Fama-MacBeth regression estimates. CashP = 0.326 + 0.361 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.026 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size - 
0.007 Cash flow/Assets - 0.163 Net working capital/Assets - 0.404 CAPEX - 0.253 Leverage/Assets + 0.109 RD/Sales + 0.005 Dividend dummy - 0.243 Acquisitions/Assets + 
0.148 Net equity/Assets + 0.134 Net debt/Assets. Average Cashp is then computed yearly and reported by year for eight subsamples of firms sorted according to four financial 
constraint criteria ± firm size, cash flow, investment grade and dividend. Constrained firms have sales less than US$1billion, report negative net cash flow, are not of investment 
grade (rating below BBB- or unrated), and do not pay common dividends in the applicable financial year; and conversely for unconstrained firms. Detailed variable definitions can 
be found in Chapter A2.3. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
FYEAR CashP Difference   CashP Difference   CashP Difference   CashP Difference 
1990 0.159 -0.017   0.097 -0.033   0.229 -0.051   0.128 -0.009 
1991 0.186 -0.019 
 
0.110 -0.042 
 
0.269 -0.051 
 
0.149 -0.013 
1992 0.193 -0.020 
 
0.110 -0.042 
 
0.311 -0.058 
 
0.147 -0.013 
1993 0.205 -0.021 
 
0.111 -0.047 
 
0.345 -0.069 
 
0.150 -0.012 
1994 0.191 -0.024 
 
0.106 -0.047 
 
0.329 -0.083 
 
0.139 -0.012 
1995 0.203 -0.021 
 
0.106 -0.048 
 
0.340 -0.072 
 
0.149 -0.011 
1996 0.222 -0.021 
 
0.108 -0.047 
 
0.410 -0.094 
 
0.149 -0.005 
1997 0.207 -0.007 
 
0.111 -0.047 
 
0.343 -0.043 
 
0.146 -0.004 
1998 0.189 -0.001 
 
0.109 -0.043 
 
0.310 -0.026 
 
0.134 -0.002 
1999 0.234 -0.027 
 
0.113 -0.046 
 
0.402 -0.082 
 
0.148 -0.013 
2000 0.224 -0.005 
 
0.114 -0.042 
 
0.346 -0.018 
 
0.143 -0.009 
2001 0.254 -0.014 
 
0.128 -0.039 
 
0.380 -0.036 
 
0.159 -0.011 
2002 0.229 0.011 
 
0.124 -0.021 
 
0.355 -0.001 
 
0.153 0.006 
2003 0.246 0.006 
 
0.129 -0.021 
 
0.396 -0.033 
 
0.171 0.009 
2004 0.267 -0.003 
 
0.134 -0.014 
 
0.515 -0.091 
 
0.172 0.012 
2005 0.271 -0.002 
 
0.130 -0.012 
 
0.500 -0.097 
 
0.169 0.017 
2006 0.283 -0.020 
 
0.126 -0.012 
 
0.571 -0.176 
 
0.163 0.017 
2007 0.275 -0.006 
 
0.115 -0.010 
 
0.537 -0.126 
 
0.154 0.020 
2008 0.260 -0.007   0.105 0.000   0.531 -0.157   0.132 0.032 
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Table A22 Comparison of actual and predicted cash holdings for firms sorted by constraints (BKS model) (continued) 
Panel B 
 
Non-investment grade 
 
Investment grade 
 
Non-dividend paying 
 
Dividend paying 
FYEAR CashP Difference 
 
CashP Difference 
 
CashP Difference 
 
CashP Difference 
1990 0.157 -0.017   0.099 -0.041   0.167 -0.019   0.117 -0.018 
1991 0.183 -0.019 
 
0.115 -0.052 
 
0.196 -0.020 
 
0.133 -0.028 
1992 0.189 -0.020 
 
0.114 -0.054 
 
0.202 -0.020 
 
0.137 -0.030 
1993 0.201 -0.021 
 
0.115 -0.062 
 
0.214 -0.022 
 
0.141 -0.030 
1994 0.187 -0.024 
 
0.110 -0.060 
 
0.199 -0.024 
 
0.131 -0.035 
1995 0.198 -0.021 
 
0.108 -0.061 
 
0.210 -0.020 
 
0.133 -0.037 
1996 0.216 -0.021 
 
0.108 -0.059 
 
0.231 -0.020 
 
0.134 -0.037 
1997 0.201 -0.008 
 
0.113 -0.062 
 
0.211 -0.006 
 
0.137 -0.036 
1998 0.183 -0.002 
 
0.112 -0.061 
 
0.192 0.002 
 
0.124 -0.038 
1999 0.224 -0.027 
 
0.115 -0.064 
 
0.239 -0.029 
 
0.122 -0.036 
2000 0.213 -0.006 
 
0.117 -0.064 
 
0.225 -0.004 
 
0.124 -0.043 
2001 0.240 -0.014 
 
0.131 -0.064 
 
0.253 -0.013 
 
0.137 -0.042 
2002 0.218 0.010 
 
0.126 -0.046 
 
0.226 0.014 
 
0.139 -0.035 
2003 0.230 0.005 
 
0.133 -0.041 
 
0.241 0.006 
 
0.150 -0.019 
2004 0.244 -0.002 
 
0.137 -0.040 
 
0.262 -0.002 
 
0.156 -0.016 
2005 0.244 -0.001 
 
0.134 -0.038 
 
0.266 -0.002 
 
0.150 -0.012 
2006 0.249 -0.015 
 
0.131 -0.041 
 
0.276 -0.020 
 
0.142 -0.013 
2007 0.238 -0.004 
 
0.125 -0.038 
 
0.263 -0.005 
 
0.137 -0.012 
2008 0.220 -0.002   0.119 -0.029   0.241 -0.002   0.131 -0.013 
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Table A22 shows that the BKS model consistently over predicts the cash ratio 
for both constrained and unconstrained firms.31 The model, however, predicts cash 
holdings better for constrained firms than unconstrained firms ± the difference between 
actual and predicted ratio is smaller for constrained firms compared to their 
counterparts. The largest difference recorded for constrained firms is between 2.4% and 
2.7%, while that of unconstrained firms is between 4.3% and 6.8%. The trend is evident 
for all constraints criteria except for cash flow where the opposite is reported. For firms 
sorted using cash flow, predicted cash ratio is closer to actual ratios for unconstrained 
firms. The results are expected, as cash ratio is directly related to cash flow to the extent 
that cash flow add to cash holdings in each financial period. As such, firms with 
negative cash flow have no ability to accumulate cash holdings even though they ought 
to do so theoretically. Predicted cash for negative cash flow firms is more than 50% of 
total assets in the last five years of the sample. The actual cash to assets in the last five 
years is about 40%; and this is almost double the average cash holdings for the period 
2000 to 2008 of 21.5%. There is evidence that constrained firms with negative cash flow 
hold significantly greater cash in practice but the lack of ability to increase cash 
KROGLQJVWRWKHµLGHDO¶predicted level results in a shortfall in the actual cash held.  
Predictions for cash holdings are more accurate for constrained firms. This 
means that the original BKS determinants model cash holdings better for constrained 
firms ± this corresponds to the evidence in previous Chapter where the main driver of 
cash holdings ± industry cash flow volatility has significant influence on cash ratio only 
for constrained firms.  
                                                             
31
 The model over predicts cash ratio for all subsample of firms sorted according to four constraint criteria, with the 
exception of firms with positive cash flow where the model under predicts cash ratio for the later sample period from 
2002 to 2008.  
Part A Chapter A6.Can debt capacity predict cash holdings level 
114 
 
In addition, cash holdings are predicted to increase significantly (from 1990 to 
2008) for constrained firms only, while the estimated maximum increase in cash for 
unconstrained is only 2% of total assets. The maximum increase in predicted cash is 
30% of total assets for firms reporting negative cash flow, followed by a 10% increase 
for small firms. The difference found for constrained and unconstrained firms are 
subjected to the extent that model predicts cash holdings accurately for these firms; 
therefore actual cash holdings are compared. The maximum increase in actual cash 
holdings from 1990 to 2008 for constrained firms is 20% of total assets; while that for 
unconstrained firms is only 4.5% ± this means actual cash holdings for constrained firms 
increase more than four times compared with unconstrained firms.32  
Next, determinants of changes in predicted cash are reported in Table A23. The 
first two columns report the average firm characteristics in 1980s and 2000s. The third 
column reports contribution of each firm characteristic to the increase in cash holdings 
by multiplying the coefficient estimates with the difference between the 1980s and 
2000s mean values.33 Industry cash flow volatility almost doubles from the 1980s to the 
2000s. Net working capital falls more than three times, average cash flow changes from 
positive to negative, and research and development expense increases dramatically 
about five times over two decades. Supporting BKS findings, these four variables 
contribute significantly to the increase in cash holdings. Additionally, firm size and 
leverage are found to contribute significantly to the increase in cash; however, this is 
attributed to the large coefficient estimates rather than actual changes in the firm 
                                                             
32
 The overall results support BKS findings where non-dividend paying firms are found to have significantly larger 
increase in cash compared to dividend paying firms 
33
 For example, estimated contribution from industry cash flow volatility is computed as coefficient estimate*(2000s 
average ± 1980s average) = 0.361*(0.130-0.074). 
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characteristics. Together, the six variables explain the increase in cash holdings 
significantly. The sum of the estimated contribution from the determinants (5.8%) 
shortfalls the actual increase in average cash level of 7.9% of total assets. This shortfall 
will be subsequently rectified in the modified model when debt capacity is included as 
one of the determinants of cash.  
The same determinants of changes in predicted cash are examined across 
subsamples of firms sorted according to different financial constraint criteria in Table 
A24. According to the trend observed in Table A22, the increase in cash level from the 
1980s to 2000s is expected to be significantly higher for constrained firms compared to 
their unconstrained counterparts. Accordingly, the sum of estimated contribution from 
the cash determinants is reported to be higher for all four subsamples of constrained 
firms ± ranging from 5.4% to 11.1%; while that of unconstrained firms has a mean of 
3.5%. The six determinants (industry volatility, net working capital, capital expenditure, 
size, research and development expenses and leverage) remain important determinants 
of cash for constrained firms, while the last two variables do not contribute to change in 
cash significantly for unconstrained firms. For instance, change in leverage explains up 
to 2% of change in cash for constrained firms, but only explains up to 0.7% for 
unconstrained firms. A similar trend is noted for research and development expenses, 
where there is a differential of 1 percentage point ± equivalent to 13% of the actual 
change in average cash from 1980s to 2000s. The greater impact of change in leverage 
on cash level for constrained firms may be due to changes in debt capacity. For all four 
constraint criteria, constrained firms experienced a greater fall in debt capacity relative 
to unconstrained firms (unreported in detail here). A larger decrease in debt capacity 
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naturally leads to greater fall in debt use because constrained firms now have less 
capacity to extend or take new borrowing when existing debt matures.  
For intangible expenses such as research and development, securing external 
debt and equity is difficult for constrained firms. These firms rely heavily on cash 
holdings for research and development expenses, and this explains the greater cash level 
kept when such expenses are required. Therefore, cash holdings grow more for 
constrained firms due to greater fall in debt use and greater increase in research and 
development expenses ± both of which can be attributed to the fall in debt capacity over 
time because lower borrowing capacity restricts the amount of debt held by firm and 
intangible expenses are then funded by cash-on-hand.   
In the second half of this section, predicted cash level is re-estimated using the 
modified BKS model with debt capacity included as additional cash determinant. This 
helps to identify whether debt capacity is a major or better explanatory variable of cash, 
and at the same time confirm our findings in the first half of this section about debt 
capacity effect on leverage and intangible expenses changes on the changes in cash 
holdings. The modified model yield the following coefficient estimates that are used to 
compute the new predicted cash level, denoted by CashP_DC.  
CashP_DC = 0.639 ± 0.749 Debt capacity/Assets + 0.249 Industry cash flow volatility + 
0.011 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size + 0.044 Cash flow/Assets - 0.022 Net working capital - 
0.156 Capex - 0.151 Leverage/Assets + 0.070 RD/Sales + 0.007 Dividend dummy - 
0.344 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.059 Net equity/Assets + 0.073 Net debt/Assets 
For comparison purposes, Tables A25 and A26 report results in a similar manner 
to Table A21 and A23. The new model predicts cash holdings better as the maximum 
difference between actual and predicted cash (1.4% of total assets) is less than half of 
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the maximum difference (3.1%) reported in Table A21 and almost half of the maximum 
difference (2.7%) found in BKS. The sum of estimated contribution from the cash 
determinants computed in the last row includes only determinants that are found 
significant in the Fama MacBeth model above. Industry cash flow volatility, net 
working capital, research and development expenses and dividend dummy becomes 
insignificant after debt capacity is included in the yearly Fama MacBeth regressions; 
and the four determinants are not included in the computation. The final sum of the 
estimated contribution from the determinants (8.7%) is closer to the actual change in 
cash of 7.9%. This difference of 0.8% is significantly lower than the shortfall of 2.1% 
reported in Table A23. This means that not only does the modified model predicts cash 
better but also it tracks changes in cash determinants better than the original model.  
Average debt capacity falls by 13% of total assets and this contributes to 9.8% of 
the increase in cash holdings. Other than firm size, the other variables contribute to less 
than 1% change in cash. This is contrasted with Table A23 where changes in cash are 
attributed to changes in six determinants in the range of 1.1% to 2.1% each. Changes in 
cash are more evenly spread across the top six determinants in the original BKS model, 
whereas the changes in cash are largely explained by changes in debt capacity in the 
modified model. Three out of the six top determinants (industry cash flow volatility, net 
working capital, research and development expenses) are insignificant once debt 
capacity is included. The remaining two variables (leverage and capital expenditure) 
contribute marginally to changes in cash over time, and the final determinant (firm size) 
has an estimated contribution that remains similar to the previous model. Supporting the 
findings in previous Chapters, results from Tables A25 and A26 prove that debt capacity 
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is an important determinant of cash and has the ability to replace previous cash 
GHWHUPLQDQWVLQH[SODLQLQJFKDQJHVLQILUPV¶FDVKKROGLQJVRYHUWLPH 
To sum up, the previous BKS model is found consistently to over-predict cash 
ratio, and predicts cash holdings better for constrained firms. The modified BKS model 
(with debt capacity included as additional determinant) performs better than the original 
model and reports predicted cash holdings that are closer to actual ratios. Second, in 
predicting cash holdings for firms with varying constraints, both the predicted and actual 
cash holdings for constrained firms increase significantly more over the period 1980 to 
2008. Third, the original BKS model identifies six cash determinants that contribute 
collectively to the increase in cash holdings over time. Half of the six important cash 
determinants, however, become insignificant after taking into account debt capacity. 
Fourth, the estimated contribution from determinants in the modified BKS model 
matches the actual change in cash better. Change in cash over time is largely explained 
by corresponding change in debt capacity alone. The results confirmed that debt 
capacity is an important determinant of cash, helps predict cash holdings better, and has 
the ability to replace previous determinants and explain substantial variance in cash 
holdings. 
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Table A23 Breakdown of determinants of changes in Cashp from 1980s to 2000s (BKS model) 
This table summarizes the determinants of the change in predicted cash between the 1980s and 2000s period. The 
change in cash ratio is measured as the difference between average cash ratio from 2000 to 2008 and the average cash 
ratio from 1980 to 1989. The estimated determinants of the cash ratio are computed using coefficient estimates from 
the following Fama MacBeth regression model. CashP = 0.326 + 0.361 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.026 Q ratio - 
0.009 Log size - 0.007 Cash flow/Assets - 0.163 Net working capital/Assets - 0.404 CAPEX - 0.253 Leverage/Assets 
+ 0.109 RD/Sales + 0.005 Dividend dummy - 0.243 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.148 Net equity/Assets + 0.134 Net 
debt/Assets. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Chapter A2.3. For each variable, its average values for the 
period 1980s and 2000s are reported. The 1980s (2000s) average is computed as the mean value of the average firm 
characteristics computed for each financial year from 1980 to 1989 (2000 to 2008). Difference between the 1980s 
average and 2000s average is then multiplied by the relevant coefficient estimate to derive the estimated determinant 
reported in column four. Standard error, t-value, and probability reported are test results from the independent t-test 
performed for the estimated determinant using Delta method (Greene, 2008). 
Variable 
1980s 
Average 
2000s 
Average Estimate Standard Error tValue Probt 
INDSTDCF 0.074 0.130 0.021 0.0073 2.799 0.005 
Q 1.756 2.020 0.007 0.0078 0.860 0.390 
LNAT 17.183 19.364 -0.019 0.0038 -5.070 0.000 
CFe 0.007 -0.012 0.000 0.0002 -0.548 0.583 
NWC 0.142 0.040 0.017 0.0051 3.236 0.001 
CAPEX 0.087 0.053 0.014 0.0063 2.183 0.029 
BKDEBT 0.258 0.210 0.012 0.0054 2.262 0.024 
RD_SALE 0.025 0.124 0.011 0.0015 6.960 0.000 
DIVDUM 0.410 0.252 -0.001 0.0005 1.546 0.122 
ACQUI 0.013 0.024 -0.003 0.0018 -1.437 0.151 
ѐEQUITY 0.062 0.046 -0.002 0.0051 -0.471 0.638 
ѐDEBT 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.0012 -0.187 0.852 
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Table A24 Breakdown of determinants of changes in Cashp for firms sorted by constraints (BKS 
model) 
This table summarizes the determinants of the change in predicted cash between the 1980s and 2000s period for eight 
subsamples of firms sorted according to four financial constraint criteria ± firm size, cash flow, investment grade and 
dividend. Constrained firms have sales less than US$1billion, report negative net cash flow, are not of investment 
grade (rating below BBB- or unrated), and do not pay common dividends in the applicable financial year; and 
conversely for unconstrained firms. The change in cash ratio is measured as the difference between average cash ratio 
from 2000 to 2008 and the average cash ratio from 1980 to 1989. The estimated determinants of the cash ratio are 
computed using coefficient estimates from the following Fama MacBeth regression model. CashP = 0.326 + 0.361 
Industry cash flow volatility + 0.026 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size - 0.007 Cash flow/Assets - 0.163 Net working 
capital/Assets - 0.404 CAPEX - 0.253 Leverage/Assets + 0.109 RD/Sales + 0.005 Dividend dummy - 0.243 
Acquisitions/Assets + 0.148 Net equity/Assets + 0.134 Net debt/Assets. Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Chapter A2.3. For each variable, the 1980s (2000s) average is computed as the mean value of the average firm 
characteristics computed for each financial year from 1980 to 1989 (2000 to 2008). Difference between the 1980s 
average and 2000s average is then multiplied by the relevant coefficient estimate to derive the estimated determinant 
reported here. 
  
Small 
firms 
Large 
firms 
Negative 
CFcf 
Positive 
CFcf 
Non-
invest-
ment 
grade 
Invest-
ment 
grade 
Non-
dividend 
paying 
Dividend 
paying 
Variable Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
INDSTDCF 0.022 0.019 0.029 0.018 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.016 
Q 0.007 0.014 -0.004 0.009 0.007 0.013 0.001 0.010 
LNAT -0.015 -0.008 -0.020 -0.020 -0.017 -0.014 -0.023 -0.019 
CFe 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NWC 0.017 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.011 0.013 0.018 
CAPEX 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.011 
BKDEBT 0.018 -0.006 0.033 0.007 0.014 0.001 0.020 0.000 
RD_SALE 0.014 0.001 0.040 0.003 0.012 0.001 0.014 0.001 
DIVDUM -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
ACQUI -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 
ѐEQUITY 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 
ѐDEBT 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
TOTAL 0.073 0.037 0.111 0.036 0.061 0.034 0.054 0.032 
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Table A25 Comparison of actual and predicted cash holdings from 1990 to 2008 (modified BKS 
model with DC) 
This table summarizes the actual (CashA) and predicted cash ratios (CashP_DC), and the difference between the two 
ratios of sample firms from 1990 through 2008. Predicted cash ratio for each firm is computed from the following 
Fama-MacBeth regression estimates. CashP_DC = 0.639 ± 0.749 Debt capacity/Assets + 0.249 Industry cash flow 
volatility + 0.011 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size + 0.044 Cash flow/Assets - 0.022 Net working capital - 0.156 Capex - 
0.151 Leverage/Assets + 0.070 RD/Sales + 0.007 Dividend dummy - 0.344 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.059 Net 
equity/Assets + 0.073 Net debt/Assets. Average Cashp is then computed yearly and reported by year for the sample of 
66,216 firms. t-value, degrees of freedom (DF) and probability reported are test results from the independent t-test 
performed for the actual and predicted ratios yearly. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Chapter A2.3. 
FYEAR 
Average 
CashA 
Average 
CashP_DC 
Difference  
tValue DF Probt (CashA ± CashP_DC) 
1991 0.155 0.150 0.005 1.228 6954 0.220 
1992 0.160 0.156 0.004 1.002 7254 0.317 
1993 0.170 0.166 0.004 1.022 7888 0.307 
1994 0.154 0.156 -0.002 -0.449 8392 0.653 
1995 0.166 0.166 0.000 0.098 8606 0.922 
1996 0.183 0.172 0.012 2.878 8718 0.004 
1997 0.180 0.169 0.011 2.800 8602 0.005 
1998 0.168 0.161 0.007 1.815 8154 0.070 
1999 0.183 0.190 -0.006 -1.374 7708 0.170 
2000 0.193 0.190 0.003 0.731 7366 0.465 
2001 0.211 0.200 0.011 2.151 6686 0.031 
2002 0.213 0.199 0.014 3.009 6250 0.003 
2003 0.220 0.214 0.006 1.176 5904 0.240 
2004 0.227 0.218 0.010 1.954 5780 0.051 
2005 0.228 0.218 0.009 1.869 5758 0.062 
2006 0.219 0.213 0.006 1.193 5680 0.233 
2007 0.219 0.213 0.007 1.304 5544 0.192 
2008 0.205 0.196 0.009 1.607 4428 0.108 
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Table A26 Breakdown of determinants of changes in CashP_DC from 1980s to 2000s (modified BKS 
model with DC) 
This table summarizes the determinants of the change in predicted cash between the 1980s and 2000s period. The 
change in cash ratio is measured as the difference between average cash ratio from 2000 to 2008 and the average cash 
ratio from 1980 to 1989. The estimated determinants of the cash ratio are computed using coefficient estimates from 
the following Fama MacBeth regression model. CashP_DC = 0.639 ± 0.749 Debt capacity/Assets + 0.249 Industry cash 
flow volatility + 0.011 Q ratio - 0.009 Log size + 0.044 Cash flow/Assets - 0.022 Net working capital - 0.156 Capex - 
0.151 Leverage/Assets + 0.070 RD/Sales + 0.007 Dividend dummy - 0.344 Acquisitions/Assets + 0.059 Net 
equity/Assets + 0.073 Net debt/Assets. Detailed variable definitions can be found in Chapter A2.3. For each variable, 
its average values for the period 1980s and 2000s are reported. The 1980s (2000s) average is computed as the mean 
value of the average firm characteristics computed for each financial year from 1980 to 1989 (2000 to 2008). 
Difference between the 1980s average and 2000s average is then multiplied by the relevant coefficient estimate to 
derive the estimated determinant reported in column four. Standard error, t-value, and probability reported are test 
results from the independent t-test performed for the estimated determinant using Delta method (Greene, 2008). 
Variable 1980s Average 2000s Average Estimate 
Standard 
Error tValue Probt 
DC 0.434 0.303 0.098 0.018 5.483 0.000 
INDSTDCF 0.074 0.130 
    Q 1.756 2.020 0.003 0.003 0.860 0.390 
LNAT 17.183 19.364 -0.021 0.004 -5.070 0.000 
CFe 0.007 -0.012 -0.001 0.002 -0.548 0.583 
NWC 0.142 0.040 
    CAPEX 0.087 0.053 0.005 0.002 2.183 0.029 
BKDEBT 0.258 0.210 0.007 0.003 2.262 0.024 
RD_SALE 0.025 0.124 
    DIVDUM 0.410 0.252 
    ACQUI 0.013 0.024 -0.004 0.003 -1.437 0.151 
ѐEQUITY 0.062 0.046 -0.001 0.002 -0.471 0.638 
ѐDEBT 0.011 0.009 0.000 0.001 -0.187 0.852 
TOTAL     0.087       
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CHAPTER A7. THE REVERSE CAUSALITY 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT CAPACITY AND 
CASH HOLDINGS 
 
A7.1 Debt capacity model specifications 
After examining the importance of debt capacity on cash holdings and assessing 
their relationship for constrained and unconstrained firms, a reverse causality test is 
performed in this Chapter using a series of debt capacity models (1) to confirm the 
substitution effect (negative relationship) between cash and debt capacity reported in 
Campello et al. (2011), (2) to confirm the positive effect of cash flow on debt capacity 
reported in Sufi (2009), and finally (3) to assess the importance of cash flow sensitivity 
of cash in explaining debt capacity. To support the reverse causality relationship 
between cash and debt capacity, a Granger causality test is performed prior to the actual 
debt capacity models using one lag of change in cash ratio and two lags of change in 
debt capacity ratio.34 The bivariate Granger test shows that there is a significant 
feedback relationship between cash and debt capacity where change in cash Granger 
cause change in debt capacity, and vice versa.35 
Further continuing the internal flexibility analysis, interactions between cash, 
cash flow and debt capacity are examined using adapted models from Sufi (2009) and 
Campello et al. (2011) as follow.  
                                                             
34
 Taking the change in debt capacity and cash ratio from one period to the previous period eliminates the time series 
effect and converts the ratios into stationary variables. One lag of change in cash ratio and two lags of change in debt 
capacity ratio are used in the Granger causality test because the respective lags are found to yield the lowest Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) for the regressions individually.  
35
 Regressions performed in the Granger causality test reports large t-values and p-value of 0.000 for all respective 
regressions. At a p-value of 0.000, null hypothesis of no relationship between the change in cash and the change in 
debt capacity is rejected.  
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DC/(DC + Cash)i,t = DC/IFi,t  FĮ1CFei,t Į4Ln(AT)i,t  Į2Crediti,t Į3Qi,t İi       (i) 
DC/Assets
 i,t  FĮ1CFei,t Į2Cashi,t Į3Ln(AT)i,t  Į4Crediti,t Į5Qi,t İi       (j) 
DC/Assetsi,t  FĮ1CFei,t Į2Cashi,t Į3(Cash flow*Cash)i,t Į4Ln(AT)i,t   
Į5Crediti,t Į6Qi,t İi (k) 
where internal flexibility (IF) is computed as the sum of debt capacity and cash; 
independent variables are firm characteristics that control for firm size, credit rating, and 
investment growth prospect following Campello et al. (2011).36 The Campello¶V
modified model is next adapted, where the effect of cash holdings on credit is explicitly 
modelled, allowing for nonlinearities by using a different scaling factor in the dependent 
variable and including cash and its interaction as independent variables. The interaction 
term helps assess the effect of cash flow sensitivity of cash on debt capacity. Inclusion 
of the interaction term makes cash and cash flow conditional upon each other which, in 
practice, is true to a certain extent in the cash model regressions. Interpretation of 
estimated coefficients for cash and cash flow become different; and model (k) will be 
interpreted in a different manner compared to model (i) and (j). Model (k) investigates 
the use of cash and credit lines when cash flow are assumed to give firms greater access 
to credit facilities, i.e. positive relationship between credit lines and cash flow 
documented in Sufi (2009). The final debt capacity model includes industry cash flow 
volatility and additional control variables from Bates et al. (2009) and Opler (1999). 
Cash flow iV IRXQG WR DGG SRVLWLYHO\ WR ILUPV¶ ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ (Campello et al., 
2011) DV VXFK LW LVH[SHFWHG WKDWFDVK IORZULVN KDVD QHJDWLYH LPSDFWRQ ILUPV¶GHEW
                                                             
36
 Total internal flexibility (liquidity) is computed as the sum of lines of credit (LC) and cash in Sufi (2009). In this 
paper, debt capacity is used to replace lines of credit in the computation of total internal flexibility. Firm 
characteristics are defined as such ± /DUJHLVDGXPP\YDULDEOHIRUILUPVL]HWDNLQJYDOXHRIRQHLIILUP¶VVDOHUHYHQXH
is equal or more than $1billion; credit is a dummy variable equals to one if firm has rating BBB- or higher; and 
investment growth prospect is measured using Q ratio.  
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capacity, where firms with volatile cash flow have lower debt capacity, or else being 
equal. Negative correlation between volatility and debt capacity is found in the 
univariate tests. The actual impact of volatility on debt capacity is derived from the 
following regression model. 
DC/Assetsi,t  FĮ1CFei,t Į2Cashi,t Į3(Cash flow*Cash)i,t Į4INDSTDCFi,t  
+  Į5Ln(AT)i,t  Į6Crediti,t Į7Qi,t İi       (l) 
 
The Granger causality test performed prior the debt capacity models indicated a 
feedback relationship between the two variables. The relationship between cash 
KROGLQJV DQG GHEW FDSDFLW\ LV VXEMHFWHG WR D ³UHYHUVH-FDXVDOLW\ VWRU\´ (Campello et al., 
2011). Greater cash holdings may be due to firms utilizing their credit lines in the same 
period, resulting in higher cash holdings and lower levels of credit lines. The authors test 
this reverse-causality using the level of drawdowns made by firms because when firms 
have higher cash holdings and use less of their credit lines, the consequent lower level of 
drawdown will not lead to greater cash holdings. 
+HUHWKLVLVWHVWHGXVLQJILUPV¶XQXVHGGHEWFDSDFLW\DQGDFWXDOGHEWXVDJH)LUVW
the OHYHO RI GUDZGRZQ LV ORZ ZKHQ ILUPV¶ XQXVHG GHEW FDSDFLW\ LV KLJK LH ILUPV
preserving their existing capacity), during which low drawdown should not add to cash 
holdings. If cash holdings are high when unused debt capacity is high, the substitution 
effect between cash holdings and debt capacity will be supported while eliminating the 
SRVVLELOLW\WKDWKLJKHUFDVKKROGLQJVDUHGXHWRKLJKHUGHEWXVHIURPILUPV¶KLJKHUGHEW
capacity. However, using the unused debt capacity ratio denominated by total assets to 
determine its relationship with cash may be subjected to bias since firms may naturally 
have higher or lower unused debt capacity depending on its size. Ratio is scaled by debt 
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capacity for models (i) to (l) because it is the unused portion out of total capacity that is 
the most important and relevant. Second, the reverse-cycle is further tested using actual 
debt usage out of the total debt capacity. Actual debt usage is measured using (1) long-
term debt scaled by debt capacity to measure the proportion of debt used out of total 
borrowing capacity, (2) net debt issuance scaled by debt capacity to measure actual debt 
use in each period more accurately predict the actual addition to cash from new debt 
issuance, (3) long-term debt scaled by total assets, and (4) net debt issuance scaled by 
total assets, where the latter two are generic measurement that serves as a robustness test 
for the first two measures scaled by debt capacity, As greater debt usage (due to higher 
debt capacity) cannot lead to firms having less cash, a negative relationship between 
debt use and cash holdings implies that firms have greater cash-on-hand not due to 
greater debt usage from larger borrowing capacity. Rather, cash holdings are carefully 
PDQDJHG WR PD[LPLVH ILUP¶V LQWHUQDO IOH[LEility according to existing borrowing 
capacity level. Together, the results from unused debt capacity and actual debt usage 
will support the trade-off between cash and debt capacity, and the active management of 
total internal financial flexibility by firms.   
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A7.2 Debt capacity model regression results 
 
Table A27 reports results of the adapted debt capacity model. The previous 
model (Sufi, 2009) uses lines of credit obtained from the Dealscan database that 
includes mainly large firms with publicly published details on bank debt. Here, debt 
capacity is a derived estimate using coefficient estimates from Berger et al. (1996). 
Although the two measures are not directly comparable, they represent a portion of a 
ILUP¶V ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ DQG DUH H[SHFWHG WR KDYH VLPLODU WUHQGV LQ WKH UHJUHVVLRQ
models. Accordingly, all variables are found to enter the debt capacity model with the 
same sign as Campello et al. (2011).37 
First, cash flow positively impacts debt capacity over the entire sample, where 
increase in cash flow improves the ILUP¶V ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ :KLOH KLJKHU SURILWV
reduce the probability of firms violating the covenants and increase the use of credit 
lines (Sufi, 2009), increased SURILWDELOLW\ DOVR FRQWULEXWHV SRVLWLYHO\ WR ILUPV¶ JHQHULF
measure of debt capacity. The magnitude of the coefficient estimate of cash flow is, 
however, much smaller than with the previous model, indicating that cash flow may be a 
less important variable in explaining total debt capacity compared to committed lines of 
credit. Supporting this further, cash flows have much lower estimate after the firm fixed 
effect is taken into account (in Model 6) and after cash holdings is included as additional 
determinant in Models 3, 7 and 11. The latter implies that cash ratio has variance that 
partly subsumes the effect of cash flow on debt capacity. Second, cash is found to have a 
highly significant and negative relationship with debt capacity, supporting the trade-off 
                                                             
37
 Campello et al. (2011) perform the credit line regression for financial year 2008 sample clustered by industry. To 
better compare the results with Campello et al. (2011), Appendix A-XIV reports the debt capacity model (k) 
performed for year 2008 and the entire sample using industry fixed effects.  
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practice between the two variables. As mentioned, the most important variable (cash 
flow) for credit line no longer reports high coefficient after cash is taken into account. 
More importantly, the fit of the model increases more than four times. This suggests that 
cash is a more important determinant of debt capacity compared to cash flow. 
Third, the interaction effect between cash and cash flow is negative and 
significant in Models 4, 8 and 12. Compared to the previous model, the estimate for the 
interaction term is small because cash flow enters the debt capacity model with a very 
small coefficient. From the Fama-MacBeth yearly regression (Model 12), the largest 
coefficient of interaction term (0.095) is further interpreted as follows. If a firm does not 
keep cash on hand, the impact of any change in cash flow on debt capacity is 7.6%, e.g. 
an arbitrary ten percent change in cash flow will increase debt capacity only by less than 
a percentage point (76 basis points). In practice, change in cash flow to total assets is, on 
average, 30 basis points from 1980 to 2008, implying that the actual impact of cash flow 
on debt capacity is minimal and, on average, 2 basis points of total assets. Taking the 
last two financial years as an example, for a firm holding the average level of cash at 
21% of total assets and cash flow to total assets decreasing at average rate 1.1% from 
2007 to 2008, the year-to-year decrease in cash flow contributes 0.06 basis point to the 
total increase in debt capacity to total assets of 80 basis points. This effect is equivalent 
to nil impact of cash flow on debt capacity from 2007 to 2008. As the year-to-year 
change in cash flow is comparably smaller than the change in debt capacity, results 
show that cash flow may not have significant impact on debt capacity. On the other 
hand, if a firm has median cash flow (6.4% of total assets) in 2008 and a decrease in 
average cash holdings of 2% from 2007 to 2008, the fall in cash holdings contribute to 
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almost all of the consequent increase in debt capacity of 80 basis points.  Finally, except 
for Model 1 and firm size, most of the control variables enter the regression model with 
the same sign as in the previous study. The positive relationship between firm size and 
debt capacity is reported in Models 1, 2 and 10, while the rest of the models report a 
negative relationship. Theoretically, a positive relationship is expected as larger firms 
have greater capacity to borrow. However, it is noted that Campello et al. (2011) report 
a similar negative relationship for firm size in their credit lines regression using a 
Compustat sample. 
BKS identified cash flow volatility as a major determinant of cash holdings, and 
previous Chapters found significant relationship between volatility and debt capacity; 
henceforth, the variable is included in the modified debt capacity model to test its 
impact on debt capacity. Results are reported in Models 5, 9 and 13 in Table A27. Fit of 
the model improves only slightly when cash flow volatility is included. Industry cash 
flow volatility is highly significant even with cash holdings present in the model. There 
is a strong negative relationship between volatility and debt capacity, where firms with 
increased cash flow risk have lower debt capacity. However, addition of the volatility 
variable does not change the relationship of existing variables on debt capacity. 
To sum up the findings in Table A27, cash flows are found to have little impact 
on debt capacity when cash and cash flow risk are considered, since the bulk of the 
variance is explained by the latter two variables. The interaction term of cash flow and 
cash holdings shows that even when consideration is made to the extent cash flow adds 
to cash holdings in each period, cash flow exhibits minimal impact on debt capacity. 
Instead, cash is a significantly more important variable of debt capacity, followed by 
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cash flow risk. Results obtained are not entirely in line with Campello et al. (2011) and 
Sufi (2009), where cash flow is a significant explanatory variable of credit lines even 
when cash holdings are accounted for. The difference in results is attributed to (1) 
difference in dependent variable used ± the previous study used direct measure of credit 
lines, while a generic measure of debt capacity is adapted here; and (2) difference in 
firm sample.  
First, debt capacity and credit lines encompass different components that should 
be interpreted differently. The estimated debt capacity is a more generic measure of the 
total borrowing capacity of firms while credit lines should be a subset of debt capacity. 
Debt capacity ratio is a firm-level measure of expected asset liquidation value from 
Berger et al. (1996), and used in Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hahn and Lee 
(2009). Subject to lenders accurately predicting asset liquidation value of firms and 
extending loans accordingly, the generic measure provides a fair measure of the general 
level of borrowing capacity in firms. From the previous chapters, debt capacity has 
important relationship with cash holdings for the entire sample and across firms with 
varying levels of financial constraints. Debt capacity is an important component in total 
internal flexibility and a form of substitute for cash. Second, the sample of firms used in 
the previous study may consist mainly of larger firms with reported information on bank 
credit commitments. This is supported by results in the fourth and fifth columns in Table 
A28 Panel A. For the debt capacity model performed on a sample of large firms, cash 
flow is found to exhibit greater explanatory power, 0.255 compared to 0.069 for the 
sample of small firms using the Fama MacBeth regression model. The estimates 
obtained for large firm subsample are comparable to previous studies. This shows that 
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the difference in results may be due to difference in samples of firms used and 
fundamental difference in dependent variable used.  
Moving on, to analyse whether the relationships between cash and debt capacity 
are consistent across all firms, the modified debt capacity model is utilised over different 
subsamples of firms sorted according to several financial constraints criteria. Table A28 
shows that the impact of cash holdings on debt capacity is similar for constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Regardless of the level of constraints, cash holdings remain an 
important driver of debt capacity. The other variables report a similar trend as there is no 
significant difference in their relationship with debt capacity over different firm 
subsamples. This means that variables influencing debt capacity do not vary for firms 
with different levels of financial constraints, which either implies that an important 
variable is omitted from the model or that debt capacity is a more stable variable that 
may not change as much as cash holdings (reported in Chapter A5) when financial 
constraints and other firm variables vary.38  
The latter supports our hypothesis that debt capacity is the first-level variable 
that exhibits less periodic change compared to the second-level variable cash which can 
be monitored and adjusted in each period. The debt capacity models suggest lines of 
credit to be dependent on the level of cash flow and amount of cash savings firms have 
but our hypothesis is slightly different in terms of cause-and-HIIHFW:HSUHVXPHILUPV¶
cash policies to be first dependent on the level of debt capacities firms have and, 
depending on the changes in credit capacities, firms adjust their cash savings 
accordingly in each period. This is because cash policies are generally more flexible and 
                                                             
38
 The problem of omission of important variables is reduced as regressions are performed with constant terms and 
firm and year fixed effects.  
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subject to less restriction, while debt capacity generally depends on many factors such as 
the nature of assets, nature of business and bank relationships. As managers in practice 
may not have total control over debt capacity, they adjust cash-on-hand periodically to 
cater for their financial flexibility needs, while both debt capacity and cash add to total 
financial flexibility, cash holdings can be managed more easily and is in practice varied 
more often compared to debt capacity.  
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Table A27 Regressions of debt capacity models (i) to (l) for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the debt capacity models (i) to (l) results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), 
utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The interaction term between cash flow and cash 
holdings is computed as the product of cash flow to total assets and cash holdings to total assets for each firm-year observation. Variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent 
variable is debt capacity ratio computed as debt capacity to the sum of debt capacity and cash (internal flexibility) for Model 1 and debt capacity to total asset for the rest of the models. Large is 
a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if firm has sales revenue equal or more than US$1billion, and zero otherwise. Credit is a dummy variable with value 1 if firm has a S&P long-term credit 
rating of BBB- and higher, and zero otherwise. OLS model reports estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. FE model controls for firm and year fixed 
effects. FM model is based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. All regressions include a constant term (not reported) . 
The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5   MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9   MODEL10 MODEL11 MODEL12 MODEL13 
Model OLS   
 
FE   
 
FM   
Dependent DC_IF DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT   DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT   DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT 
CFe 0.186*** 0.113*** 0.043*** 0.067*** 0.062*** 
 
0.001 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 
0.105*** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.074*** 
           . (54.68) (62.24) (29.71) (30.66) (28.85) 
 
(0.45) (9.86) (13.61) (12.79) 
 
(15.52) (5.95) (9.11) (8.53) 
CASH 
  
-0.458*** -0.467*** -0.443*** 
  
-0.375*** -0.380*** -0.382*** 
  
-0.438*** -0.445*** -0.435*** 
           . 
  
(-265.04) (-252.82) (-236.70) 
  
(-209.32) (-204.07) (-205.73) 
  
(-34.25) (-38.36) (-29.62) 
CASH_CFe 
   
-0.091*** -0.107*** 
   
-0.050*** -0.049*** 
   
-0.095*** -0.095*** 
           . 
   
(-14.56) (-17.31) 
   
(-9.39) (-9.32) 
   
(-7.03) (-7.39) 
LARGE 0.072*** 0.001 -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.030*** 
 
-0.034*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.037*** 
 
0.019*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 
                 . (27.13) (0.36) (-24.27) (-24.90) (-26.48) 
 
(-25.11) (-34.40) (-34.47) (-32.00) 
 
(5.82) (-6.64) (-7.24) (-7.61) 
CREDIT 0.060*** -0.006*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.024*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.034*** 
 
-0.003 -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** 
           . (16.71) (-3.10) (-17.15) (-17.69) (-15.87) 
 
(-21.36) (-29.68) (-29.79) (-27.18) 
 
(-1.20) (-5.05) (-5.03) (-5.00) 
Q -0.039*** -0.016*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
-0.015*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
           . (-91.60) (-71.95) (-7.65) (-7.10) (-3.70) 
 
(-4.27) (26.29) (26.54) (24.71) 
 
(-21.31) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-0.18) 
INDSTDCF 
    
-0.327*** 
    
-0.178*** 
    
-0.158*** 
. 
    
(-57.84) 
    
(-31.30) 
    
(-4.89) 
Adj R-Sq   0.142   0.098   0.435   0.436   0.451               0.093   0.412   0.413   0.418 
Obs     118079     118079     118064     118064     118064       118079     118064     118064     118064       118079     118064     118064     118064 
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Table A28 Regressions of debt capacity models (l) for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the debt capacity model (l) results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. The dependent variable is debt capacity ratio computed as debt capacity to total 
asset. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is debt capacity ratio computed as debt capacity to total assets. Large is a dummy variable taking a 
value of 1 if firm has sales revenue equal or more than US$1billion, and zero otherwise. Credit is a dummy variable with value 1 if firm has a S&P long-term credit rating of BBB- and higher, 
and zero otherwise. OLS model reports estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. FM model is based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and 
West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 
10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
Intercept 0.482*** 0.459*** 
 
0.453*** 0.446*** 
 
0.465*** 0.447*** 
 
0.483*** 0.457*** 
        . (621.09) (39.70) 
 
(236.45) (32.22) 
 
(276.68) (41.39) 
 
(551.52) (37.93) 
Cfe 0.059*** 0.069*** 
 
0.164*** 0.255*** 
 
0.027*** 0.018** 
 
0.099*** 0.139*** 
           . (26.58) (7.99) 
 
(15.92) (5.60) 
 
(8.27) (2.10) 
 
(20.18) (5.87) 
CASH -0.446*** -0.437*** 
 
-0.361*** -0.344*** 
 
-0.440*** -0.429*** 
 
-0.435*** -0.426*** 
           . (-229.86) (-30.19) 
 
(-34.56) (-22.47) 
 
(-113.32) (-26.11) 
 
(-164.13) (-27.37) 
CASH_Cfe -0.103*** -0.088*** 
 
-0.233*** -0.341 
 
-0.082*** -0.056** 
 
-0.092*** -0.135*** 
           . (-16.24) (-7.14) 
 
(-3.35) (-1.55) 
 
(-8.75) (-2.38) 
 
(-4.52) (-3.25) 
LARGE 0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
 
-0.022*** -0.006 
 
-0.031*** -0.014*** 
                 . (.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
 
(-4.17) (-0.84) 
 
(-27.33) (-6.71) 
CREDIT -0.030*** -0.045** 
 
-0.019*** -0.014*** 
 
-0.034*** -0.023* 
 
-0.024*** -0.018*** 
           . (-8.70) (-2.44) 
 
(-11.69) (-4.09) 
 
(-2.72) (-1.72) 
 
(-15.79) (-5.20) 
Q -0.000** 0.000 
 
-0.010*** -0.012*** 
 
-0.001** -0.001 
 
-0.002*** -0.002*** 
           . (-1.99) (0.13) 
 
(-12.61) (-7.62) 
 
(-2.05) (-1.52) 
 
(-8.60) (-2.89) 
INDSTDCF -0.327*** -0.154*** 
 
-0.328*** -0.229*** 
 
-0.312*** -0.173*** 
 
-0.328*** -0.151*** 
                . (-51.54) (-4.26) 
 
(-26.36) (-7.37) 
 
(-27.32) (-3.36) 
 
(-50.18) (-5.22) 
Adj R-Sq   0.479   0.442     0.203   0.165     0.568   0.517     0.353   0.335 
Obs      99656      99656        18408      18408        26628      26628        91436      91436 
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Table A28 Regressions of debt capacity models (l) for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 (continued) 
Panel B 
  Non-investment graded   Investment graded   Non-dividend paying   Dividend paying 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
 
DC_AT DC_AT 
Intercept 0.483*** 0.459***   0.449*** 0.384***   0.470*** 0.451***   0.504*** 0.469*** 
        . (648.68) (39.63) 
 
(105.57) (9.51) 
 
(525.47) (46.55) 
 
(389.46) (33.82) 
Cfe 0.059*** 0.070*** 
 
0.158*** 0.380*** 
 
0.049*** 0.061*** 
 
0.136*** 0.150*** 
           . (27.02) (7.81) 
 
(10.36) (3.15) 
 
(20.54) (7.76) 
 
(19.15) (7.07) 
CASH -0.443*** -0.435*** 
 
-0.431*** -0.357*** 
 
-0.436*** -0.429*** 
 
-0.437*** -0.425*** 
           . (-234.06) (-29.98) 
 
(-21.10) (-5.00) 
 
(-204.85) (-31.00) 
 
(-95.07) (-19.63) 
CASH_Cfe -0.103*** -0.089*** 
 
0.530*** -0.239 
 
-0.078*** -0.072*** 
 
-0.156*** -0.133** 
           . (-16.50) (-6.89) 
 
(2.98) (-0.46) 
 
(-11.62) (-4.70) 
 
(-5.53) (-2.53) 
LARGE -0.030*** -0.014*** 
 
-0.022*** 0.019 
 
-0.044*** -0.013*** 
 
-0.029*** -0.016*** 
                 . (-25.75) (-6.95) 
 
(-6.17) (0.96) 
 
(-25.59) (-3.47) 
 
(-21.10) (-8.93) 
CREDIT 0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.045*** -0.036*** 
 
-0.034*** -0.022*** 
           . (.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (.) 
 
(-13.15) (-4.68) 
 
(-21.11) (-5.29) 
Q -0.001*** -0.000 
 
-0.009*** -0.011*** 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
-0.007*** -0.005*** 
           . (-3.45) (-0.33) 
 
(-7.63) (-4.74) 
 
(0.06) (0.28) 
 
(-13.27) (-7.79) 
INDSTDCF -0.334*** -0.160*** 
 
-0.260*** -0.180*** 
 
-0.289*** -0.114* 
 
-0.313*** -0.146*** 
                . (-56.20) (-4.64) 
 
(-14.19) (-9.51) 
 
(-42.56) (-2.02) 
 
(-29.94) (-7.18) 
Adj R-Sq   0.467   0.432     0.152   0.153     0.467   0.435     0.307   0.274 
Obs     109006     109006         9058       9058        82509      82509        35555      35555 
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Table A29 Regressions of unused debt capacity (out of debt capacity) models for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the unused debt capacity models results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. Sample and variable definitions and model specifications are reported in 
Chapter A2.3 and Table A28 respectively. The dependent variable is unused debt capacity ratio computed as unused debt capacity to the sum of debt capacity and cash (internal flexibility) for 
Model 1 and unused debt capacity to debt capacity for the rest of the models. Large is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 i f firm has sales revenue equal or more than US$1billion, and zero 
otherwise. Credit is a dummy variable with value 1 if firm has a S&P long-term credit rating of BBB- and higher, and zero otherwise. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** 
represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model OLS     FE     FM   
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 
 
MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
 
MODEL10 MODEL11 MODEL12 MODEL13 
Dependent UDC_IF UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC UDC_DC 
Cfe 0.418*** 0.752*** 0.819*** 0.506*** 0.486*** 
 
0.579*** 0.566*** 0.567*** 0.557*** 
 
0.811*** 0.875*** 0.638*** 0.632*** 
           . (50.31) (48.56) (52.12) (21.50) (20.65) 
 
(35.78) (34.96) (26.00) (25.58) 
 
(8.94) (9.94) (7.51) (7.27) 
CASH 
  
0.443*** 0.570*** 0.676*** 
  
0.376*** 0.375*** 0.366*** 
  
0.598*** 0.678*** 0.705*** 
           . 
  
(23.77) (28.60) (33.11) 
  
(17.01) (16.35) (15.98) 
  
(9.91) (14.86) (18.98) 
CASH_Cfe 
   
1.195*** 1.127*** 
   
-0.004 -0.000 
   
0.749** 0.740** 
           . 
   
(17.77) (16.78) 
   
(-0.06) (-0.01) 
   
(2.66) (2.67) 
LARGE -0.077*** -0.169*** -0.141*** -0.131*** -0.137*** 
 
-0.151*** -0.144*** -0.144*** -0.126*** 
 
-0.099* -0.060 -0.051 -0.053 
                 . (-11.76) (-13.88) (-11.54) (-10.78) (-11.29) 
 
(-10.65) (-10.19) (-10.19) (-8.89) 
 
(-1.98) (-1.21) (-1.11) (-1.10) 
CREDIT 0.027*** 0.009 0.028* 0.039** 0.052*** 
 
-0.120*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.094*** 
 
0.041 0.060* 0.068** 0.070** 
           . (3.01) (0.56) (1.68) (2.34) (3.16) 
 
(-7.68) (-7.36) (-7.36) (-6.00) 
 
(1.30) (1.97) (2.08) (2.11) 
Q 0.011*** 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 
 
0.036*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 
0.040*** 0.020** 0.019** 0.020** 
           . (10.37) (17.23) (9.36) (8.69) (10.08) 
 
(20.50) (17.75) (17.74) (16.77) 
 
(4.46) (2.53) (2.40) (2.75) 
INDSTDCF 
    
-1.416*** 
    
-1.110*** 
    
-0.155 
                . 
    
(-22.97) 
    
(-15.81) 
    
(-0.63) 
Adj R-Sq   0.022   0.021   0.025   0.028   0.032               0.031   0.047   0.049   0.050 
Obs     118079     118079     118064     118064     118064       118079     118064     118064     118064       118079     118064     118064     118064 
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Table A30 Regressions of leverage models for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the leverage models results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. The interaction term between cash flow and cash holdings is computed as the product of 
cash flow to total assets and cash holdings to total assets for each firm-year observation. Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is long-term debt 
to debt capacity (BKDEBT_DC) and long-term debt to total assets (BKDEBT_AT) in Panel A, and net issuance of debt to debt capacity (ѐDEBT_DC) and net issuance of debt to total assets 
(ѐDEBT_AT) in Panel A. Large is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if firm has sales revenue equal or more than US$1billion, and zero otherwise. Credit is a dummy variable with value 1 if 
firm has a S&P long-term credit rating of BBB- and higher, and zero otherwise. All models are estimated using fixed effects regression that controls for firm and year fixed effects. All 
regressions include a constant term (not reported). The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
Dependent BKDEBT_DC   BKDEBT_AT 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 
CFe -0.586*** -0.573*** -0.578*** -0.569*** 
 
-0.176*** -0.166*** -0.209*** -0.208*** 
              . (-44.34) (-43.40) (-32.10) (-31.62) 
 
(-67.37) (-65.85) (-61.92) (-61.68) 
CASH 
 
-0.400*** -0.397*** -0.389*** 
  
-0.312*** -0.293*** -0.292*** 
              . 
 
(-22.49) (-21.50) (-21.09) 
  
(-90.96) (-82.42) (-82.21) 
CASH_CFe 
  
0.022 0.017 
   
0.195*** 0.195*** 
              . 
  
(0.42) (0.32) 
   
(19.31) (19.29) 
LARGE 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.066*** 
 
0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
              . (7.66) (7.20) (7.20) (5.74) 
 
(0.96) (-1.03) (-0.89) (-1.57) 
CREDIT 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.102*** 
 
0.018*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
              . (10.05) (9.63) (9.63) (8.10) 
 
(7.07) (5.53) (5.74) (5.02) 
Q -0.034*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 
-0.007*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
              . (-23.63) (-20.01) (-20.02) (-18.88) 
 
(-24.26) (-11.34) (-11.85) (-11.33) 
INDSTDCF 
   
1.014*** 
    
0.091*** 
              . 
   
(18.01) 
    
(8.40) 
Obs     114787     114776     114776     114776       117855     117840     117840     117840 
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Table A30 Regressions of leverage models for period 1980 to 2008 (continued) 
Panel B 
Dependent ѐDEBT_DC   ѐDEBT_AT 
VARIABLE MODEL9 MODEL10 MODEL11 MODEL12   MODEL13 MODEL14 MODEL15 MODEL16 
CFe -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.086*** -0.088*** 
 
-0.032*** -0.031*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
              . (-5.59) (-5.49) (-6.80) (-6.93) 
 
(-11.59) (-11.22) (-13.09) (-13.27) 
CASH 
 
-0.051*** -0.036*** -0.038*** 
  
-0.032*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
              . 
 
(-3.99) (-2.73) (-2.84) 
  
(-8.71) (-6.42) (-6.57) 
CASH_CFe 
  
0.154*** 0.154*** 
   
0.078*** 0.078*** 
              . 
  
(4.07) (4.08) 
   
(7.13) (7.16) 
LARGE -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
              . (-1.32) (-1.38) (-1.36) (-0.98) 
 
(-0.24) (-0.44) (-0.40) (0.10) 
CREDIT 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
              . (4.51) (4.44) (4.48) (4.85) 
 
(3.10) (2.94) (3.02) (3.48) 
Q 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
-0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
              . (2.41) (2.97) (2.86) (2.58) 
 
(-2.17) (-0.85) (-1.05) (-1.43) 
INDSTDCF 
   
-0.186*** 
    
-0.072*** 
              . 
   
(-4.55) 
    
(-6.13) 
Obs     118079     118064     118064     118064       110959     110946     110946     110946 
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A7.3 Unused debt capacity model regression results 
In the final part of this Chapter, the reverse-cycle effect between cash and 
debt capacity is tested and reported in Table A29 to A30. The positive relationship 
between cash and unused debt capacity found in Table A29 shows that firms have 
higher unused debt capacity when cash holdings are higher. Unused debt capacity is 
measured as the actual unused portion of debt capacity out of total estimated 
borrowing capacity. The positive relationship between cash and unused debt capacity 
supports the trade-off between cash and debt capacity as firms use less of their 
borrowing capacity (and have higher unused debt capacity) when cash holdings are 
higher. The unused debt capacity regression model is not subjected to a reverse-
causality critique as less use of debt capacity cannot cause firms to have greater cash 
on hand (Campello et al., 2011). 
In the regression of unused debt capacity, cash flow ratio is found to have 
increased importance in its impact on the dependent variable. This is contrasted with 
the previous results where cash flow does not play a significant role in explaining 
changes in debt capacity. While cash flow may not dictate the level of debt capacity, 
it affects the amount of debt capacity preserved. Cash flow risk affects unused debt 
capacity in negative manner. Firms utilise more debt capacity when cash flow risks 
are higher because more cash will be kept when risks are higher (subject to the 
extent cash flow add to cash holdings). As cash flow has a greater impact on unused 
debt capacity, the interaction term between cash and cash flow report a significant 
and large estimate. The rest of the variables exhibit similar estimates as for previous 
model and Campello et al. (2011). 
In the debt capacity models, changes in cash holdings contribute to almost all 
of the actual changes in debt capacity, while changes in cash flow have little actual 
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impact on debt capacity. For unused debt capacity, change in average cash holdings 
is found to contribute 59% of the actual change in debt capacity over the recent two 
years (2007 to 2008); and change in average cash flow contribute about 36% to the 
change in average debt capacity ± both changes in cash and cash flow contribute to 
almost all of the average change unused debt capacity.39 In the decision to preserve 
borrowing capacity, firms take into account not only the level of cash on hand, but 
also cash flow level and cash flow risk. While total debt capacity dictates the level of 
cash holdings firms maintain in each period, the level of unused debt capacity is 
partially dependent on cash holdings and cash flow. This partially explains the 
Granger feedback relationship between cash and debt capacity found in the earlier 
part of the Chapter.40 Nevertheless, it is noted that the interaction effect becomes 
insignificant and has lower estimated magnitude in the fixed effect and Fama 
MacBeth regression respectively. This means the impact of cash flow sensitivity of 
cash on the usage of debt capacity falls when firm and time effects are considered.  
Table A30 reports four variations of leverage models to support the findings 
in Table A29. Both the stock and flow variable of leverage (total long-term debt and 
net debt issuance) regressions produce negative and significant estimates with cash 
holdings. As greater debt usage (due to higher debt capacity) cannot lead to firms 
having less cash, a negative relationship between debt use and cash holdings implies 
that firms have greater cash-on-hand not due to greater debt usage from larger 
borrowing capacity. Rather, it implies that cash holdings are carefully managed to 
PD[LPLVH ILUP¶V LQWHUQDO IOH[LELOLW\DFFRUGLQJ WRH[LVWLQJ ERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\ OHYHO
                                                             
39
 Average cash holdings and cash flow in year 2008 are 21% and -2.9% of total assets. Average decrease in cash 
flow is 1.1% of total assets and estimated average decrease in unused debt capacity due to changes in cash flow is 
0.8%. This amounts to about 36% when scaled by the actual decrease in average unused debt capacity ratio of 
2.2%. In a similar respect, average cash holdings to total assets decrease 2% from 2007 to 2008, and this 
contributed to an estimated 1.3% decrease in unused debt capacity ratio. This amounts to about 59% of the actual 
decrease in average unused debt capacity of 2.2%.   
40
 In an unreported test, Granger feedback relationship is found between cash holdings and unused debt capacity 
where changes in cash Granger cause changes in unused debt capacity, and vice versa. 
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In contrast with the unused debt capacity regressions, cash flow has a negative 
relationship with leverage, where increase in cash flow decreases the amount of debt 
held and issued by firms.  
Having proven that results from unused debt capacity model and different 
variations of leverage models are consistent, unused debt capacity is used to model 
ILUPV¶ DUWLILFLDO SUHVHUYDWLRQ RI ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ LQ WKH QH[W UHJUHVVLRQ PRGHO
where firms are divided according to level of financial constraints. Financially 
constrained firms are expected to have less ability to preserve capacity and the 
relationship between cash and unused debt capacity will either be lower in 
magnitude if positive, or become negative or insignificant. The use of debt capacity 
(lower unused portion of debt capacity) is more likely to add positively to cash 
holdings and contribute to the reverse-causality effect between debt capacity and 
cash for constrained firms. Accordingly, Table A31 shows cash holdings being 
insignificant in explaining unused debt capacity of small, unprofitable and non-
investment graded firms. For non-dividend payers, cash holdings have a smaller 
estimated coefficient compared to dividend payers. Results are in line with 
expectations, with the exception of investment graded firms reporting a negative 
coefficient for cash holdings. The results obtained are robust to different measures of 
unused debt capacity. The same regressions are performed using unused debt 
capacity scaled by debt capacity as the dependent variable and results are reported in 
Appendix A-XV. Cash is a more important explanatory variable for unused debt 
capacity for small, unprofitable and non-dividend paying firms. With the exception 
of constraints measured by long-term credit rating, estimated coefficient of cash 
holdings has a lower magnitude for constrained firms. 
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To sum up, the regressions of unused debt capacity models support the trade-
off between cash and debt capacity as firms use less of their borrowing capacity 
when cash holdings are higher; since less use of debt capacity cannot cause firms to 
have greater cash on hand, reverse-causality is eliminated. Second, cash flows are 
found to have positive impact on unused debt capacity as firms with higher cash flow 
preserve greater debt capacity. Cash flow risk affects unused debt capacity in the 
opposite and negative manner, where riskier firms use greater portions of their 
borrowing capacity. Third, the extent that cash flow adds to cash holdings measured 
by the interaction term is more important in explaining the level of unused debt 
capacity than total borrowing capacity. Finally, reverse causality problem is more 
prominent for constrained firms as the use of debt capacity is more likely to add 
positively to cash holdings because constrained firms have less ability to preserve 
capacity without restrictions.  
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Table A31 Regressions of unused debt capacity models for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the debt capacity models (i) to (k) results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. Sample and variable definitions and model specifications are reported in 
Chapter A2.3 and Table A28 respectively. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
Intercept 0.164*** 0.130*** 
 
0.113*** 0.075*** 
 
0.109*** 0.091*** 
 
0.154*** 0.113*** 
        . (103.84) (15.24) 
 
(31.08) (5.28) 
 
(28.51) (4.18) 
 
(91.16) (13.87) 
Cfe 0.237*** 0.275*** 
 
0.477*** 0.658*** 
 
0.082*** 0.111*** 
 
0.481*** 0.532*** 
        . (51.55) (7.17) 
 
(21.64) (5.03) 
 
(10.93) (7.46) 
 
(46.97) (15.85) 
CASH -0.004 0.003 
 
0.212*** 0.178** 
 
-0.008 -0.027** 
 
0.066*** 0.068*** 
        . (-0.97) (0.32) 
 
(10.72) (2.71) 
 
(-0.89) (-2.40) 
 
(12.94) (3.56) 
CASH_Cfe -0.084*** -0.091** 
 
-0.406*** 0.020 
 
-0.027 -0.170*** 
 
-0.419*** -0.403*** 
        . (-6.48) (-2.37) 
 
(-3.03) (0.03) 
 
(-1.26) (-3.15) 
 
(-10.42) (-7.41) 
LARGE 0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** -0.000** 
 
-0.098*** -0.067*** 
 
-0.044*** -0.024** 
        . (.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (-2.70) 
 
(-8.23) (-3.10) 
 
(-20.17) (-2.19) 
CREDIT -0.058*** -0.066*** 
 
0.006* 0.018*** 
 
0.027 0.002 
 
-0.016*** -0.002 
        . (-8.16) (-2.96) 
 
(1.94) (3.23) 
 
(0.92) (0.12) 
 
(-5.58) (-0.37) 
Q 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 
-0.002 0.002 
 
-0.001** -0.003 
 
0.004*** 0.004*** 
        . (10.80) (3.44) 
 
(-1.54) (0.44) 
 
(-2.31) (-1.63) 
 
(7.23) (2.99) 
INDSTDCF -0.248*** 0.063 
 
-0.492*** -0.128** 
 
-0.195*** 0.092 
 
-0.318*** 0.057 
        . (-19.25) (0.73) 
 
(-21.29) (-2.18) 
 
(-7.55) (0.60) 
 
(-25.59) (0.79) 
Adj R-Sq   0.061   0.067     0.062   0.094     0.018   0.028     0.053   0.060 
Obs 97625 97625 
 
18056 18056 
 
26212 26212 
 
89469 89469 
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Table A31 Regressions of unused debt capacity models for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 (continued) 
Panel B 
  Non-investment graded   Investment graded   Non-dividend paying   Dividend paying 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
 
UDC_AT UDC_AT 
Intercept 0.166*** 0.127***   0.125*** 0.048   0.130*** 0.096***   0.204*** 0.161*** 
        . (108.71) (14.53) 
 
(19.70) (1.40) 
 
(70.43) (9.07) 
 
(87.60) (24.17) 
Cfe 0.242*** 0.283*** 
 
0.224*** 0.598*** 
 
0.197*** 0.237*** 
 
0.497*** 0.549*** 
        . (53.14) (7.28) 
 
(8.71) (3.46) 
 
(39.97) (7.77) 
 
(35.24) (8.57) 
CASH 0.005 0.011 
 
-0.100*** -0.006 
 
0.018*** 0.019** 
 
0.096*** 0.111*** 
        . (1.26) (1.25) 
 
(-3.17) (-0.05) 
 
(4.01) (2.35) 
 
(11.61) (4.07) 
CASH_Cfe -0.087*** -0.091** 
 
1.896*** 0.938 
 
-0.013 -0.044 
 
-0.551*** -0.553*** 
        . (-6.81) (-2.22) 
 
(6.84) (1.16) 
 
(-0.97) (-1.26) 
 
(-10.63) (-3.71) 
LARGE -0.047*** -0.030** 
 
0.009* 0.047*** 
 
-0.088*** -0.066*** 
 
-0.039*** -0.029*** 
        . (-19.53) (-2.42) 
 
(1.71) (3.17) 
 
(-25.15) (-9.56) 
 
(-15.76) (-3.46) 
CREDIT 0.000*** -0.000** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.005 -0.009 
 
-0.061*** -0.037*** 
        . (.) (-2.70) 
 
(.) (.) 
 
(-0.76) (-0.58) 
 
(-20.93) (-3.71) 
Q 0.004*** 0.006*** 
 
-0.004** -0.005 
 
0.005*** 0.006*** 
 
0.004*** 0.007** 
        . (11.45) (3.70) 
 
(-2.26) (-0.91) 
 
(10.99) (3.34) 
 
(4.34) (2.55) 
INDSTDCF -0.287*** 0.065 
 
-0.327*** -0.191*** 
 
-0.150*** 0.228 
 
-0.344*** -0.029 
        . (-23.56) (0.72) 
 
(-12.21) (-6.37) 
 
(-10.75) (1.69) 
 
(-18.48) (-0.40) 
Adj R-Sq   0.061   0.067     0.047   0.071     0.052   0.061     0.101   0.095 
Obs 106778 106778 
 
8903 8903 
 
80750 80750 
 
34931 34931 
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CHAPTER A8. DEBT CAPACITY, CASH HOLDINGS 
AND INDUSTRY EFFECT 
 
A8.1 Cash holdings and industry effect 
While financial flexibility has been highlighted in liquidity management and 
capital structure literature, few papers in the existing literature discuss industry 
impact on financial flexibility directly. Many papers consider industry factor as a 
fixed effect and control it statistically in multivariate analysis (e.g. Almeida and 
Campello, 2007, Bates et al., 2009, Campello et al., 2011). Nevertheless, there is 
empirical evidence indiFDWLQJWKHHIIHFWRILQGXVWU\RQILUPV¶OLTXLGLW\PDQDJHPHQW
)LUPV PD\ PDNH OLTXLGLW\ FKRLFHV EDVHG RQ FRPSHWLWRUV¶ LQWHUQDO IOH[LELOLW\
positions, and even more so in more competitive industries because of the strategic 
benefits of flexibility from both cash and debt capacity (Lins et al., 2010). 
In Chapter A3.2.3, univariate analysis shows significant variation in the level 
of cash and debt capacity held by firms across different industries. The time trend 
analysis of average cash over time shows cash increase at a significant rate only for 
certain industries.41 In this Chapter, the relationship between cash and debt capacity 
across different industries is analysed to determine (1) whether trade-off between the 
two instruments is evident across industries and, if so, how different is the degree of 
substitution and (2) whether other cash determinants affect cash holdings equally 
across industries. According to the trade-off hypothesis, the substitution effect 
should be apparent in all industries; however, the effect may be stronger in two 
                                                             
41
 Yearly mean of cash is regressed against time variable for each industry group and a positive significant 
estimate for time factor is reported only for half of the industry. Mean of cash is computed yearly for each 
industry group. Time variable is measured as the number of years from the start of the sample period, 1980 (e.g. 
financial year 1980 and 1981 will have time variable equals to 0 and 1 respectively).  Estimated coefficients for 
time variable are found to be insignificant in Industry 1, 8, 9 and 10, and negative in Industry 3. Industry groups 
are sorted according to their SIC codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 
4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, and 9=Others. 
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opposite scenarios ± (1) more stable or less risky industries because firms in such 
industries have greater ability to borrow and are less constrained in the external debt 
market; this effect is substantiated by herding behaviour of firms in highly 
competitive industries; (2) risky and high growth firms because these firms have 
greater need to grow but have difficulty sourcing external funds and, thus, cash has 
to be maintained at sufficiently high level. 
The cash model with debt capacity included is performed using Fama-
MacBeth regressions across the nine industries (reported in Table A32). Only debt 
capacity and leverage remains significant across all industries. All the other cash 
determinants are insignificant in at least one industry group. This suggests that debt 
capacity and leverage are robust cash determinants across all industry groups. 
First, industry cash flow volatility is a significant cash determinant only in 
manufacturing and transportation. Volatility reports insignificant or zero coefficient 
estimates in all other industries. Results support findings in previous chapters that 
industry cash flow volatility may not be a robust cash determinant as it only proves 
significant for certain firms. Manufacturing and transportation industries have the 
largest proportion of lines of credit (Campello et al., 2011). As manufacturing and 
transportation firms have higher lines of credit and are less constrained in seeking 
external debt, average cash holdings are, on average, not high in the two industries.42 
With less cash held mostly for operations purpose (rather than investment purpose), 
manufacturing and transportation firms may have higher cash flow to cash 
sensitivity, and keep more cash when cash flow risks are higher, thereby explaining 
the significance of industry cash flow volatility in these two industries. 
                                                             
42
 Average cash holdings from 1980 to 2008 are 17% and 11% of total assets for manufacturing and 
transportation firms respectively. This is relatively low compared to the highest cash holdings reported for 
software and biotechnology firms (41%). 
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Second, the acquisition variable reports interesting results. Acquisition has a 
relatively high, negative and significant estimate for all other industries (except for 
the residual industry). The largest estimate magnitude (0.714) is reported in software 
and biotechnology, implying that acquisition activities in high technology industries 
is largely funded by cash, probably because other sources of funding are difficult to 
access or are much more costly. Supporting this, the mining industry with high 
tangibility reports a significantly lower estimate magnitude (0.090), implying that, 
while mining firms use cash for acquisitions, they are likely to depend on other 
sources of financing and overall cash level is not significantly affected by the level 
of acquisition. The results are supported by Harford (1999) where cash-rich firms 
were found to engage in acquisition activities more than their counterparts. On 
average, software and biotechnology firms hold the largest average cash (41% of 
total assets over the sample period), while mining firms have a low cash average of 
12%. The large cash holdings enable cash-rich high technology firms to acquire 
more. Using a reverse-causality explanation, acquisition activities are then found to 
have greater impact on cash level of cash-rich industries such as software and 
biotechnology. 
Third, the substitution effect is the greatest in software, biotechnology and 
manufacturing, where the coefficient estimate for debt capacity is greater than one, 
such that any decrease in debt capacity will result in a more than proportional 
increase in cash holdings. For software and biotechnology firms, cash is an 
important source of funding because of low borrowing capacity. Large intangibles 
DQGUHVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQWDFWLYLWLHVFRQWULEXWHOLWWOHWRILUPV¶ERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\
in high technology industry. The evidence above shows that high technology firms 
rely substantially on cash even for acquisition activities. An increase in debt capacity 
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for these firms means freeing up the cash for other purposes. As such, any change in 
debt capacity is likely to impact cash level because cash is used extensively for 
various purposes, e.g. acquisitions, investment and operations. As mentioned, cash in 
the software and biotechnology industries are held consistently at a sufficiently high 
level for these firms. The importance of cash in high technology firms is supported 
by empirical evidence in Brown and Petersen (2011) where cash is used for 
smoothing investment in intangibles. Furthermore, the marginal value of cash 
holdings is higher in high technology firms compared to other firms (Zhou, 2011), 
supporting the results obtained here that the value of substituting a drop in debt 
capacity with greater cash holdings is greater for high technology firms. 
 On the other hand, the substitution effect is higher for manufacturing firms, 
possibly due to strategic reasons. For competitive reasons, Haushalter et al. (2007) 
IRXQG WKDW ILUP¶V FRPSHWLWLRQ ZLWK LWV LQGXVWU\ ULYDOV IRU valuable investment is 
dependent on the level of cash held ± to prevent losing valuable investment 
opportunities and market share, firms hold greater cash holdings (at least greater than 
the rivals) whenever possible. High substitution effect for manufacturing firms 
support previous empirical results where firms hold greater debt capacity and/or cash 
for strategic reasons (Lins et al., 2010, Maksimovic, 1990). Any change in debt 
FDSDFLW\ LV³UHSODFHG´TXLFNO\E\DGMXVWLQJWKH OHYHORIFDVKKHOGWRSUHYHQW ORVLQJ
strategically to rivals.  
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A8.2 Debt capacity and industry effect 
 To examine the impact of industry on debt capacity, the debt capacity model 
is performed for the nine industry groups and results are reported in Table A33. 
Similar to the cash model results, industry cash flow volatility is not a significant 
determinant of debt capacity in most of the industries. Volatility is found significant 
in the software and biotechnology industries possibly because high technology firms 
have greater risks and less stable cash flow compared to other firms with more 
tangible investments. 
Debt capacity is the most important determinant of cash in Table A32. The 
same is found on the reverse side, where cash reports the largest estimate that is 
significant across all industry groups. This reinforces the substitution effect between 
cash and debt capacity across different industries, and shows that the relationship 
between cash and debt capacity is robust even when there are substantial industry 
effects. 
Cash flow is insignificant in about half the industries (retail and wholesale, 
manufacturing, mining, transportation and communication industries); while the 
interaction term is significant only in retail and wholesale and manufacturing 
industries. In Chapter A5, cash flow and the interaction between cash holdings and 
cash flow are more important determinants of debt capacity for constrained firms. 
Both sets of results may tell the same story if industries listed above are made up 
more of constrained firms with difficulty sourcing for external funds. However, this 
is not the case. Except for the communication industry, the above industries have 
higher borrowing capacity compared to the other industries. This implies they have 
little difficulty sourcing for external borrowing with existing tangible assets as 
collaterals. As such, results in Table A33 are attributed to industry difference rather 
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than the level of constraints faced by specific industries. Contrary to Campello et al. 
(2011), cash flow and cash flow sensitivity of cash may not impact debt capacity in 
the same manner when industry effects considered.  
To sum up, Table A32 shows that there is substantial industry effect in 
determining the level of cash holdings and debt capacity. Regardless of the 
magnitude of estimates reported, the number and type of cash determinants are found 
to be significant across all nine industries. Only debt capacity is a consistent 
significant cash determinant for all industries. Contrary to expectations, the greatest 
substitution effect is found in manufacturing, software and biotechnology firms. 
Even when the other cash determinants are significant, their impact on cash varies 
substantially in magnitude, e.g. acquisition variable has a negative 0.714 estimate for 
software and biotechnology firms but only a negative 0.090 estimate for mining 
firms ± implying greater proportion of cash used for acquisition activities for high 
technology firms. The previous important cash determinant (found in Bates et al., 
2009), industry cash flow volatility, is no longer a robust explanatory variable once 
industry effects are considered ± it is important only for low debt capacity industries 
such as manufacturing and transportation. For debt capacity, Table A33 shows 
similar important industry effects. Only cash has an important relationship with debt 
capacity across all industries, while cash flow and cash flow sensitivity of cash are 
insignificant in industries with lower tangibles and borrowing capacity. While cash 
flow variable is an insignificant debt capacity determinant in high technology firms, 
cash flow volatility is remained important in determining the level of debt capacity. 
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Table A32 Regressions of cash model (b) for period 1980 to 2008 across industries 
This table reports cash model (b) regression results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2006. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Industry groups are sorted according to their SIC codes as 
follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, and 9=Others. Variable definitions are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total asset. All estimates are reported based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model FM 
Industry IND=1 IND=2 IND=3 IND=4 IND=5 IND=6 IND=7 IND=8 IND=9 
Dependent CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH 
Intercept 0.485*** 0.648*** 0.560*** 0.438*** 0.386*** 0.738*** 0.518*** 0.445*** 0.520*** 
        . (26.26) (96.72) (22.96) (16.62) (17.42) (26.70) (22.89) (7.92) (21.65) 
DC_NOCASH -0.723*** -1.006*** -0.938*** -0.787*** -0.462*** -1.236*** -0.742*** -0.681*** -0.677*** 
        . (-13.99) (-69.95) (-38.90) (-15.19) (-7.63) (-27.61) (-24.10) (-5.25) (-13.74) 
INDSTDCF -0.085 0.178*** -0.038 0.368*** -0.000** 0.031 0.093* -0.000** 0.250 
        . (-1.18) (7.06) (-0.16) (3.65) (-2.70) (0.15) (1.92) (-2.70) (1.18) 
Q 0.015*** 0.007*** -0.001 0.032*** 0.011* 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.022*** 0.002 
        . (4.22) (4.94) (-0.25) (6.00) (1.96) (3.15) (4.05) (3.70) (0.47) 
LNAT -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.005 -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.014*** 
        . (-5.79) (-11.79) (-3.24) (-2.72) (-7.68) (-1.20) (-8.79) (-7.52) (-5.45) 
Cfe -0.019* 0.033** 0.036*** 0.111*** -0.050 0.025*** 0.011 -0.009 0.047** 
        . (-1.81) (2.41) (3.58) (5.91) (-1.43) (3.72) (0.69) (-0.22) (2.13) 
NWC 0.003 -0.015 -0.003 -0.072*** 0.046** 0.019 -0.025** -0.007 -0.052*** 
        . (0.21) (-1.16) (-0.17) (-3.22) (2.62) (1.43) (-2.29) (-0.23) (-2.99) 
CAPEX -0.110*** 0.033* 0.085*** 0.006 0.273*** -0.007 0.109** 0.136** 0.032 
        . (-3.46) (1.86) (4.81) (0.26) (3.37) (-0.13) (2.17) (2.74) (0.58) 
BKDEBT -0.168*** -0.213*** -0.099*** -0.117*** -0.179*** -0.214*** -0.239*** -0.133*** -0.224*** 
        . (-11.87) (-14.04) (-7.76) (-9.50) (-8.26) (-8.75) (-29.33) (-5.60) (-11.55) 
RD_SALE 0.233** 0.058*** -0.127 -4.051 0.346** 0.036** 0.040* 0.293*** 0.032 
        . (2.69) (2.84) (-1.12) (-1.42) (2.11) (2.76) (1.89) (4.72) (0.18) 
DIVDUM 0.010*** -0.024*** -0.016*** 0.008 -0.025*** -0.026** -0.008** 0.022** 0.006 
        . (3.84) (-4.49) (-3.04) (0.94) (-4.35) (-2.57) (-2.61) (2.38) (0.60) 
ACQUI -0.308*** -0.388*** -0.090*** -0.318*** -0.332*** -0.714*** -0.490*** -0.433*** -0.233* 
        . (-12.63) (-15.52) (-4.05) (-6.14) (-5.66) (-10.98) (-16.08) (-11.57) (-2.02) 
Adj R-Sq   0.551   0.690   0.582   0.607   0.460   0.682   0.515   0.541   0.537 
Obs 14656 60062 6406 3117 3557 7702 14579 2538 3064 
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Table A33 Regressions of debt capacity model (l) for period 1980 to 2008 across industries 
This table reports debt capacity model (l) regression results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2006. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), 
utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Industry groups are sorted according to their SIC 
codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, and 9=Others. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is debt capacity scaled by total asset. All estimates are reported based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West 
(1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model FM 
Industry IND=1 IND=2 IND=3 IND=4 IND=5 IND=6 IND=7 IND=8 IND=9 
Dependent DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT 
Intercept 0.475*** 0.471*** 0.487*** 0.456*** 0.278*** 0.515*** 0.372*** 0.374*** 0.367*** 
        . (139.92) (36.51) (34.73) (37.04) (15.79) (17.67) (31.53) (16.32) (11.96) 
CFe 0.089*** 0.066*** 0.102*** 0.203*** 0.109** 0.003 0.015 0.003 0.125* 
        . (4.48) (7.83) (5.93) (7.44) (2.59) (0.19) (1.51) (0.12) (1.89) 
CASH -0.494*** -0.464*** -0.480*** -0.495*** -0.233*** -0.369*** -0.352*** -0.344*** -0.366*** 
        . (-37.53) (-27.23) (-41.62) (-13.26) (-7.30) (-11.07) (-25.38) (-9.87) (-11.13) 
CASH_CFe -0.184*** -0.068*** -0.041 -0.217 -0.239* 0.025 0.085 0.050 -0.141 
        . (-3.75) (-5.41) (-0.53) (-1.61) (-1.84) (0.62) (1.66) (0.74) (-0.96) 
LARGE -0.004 -0.031*** -0.035*** 0.008 0.032 -0.022 -0.015** 0.008 0.009 
        . (-1.51) (-15.16) (-3.07) (1.12) (1.60) (-0.97) (-2.57) (1.01) (0.29) 
CREDIT -0.005 -0.022*** 0.004 -0.016 0.014 0.025 -0.024*** 0.021 -0.039** 
        . (-1.04) (-5.33) (0.66) (-1.25) (0.64) (1.47) (-3.58) (1.25) (-2.35) 
Q -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.001 0.003* 0.006 
        . (-1.09) (-0.85) (-0.10) (0.89) (1.54) (-1.63) (0.70) (1.77) (1.15) 
INDSTDCF -0.095 -0.003 -0.248 -0.185* 0.000** -0.786*** 0.186* 0.000*** 0.298 
        . (-0.63) (-0.05) (-1.35) (-1.80) (2.70) (-5.07) (1.73) (.) (1.44) 
Adj R-Sq   0.334   0.553   0.312   0.322   0.138   0.600   0.225   0.269   0.186 
Obs      14896      60436       6643       3215       3686       7858      15207       2610       3513 
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CHAPTER A9. DEBT CAPACITY, CASH HOLDINGS 
AND INVESTMENT  
 
A9.1 Investment model specifications 
Firms with greater untapped borrowing capacity are found to perform better 
in the long-run because of their greater ability to invest more in better projects 
(Denis and McKeon, March 2012, Marchica and Mura, 2010). In the face of positive 
shocks, firms with greater spare debt capacity are able to seize opportunities better 
WKDQ WKHLU FRXQWHUSDUWV E\ XVLQJ WKHLU SUHVHUYHG GHEW FDSDFLW\ DV D µWUDQVLWRU\
ILQDQFLQJYHKLFOH¶DQGPLQLPL]ing the total cost of funding (DeAngelo et al., 2011). 
Firms with greater cash are also found to invest better in good times, and the greater 
investment made adds positively to future firm value (Simutin, 2010). Also, in the 
face of negative shocks, firms with greater financial flexibility are able to withstand 
external shocks and perform better during crises with the greater pool of cash on 
hand (Campello et al., 2011, Harford et al., April 2003) and unused debt capacity 
(Arslana et al., 2011). In addition, there is evidence of firms managing financial 
flexibility to prepare for recession; this, however, is applicable only for 
unconstrained firms who are able to maintain adequate flexibility in normal times 
(Ang and Smedema, 2011). Han and Qiu (2007) found a negative relationship 
between investment and cash flow risks, and positive relationship between cash 
holdings and cash flow risks for financially constrained firms.  
 The literature provides evidence that cash and debt capacity contribute to 
better investment and greater firm value in the long-run. However, it is important to 
understand how the two instruments together impact investment activities and firm 
value. To examine the real impact of internal flexibility, the following investment 
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model is adapted from previous studies (Almeida and Campello, 2007, Brown and 
Petersen, 2011, Campello et al., 2011, Marchica and Mura, 2010). 
Gross or Net Investment, INVTMTit / NINVTMTit  
 FĮ1Cashit Į2DCit Į3(Cash*DC)it Į4Qit Į5CFeit İi   (m) 
In the previous survey study (Campello et al., 2011), the authors use planned 
expenditure, planned technology spending and planned employment as the 
independent variables because they measure ex-ante investment decisions (from data 
obtained in surveys) rather than ex-post. However, to measure the actual impact on 
firms, we use the actual investment variable measured in two ways: (i) Investment 
(INVTMT) computed as the ratio of investment in fixed assets to beginning period 
capital stock following Almeida and Campello (2007) and Marchica and Mura 
(2010), and (ii) net investment (NINVTMT) computed as the sum of capital 
expenditure, acquisitions, increase in investment less sale of property plant and 
equipment and sale of investment to beginning period total assets following Lemmon 
and Roberts (2010).43 Following Almeida and Campello (2007), firms with capital 
stock less than USD 5million, real asset or sale growth more than 100%, negative Q 
or Q larger than 10 is excluded from the final sample for investment regression. 
Excluding these firms avoids potential bias from extreme value of investments due to 
young and developing firms making initial start-up investments and mature firm 
making major change to the nature of business or investment portfolio. 
 Evidence from the literature suggests that both cash and debt capacity are 
important in liquidity management, especially in times of crisis. Recent surveys also 
highlight better performance of firms with greater internal liquidity during the 
financial crisis. To measure the effect of cash and debt capacity on investment during 
a crisis period, a recession dummy is created. The recession dummy equals 1 during 
                                                             
43
 Detailed variable definitions are reported in Chapter A-4. 
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a recession period and zero otherwise. Recession periods are recorded based on 
NBER Business Cycle Dates ± a financial year is recorded as a recession year when 
more than half of the year is in a contraction period. Using this formula, years 1980, 
1981, 1982, 1990, 1991, 2001, 2008 and 2009 are recorded as recession years. 
)ROORZLQJ /HDU\¶V (2009) event study method, recession dummy and additional 
interaction terms between each independent variable and recession dummy is put 
into the model. By construction, the interaction term between each independent 
variable and recession dummy is equal to zero in normal non-recessionary years. In 
addition, a pre-recession variable is constructed for the year prior the start of 
recession year. The pre-recession variable represents the peak before the start of 
contraction, and a positive relationship between pre-recession indicator and 
investment is expected. 
 According to the literature, internal liquidity has a role to play in both 
positive and negative times; thus, it is important to test the effect of internal liquidity 
when firms face positive shocks. Here, positive period is identified as the post-
recession years when recovery takes place and firms are faced with valuable 
investment opportunities, their ability to recover and seize valuable investments 
becomes important in the period after recession. The number of years of post-
recession years equals the number of years of recession on the assumption that the 
economy takes an equal amount of time (as it contracted previously) to recover.44  
                                                             
44
 The arbitrary selection of post-recession years is tested for robustness by taking just one period after recession 
as the post-recession year. Although unreported, results obtained are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
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A9.2 Investment model results 
 
A9.2.1 Base Investment model results 
 
Table A34 reports the results of the investment function (with and without 
cash and debt capacity interaction term) performed using three regression 
techniques. Panels A and B report results using investment ratio and net investment 
ratio respectively. The inclusion of an interaction term between cash and debt 
capacity makes little difference to the model estimation except that the interpretation 
of coefficients is different.  
First, according to expectations, both cash and debt capacity add positively to 
investment and net investment. Greater cash and debt capacity increase investment 
capacity and actual investment made by firms. The largest estimates recorded are for 
the OLS regression of gross investment ratio where a unit change in cash and debt 
capacity increase investment by more than four times each. The latter evidence of 
GHEWFDSDFLW\VXSSRUWV$OPHLGDDQG&DPSHOOR¶V(2007) credit multiplier effect where 
investments in tangible assets generate greater capacity for further investments as 
tangible assets are used as collateral for additional investment. Investment ratio has 
greater coefficient estimate compared to net investment because the former measures 
gross investment of firms without considering any sale of existing investments, and a 
different scaling variable is used for gross investment. Difference in scaling variable 
results in larger investment ratios and the subsequent larger coefficient estimates 
(robustness checks in the latter part of this section show that results are robust to 
different scaling variable). Net investment measures new investments made by firms 
using cash-on-hand, bank debt, or new debt and equity issues. Panel A shows that, 
after fixed and year effects are considered, increase in cash adds less than 
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proportionately to increase in investment; while increase in debt capacity increases 
investment proportionately more (i.e. credit multiplier effect).   
Second, the interaction term between cash and debt capacity enters the 
investment model with an expected negative coefficient supporting the trade-off 
between cash and debt capacity as funding instrument for investments. As the level 
of cash holdings increases, the impact of debt capacity on investment falls as the 
final coefficient estimate of debt capacity is reduced by the negative interaction term. 
Firms with greater cash holdings will rely less on debt capacity to fund investments. 
This applies for cash holdings in a similar respect, where the cash effect on 
investment falls when debt capacity increases. As explained above, net investment 
regressions report lower coefficients compared to gross investment models. 
To interpret the results in another way, the impact of debt capacity on 
investment is 1.73 for a firm with average cash holdings of 21%; while the impact of 
cash on investment is 0.52 for a firm owning average debt capacity of 29% in the 
final year of sample.45 The estimates show that it is not possible for cash and debt 
capacity to have zero impact on investment.46 The minimum effect of debt capacity 
on investment is 1.404, while the minimum cash effect is 0.26. Debt capacity has 
greater impact on investment compared to cash. The positive minimum effect of both 
OLTXLGLW\ LQVWUXPHQWV SURYHV WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI FDVK DQG GHEW FDSDFLW\ LQ ILUP¶V
investment behaviour.  
 
                                                             
45
 Impact of debt capacity on net investment at average cash level for FY2008 is 1.795 ± 0.332*0.21 = 1.73 
    Impact of cash on net investment at average debt capacity for FY2008 is 0.614- 0.332*0.293 = 0.52 
46
 For debt capacity to have zero impact on net investment, cash needs to be 5.25 of total assets which is not 
possible because the maximum value of cash ratio is 1. Similarly, it is not feasible for cash to have zero impact 
on net investment because debt capacity has to be 1.788 of total assets. By construction, the debt capacity ratio is 
FDSSHGDWYDOXHEHFDXVHLWPHDVXUHVWKHOLTXLGDWLRQYDOXHRIILUP¶VDVVHWVDQGLVDSUR[\IRU WRWDOERUURZLQJ
capacity firm is able to obtain if lenders are willing to extend the funds when required. Unless debt capacity 
measures a component that is not included in the balance sheet (which is not considered in this study), the 
maximum value of debt capacity ratio is taken to be 1.  
Part A Chapter A9.Debt capacity, cash holdings and investment 
158 
 
Third, cash flow is significant in determining gross investment only. The 
variable becomes insignificant when interaction term and fixed effects are taken into 
account. Similar to Almeida and Campello (2007) and Marchica and Mura (2010), 
cash flow enters the fixed effect model with the correct positive estimate ± cash 
flows and investment are positively correlated. The estimate of cash flow is smaller 
for net investment regression possibly because the sale of investment and capital 
stock is considered in net investment ratio, and these sales contribute to investment 
funding while cash flows contribute more to funding for operational needs. Fourth, 
consistent with previous estimates, Q ratio has a significant positive impact on gross 
investment. The positive relationship is expected as Q ratio is a proxy for future 
investment opportunities. However, this is not the case for net investment where Q 
ratio is insignificant when firm and year fixed effects are considered, and found to 
have negative coefficient in the OLS regressions. Inconsistent estimates of Q ratio 
are possibly due to the measurement of net investment ratio which includes the sale 
of existing investments.  
A9.2.2 Robustness tests 
The following are carried out to test the robustness of the investment model 
and results. First, correlations coefficients between debt capacity and the two 
investment ratios are checked to avoid any bias problems due to variable design 
because capital stock is included in the estimation of debt capacity and a main 
component in investment ratios. Results are reported in Appendix A-XVIII. 
Correlations between debt capacity and the two investment ratios are relatively small 
(largest correlation of 0.111 is reported between debt capacity and net investment 
using Spearman rank correlations tests). Low correlations between the two internal 
flexibility instruments and investment ratios indicate that high coefficient estimates 
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found in the investment regressions are not due to variable construction or design but 
actual underlying strong relationship between investment behaviour and internal 
liquidity. 
Second, to ensure results are robust to the construction of variables, 
independent variables are scaled by beginning capital stock (instead of total assets) 
for the regression of gross investment because investment ratio is computed as 
capital expenditure scaled by beginning period capital stock. Following Almeida and 
Campello (2007) and Marchica and Mura (2010), cash flows are scaled by capital 
stock for each firm-year. For consistency, the same scaling variable is used for debt 
capacity and cash ratios. Appendix A-XIX reports the regression of gross investment 
with independent variables scaled by capital stock. Results obtained are similar to 
previous studies. As expected, coefficient estimates for cash and debt capacity falls 
significantly due to the difference in value of ratio. Cash and debt capacity scaled by 
net assets have values greater than the original ratios scaled by total assets. Lower 
coefficients together with larger independent variable values produce similar 
quantitative results as that reported in Table A34. For example, the impact of 
changes in cash on gross investment from 2007 to 2008 is similar for both 
measurements of cash (cash ratio scaled by total assets and capital stock) for a firm 
with average debt capacity. When a firm with average debt capacity to total assets of 
29.3% in 2008 experiences a decrease in cash holdings of 2% (fall in average cash 
holdings to total assets from 2007 to 2008), gross investment of the firm will fall 
7.56%. This is about 27% of the total decrease in actual average gross investment 
from 2007 to 2008. In a similar respect, for a firm with average debt capacity to 
capital stock ratio of 2.037, a fall in average cash holdings to capital stock of 18.4% 
will result in a decrease of 7.48% in gross investment. The decrease in gross 
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investment from changes in average cash to total assets and changes in average cash 
to capital stock is almost equivalent (7.56% vs 7.48%) ± indicating the similarity of 
quantitative and qualitative results of Table A34 and Appendix A-XIX. This further 
proves that results are robust to the construction of independent variables when 
scaling variable is different.  
Third, to ensure results are not due to the winsorisation method used for the 
sample, further results are reported in Appendix A-XX for investment ratios 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The estimates obtained are qualitatively 
similar to Table A34, but are quantitatively much larger than the initial estimates. 
This is due to the large values of investment ratios for some firm-year observations. 
To normalize the investment ratios and prevent extreme large value of investment 
ratios from biasing the results, Table A33 reports results of the dependent variable 
winsorized at the 5% top and bottom tails. In an unreported regression, dependent 
variable is winsorized by 10% at the top and bottom tails, and results obtained are 
similar to that for 5% winsorisation. The final regression models used 5% 
winsorisation method because it is not subject to extreme values biasness.  
A9.2.3 Investment and recession 
In the final stage of investment behaviour analysis, recessionary impact on 
the relationship between internal liquidity and investment is examined. Table A35 
Panel A reports the investment model with recession variable and interaction of 
independent variables with recession. Recession is important in dictating the level of 
investments for Model 1 to 3. With the exception of net investment fixed effects 
regression, recession variable enters all other models with an expected negative and 
significant estimate ± suggesting that there are fewer investments made during a 
recessionary period. Insignificance of recession variable in net investment regression 
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with fixed effects may suggest that firm effects and/or sales of previous investments 
and existing tangibles during recession are better able to explain the difference in net 
investments made by firms. First, firm fixed effects measure inert firm 
characteristics that are not picked up in the model specification, and some firms are 
possibly more greatly hit by recession than others (e.g. the automobile 
manufacturing and airline transportation industries were greatly affected by the 
2007-2008 financial crisis). Second, net investments includes sale of previous 
investments and these sales generate cash flows for operational and investment use 
during recessionary years. The sales activities are expected to be greater in 
recessionary period because firms may have difficulty renewing existing credit lines 
or initiating new source of funding (Campello et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the models 
show the effect of negative shocks on gross investments as hypothesized.   
As the interaction term between debt capacity and recession has positive 
coefficients, debt capacity is more likely to be used in recessionary times. The same 
is, however, not found for cash since the interaction term between cash and recession 
is mildly significant for net investments. The same regressions are repeated 
excluding debt capacity and its interaction with recession (unreported) but results 
confirm findings in Panel A of Table A35. Results indicate that firms use more debt 
capacity for both gross and net investments but there is only partial evidence of 
greater use of cash for net investments during recessionary periods. This suggests 
that the use of cash for new investment (not including replacement) is curbed 
because managers are more cautious and build up precautionary cash savings as risk 
increases. Debt capacity, on the other hand, may be drawn down during recession 
times as managers try to draw down whatever credit that is available to avoid 
restriction on borrowing ± this is more apparent for unprofitable firms (Campello et 
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al., 2011). Evidence found in the previous study suggests that firms spend and invest 
more only when they have sufficient cash holdings ± therefore, investments are made 
out of cash and debt capacity during recessions only when enough cash is held 
within the firm.  
Finally, growth opportunities have positive relationships with both 
investment measures but cash flow only reports a positive relationship with gross 
investments. However, greater growth opportunities and increased cash flow are not 
IRXQG WR LPSDFW SRVLWLYHO\ JURVV LQYHVWPHQW GXULQJ UHFHVVLRQ DV WKH YDULDEOHV¶
interaction term with recession are insignificant. Growth opportunities proxied by Q 
ratio remain an unimportant variable during recession whilst cash flow is positively 
related to net investment only during recession.  
Panel B of Table A35 repeats Panel A regressions with an additional two 
variables for pre-recession and post-recession period. Estimates for the explanatory 
variables in Panel B are largely similar to those reported in Panel A. First, similar to 
Panel A, the recession variable enters the model with a negative and significant 
estimate (except for the net investment fixed effects model) ± suggesting firms 
significantly reduce investment during recession years. Second, during the year prior 
to recession, firms are also found to reduce investments. This negative relationship is 
expected because the year prior to recession is usually the peak where investments 
saturation is high and new investments are relatively lower compared to the growth 
EHIRUHWKHSHDN7KLVQHJDWLYHHIIHFW LVKRZHYHUQRWVLJQLILFDQWZKHQ ILUPV¶ IL[HG
effects are considered. Finally, the post-recession variable enters all the models with 
significant and positive estimates. This indicates significantly larger investment 
activities during the right period after recession. The estimates for the three recession 
variables are encouraging because they show a decrease in investments before and 
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during recession, and an increase in investments after recession. This not only 
supports our investment model using cash and debt capacity as main determinants 
but also supports the use of the three recession dummy variables for modelling 
purposes. 
  Summing up the findings from the investment models, cash and debt 
capacity are found to explain most of the changes in investment, leaving other 
variables with trivial impact. Results are robust to the consideration of fixed firm and 
time effects. The results support the credit multiplier effect of Almeida and 
Campello (2007); and debt capacity is found to have greater impact on investment 
compared to cash. Results are extended to the model with recessionary impact 
because debt capacity is found to impact positively investment during recession, but 
cash is not found to influence positively investment during recession. Whilst growth 
opportunities and cash flows enter the investment model according to hypothesis, the 
relationships of investment and the two variables do not change significantly over 
the recessionary period. Recessionary variables constructed are found to model 
external shocks on investment relatively well as investments are found to decline 
slightly prior to recession, decline by a larger portion during recession, and increase 
after the recession. On the whole, results suggest that debt capacity increases firm 
YDOXHE\LQFUHDVLQJILUPV¶DELOLW\WRLQYHVWGXULQJUHFHVVLRQZKLOHFDVKWDNHVDPRUH
precautionary purpose, supporting operational requirement rather than investment 
need, by cushioning the drop in cash flows during recession. 
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Table A34 Regressions of investment model (model m) for period 1980 to 2008  
This table reports the investment models results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms 
are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government 
(SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Following 
Almeida and Campello (2007), firms with the following characteristics are eliminated from the sample: (1) 
capital stock less than USD5million, (2) real asset or sale growth more than 100%, and (3) negative Q or Q more 
than 10. The interaction term between cash holdings and debt capacity is computed as the product of cash 
holdings to total assets and debt capacity to total assets for each firm-year observation. Variable definitions are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is investment ratio computed as capital investment to lagged 
capital stock for Panel A and net investment computed as the sum of capital investment, acquisitions and change 
in investments less sale in property plant and equipment and investment to lagged total assets for Panel B. Both 
investment and net investment ratios are winsorised at top and bottom 5% due to large extreme values. OLS 
model reports estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. FE model 
controls for firm and year fixed effects. FM model is based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and 
West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. All regressions include a constant term (not 
reported). The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * 
represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
 
FM 
Dependent NINVTMT NINVTMT   NINVTMT NINVTMT   NINVTMT NINVTMT 
CASH 1.214*** 1.114*** 
 
0.706*** 0.614*** 
 
1.386*** 1.229*** 
             . (13.64) (12.13) 
 
(6.89) (6.11) 
 
(3.95) (4.22) 
DC 2.399*** 2.366*** 
 
1.887*** 1.795*** 
 
1.647*** 1.646*** 
             . (22.16) (21.06) 
 
(14.02) (13.48) 
 
(5.21) (5.42) 
CASH*DC 
 
-0.980*** 
 
 
-0.332*** 
 
 
-6.204*** 
             . 
 
(-8.63) 
 
 
(-4.23) 
 
 
(-5.12) 
Q -0.040*** -0.036*** 
 
0.019* 0.018* 
 
-0.021 -0.009 
             . (-3.82) (-3.32) 
 
(1.95) (1.91) 
 
(-1.40) (-0.65) 
Cfe -0.008 -0.115 
 
0.164** 0.090 
 
-0.030 -0.273 
             . (-0.11) (-1.42) 
 
(2.15) (1.20) 
 
(-0.16) (-1.41) 
Adj R-Sq   0.007   0.008 
 
    
 
  0.005   0.015 
Obs      75457      66972 
 
     75457      66972 
 
     75457      66972 
Panel B 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
 
FM 
Dependent INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT 
CASH 4.365*** 4.544*** 
 
3.947*** 4.060*** 
 
4.610*** 4.576*** 
             . (14.01) (13.39) 
 
(11.06) (10.82) 
 
(7.42) (8.63) 
DC 4.204*** 4.502*** 
 
4.858*** 5.468*** 
 
2.164*** 2.242*** 
             . (11.09) (10.85) 
 
(10.37) (11.00) 
 
(2.83) (3.07) 
CASH*DC 
 
-3.870*** 
  
-0.948*** 
  
-24.448*** 
             . 
 
(-9.22) 
  
(-3.24) 
  
(-7.92) 
Q 0.181*** 0.183*** 
 
0.423*** 0.436*** 
 
0.345*** 0.361*** 
             . (4.92) (4.60) 
 
(12.32) (12.07) 
 
(3.08) (3.12) 
Cfe -1.085*** -1.391*** 
 
0.604** 0.446 
 
-1.679*** -2.186*** 
             . (-3.97) (-4.64) 
 
(2.28) (1.59) 
 
(-3.59) (-3.86) 
Adj R-Sq   0.004   0.005           0.007   0.016 
Obs 75457 66972 
 
75457 66972 
 
75457 66972 
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Table A35 Regressions of investment model (m) with recession variables for period 1980 to 2008  
This table reports the investment models results using the CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. The 
interaction terms between recession dummy and cash holdings and debt capacity is computed as the product of  
recession dummy and cash holdings to total assets and debt capacity to total assets respectively for each firm-
year observation. Recession, Prerecession and Postrecession are dummy variables that equal one (and zero 
otherwise) during recessionary period, the year prior the start of recessionary period, the period after the last year 
of recessionary period respectively. The Postrecession period duration follows number of years of recession. 
Sample and variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3 and Table A34. Regressions are performed with 
firm and year fixed effects and include a constant term (not reported). The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. 
T-values are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
Dependent INVTMT NINVTMT   INVTMT NINVTMT 
RECESSION -1.667*** -0.516*** 
 
-0.718** -0.154 
                  . (-3.44) (-3.72) 
 
(-2.13) (-1.59) 
CASH 4.233*** 1.116*** 
 
3.740*** 0.628*** 
                  . (12.31) (11.37) 
 
(10.04) (5.87) 
CASH*RECESSION 0.617 0.439* 
 
0.686 0.290* 
                  . (0.76) (1.89) 
 
(1.19) (1.75) 
DC 3.509*** 2.115*** 
 
4.263*** 1.715*** 
                  . (8.23) (17.38) 
 
(8.66) (12.13) 
DC*RECESSION 3.305*** 1.213*** 
 
1.952*** 0.522*** 
                  . (3.49) (4.49) 
 
(2.96) (2.76) 
Q 0.156*** -0.042*** 
 
0.429*** 0.026** 
                  . (3.85) (-3.61) 
 
(11.74) (2.49) 
Q*RECESSION 0.147 0.031 
 
0.036 -0.017 
                  . (1.50) (1.12) 
 
(0.52) (-0.87) 
Cfe -1.285*** -0.102 
 
0.489* 0.109 
                  . (-4.15) (-1.16) 
 
(1.69) (1.31) 
Cfe*RECESSION 0.879 0.446** 
 
0.521 0.247* 
                  . (1.33) (2.36) 
 
(1.05) (1.74) 
Obs      75457      75457        75457      75457 
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Table A35 Regressions of investment model (m) with recession variables for period 1980 to 2008 
(continued) 
Panel B 
Dependent INVTMT NINVTMT   INVTMT NINVTMT 
PRERECESSION -0.318** -0.076** 
 
-0.095 -0.017 
                  . (-2.50) (-2.08) 
 
(-1.09) (-0.66) 
RECESSION -1.737*** -0.526*** 
 
-0.754** -0.161* 
                  . (-3.57) (-3.79) 
 
(-2.23) (-1.65) 
POSTRECESSION 0.181* 0.184*** 
 
0.252*** 0.071*** 
                  . (1.82) (6.50) 
 
(3.62) (3.54) 
CASH 4.155*** 1.059*** 
 
3.574*** 0.584*** 
                  . (12.04) (10.76) 
 
(9.54) (5.42) 
CASH*RECESSION 0.695 0.497** 
 
0.785 0.316* 
                  . (0.85) (2.13) 
 
(1.36) (1.91) 
DC 3.320*** 1.984*** 
 
3.983*** 1.640*** 
                  . (7.71) (16.14) 
 
(8.02) (11.49) 
DC*RECESSION 3.494*** 1.344*** 
 
2.209*** 0.591*** 
                  . (3.69) (4.97) 
 
(3.34) (3.10) 
Q 0.161*** -0.036*** 
 
0.438*** 0.029*** 
                  . (3.97) (-3.06) 
 
(11.95) (2.74) 
Q*RECESSION 0.141 0.025 
 
0.029 -0.019 
                  . (1.45) (0.89) 
 
(0.41) (-0.98) 
Cfe -1.302*** -0.105 
 
0.492* 0.110 
                  . (-4.20) (-1.19) 
 
(1.70) (1.33) 
Cfe*RECESSION 0.896 0.449** 
 
0.529 0.248* 
                  . (1.35) (2.37) 
 
(1.07) (1.75) 
Obs      75457      75457        75457      75457 
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CHAPTER A10. CONCLUSION 
 
Supporting the trade-off between cash and debt capacity, cash is found to 
decrease monotonically over the sample ranked according to debt capacity. The 
negative relationship between the two internal flexibility instruments is apparent 
even when firm size, idiosyncratic risks and industry effects are accounted for. In 
addition, cash and debt capacity levels of firms are found to be increasingly 
dispersed, indicating a larger difference in the liquidity management. Evidence 
supports previous studies (Bates et al., 2009, Brown and Kapadia, 2007) and shows 
that firm size and idiosyncratic risk exhibit positive influence on cash holdings; but 
the relationship is weakened once debt capacity is considered. In addition, no single 
industry is the main driver of the increasing trend in cash holdings over time. This 
supports the hypothesis that industries dictate the nature of assets held by firms; and 
the nature of assets will determine the amount of debt capacity owned by firms and 
thereby directly impact the amount of cash held. Results suggest that increase in cash 
holdings is probably due to the changing nature of firms internally rather than 
change in proportion of firms in specific industries.  
Multivariate analyses show that debt capacity is found to have the greatest 
impact on level of cash. After considering the impact of debt capacity, previous 
important cash determinants may no longer be important or significant in explaining 
the variance of cash. Debt capacity is found to replace net working capital and 
capital expenditure in explaining level of cash, and the cash function may not have 
shifted over time but its slope becomes steeper.  
When varying financial constraints are considered, the evidence is that 
industry cash flow volatility is a more important cash determinant only for 
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constrained firms because of herding behaviour in competitive industries (Lins et al., 
2010) and the increased intensity of deadweight costs of financial distress for 
constrained firms (e.g. Bates et al., 2009, Froot et al., 1993, Minton and Schrandb, 
1999, Smith and Stulz, 1985). Constrained firms also consider funding from leverage 
and cash as substitutes of each other more than unconstrained firms. This indicates 
that funding used for operations and investments might be not clearly distinguished 
all the time, as evidence suggests that investments are funded proportionately more 
by cash in constrained firms. Finally and most importantly, in the modified cash 
model (when debt capacity is included as additional determinant), previous 
important cash determinants ± cash flow volatility, net working capital, and capital 
expenditure are no longer significant in explaining cash level of unconstrained firms, 
while debt capacity and research and development expenses remain significant 
(although of different magnitude) for both constrained and unconstrained firms. The 
substitution effect between debt capacity and cash is larger when firms have greater 
financial constraints. On the other hand, research and development expenses increase 
the level of cash holdings and even more so for unconstrained firms.  
In predicting cash holdings, the modified model performs better than the 
original model and reports predicted cash holdings that are closer to actual ratios. 
Both the predicted and actual cash holdings for constrained firms increase 
significantly more over the sample period (e.g. change in actual cash holdings for 
constrained firms is more than four times that of unconstrained firms). The original 
BKS model identifies six cash determinants (industry volatility, net working capital, 
capital expenditure, size, research and development expenses and leverage) that 
contribute collectively to the increase in cash holdings over time; but half of these 
determinants become insignificant after considering debt capacity. Not only does the 
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modified BKS model predicts cash holdings better, estimated contribution from the 
determinants in the modified model matches the actual change in cash better. Change 
in cash over time is largely explained by corresponding change in debt capacity 
alone, while change in cash in the original model is explained collectively by the six 
determinants. The results confirm that debt capacity is an important determinant of 
cash, helps predict cash holdings better, and has the ability to replace previous 
determinants and explain substantial variance in cash level. 
On the reverse side for debt capacity models, contrary to previous studies, 
cash flow has little impact on debt capacity, but cash and cash flow risk are able to 
explain the bulk of the variance in debt capacity. The interaction term of cash flow 
and cash holdings shows that even when consideration is made to the extent cash 
flow add to cash holdings in each period, cash flow exhibits minimal impact on debt 
capacity. The unused debt capacity models resolve the reverse-causality issue by 
providing evidence for the trade-off between cash and debt capacity as firms use less 
borrowing capacity when cash holdings are higher; while less use of debt capacity 
cannot cause firms to have greater cash on hand. The reverse causality problem is 
more prominent for constrained firms as the use of debt capacity is more likely to 
add positively to cash holdings because constrained firms have less ability to 
preserve capacity without restrictions.  
The relationship between cash and debt capacity is proven robust even across 
different industry groups. Only debt capacity and leverage are consistent and 
significant in determining cash when firms are split according to industries. 
Manufacturing and software and biotechnology firms experience the largest 
substitution effect. Greater proportion of cash is used for acquisition activities for 
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high technology firms. Lastly, industry cash flow volatility is an important cash 
determinant only for low debt capacity industries.  
The hypothesis that debt capacity is the first-level variable that exhibits less 
periodic changes compared to the second-level variable, cash, which can be 
monitored and adjusted in each period is supported. While the original debt capacity 
models (Bates et al., 2009, Campello et al., 2011) suggest lines of credit are 
dependent on the level of cash flow and amount of cash savings firms have, the 
hypothesis is slightly different in terms of cause-and-effect here)LUPV¶FDVKSROLFLHV
are presumed to be first dependent on the levels of debt capacities firms have, and 
firms adjust their cash savings accordingly in each period. This is because cash 
policies are generally more flexible and subject to less restriction, while debt 
capacity generally depends on many factors such as the nature of assets, nature of 
business and bank relationships. While both debt capacity and cash add to total 
financial flexibility, cash holdings can be managed more easily and is in practice 
varied more often compared to debt capacity.  
In the investment regressions, cash and debt capacity are found to explain 
most of the changes in investment, leaving other variables with trivial impact. 
Results are robust to the consideration of fixed firm and time effects. Results support 
the credit multiplier effect of Almeida and Campello (2007) and debt capacity is 
found to have greater impact on investment compared to cash. Furthermore, debt 
capacity is found to impact positively investment even during recession, but cash 
does not7KHUHIRUHGHEWFDSDFLW\LQFUHDVHVILUPYDOXHE\LQFUHDVHILUPV¶DELOLW\WR
invest during recession, while cash takes a more precautionary purpose for 
operational requirement rather than investment need by cushioning the drop in cash 
flows during recession.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Appendix A-I Average cash holdings by industry cash flow volatility quintiles sorted by sample 
period 1980 to 2008 
 
The figure summarises the average cash to total assets ratio for firms sorted by industry cash flow volatility 
quintiles over the entire sample (i.e. non-truncated criteria), with quintile 1 having the lowest volatility and 
quintile 5 having the highest volatility. Average cash holdings are computed for every volatility quintile over the 
entire sample. Industry cash flow volatility is measured as the average of standard deviation of cash flow of firms 
for the past 3 to 10 years in each industry sorted by two digit SIC code. Cash holdings is the ratio of cash 
holdings and marketable securities to total assets. Cash ratio is censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is 
made equal to one. Industry cash flow volatility is winsorized at the bottom 1% level. All public firms (i.e. share 
code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 
4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales 
are excluded. 
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Appendix A-II Average cash and debt variables compared to Bates et al. (2009)  
from 1951 to 2008 
This table compares the CRSP/Compustat sample used in this thesis with Bates et al. (2009) Compustat 
sample. The number of observations and proportions are reported in a similar manner for ease of comparison. 
All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and 
government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. 
All statistics are computed conditional upon cash and debt ratios being nonmissing. Cash, debt and debt 
capacity ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. Cash sflow are 
winsorized at the bottom 1%.  
 
  
Bates et al. (2009)          
Compustat sample   CRSP/Compustat sample   
CRSP/Compustat sample 
with utilities (SIC 4900-
4999) firms 
Year N 
Mean 
cash 
holdings 
Mean 
debt   N 
Mean 
cash 
holdings 
Mean 
debt    N 
Mean 
cash 
holdings 
Mean 
debt  
1951  -   -   -  
 
34 0.162 0.1664 
 
34 0.162 0.166 
1952  -   -   -  
 
378 0.184 0.1518 
 
378 0.184 0.200 
1953  -   -   -  
 
382 0.183 0.1502 
 
382 0.183 0.200 
1954  -   -   -  
 
388 0.182 0.1417 
 
388 0.182 0.192 
1955  -   -   -  
 
392 0.175 0.1382 
 
392 0.175 0.188 
1956  -   -   -  
 
397 0.148 0.1523 
 
397 0.148 0.199 
1957  -   -   -  
 
402 0.138 0.164 
 
402 0.138 0.210 
1958  -   -   -  
 
403 0.138 0.1651 
 
403 0.138 0.214 
1959  -   -   -  
 
409 0.140 0.1607 
 
409 0.140 0.209 
1960  -   -   -  
 
471 0.131 0.1638 
 
471 0.131 0.206 
1961  -   -   -  
 
493 0.129 0.1625 
 
493 0.129 0.206 
1962  -   -   -  
 
703 0.125 0.1622 
 
708 0.125 0.198 
1963  -   -   -  
 
861 0.124 0.1712 
 
866 0.124 0.202 
1964  -   -   -  
 
972 0.120 0.1801 
 
979 0.120 0.208 
1965  -   -   -  
 
1106 0.110 0.1983 
 
1116 0.110 0.223 
1966  -   -   -  
 
1331 0.095 0.2222 
 
1342 0.095 0.243 
1967  -   -   -  
 
1432 0.094 0.2349 
 
1443 0.093 0.255 
1968  -   -   -  
 
1560 0.095 0.2439 
 
1574 0.094 0.263 
1969  -   -   -  
 
1682 0.082 0.2571 
 
1696 0.081 0.276 
1970  -   -   -  
 
1760 0.079 0.2768 
 
1774 0.078 0.293 
1971  -   -   -  
 
1860 0.086 0.269 
 
1876 0.085 0.286 
1972  -   -   -  
 
2423 0.090 0.2566 
 
2444 0.089 0.271 
1973  -   -   -  
 
3064 0.084 0.2634 
 
3248 0.080 0.276 
1974  -   -   -  
 
3478 0.077 0.2794 
 
3680 0.074 0.291 
1975  -   -   -  
 
3443 0.092 0.2661 
 
3648 0.088 0.277 
1976  -   -   -  
 
3410 0.096 0.2561 
 
3618 0.092 0.267 
1977  -   -   -  
 
3343 0.091 0.2625 
 
3562 0.087 0.272 
1978  -   -   -  
 
3269 0.088 0.2668 
 
3489 0.084 0.276 
1979  -   -   -  
 
3313 0.086 0.2741 
 
3537 0.082 0.282 
1980 3519 0.105 0.269 
 
3394 0.103 0.2645 
 
3620 0.098 0.272 
1981 3748 0.121 0.253 
 
3599 0.118 0.2519 
 
3828 0.112 0.260 
1982 3752 0.121 0.261 
 
3661 0.119 0.2594 
 
3896 0.114 0.267 
1983 4120 0.159 0.246 
 
3945 0.153 0.2408 
 
4181 0.146 0.248 
1984 4172 0.14 0.254 
 
4018 0.136 0.2517 
 
4257 0.130 0.257 
1985 4127 0.142 0.27 
 
3985 0.139 0.2651 
 
4224 0.133 0.271 
1986 4261 0.157 0.273 
 
4092 0.155 0.269 
 
4334 0.149 0.274 
1987 4407 0.156 0.273 
 
4193 0.153 0.271 
 
4440 0.148 0.276 
1988 
 
4237 0.141 0.28 
 
4065 0.140 0.275 
 
4308 0.135 0.280 
1989 4095 0.138 0.286 
 
3933 0.136 0.281 
 
4184 0.130 0.286 
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Appendix A-II Average cash and debt variables compared to Bates et al. (2009)  
from 1951 to 2008 (continued) 
 
1990 4042 0.134 0.282 
 
3885 0.132 0.276 
 
4134 0.127 0.281 
1991 4137 0.155 0.259 
 
3962 0.154 0.251 
 
4220 0.147 0.259 
1992 4307 0.163 0.245 
 
4107 0.161 0.232 
 
4366 0.154 0.240 
1993 4713 0.171 0.225 
 
4474 0.169 0.220 
 
4736 0.163 0.227 
1994 4985 0.155 0.23 
 
4757 0.153 0.224 
 
5011 0.147 0.230 
1995 5165 0.171 0.23 
 
4985 0.167 0.225 
 
5230 0.161 0.230 
1996 5568 0.193 0.222 
 
5344 0.189 0.217 
 
5587 0.183 0.223 
1997 5605 0.191 0.236 
 
5425 0.190 0.228 
 
5654 0.184 0.233 
1998 5263 0.178 0.289 
 
5102 0.176 0.247 
 
5311 0.170 0.252 
1999 4971 0.194 0.247 
 
4898 0.195 0.241 
 
5084 0.189 0.246 
2000 4947 0.208 0.242 
 
4698 0.205 0.227 
 
4854 0.200 0.232 
2001 4540 0.214 0.268 
 
4258 0.217 0.227 
 
4402 0.211 0.233 
2002 4233 0.214 0.258 
 
3925 0.218 0.216 
 
4060 0.212 0.222 
2003 3992 0.227 0.235 
 
3652 0.231 0.201 
 
3780 0.225 0.207 
2004 3693 0.24 0.225 
 
3583 0.239 0.189 
 
3722 0.232 0.196 
2005 3549 0.237 0.219 
 
3493 0.238 0.187 
 
3630 0.231 0.193 
2006 3297 0.232 0.221 
 
3404 0.233 0.193 
 
3538 0.225 0.199 
2007  -   -   -  
 
3256 0.230 0.203 
 
3382 0.223 0.208 
2008  -   -   -  
 
2568 0.210 0.232 
 
2689 0.202 0.237 
Avg 4350 0.172 0.252   2790 0.153 0.239   2921 0.148 0.248 
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Appendix A-III Summary statistics of cash flow and debt capacities ratios from 1951 to 2008 
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Cash flow computed using earnings method (CFe) is the ratio of the sum of earnings less interest, tax and common 
dividend to total assets computed according to Bates et al. (2009). Net cash flow computed based on cash flow method (CFcf) is the ratio of net cash flow to total assets, computed according to 
Frank and Goyal (2009). Debt capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total  assets; and unused debt capacity is debt capacity less debt only 
computed when firms report a positive debt capacity. Cash flow (CFe and CFcf) are winsorized at the bottom 1%. Debt capacity ratio is censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made 
equal to one. 
  
CFe : Earnings method                
(Bates et al., 2009)   
CFcf: Cash flow method              
(Frank and Goyal, 2009)   DC   UDC 
Year Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std 
1951 0.035 0.048 0.051 
 
. . . 
 
0.456 0.463 0.068 
 
0.289 0.314 0.091 
1952 0.056 0.053 0.036 
 
. . . 
 
0.438 0.449 0.078 
 
0.286 0.292 0.122 
1953 0.061 0.058 0.038 
 
. . . 
 
0.437 0.448 0.076 
 
0.286 0.299 0.118 
1954 0.062 0.060 0.044 
 
. . . 
 
0.436 0.446 0.076 
 
0.294 0.305 0.115 
1955 0.073 0.070 0.042 
 
. . . 
 
0.441 0.451 0.078 
 
0.303 0.319 0.118 
1956 0.071 0.067 0.040 
 
. . . 
 
0.454 0.466 0.075 
 
0.301 0.323 0.121 
1957 0.067 0.063 0.035 
 
. . . 
 
0.456 0.470 0.075 
 
0.292 0.305 0.124 
1958 0.059 0.056 0.034 
 
. . . 
 
0.457 0.471 0.073 
 
0.291 0.302 0.122 
1959 0.067 0.064 0.034 
 
. . . 
 
0.455 0.470 0.076 
 
0.294 0.306 0.122 
1960 0.055 0.055 0.040 
 
. . . 
 
0.456 0.475 0.080 
 
0.293 0.310 0.136 
1961 0.054 0.053 0.035 
 
. . . 
 
0.457 0.473 0.080 
 
0.295 0.312 0.135 
1962 0.064 0.063 0.039 
 
. . . 
 
0.457 0.476 0.085 
 
0.295 0.315 0.141 
1963 0.063 0.062 0.041 
 
. . . 
 
0.459 0.477 0.086 
 
0.288 0.308 0.149 
1964 0.069 0.068 0.045 
 
. . . 
 
0.462 0.477 0.086 
 
0.282 0.303 0.158 
1965 0.074 0.073 0.044 
 
. . . 
 
0.467 0.485 0.086 
 
0.269 0.289 0.166 
1966 0.076 0.074 0.048 
 
. . . 
 
0.474 0.493 0.084 
 
0.252 0.277 0.179 
1967 0.068 0.068 0.053 
 
. . . 
 
0.472 0.489 0.082 
 
0.237 0.265 0.178 
1968 0.066 0.064 0.046 
 
. . . 
 
0.469 0.488 0.082 
 
0.225 0.249 0.177 
1969 0.062 0.062 0.046 
 
. . . 
 
0.472 0.491 0.083 
 
0.215 0.243 0.185 
1970 0.052 0.053 0.050 
 
. . . 
 
0.470 0.490 0.082 
 
0.193 0.212 0.188 
1971 0.056 0.058 0.054 
 
0.083 0.093 0.095 
 
0.465 0.483 0.082 
 
0.196 0.217 0.188 
1972 0.069 0.067 0.050 
 
0.099 0.103 0.085 
 
0.467 0.487 0.086 
 
0.210 0.233 0.188 
1973 0.073 0.071 0.053 
 
0.111 0.108 0.091 
 
0.473 0.493 0.087 
 
0.210 0.231 0.186 
1974 0.063 0.066 0.072 
 
0.102 0.104 0.114 
 
0.480 0.500 0.084 
 
0.204 0.225 0.192 
1975 0.065 0.067 0.070 
 
0.114 0.105 0.205 
 
0.471 0.489 0.081 
 
0.209 0.237 0.194 
1976 0.070 0.075 0.070 
 
0.117 0.113 0.170 
 
0.470 0.488 0.083 
 
0.218 0.247 0.190 
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Appendix A-III Summary statistics of cash flow and debt capacities ratios from 1951 to 2008 
(continued) 
  
CFe : Earnings method               
(Bates et al., 2009)   
CFcf: Cash flow method              
(Frank and Goyal, 2009)   DC   UDC 
Year Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std   Mean Median Std 
1977 0.068 0.074 0.074 
 
0.120 0.114 0.261 
 
0.476 0.494 0.084 
 
0.217 0.244 0.192 
1978 0.072 0.076 0.067 
 
0.123 0.118 0.116 
 
0.481 0.499 0.084 
 
0.218 0.242 0.183 
1979 0.064 0.072 0.087 
 
0.117 0.117 0.117 
 
0.482 0.502 0.087 
 
0.213 0.235 0.187 
1980 0.047 0.065 0.115 
 
0.109 0.112 0.175 
 
0.471 0.496 0.098 
 
0.212 0.240 0.191 
1981 0.032 0.059 0.134 
 
0.095 0.110 0.154 
 
0.459 0.488 0.106 
 
0.212 0.237 0.189 
1982 0.012 0.049 0.157 
 
0.098 0.105 0.776 
 
0.452 0.478 0.104 
 
0.197 0.227 0.199 
1983 0.016 0.052 0.146 
 
0.092 0.104 0.407 
 
0.430 0.462 0.119 
 
0.194 0.230 0.203 
1984 0.005 0.057 0.188 
 
0.070 0.106 0.211 
 
0.438 0.469 0.116 
 
0.191 0.226 0.208 
1985 -0.015 0.050 0.239 
 
0.058 0.099 0.264 
 
0.430 0.460 0.119 
 
0.169 0.211 0.225 
1986 -0.016 0.047 0.229 
 
0.076 0.098 0.272 
 
0.414 0.446 0.126 
 
0.151 0.188 0.230 
1987 -0.007 0.050 0.216 
 
0.067 0.096 0.292 
 
0.412 0.443 0.128 
 
0.148 0.190 0.232 
1988 -0.005 0.055 0.230 
 
0.033 0.081 0.225 
 
0.416 0.445 0.126 
 
0.143 0.187 0.239 
1989 -0.006 0.052 0.232 
 
0.030 0.078 0.220 
 
0.417 0.448 0.125 
 
0.138 0.175 0.237 
1990 0.002 0.054 0.231 
 
0.038 0.079 0.229 
 
0.416 0.447 0.125 
 
0.141 0.179 0.239 
1991 0.009 0.054 0.193 
 
0.041 0.078 0.184 
 
0.401 0.432 0.133 
 
0.150 0.185 0.229 
1992 0.014 0.064 0.203 
 
0.043 0.085 0.192 
 
0.391 0.423 0.135 
 
0.160 0.192 0.221 
1993 0.008 0.065 0.228 
 
0.032 0.084 0.218 
 
0.382 0.411 0.135 
 
0.164 0.189 0.214 
1994 0.007 0.071 0.240 
 
0.033 0.090 0.230 
 
0.387 0.413 0.131 
 
0.164 0.196 0.218 
1995 0.012 0.069 0.220 
 
0.039 0.085 0.205 
 
0.377 0.406 0.137 
 
0.154 0.185 0.220 
1996 -0.003 0.067 0.246 
 
0.027 0.084 0.236 
 
0.363 0.391 0.141 
 
0.148 0.176 0.220 
1997 -0.021 0.065 0.282 
 
0.010 0.081 0.258 
 
0.358 0.382 0.140 
 
0.131 0.168 0.236 
1998 -0.027 0.064 0.307 
 
0.007 0.077 0.270 
 
0.355 0.378 0.137 
 
0.109 0.149 0.246 
1999 -0.027 0.055 0.277 
 
0.007 0.070 0.241 
 
0.333 0.357 0.147 
 
0.094 0.124 0.239 
2000 -0.060 0.049 0.330 
 
-0.016 0.064 0.285 
 
0.320 0.342 0.152 
 
0.095 0.121 0.235 
2001 -0.073 0.046 0.363 
 
-0.036 0.060 0.326 
 
0.310 0.325 0.148 
 
0.083 0.117 0.243 
2002 -0.041 0.052 0.302 
 
-0.004 0.068 0.270 
 
0.309 0.323 0.146 
 
0.095 0.125 0.237 
2003 0.000 0.059 0.231 
 
0.035 0.077 0.200 
 
0.299 0.307 0.146 
 
0.099 0.126 0.231 
2004 0.008 0.068 0.233 
 
0.040 0.085 0.215 
 
0.293 0.299 0.147 
 
0.105 0.131 0.233 
2005 0.001 0.065 0.244 
 
0.032 0.084 0.224 
 
0.289 0.292 0.145 
 
0.103 0.134 0.235 
2006 -0.014 0.063 0.277 
 
0.035 0.088 0.228 
 
0.289 0.292 0.146 
 
0.096 0.126 0.239 
2007 -0.018 0.059 0.267 
 
0.033 0.086 0.223 
 
0.285 0.286 0.146 
 
0.083 0.121 0.245 
2008 -0.029 0.064 0.330 
 
0.021 0.087 0.288 
 
0.293 0.295 0.143 
 
0.061 0.106 0.259 
Average 0.012 0.062 0.216 
 
0.051 0.092 0.263 
 
0.399 0.438 0.138 
 
0.162 0.196 0.223 
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Appendix A-IV Regressions to match to Opler et al. (1999) for period 1971 to 1994 
This table compares the cash model regression results reported in this thesis with Compustat sample from 1971 to 1994. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-
6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable in all regressions is 
the natural logarithm of ratio cash to net assets, where net asset is total assets less cash holdings. All independent variables are denominated with net assets (instead of total assets), with the 
exception for industry cash flow volatility (INDSTDCF), research and development expenses to sales (RD_SALE) and common dividend dummy (DIVDUM). Variable definitions are reported 
in Section 4. Fama-MacBeth regression is performed cross-sectionally for each financial year using Newey and West (1987) standard errors to control for autocorrelation. Fixed effects 
regression control for both firm and year fixed effects. Following Opler et al. (1999), R-squared for fixed effects model is computed without the fixed effects and intercept. OLS regression is 
estimated with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 
10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  Opler et al. (1999, pp. 25)   Current sample  
Model FM FE OLS 
 
FM FE OLS 
Dependent variable LnCash_netasset LnCash_ netasset LnCash_ netasset  LnCash_ netasset LnCash_ netasset LnCash_ netasset 
Intercept -2.017 
   
-2.267*** 
                      . (-19.53) 
   
(-29.39) 
  INDSTDCF 0.4533 1.1636 -0.8903 
 
1.272 0.147 2.764*** 
                    . (1.98) (14.92) (-12.51) 
 
(1.12) (0.80) (16.93) 
Q_NETASSET 0.1515 0.1422 0.0998 
 
0.152*** 0.009*** 0.023*** 
                    . (16.47) (27.60) (-18.1) 
 
(2.96) (18.84) (42.60) 
LNNETASSET -0.0439 -0.0402 -0.0826 
 
-0.142*** -0.508*** -0.191*** 
                    . (-6.79) (-13.37) (-10.14) 
 
(-9.40) (-72.36) (-66.10) 
CF2_NETASSET 0.6601 0.1618 0.0742 
 
0.782*** 0.063*** 0.164*** 
                    . (3.71) (4.44) (-1.93) 
 
(2.84) (10.61) (24.26) 
NWC_NETASSET -0.9713 -0.8136 -0.556 
 
-0.572*** -0.132*** -0.479*** 
                    . (-11.71) (-13.24) (-16.95) 
 
(-5.39) (-9.66) (-34.04) 
CAPEX_NETASSET 0.0703 0.4850 0.6524 
 
0.450 1.233*** 1.381*** 
                    . (0.32) (7.38) (-10.52) 
 
(0.82) (24.91) (27.28) 
BKDEBT_NETASSET -2.8145 -3.0234 -2.3395 
 
-1.274*** -0.269*** -0.911*** 
                    . (-29.16) (-101.61) (-65.80) 
 
(-10.10) (-16.87) (-53.76) 
RD_SALE 1.2783 1.1636 0.7631 
 
-0.088 0.147*** 0.538*** 
                    . 10.03 (14.92) (-9.04) 
 
(-0.18) (8.22) (42.97) 
DIVDUM -0.1001 -0.1275 0.0403 
 
0.156*** 0.251*** 0.252*** 
                    . (-2.67) (-11.35) (-3.1) 
 
(4.73) (17.63) (20.80) 
R-Sq 0.223 0.219 0.101 
 
0.231 0.175 0.179 
Adj R-Sq 
    
0.229 
  Obs 86955 86955 86955 
 
85509 85509 85509 
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Appendix A-V Regressions of base cash model with debt capacity (b) for period 1980 to 2006 
This table reports the base cash model regression results after inclusion of debt capacity as additional independent variable from 1980 to 2006. Sample and variable definitions are reported in 
Chapter A2.3. Following Bates et al. (2009), firms with IPO in the last 5 years are excluded in the fixed effects regression. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total 
asset except for the following models: Model 2 and 5 use the natural logarithm of ratio cash to net asset (LNCASH_NETASSET), where net asset is computed as total asset less cash holdings; 
and Model 3 and 6 use the period-to-period change in cash holdings (DCASH) computed as Casht ± Casht-1. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Model 7 and 8 are based on 
Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The table reports coefficient 
estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.597*** 0.540*** 0.263*** 0.608*** 0.552*** 0.272*** 0.617*** 0.562*** 
         . (298.12) (116.31) (140.64) (300.60) (117.14) (142.98) (59.16) (106.98) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.052*** 
  
-0.050*** 
           . 
  
(-18.72) 
  
(-18.24) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.415*** 
  
-0.418*** 
           . 
  
(-200.48) 
  
(-202.18) 
   DC -0.891*** -1.030*** -0.406*** -0.905*** -1.053*** -0.415*** -0.944*** -0.863*** -0.824*** 
        . (-248.61) (-123.86) (-130.27) (-252.03) (-125.97) (-131.86) (-45.79) (-53.92) (-162.00) 
INDSTDCF 0.072*** 0.047*** 0.006 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.034*** -0.006 0.204*** -0.008 
        . (10.27) (2.92) (1.10) (19.26) (9.04) (6.26) (-0.13) (11.74) (-0.94) 
Q 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 
        . (43.90) (13.00) (21.98) (44.64) (12.67) (23.26) (3.44) (6.09) (23.43) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
        . (-61.27) (-27.93) (-28.12) (-44.63) (-17.98) (-19.54) (-27.12) (-12.51) (-23.69) 
CFe -0.003 -0.003 0.052*** -0.005** -0.008* 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.010 0.031*** 
        . (-1.27) (-0.73) (34.13) (-2.55) (-1.81) (33.56) (4.56) (0.75) (11.71) 
NWC 0.009*** 0.012** -0.009*** 0.005** 0.007 -0.011*** 0.021*** -0.016 -0.034*** 
        . (4.31) (2.52) (-6.39) (2.47) (1.50) (-7.52) (4.84) (-1.42) (-12.80) 
CAPEX 0.046*** -0.097*** -0.141*** 0.023*** -0.128*** -0.150*** -0.019*** 0.055*** -0.050*** 
        . (8.40) (-7.73) (-32.60) (4.29) (-10.10) (-34.72) (-4.47) (3.62) (-6.82) 
BKDEBT -0.216*** -0.083*** -0.072*** -0.223*** -0.093*** -0.076*** -0.174*** -0.229*** -0.135*** 
        . (-104.75) (-17.42) (-44.81) (-108.26) (-19.39) (-47.16) (-16.71) (-39.83) (-51.22) 
RD_SALE 0.018*** 0.075*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.075*** 0.008*** 0.129*** 0.032*** 0.004*** 
        . (58.91) (107.96) (33.57) (59.24) (108.26) (33.80) (5.34) (3.21) (8.50) 
DIVCUMMY -0.005*** 0.014*** 0.004*** -0.013*** 0.002 -0.000 -0.008*** -0.020*** 0.009*** 
        . (-4.74) (6.12) (6.09) (-13.35) (1.03) (-0.03) (-6.82) (-11.30) (6.85) 
ACQUI -0.464*** -0.569*** -0.457*** -0.464*** -0.574*** -0.455*** -0.332*** -0.495*** -0.231*** 
        . (-66.40) (-35.06) (-85.33) (-66.66) (-35.46) (-85.18) (-35.22) (-18.51) (-36.25) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.027*** -0.024*** -0.015*** 
           . 
   
(-28.27) (-10.90) (-21.83) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.016*** -0.041*** -0.003*** 
           . 
   
(-15.35) (-16.84) (-3.89) 
   R-Sq   0.637   0.353   0.380   0.641   0.356   0.384   0.644   0.642   0.837 
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Appendix A-VI Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients of independent variables 
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable definitions are provided in Chapter A2.3.  All correlation coefficients exhibit statistical significance at 1% 
(two-tail) test level. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  DC INDSTDCF Q LNAT CFe NWC CAPEX BKDEBT RD_SALE DIVDUM ACQUI 
DC 1                     
INDSTDCF -0.363 1          
Q -0.288 0.190 1.000         
LNAT -0.017 -0.047 -0.187 1        
CF2 0.260 -0.200 -0.294 0.341 1       
NWC 0.366 -0.151 -0.128 -0.053 0.283 1      
CAPEX 0.241 -0.107 0.035 -0.015 0.067 -0.144 1     
BKDEBT 0.232 -0.132 -0.155 0.119 -0.059 -0.263 0.086 1    
RD_SALE -0.255 0.228 0.180 -0.084 -0.358 -0.110 -0.046 -0.062 1   
DIVDUM 0.212 -0.206 -0.144 0.422 0.204 0.123 0.011 -0.039 -0.093 1  
ACQUI -0.113 0.017 -0.032 0.126 0.067 -0.017 -0.076 0.101 -0.036 0.002 1 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 DC INDSTDCF Q LNAT CFe NWC CAPEX BKDEBT RD_SALE DIVDUM ACQUI 
DC 1                     
INDSTDCF -0.364 1          
Q -0.319 0.268 1.000         
LNAT -0.042 -0.102 -0.097 1        
CF2 0.201 -0.132 0.090 0.311 1       
NWC 0.426 -0.159 -0.157 -0.053 0.240 1      
CAPEX 0.281 -0.181 0.065 0.098 0.276 -0.059 1     
BKDEBT 0.310 -0.224 -0.244 0.166 -0.093 -0.156 0.076 1    
RD_SALE -0.313 0.421 0.311 -0.118 -0.184 0.030 -0.131 -0.307 1   
DIVDUM 0.192 -0.264 -0.116 0.413 0.212 0.144 0.129 0.019 -0.152 1  
ACQUI -0.128 0.023 0.016 0.289 0.125 -0.002 -0.042 0.104 -0.063 0.094 1 
 Note: All correlations coefficients exhibit statistical significance at 1% (two-tail) test level 
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Appendix A-VII Regressions of modified cash model (with debt capacity and lagged INDSTDCF less NWC and CAPEX) 
This table reports the modified cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the exception of 
financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable definitions are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. Industry cash flow volatility variable is lagged one period in the model. Following Bates et al. (2009), firms with IPO in the last 5 years are excluded in the fixed 
effects regression. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total asset except for the following models: Model 2 and 5 use the natural logarithm of ratio cash to net 
asset (LNCASH_NETASSET), where net asset is computed as total asset less cash holdings; and Model 3 and 6 use the period-to-period change in cash holdings (DCash) computed as Casht ± 
Casht-1. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for 
observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for 
autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents 
significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.560*** 0.447*** 0.260*** 0.573*** 0.459*** 0.268*** 0.545*** 0.529*** 
            . (272.96) (100.16) (142.44) (276.08) (101.35) (144.18) (56.34) (74.13) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.049*** 
              . 
  
(-18.39) 
  
(-17.94) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.414*** 
  
-0.418*** 
              . 
  
(-207.41) 
  
(-208.89) 
   DC -0.821*** -0.864*** -0.425*** -0.839*** -0.888*** -0.435*** -0.826*** -0.808*** -0.849*** 
           . (-251.71) (-121.81) (-154.55) (-253.96) (-123.21) (-155.15) (-61.30) (-59.61) (-178.07) 
LAGINDSTDCF 0.112*** 0.176*** 0.018*** 0.181*** 0.262*** 0.049*** 0.138** 0.228*** -0.013 
           . (15.82) (11.45) (3.51) (24.72) (16.38) (9.01) (2.76) (9.65) (-1.51) 
Q 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (40.82) (4.87) (19.18) (41.60) (4.69) (19.98) (3.99) (5.60) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.016*** 
           . (-57.84) (-26.34) (-31.12) (-42.37) (-17.83) (-22.64) (-10.74) (-10.19) (-24.74) 
CFe -0.010*** -0.028*** 0.045*** -0.013*** -0.032*** 0.044*** 0.017 -0.004 0.024*** 
           . (-5.12) (-6.49) (31.25) (-6.69) (-7.57) (30.14) (1.09) (-0.22) (9.36) 
BKDEBT -0.212*** -0.081*** -0.071*** -0.218*** -0.088*** -0.074*** -0.202*** -0.218*** -0.125*** 
           . (-110.56) (-19.38) (-47.60) (-113.68) (-20.96) (-49.62) (-21.27) (-54.71) (-49.37) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.066*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.065*** 0.007*** 0.060*** 0.031*** 0.004*** 
           . (58.11) (106.85) (32.45) (57.89) (106.80) (32.45) (3.64) (3.19) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.005*** 0.014*** 0.005*** -0.013*** 0.005** 0.001 -0.016*** -0.021*** 0.008*** 
           . (-5.09) (6.73) (6.88) (-13.38) (2.25) (1.50) (-4.72) (-11.02) (6.44) 
ACQUI -0.441*** -0.477*** -0.450*** -0.439*** -0.478*** -0.449*** -0.412*** -0.475*** -0.231*** 
           . (-62.94) (-31.30) (-87.19) (-62.90) (-31.39) (-87.01) (-11.01) (-15.10) (-36.22) 
DUMMY1990 
  
-0.028*** -0.023*** -0.014*** 
              . 
   
(-29.30) (-10.94) (-19.18) 
   DUMMY2000 
  
-0.011*** -0.025*** -0.003*** 
              . 
   
(-10.53) (-11.55) (-4.15) 
   R-Sq   0.610   0.327   0.366   0.615   0.330   0.368   0.609   0.617   0.837 
Obs     106513     106524     106501     106513     106524     106501     106513      72431      66083 
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Appendix A-VIII Regressions of orthogonalized cash model with debt capacity residuals (f) (pooled OLS) 
This table reports the orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the exception 
of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable definitions 
are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for dependent variable specifications. The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses debt capacity against industry cash flow volatility 
over the entire sample period (1980-2008) to obtain debt capacity residuals, R_DC, for each firm-year observation. R_DC are then put into the regression models with other cash determinants in 
the second step estimation. Results from the second step estimation are reported as follow. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. 
Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth 
regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The table reports coefficient estimates where 
*** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.194*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.197*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 0.174*** 0.166*** 
         . (150.30) (21.09) (61.27) (149.32) (19.72) (63.08) (36.08) (52.64) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.049*** 
           . 
  
(-18.30) 
  
(-17.83) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.414*** 
  
-0.418*** 
           . 
  
(-207.40) 
  
(-208.85) 
   R_DC -0.873*** -1.031*** -0.425*** -0.893*** -1.064*** -0.435*** -0.879*** -0.854*** -0.849*** 
        . (-276.86) (-140.10) (-154.83) (-280.31) (-142.51) (-155.36) (-47.49) (-52.36) (-178.07) 
INDSTDCF 0.830*** 0.979*** 0.382*** 0.915*** 1.112*** 0.415*** 0.885*** 0.943*** 0.631*** 
        . (124.54) (62.93) (74.20) (130.14) (67.53) (75.99) (25.40) (41.51) (65.77) 
Q 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (46.80) (12.66) (19.12) (46.86) (11.78) (19.97) (4.27) (6.31) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
        . (-65.02) (-30.69) (-31.16) (-46.44) (-19.47) (-22.69) (-12.37) (-13.47) (-24.75) 
CFe -0.005** -0.012*** 0.046*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.000 0.024*** 
        . (-2.55) (-2.60) (31.33) (-4.70) (-4.24) (30.29) (1.29) (0.00) (9.35) 
BKDEBT -0.219*** -0.093*** -0.071*** -0.225*** -0.102*** -0.074*** -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.125*** 
        . (-114.93) (-20.89) (-47.60) (-118.53) (-22.91) (-49.66) (-24.59) (-58.90) (-49.38) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.065*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (59.61) (108.47) (32.34) (59.66) (108.63) (32.42) (3.20) (3.08) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.005*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.014*** 0.004 0.001 -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 
        . (-5.37) (6.85) (6.99) (-14.22) (1.63) (1.51) (-5.83) (-11.18) (6.44) 
ACQUI -0.468*** -0.566*** -0.450*** -0.466*** -0.570*** -0.449*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.90) (-35.71) (-87.19) (-69.04) (-36.01) (-87.00) (-12.75) (-19.69) (-36.21) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.027*** -0.022*** -0.013*** 
           . 
   
(-28.51) (-10.15) (-18.92) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.017*** -0.043*** -0.003*** 
           . 
   
(-16.64) (-18.36) (-4.15) 
   R-Sq   0.634   0.350   0.366   0.638   0.354   0.368   0.639   0.637   0.837 
Obs 115681 115692 106501 115681 115692 106501 115681 78147 66083 
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Appendix A-IX Regressions of lagged orthogonalized cash model with debt capacity residuals (f) (pooled OLS) 
This table reports the lagged orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the 
exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for dependent variable specifications. The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses debt capacity against industry cash 
flow volatility over the entire sample period (1980-2008) to obtain debt capacity residuals, R_DC, for each firm-year observation. R_DC are then put into the regression models with other cash 
determinants in the second step estimation. All explanatory variables are lagged one period in the second step regression. Results from the second step estimation are reported as follow. Model 1 
to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 
1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final 
model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% 
respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.170*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 0.174*** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.156*** 0.151*** 
            . (112.96) (12.14) (15.90) (112.14) (11.96) (17.34) (24.75) (18.28) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.096*** 
  
-0.097*** 
              . 
  
(-29.68) 
  
(-30.24) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.256*** 
  
-0.252*** 
              . 
  
(-95.87) 
  
(-93.76) 
   LAGR_DC -0.672*** -0.694*** -0.022*** -0.680*** -0.706*** -0.011*** -0.662*** -0.667*** -0.445*** 
           . (-181.78) (-93.51) (-6.00) (-181.56) (-93.75) (-2.89) (-46.06) (-36.33) (-72.43) 
LAGINDSTDCF 0.808*** 0.892*** 0.201*** 0.850*** 0.946*** 0.167*** 0.793*** 0.893*** 0.354*** 
           . (101.98) (56.10) (31.59) (101.11) (56.03) (24.54) (12.48) (31.70) (29.16) 
LAGQ 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (32.88) (5.14) (4.28) (33.62) (5.44) (3.89) (4.88) (7.07) (18.20) 
LAGLNAT -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.001*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 
           . (-40.72) (-19.88) (3.10) (-32.37) (-14.91) (-2.10) (-9.72) (-9.34) (-22.60) 
LAGCFe -0.026*** -0.084*** -0.010*** -0.026*** -0.086*** -0.008*** 0.017 -0.014 0.012*** 
           . (-10.71) (-17.53) (-5.26) (-11.01) (-17.86) (-4.38) (0.76) (-0.70) (3.27) 
LAGBKDEBT -0.202*** -0.077*** -0.037*** -0.205*** -0.080*** -0.034*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.085*** 
           . (-88.54) (-16.74) (-20.08) (-89.58) (-17.37) (-18.62) (-17.11) (-23.32) (-25.67) 
LAGRD_SALE 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.071*** 0.035*** 0.002*** 
           . (54.30) (98.13) (21.14) (54.17) (98.07) (20.96) (2.89) (2.94) (2.62) 
LAGDIVDUM -0.011*** 0.011*** -0.007*** -0.016*** 0.006** -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.000 
           . (-9.98) (4.79) (-7.84) (-13.75) (2.47) (-5.03) (-4.38) (-9.67) (0.16) 
LAGACQUI -0.404*** -0.403*** -0.092*** -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.089*** -0.368*** -0.426*** -0.159*** 
           . (-51.51) (-25.60) (-14.96) (-51.22) (-25.53) (-14.58) (-9.70) (-13.90) (-19.56) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.020*** -0.013*** -0.001 
              . 
   
(-18.01) (-6.05) (-1.14) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.001 -0.013*** 0.015*** 
              . 
   
(-1.01) (-5.52) (17.26) 
   R-Sq   0.513   0.289   0.166   0.515   0.289   0.168   0.497   0.535   0.760 
Obs     103482     103515     103473     103482     103515     103473     103482      72469      58724 
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Appendix A-X Regressions of orthogonalized cash model with industry cash flow volatility residuals (g) (pooled OLS) 
This table reports the orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the exception 
of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable definitions 
are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for dependent variable specifications.  The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses industry cash flow volatility against debt capacity 
over the entire sample period (1980-2008) to obtain volatility residuals, R_INDSTDCF, for each firm-year observation. R_ INDSTDCF are then put into the regression models with other cash 
determinants in the second step estimation. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, 
DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) 
standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and 
** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.608*** 0.553*** 0.263*** 0.631*** 0.582*** 0.275*** 0.599*** 0.592*** 
         . (350.51) (136.47) (153.91) (344.85) (135.68) (152.78) (97.24) (126.20) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.050*** 
  
-0.049*** 
           . 
  
(-18.30) 
  
(-17.83) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.414*** 
  
-0.418*** 
           . 
  
(-207.40) 
  
(-208.85) 
   R_INDSTCF 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.022*** 0.159*** 0.211*** 0.047*** 0.140*** 0.221*** -0.006 
        . (13.43) (6.71) (4.47) (22.80) (12.97) (9.06) (3.10) (8.46) (-0.66) 
DC -0.887*** -1.048*** -0.428*** -0.918*** -1.097*** -0.442*** -0.901*** -0.888*** -0.848*** 
        . (-287.12) (-145.26) (-157.49) (-287.67) (-146.72) (-156.35) (-64.27) (-60.22) (-170.89) 
Q 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
        . (46.80) (12.66) (19.12) (46.86) (11.78) (19.97) (4.27) (6.31) (23.46) 
LNAT -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
        . (-65.02) (-30.69) (-31.16) (-46.44) (-19.47) (-22.69) (-12.37) (-13.47) (-24.75) 
CFe -0.005** -0.012*** 0.046*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 0.044*** 0.020 0.000 0.024*** 
        . (-2.55) (-2.60) (31.33) (-4.70) (-4.24) (30.29) (1.29) (0.00) (9.35) 
BKDEBT -0.219*** -0.093*** -0.071*** -0.225*** -0.102*** -0.074*** -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.125*** 
        . (-114.93) (-20.89) (-47.60) (-118.53) (-22.91) (-49.66) (-24.59) (-58.90) (-49.38) 
RD_SALE 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.016*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.065*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
        . (59.61) (108.47) (32.34) (59.66) (108.63) (32.42) (3.20) (3.08) (8.07) 
DIVDUM -0.005*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.014*** 0.004 0.001 -0.017*** -0.022*** 0.008*** 
        . (-5.37) (6.85) (6.99) (-14.22) (1.63) (1.51) (-5.83) (-11.18) (6.44) 
ACQUI -0.468*** -0.566*** -0.450*** -0.466*** -0.570*** -0.449*** -0.439*** -0.498*** -0.231*** 
        . (-68.90) (-35.71) (-87.19) (-69.04) (-36.01) (-87.00) (-12.75) (-19.69) (-36.21) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.027*** -0.022*** -0.013*** 
           . 
   
(-28.51) (-10.15) (-18.92) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.017*** -0.043*** -0.003*** 
           . 
   
(-16.64) (-18.36) (-4.15) 
   R-Sq   0.634   0.350   0.366   0.638   0.354   0.368   0.639   0.637   0.837 
Adj R-Sq   0.634   0.350   0.366   0.638   0.354   0.368   0.638   0.637 
 Obs     115681     115692     106501     115681     115692     106501     115681      78147      66083 
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Appendix A-XI Regressions of lagged orthogonalized cash model with industry cash flow volatility residuals (g) (pooled OLS) 
This table reports the lagged orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the 
exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for dependent variable specifications.  The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses industry cash flow volatili ty against 
debt capacity over the entire sample period (1980-2008) to obtain volatility residuals, R_INDSTDCF, for each firm-year observation. R_ INDSTDCF are then put into the regression models 
with other cash determinants in the second step estimation. All explanatory variables are lagged one period in the second step regression. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions 
with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. 
Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. 
The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.515*** 0.403*** 0.059*** 0.529*** 0.416*** 0.052*** 0.496*** 0.509*** 
            . (254.95) (99.28) (26.39) (245.90) (96.15) (22.27) (40.22) (38.16) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.096*** 
  
-0.097*** 
              . 
  
(-29.68) 
  
(-30.24) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.256*** 
  
-0.252*** 
              . 
  
(-95.87) 
  
(-93.76) 
   LAGR_ INDSTCF 0.239*** 0.304*** 0.182*** 0.274*** 0.349*** 0.158*** 0.232*** 0.329*** 0.020* 
           . (29.76) (18.91) (30.12) (32.86) (20.82) (25.01) (3.87) (11.39) (1.73) 
LAGDC -0.709*** -0.741*** -0.050*** -0.723*** -0.760*** -0.035*** -0.698*** -0.718*** -0.449*** 
           . (-195.67) (-101.89) (-13.88) (-192.61) (-100.79) (-9.39) (-37.62) (-41.06) (-70.29) 
LAGQ 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (32.88) (5.14) (4.28) (33.62) (5.44) (3.89) (4.88) (7.07) (18.20) 
LAGLNAT -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.001*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 
           . (-40.72) (-19.88) (3.10) (-32.37) (-14.91) (-2.10) (-9.72) (-9.34) (-22.60) 
LAGCFe -0.026*** -0.084*** -0.010*** -0.026*** -0.086*** -0.008*** 0.017 -0.014 0.012*** 
           . (-10.71) (-17.53) (-5.26) (-11.01) (-17.86) (-4.38) (0.76) (-0.70) (3.27) 
LAGBKDEBT -0.202*** -0.077*** -0.037*** -0.205*** -0.080*** -0.034*** -0.188*** -0.204*** -0.085*** 
           . (-88.54) (-16.74) (-20.08) (-89.58) (-17.37) (-18.62) (-17.11) (-23.32) (-25.67) 
LAGRD_SALE 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.005*** 0.071*** 0.035*** 0.002*** 
           . (54.30) (98.13) (21.14) (54.17) (98.07) (20.96) (2.89) (2.94) (2.62) 
LAGDIVDUM -0.011*** 0.011*** -0.007*** -0.016*** 0.006** -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.000 
           . (-9.98) (4.79) (-7.84) (-13.75) (2.47) (-5.03) (-4.38) (-9.67) (0.16) 
LAGACQUI -0.404*** -0.403*** -0.092*** -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.089*** -0.368*** -0.426*** -0.159*** 
           . (-51.51) (-25.60) (-14.96) (-51.22) (-25.53) (-14.58) (-9.70) (-13.90) (-19.56) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.020*** -0.013*** -0.001 
              . 
   
(-18.01) (-6.05) (-1.14) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
-0.001 -0.013*** 0.015*** 
              . 
   
(-1.01) (-5.52) (17.26) 
   R-Sq   0.513   0.289   0.166   0.515   0.289   0.168   0.497   0.535   0.760 
Adj R-Sq   0.513   0.289   0.166   0.515   0.289   0.168   0.496   0.534 
 Obs     103482     103515     103473     103482     103515     103473     103482      72469      58724 
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Appendix A-XII Regressions of lagged orthogonalized cash model with industry cash flow volatility residuals (g) (yearly OLS) 
This table reports the lagged orthogonalized cash model regression results from 1980 to 2008 in a similar manner as the previous table for ease of comparison. All firms are included with the 
exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Refer to Table A7 for dependent variable specifications.  The first step of the orthogonalized estimation regresses industry cash flow volatili ty against 
debt capacity in each financial year to obtain volatility residuals, R_INDSTDCF, for each firm-year observation. R_ INDSTDCF are then put into the regression models with other cash 
determinants in the second step estimation. All explanatory variables are lagged one period in the second step regression. Model 1 to 6 report estimates from OLS regressions with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. Model 4 to 6 includes dummy variables, DUMMY1990 and DUMMY2000, for observations from 1990 to 2006 and 2000 to 2006 respectively. 
Model 7 and 8 are based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The final model controls for firm and year fixed effects. 
The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
 
MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS FM1980 FM1990 FE 
Dependent Cash LnCash DCash Cash LnCash DCash Cash Cash Cash 
Intercept 0.509*** 0.393*** 0.056*** 0.518*** 0.399*** 0.046*** 0.492*** 0.506*** 
            . (257.35) (99.33) (25.46) (248.28) (95.76) (20.21) (35.78) (29.80) 
 LAGDCASH 
  
-0.096*** 
  
-0.098*** 
              . 
  
(-30.18) 
  
(-30.80) 
   LAGCASH 
  
-0.257*** 
  
-0.252*** 
              . 
  
(-97.05) 
  
(-94.58) 
   LAGR_ INDSTCF 0.256*** 0.300*** 0.139*** 0.256*** 0.302*** 0.134*** 0.229*** 0.328*** 0.034*** 
           . (30.03) (17.63) (21.43) (30.11) (17.71) (20.83) (3.84) (11.32) (2.97) 
LAGDC -0.702*** -0.726*** -0.045*** -0.707*** -0.734*** -0.026*** -0.686*** -0.707*** -0.448*** 
           . (-197.73) (-102.33) (-12.75) (-193.77) (-100.58) (-7.09) (-32.76) (-29.72) (-72.17) 
LAGQ 0.008*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
           . (33.02) (5.17) (4.95) (33.65) (5.42) (3.95) (5.01) (7.07) (18.19) 
LAGLNAT -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.001*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.000** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.019*** 
           . (-38.13) (-17.94) (5.69) (-32.55) (-14.76) (-2.34) (-10.06) (-9.35) (-22.58) 
LAGCFe -0.027*** -0.087*** -0.011*** -0.027*** -0.088*** -0.008*** 0.019 -0.014 0.012*** 
           . (-11.29) (-18.36) (-5.84) (-11.44) (-18.57) (-4.39) (0.85) (-0.70) (3.28) 
LAGBKDEBT -0.202*** -0.078*** -0.039*** -0.204*** -0.080*** -0.034*** -0.186*** -0.204*** -0.085*** 
           . (-90.35) (-17.42) (-21.47) (-90.83) (-17.79) (-18.98) (-16.39) (-23.35) (-25.66) 
LAGRD_SALE 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.065*** 0.006*** 0.068*** 0.035*** 0.002*** 
           . (55.70) (100.31) (22.82) (55.77) (100.38) (22.02) (3.07) (2.94) (2.63) 
LAGDIVDUM -0.013*** 0.007*** -0.009*** -0.016*** 0.004** -0.005*** -0.018*** -0.025*** 0.000 
           . (-12.24) (3.51) (-11.19) (-14.56) (1.99) (-5.81) (-4.24) (-9.68) (0.17) 
LAGACQUI -0.403*** -0.400*** -0.092*** -0.400*** -0.399*** -0.089*** -0.363*** -0.426*** -0.159*** 
           . (-51.87) (-25.81) (-15.04) (-51.51) (-25.72) (-14.63) (-9.38) (-13.90) (-19.56) 
DUMMY1990 
   
-0.015*** -0.008*** 0.002** 
              . 
   
(-14.14) (-3.78) (2.05) 
   DUMMY2000 
   
0.005*** -0.004** 0.019*** 
              . 
   
(4.64) (-1.98) (22.09) 
   R-Sq   0.513   0.288   0.162   0.514   0.288   0.166   0.491   0.535   0.760 
Adj R-Sq   0.513   0.288   0.162   0.514   0.288   0.166   0.490   0.534 
 Obs     106483     106516     106474     106483     106516     106474     106483      72471      58724 
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Appendix A-XIII Regression of modified OPWS cash model following Bates for predicted cash 
holdings computation 
This table reports and compares coefficient estimates used to compute predicted cash level. All firms are 
included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government 
(SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total 
asset. Estimates are derived from Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors 
controlling for autocorrelation. 
  
BKS predicted cash 
model    CRSP/Compustat Sample 
Variable Estimate   Estimate StdErr tValue Probt 
Intercept 0.307   0.326 0.031 10.46 0.0000 
INDSTDCF_10 0.230 
 
0.361 0.092 3.93 0.0035 
Q 0.006 
 
0.026 0.002 16.29 0.0000 
LNATgdp -0.009 
 
-0.009 0.002 -4.70 0.0011 
CFe 0.077 
 
-0.007 0.011 -0.60 0.5635 
NWC -0.238 
 
-0.163 0.012 -13.87 0.0000 
CAPEX -0.372 
 
-0.404 0.011 -36.63 0.0000 
BKDEBT -0.360 
 
-0.253 0.005 -47.69 0.0000 
RD_SALE 0.048 
 
0.109 0.043 2.52 0.0328 
DIVDUM -0.024 
 
0.005 0.005 0.89 0.3980 
ACQUI -0.233 
 
-0.243 0.023 -10.43 0.0000 
ѐEQUITY 0.158 
 
0.148 0.010 15.20 0.0000 
ѐDEBT 0.190   0.134 0.017 7.94 0.0000 
Adj R-Sq     0.290       
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Appendix A-XIV Regressions of debt capacity models (k) for FY2008 and FY1980-2008 
This table compares previous results from Campello et al. (2011) and the debt capacity model (k) results using 
CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-
6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total 
assets and total sales are excluded. The interaction term between cash flow and cash holdings is computed as the 
product of cash flow to total assets and cash holdings to total assets for each firm-year observation. Variable 
definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Following previous model, two dummy variables are used ± (1) Large 
WDNHVDYDOXHRILIWKHILUP¶VVDOHVUevenue is equal to or more than US$1billion, and (2) Credit takes a value of 
1 if the firm has a long-term credit rating of -BBB or above. The dependent variable is debt capacity to total 
asset. The first column reports the coefficient estimates of Campello et al. (2011). Column (2) reports OLS 
regression results on sample for financial year 2008 with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered by 
industry. Column (3) reports OLS regression results on the entire sample with heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors. All regressions include a constant term (not reported). The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. 
T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
  Campello et al. (2011)   CRSP/Compustat Sample  
VARIABLE 
FY2008 
(1)   
FY2008 
(2)   
FY1980-2008 
(3) 
CFe 0.371*** 
 
0.004 
 
0.067*** 
                 . (6.37) 
 
(0.32) 
 
(30.66) 
CASH -0.288*** 
 
-0.382*** 
 
-0.467*** 
                 . (-10.53) 
 
(-30.14) 
 
(-252.82) 
CASH_CFe -0.761*** 
 
-0.008 
 
-0.091*** 
                 . (-6.88) 
 
(-0.23) 
 
(-14.56) 
LARGE -0.044*** 
 
-0.009 
 
-0.028*** 
                 . (2.64) 
 
(-1.60) 
 
(-24.90) 
CREDIT -0.017 
 
-0.021** 
 
-0.027*** 
                 . (-0.89) 
 
(-2.43) 
 
(-17.69) 
Q -0.007** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.001*** 
                 . (-2.50) 
 
(-3.26) 
 
(-7.10) 
R-Sq 0.27     0.362     0.436 
Obs 1,908   2567   118064 
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Appendix A-XV Regressions of unused debt capacity models for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 
This table reports the debt capacity models (i) to (k) results using CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is unused debt capacity ratio 
computed as unused debt capacity to total assets. Variable definitions and model specifications are reported in Chapter A2.3 and Table A28 respectively. The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
  Small size   Large size   Negative CFcf   Positive CFcf 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC 
Intercept 0.215*** 0.088*** 
 
-0.011 -0.075 
 
0.253*** 0.138 
 
0.143*** 0.010 
        . (25.36) (3.42) 
 
(-0.52) (-0.97) 
 
(10.92) (1.27) 
 
(16.51) (0.24) 
Cfe 0.419*** 0.562*** 
 
2.033*** 2.292*** 
 
0.196*** 0.369*** 
 
0.931*** 1.110*** 
        . (17.16) (5.94) 
 
(18.54) (6.89) 
 
(4.33) (4.39) 
 
(19.23) (10.45) 
CASH 0.681*** 0.706*** 
 
1.062*** 0.960*** 
 
0.497*** 0.381*** 
 
0.825*** 0.871*** 
        . (32.07) (18.95) 
 
(9.56) (3.23) 
 
(9.29) (3.94) 
 
(31.61) (11.48) 
CASH_Cfe 1.256*** 0.857*** 
 
-1.930*** 0.093 
 
0.709*** -0.126 
 
0.949*** 0.744** 
        . (18.13) (3.02) 
 
(-2.61) (0.03) 
 
(5.47) (-0.65) 
 
(4.73) (2.20) 
LARGE 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.370*** -0.259** 
 
-0.133*** -0.043 
        . (.) (.) 
 
(.) (.) 
 
(-5.09) (-2.63) 
 
(-11.80) (-0.98) 
CREDIT -0.231*** -0.343** 
 
0.120*** 0.125*** 
 
0.083 -0.021 
 
0.040*** 0.061* 
        . (-6.09) (-2.38) 
 
(6.79) (3.46) 
 
(0.48) (-0.15) 
 
(2.70) (1.75) 
Q 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 
-0.041*** -0.043 
 
0.006 -0.003 
 
0.016*** 0.013 
        . (9.94) (2.98) 
 
(-4.78) (-1.40) 
 
(1.61) (-0.27) 
 
(6.05) (1.56) 
INDSTDCF -1.496*** -0.309 
 
-1.151*** 0.048 
 
-2.485*** -0.674 
 
-1.061*** 0.075 
        . (-21.55) (-0.99) 
 
(-8.70) (0.30) 
 
(-15.80) (-0.83) 
 
(-16.45) (0.60) 
Adj R-Sq   0.034   0.050     0.034   0.080     0.020   0.032     0.034   0.054 
Obs      99656      99656        18408      18408        26628      26628        91436      91436 
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Appendix A-XV Regressions of unused debt capacity models for constrained and unconstrained firms for period 1980 to 2008 (continued) 
Panel B 
  Non-investment graded   Investment graded   Non-dividend paying   Dividend paying 
Model OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM   OLS FM 
Dependent UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC   UDC_DC UDC_DC 
Intercept 0.224*** 0.085***   -0.116*** -0.473*   0.117*** -0.012   0.266*** 0.141*** 
        . (27.09) (3.27) 
 
(-3.29) (-2.05) 
 
(11.36) (-0.44) 
 
(23.11) (3.28) 
Cfe 0.450*** 0.598*** 
 
1.191*** 1.812*** 
 
0.331*** 0.489*** 
 
1.473*** 1.339*** 
        . (18.53) (6.50) 
 
(9.40) (3.68) 
 
(12.15) (6.46) 
 
(23.23) (6.79) 
CASH 0.690*** 0.720*** 
 
-0.393** -0.197 
 
0.716*** 0.729*** 
 
1.033*** 1.088*** 
        . (32.83) (19.57) 
 
(-2.32) (-0.45) 
 
(29.26) (18.19) 
 
(25.22) (8.49) 
CASH_Cfe 1.180*** 0.800*** 
 
10.129*** 8.165** 
 
1.380*** 0.908*** 
 
-1.231*** -0.811 
        . (17.10) (2.89) 
 
(6.88) (2.28) 
 
(17.93) (3.92) 
 
(-4.90) (-1.33) 
LARGE -0.169*** -0.082 
 
0.154*** 0.405** 
 
-0.292*** -0.162*** 
 
-0.115*** -0.068* 
        . (-13.04) (-1.62) 
 
(5.14) (2.73) 
 
(-14.90) (-3.93) 
 
(-9.25) (-1.85) 
CREDIT 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
-0.017 -0.051 
 
-0.093*** -0.028 
        . (.) (.) 
 
(.) (.) 
 
(-0.44) (-0.92) 
 
(-6.46) (-0.67) 
Q 0.019*** 0.018** 
 
0.003 0.019* 
 
0.021*** 0.019** 
 
0.014*** 0.021** 
        . (9.05) (2.25) 
 
(0.30) (1.72) 
 
(8.97) (2.52) 
 
(2.87) (2.25) 
INDSTDCF -1.558*** -0.232 
 
-0.277* 0.084 
 
-1.172*** 0.287 
 
-1.035*** -0.150 
        . (-23.62) (-0.79) 
 
(-1.82) (0.58) 
 
(-15.00) (0.65) 
 
(-11.10) (-1.01) 
Adj R-Sq   0.033   0.050     0.048   0.077     0.031   0.051     0.053   0.078 
Obs     109006     109006         9058       9058        82509      82509        35555      35555 
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Appendix A-XVI Regressions of cash model (b) for period 1980 to 2008 across industries 
This table reports cash model (b) regression results using CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2006. All firms are included wi th the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 
4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Industry groups are sorted according to their SIC codes as follow: 
1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, and 9=Others. Variable definitions are reported 
in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is cash holdings ratio computed as cash to total asset. All estimates are reported based on OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses. 
Model OLS 
Industry IND=1 IND=2 IND=3 IND=4 IND=5 IND=6 IND=7 IND=8 IND=9 
Dependent CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH CASH 
Intercept 0.503*** 0.665*** 0.576*** 0.458*** 0.356*** 0.754*** 0.533*** 0.544*** 0.540*** 
        . (100.34) (247.42) (83.25) (45.72) (16.47) (73.41) (93.54) (31.76) (48.40) 
DC_NOCASH -0.723*** -0.993*** -0.947*** -0.723*** -0.459*** -1.248*** -0.732*** -0.643*** -0.731*** 
        . (-84.17) (-200.17) (-71.56) (-40.37) (-22.23) (-72.11) (-70.31) (-26.47) (-36.80) 
INDSTDCF -0.277*** 0.054*** 0.012 0.182*** 0.252 -0.017 -0.000 -1.003*** -0.023 
        . (-8.33) (5.46) (0.46) (6.21) (1.01) (-0.43) (-0.03) (-7.49) (-0.68) 
Q 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.019*** -0.003* 
        . (19.02) (26.59) (0.06) (7.85) (7.41) (11.03) (18.83) (10.63) (-1.90) 
LNAT -0.011*** -0.017*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.011*** 
        . (-24.02) (-58.65) (-9.11) (-11.10) (-9.70) (-10.13) (-19.50) (-8.67) (-8.24) 
Cfe -0.024*** 0.001 0.027*** 0.107*** -0.084*** 0.016** 0.002 -0.022 0.018 
        . (-4.50) (0.19) (3.66) (8.03) (-6.60) (2.32) (0.34) (-1.55) (1.54) 
NWC 0.014*** 0.002 0.005 -0.090*** 0.052*** 0.051*** -0.016*** 0.019 -0.039*** 
        . (3.41) (0.59) (0.59) (-8.51) (4.10) (4.47) (-2.69) (1.20) (-4.64) 
CAPEX -0.067*** 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.020 0.260*** 0.150*** 0.091*** 0.136*** 0.040 
        . (-5.75) (9.74) (8.04) (1.15) (7.86) (3.81) (5.65) (3.36) (1.12) 
BKDEBT -0.164*** -0.222*** -0.111*** -0.118*** -0.173*** -0.205*** -0.239*** -0.164*** -0.210*** 
        . (-38.86) (-78.46) (-17.53) (-12.66) (-18.72) (-18.58) (-38.46) (-12.07) (-15.91) 
RD_SALE 0.042*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.258*** 0.024*** 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.013** 0.077*** 
        . (9.39) (38.01) (3.37) (5.23) (5.98) (16.56) (11.28) (2.14) (15.37) 
DIVDUM 0.019*** -0.012*** -0.015*** 0.018*** -0.029*** -0.017** 0.002 0.020** 0.003 
        . (10.40) (-10.24) (-4.18) (4.57) (-4.32) (-2.02) (0.63) (2.50) (0.53) 
ACQUI -0.325*** -0.416*** -0.105*** -0.344*** -0.342*** -0.822*** -0.498*** -0.468*** -0.388*** 
        . (-20.76) (-45.50) (-4.45) (-9.86) (-11.06) (-23.28) (-25.56) (-14.32) (-7.29) 
Adj R-Sq   0.522   0.684   0.569   0.543   0.372   0.642   0.495   0.470   0.539 
Obs 14656 60062 6406 3117 3557 7702 14579 2538 3064 
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Appendix A-XVII Regressions of debt capacity model (l) for period 1980 to 2008 across industries 
This table reports debt capacity model (l) regression results using CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2006. All firms are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Industry groups are sorted according to their SIC codes as 
follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 7=Services, 8=Healthcare, and 9=Others. Variable definitions are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is debt capacity scaled by total asset. All estimates are reported based on OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model OLS 
Industry IND=1 IND=2 IND=3 IND=4 IND=5 IND=6 IND=7 IND=8 IND=9 
Dependent DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT DC_AT 
Intercept 0.493*** 0.509*** 0.479*** 0.473*** 0.366*** 0.500*** 0.413*** 0.526*** 0.366*** 
        . (196.78) (601.83) (115.35) (105.93) (18.88) (140.70) (167.81) (47.13) (62.56) 
Cfe 0.070*** 0.057*** 0.083*** 0.132*** 0.063*** 0.034*** 0.014** -0.027 0.123*** 
        . (9.78) (22.57) (8.95) (7.07) (4.02) (5.77) (2.13) (-1.64) (8.16) 
CASH -0.495*** -0.471*** -0.472*** -0.486*** -0.236*** -0.362*** -0.364*** -0.350*** -0.394*** 
        . (-77.22) (-219.81) (-49.61) (-31.19) (-14.97) (-70.34) (-62.08) (-24.12) (-22.44) 
CASH_Cfe -0.141*** -0.091*** -0.078* -0.198** -0.100* -0.102*** 0.024 0.112* -0.159** 
        . (-4.69) (-12.92) (-1.65) (-2.29) (-1.82) (-7.49) (1.14) (1.89) (-2.54) 
LARGE -0.014*** -0.045*** -0.025*** -0.001 0.022*** -0.014** -0.044*** -0.012 0.008 
        . (-6.20) (-34.89) (-4.21) (-0.11) (3.01) (-2.53) (-9.95) (-1.49) (0.87) 
CREDIT -0.004 -0.030*** -0.011* -0.024*** 0.007 0.006 -0.023*** 0.033** -0.062*** 
        . (-1.22) (-17.93) (-1.75) (-3.72) (0.82) (0.62) (-3.48) (2.43) (-4.69) 
Q -0.002** -0.001*** -0.002* -0.004* 0.006*** -0.001* -0.001 0.004** 0.007*** 
        . (-2.36) (-2.66) (-1.92) (-1.78) (4.25) (-1.75) (-1.08) (2.13) (4.05) 
INDSTDCF -0.338*** -0.345*** 0.004 -0.168*** -1.002*** -0.757*** -0.167*** -1.610*** 0.218*** 
        . (-10.06) (-47.11) (0.15) (-4.93) (-4.21) (-36.54) (-12.28) (-14.77) (5.44) 
Adj R-Sq   0.327   0.580   0.318   0.305   0.097   0.604   0.256   0.257   0.174 
Obs 14896 60436 6643 3215 3686 7858 15207 2610 3513 
  
Part A          Appendix 
191 
 
Appendix A-XVIII Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for investment model variables 
This table reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for variables in the investment model. The sample is taken from CRSP/Compustat from 1980 to 2008. All firms are included 
with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. 
Following Almeida and Campello (2007), firms with the following characteristics are eliminated from the sample: (1) capital stock less than USD5million, (2) real asset or sale growth more 
than 100%, and (3) negative Q or Q more than 10. Variable definitions are reported in Chapter A2.3. Investment ratio (INVTMT) computed as capital investment to lagged capital stock and net 
investment (NINVTMT) is computed as the sum of capital investment, acquisitions and change in investments less sale in property plant and equipment and investment to lagged total assets 
Both investment and net investment ratios are winsorized at top and bottom 5% due to large extreme values. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  NINVTMT INVTMT CASH LAGCASH DC LAGDC Cfe LAGCFe Q 
NINVTMT 1 
        INVTMT 0.651 1 
       CASH -0.005 0.044 1 
      LAGCASH 0.007 0.057 0.875 1 
     DC 0.067 0.001 -0.623 -0.562 1 
    LAGDC 0.061 -0.003 -0.571 -0.632 0.929 1 
   Cfe 0.007 -0.013 -0.180 -0.190 0.159 0.172 1 
  LAGCFe 0.006 -0.008 -0.153 -0.163 0.144 0.168 0.660 1 
 Q -0.021 0.029 0.371 0.352 -0.295 -0.292 0.047 0.044 1 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 
NINVTMT INVTMT CASH LAGCASH DC LAGDC Cfe LAGCFe Q 
NINVTMT 1                 
INVTMT 0.817 1 
       CASH 0.001 0.072 1 
      LAGCASH 0.036 0.088 0.820 1 
     DC 0.115 0.010 -0.538 -0.464 1 
    LAGDC 0.092 0.004 -0.471 -0.540 0.909 1 
   Cfe -0.011 -0.046 -0.006 -0.013 0.075 0.070 1 
  LAGCFe -0.014 -0.036 0.001 0.002 0.059 0.084 0.747 1 
 Q -0.080 -0.001 0.307 0.289 -0.317 -0.312 0.336 0.291 1 
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Appendix A-XIX Regressions of investment model (m) for period 1980 to 2008  
(different scaling variable) 
This table reports the investment models results using CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms are 
included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government 
(SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Following 
Almeida and Campello (2007), firms with the following characteristics are eliminated from the sample: (1) 
capital stock less than USD5million, (2) real asset or sale growth more than 100%, and (3) negative Q or Q more 
than 10. Cash, debt capacity and cash flow are scaled by capital stock (PPENT) and winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. The interaction term between cash holdings and debt capacity is computed as the product of cash 
holdings to capital stock and debt capacity to capital stock for each firm-year observation. Variable definitions 
are reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is investment ratio computed as capital investment to 
lagged capital stock OLS model reports estimates from OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors. FE model controls for firm and year fixed effects. FM model is based on Fama-MacBeth 
regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. All regressions include 
a constant term (not reported). The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% 
level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
 
FM 
Dependent INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT 
CASH_PPENT 0.030** 0.096*** 
 
0.024 0.040** 
 
0.169*** 0.322*** 
             . (2.28) (6.35) 
 
(1.57) (2.49) 
 
(3.31) (4.38) 
DC_PPENT 0.113*** 0.205*** 
 
0.037** 0.061*** 
 
0.310*** 0.584*** 
             . (8.20) (12.55) 
 
(2.21) (3.35) 
 
(3.70) (3.89) 
CASH*DC_PPENT 
 
-1.187*** 
  
-0.458*** 
  
-3.201*** 
             . 
 
(-12.88) 
  
(-6.23) 
  
(-3.49) 
Q 0.254*** 0.247*** 
 
0.490*** 0.497*** 
 
0.436*** 0.428*** 
             . (7.35) (6.59) 
 
(14.55) (14.07) 
 
(4.09) (3.99) 
Cfe_PPENT 0.006 -0.000 
 
0.018 0.004 
 
-0.017 -0.101 
             . (0.23) (-0.02) 
 
(0.88) (0.17) 
 
(-0.27) (-1.48) 
Adj R-Sq 0.002 0.004 
    
0.006 0.012 
Obs 75457 66972 
 
75457 66972 
 
75457 66972 
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Appendix A-XX Regressions of investment model (m) for period 1980 to 2008  
(different winsorisation method) 
This table reports the investment models results using CRSP/Compustat sample from 1980 to 2008. All firms are 
included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government 
(SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Following 
Almeida and Campello (2007), firms with the following characteristics are eliminated from the sample: (1) 
capital stock less than USD5million, (2) real asset or sale growth more than 100%, and (3) negative Q or Q more 
than 10. The interaction term between cash holdings and debt capacity is computed as the product of cash 
holdings to total assets and debt capacity to total assets for each firm-year observation. Variable definitions are 
reported in Chapter A2.3. The dependent variable is investment ratio computed as capital investment to lagged 
capital stock for Panel A and net investment computed as the sum of capital investment, acquisitions and change 
in investments less sale in property plant and equipment and investment to lagged total assets for Panel B. Both 
investment and net investment ratios are winsorised at top and bottom 1%. OLS model reports estimates from 
OLS regressions with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors. FE model controls for firm and year fixed 
effects. FM model is based on Fama-MacBeth regressions using Newey and West (1987) standard errors 
controlling for autocorrelation. All regressions include a constant term (not reported). The table reports 
coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% 
and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
 
FM 
Dependent NINVTMT NINVTMT   NINVTMT NINVTMT   NINVTMT NINVTMT 
CASH 4.349*** 3.708*** 
 
2.228*** 2.525*** 
 
5.693*** 5.116*** 
             . (8.98) (8.03) 
 
(3.77) (4.40) 
 
(3.07) (2.86) 
DC 7.623*** 6.781*** 
 
5.692*** 4.798*** 
 
6.594*** 6.310*** 
             . (12.94) (12.00) 
 
(7.33) (6.32) 
 
(3.71) (3.52) 
CASH*DC 
 
-1.985*** 
  
-0.779* 
  
-12.513*** 
             . 
 
(-3.48) 
  
(-1.74) 
  
(-5.26) 
Q -0.137** -0.150*** 
 
0.015 0.009 
 
-0.063 -0.087 
             . (-2.41) (-2.77) 
 
(0.26) (0.17) 
 
(-0.90) (-1.44) 
Cfe 0.242 -0.426 
 
0.793* 0.385 
 
0.139 -1.235 
             . (0.57) (-1.04) 
 
(1.80) (0.90) 
 
(0.19) (-1.33) 
Adj R-Sq   0.002   0.003           0.003   0.006 
Obs      75457      66972        75457      66972        75457      66972 
Panel B 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2   MODEL3 MODEL4   MODEL5 MODEL6 
Model OLS 
 
FE 
 
FM 
Dependent INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT   INVTMT INVTMT 
CASH 7.732*** 7.808*** 
 
7.523*** 7.839*** 
 
7.575*** 7.116*** 
             . (7.02) (6.46) 
 
(5.15) (4.82) 
 
(3.82) (3.55) 
DC 6.811*** 7.512*** 
 
9.674*** 11.066*** 
 
1.878 2.020 
             . (5.08) (5.08) 
 
(5.05) (5.14) 
 
(0.77) (0.79) 
CASH*DC 
 
-7.061*** 
  
-1.739 
  
-44.309*** 
             . 
 
(-4.72) 
  
(-1.37) 
  
(-6.80) 
Q 0.614*** 0.670*** 
 
1.077*** 1.112*** 
 
1.010*** 1.109*** 
             . (4.73) (4.72) 
 
(7.65) (7.11) 
 
(3.10) (3.29) 
Cfe -2.941*** -3.571*** 
 
1.390 1.383 
 
-4.912*** -5.835*** 
             . (-3.04) (-3.34) 
 
(1.28) (1.14) 
 
(-2.94) (-3.07) 
Adj R-Sq   0.001   0.002           0.004   0.006 
Obs      75457      66972        75457      66972        75457      66972 
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ABSTRACT B 
 
Using a sample of public US firms over the period 1980 to 2008, the role of 
financial flexibility in capital structure decisions is examined. Financial flexibility is 
measured internally as cash and debt capacity, and externally as equity liquidity 
using a novel external equity flexibility index based on common equity liquidity 
measures. The increasing trend in financing deficit is largely funded by equity rather 
than debt. Results suggest that the amount of debt issued to finance the deficit no 
longer depends solely on the size of deficit a firm faces but depends on the amount 
of the deficit relative to the ILUP¶VERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\,QWHVWVRIFDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH
WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU WKHRU\ LV FRQWLQJHQW XSRQ ILUPV¶ DELOLW\ WR ERUURZ )LUPV ZLWK
greater debt capacity issue less equity to fund deficits but firms with greater equity 
flexibility may not issue less debt, and equity is not used as a substitute for debt. 
Although there is weak evidence for substitution between debt and equity use, firms 
have the tendency to choose the financing source which provides them the best 
funding capacity. Finally, in the conventional trade-off model tests, debt capacity 
and external equity flexibility are shown to be the most important determinants of 
leverage - supporting the notion that financial flexibility is the most important 
consideration in financing decisions.  
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AJEX   Split-adjusted average stock price 
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CHAPTER B1. INTRODUCTION 
 
To date, none of the grand theories of capital structure is of general practical 
use and the theory-practice gap in corporate finance is evident. Researchers then turn 
to surveying managers for insights. Frank and Goyal (2003) note that Graham and 
Harvey (2001) VKRZLQWKHLUVXUYH\WKDW³VRPHILUPVH[SUHVVHGYLHZVVLPLODUWRWKH
pecking order, but apparentO\QRWGXHWRDGYHUVHVHOHFWLRQ´+HUH, we present another 
YLHZ RQ WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU WKHRU\ ZKHUH ILUPV DUH IRXQG WR REH\ WKH WKHRU\¶V
financing behaviour not due to the presence of adverse selection problems but due to 
their practical need for financial flexibility. As expected, pecking order is more 
applicable for firms with high debt capacity because these firms can afford greater 
debt. On the other hand, the theory becomes less applicable for firms with lower debt 
capacity because they simply cannot afford to issue debt. Debt capacity measures 
ILUPV¶ERUURZLQJDELOLW\DQGGHSHQGVSULPDULO\RQWKHQDWXUHRIDVVHWVDQGWKHZD\
business is conducted. Debt capacity may also be taken as a measure of credit 
constraint. The increase in applicability of pecking order with debt capacity is 
documented in various studies (Bharath et al., 2009, Frank and Goyal, 2003) when 
tangibility is used to measure intrinsic debt capacity. Simply said, two firms with the 
same level of adverse selection problem but different credit constraints will issue 
different amounts of debt and follow the pecking order theory to differing degrees. 
Bharath et al. (2009) fiQGWKDWWKHWKHRU\¶VDSSOLFDELOLW\ LQFUHDVHVZLWKWKHSUREOem 
of adverse selection.  
As financial flexibility (thereafter FF) is the most important determinant of 
capital structure (Campello et al., 2011), the FF motivation is used in this thesis to 
explain debt and equity use in practice. In the literature, there are numerous proxies 
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used to measure FF; however, there is no single clear definition and measure for it. 
Using the general flexibility definition in the literature, FF is measured by the ease 
with which a firm obtains its required funding, and is given by the optimal balance 
of both the external and internal flexibility. Here, external flexibility refers to the 
HDVH RI DFFHVV OLTXLGLW\ DQG FRVW RI D ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO LQVWUXPHQWV LQ WKH H[WHUQDO
capital markets; and internal flexibility LQFOXGHV ILUP¶V cash holdings and debt 
capacity (which has been in the spotlight of capital structure research in recent 
years). While the external component is based on market variables that are not under 
the direct control of managers, the internal component is influenced by the volatility 
of cash anGHDUQLQJVDQGPDQDJHULDOGLVFUHWLRQDQGSUHIHUHQFHRYHUDILUP¶VLQWHUQDO
liquidity position.  
As a measure of credit constraint, debt capacity affects debt issue and the 
capital structure in the following ways. First, Frank and Goyal (2003) provide 
evidence for the failure of pecking order theory in explaining financing for small 
firms where information asymmetry is generally the largest. Here, it is suggested that 
the limit applicability of the theory is due to debt constraints because small firms 
generally have lower debt capacities. As such, instead of choosing equity over debt, 
small firms are forced to use equity instead of debt because they simply cannot use 
debt. Second, the sharp increase in cash holdings over time documented by Bates et 
al. (2009) may be explained by the fall in debt capacity over time. Due to the change 
in nature of business form, average debt capacity of US firms are found to fall over 
time. Thus, firms have to hold more cash and this trend is increasingly predominant 
DV ILUPV¶GHEWFDSDFLW\ IDOOV This would mean the general trend of increased cash 
holdings over time is due to the larger amount of credit constraints faced by firms. 
Eliminating the periodic trend, firms with lower debt capacities are found to hold 
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greater cash at any particular time point. Third, the difference in nature of firmV¶ 
assets (measured by debt capacity) may be a plausible explanation for the observed 
persistence in capital structure. Recent studies (e.g. Leary, 2009, Lemmon and 
Roberts, 2010) used the high cost of switching to explain the observed debt 
persistence found in Lemmon et al. (Lemmon et al., 2008).47 Lemmon and Roberts 
(2010) UHSRUWHG HYLGHQFH RI ILUPV¶ KHDY\ UHOLDQFH RQ D VLQJOH VRXUFH RI FUHGLW48 
However, transaction cost may only explain part of the reliance as it forms only a 
small proportion of the total capital raised. Reliance on specific capital market may 
be largely due to a ILUP¶V FRUH DVVHW VWUXFWXUH ZKHUH GHEW LV ODUJHO\ FROODWHUDOL]HG
XVLQJWDQJLEOHDVVHWV:KLOVWDVVHWVWUXFWXUHGHWHUPLQHVILUP¶VSULPDU\GHEWcapacity 
and debt usage, access to equity funds requires external market proxies.  
Debt constrained firms not only stockpile cash, they sometimes seek ways to 
enhance equity liquidity for financing needs. It is noted that stockpiling cash reserves 
increases the adverse selection problem and leads to greater information asymmetry. 
However, instead of having a negative impact on their stock liquidity, these (high 
cash) firms are found to have greater equity liquidity. This suggests that cash 
holdings do not have sufficient impact on information asymmetry to affect equity 
liquidity. Similar to prior studies (Bharath et al., 2009, Frank and Goyal, 2003), the 
pecking order theory is found to have declining importance over time. In their paper, 
Bharath et al. (2009) suggest alternative ways of equity issue to circumvent 
information asymmetry problems (Fama and French, 2005), and increasing 
proportion of equity financing (Frank and Goyal, 2003) as possible explanations for 
the declining importance of the pecking order theory. In this workILUPV¶IOH[LELOLW\
                                                             
47
 As the net cost of switching for most firms is high. Highly levered firms are observed to continue to issue more 
debt and remain highly levered for substantially long periods of time. 
48
 Lemmon and Roberts (2009) investigate the response of financing and investment decisions from a change in 
supply of credit, and find that firms significantly modify their financing and investment decisions following a 
change in supply shock in their specific capital market. Furthermore, a contraction in credit supply in the debt 
market leads to a consequent reduction in debt use with no substitution to alternative sources of funding. 
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position in the equity market is used to explain how much equity firms issue and 
whether or not firms with greater equity flexibility will issue more equity for deficit 
funding. This is a direct test of external financing flexibility (equity market) on the 
pecking order theory.  
This thesis investigates the interaction between FF and capital structure, i.e. 
how FF decisions affect firms¶ financing and investment decisions, through the 
pecking order model and conventional trade-off leverage model. By exploring the 
relationship between flexibility and firms¶ preference for debt or equity to finance 
GHILFLW WKH VWXG\ H[DPLQHV KRZ ILQDQFLQJ SROLF\ LV DIIHFWHG E\ ERWK L ILUP¶V
LQWHUQDOFDVKDQGGHEWFDSDFLW\DQGLL ILUP¶VH[WHUQDO IOH[LELOLW\ZKLFKVLJQDOV its 
capacity in the equity capital market. The two conventional theories of capital 
structure ± the pecking order and the trade-off theories will be used as the base 
model to examine the impact of FF on capital structure.  
First, the external equity flexibility (EEF) index is constructed using the four 
selected equity variables. Due to the nature of construction, the EEF index 
effectively measures inflexibility and has a positive correlation with debt capacity 
and a negative correlation with cash holdings ± firms with better equity position have 
lower debt capacity and greater cash holdings. Similar to the increasing cash 
holdings and decreasing debt capacity trends over time, the EEF index decreases 
IURP  WR  VXJJHVWLQJ DQ LQFUHDVH LQ ILUPV¶ DFFHVVibility to the equity 
market.  
Second, the base pecking order model is adapted from Frank and Goyal 
(2003). The modified pecking order model is constructed with net equity issue as the 
dependent variable. Interaction variables between deficit and debt capacity, and 
deficit and EEF index are put into both models separately and the following results 
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are obtained. A large proportion of the financing deficit is met by net equity issue, 
and the trend is increasing with time. Supporting Frank and Goyal (2003), net equity 
issue is found to track deficit better than net debt issue, suggesting that firms choose 
to issue equity rather than debt for financing needs. Results indicate that the amount 
of debt issued to finance deficit no longer depends solely on the amount of deficit a 
firm faces, but depends on the amount of deficit relative to the ILUP¶V ERUURZLQJ
capacity. It is found that only firms with sufficient debt capacity appear to follow a 
financing hierarchy, whereas firms with insufficient debt capacity do not follow the 
hierarchy because they simply cannot do so. Therefore, the pecking order theory is 
IRXQGWREHFRQWLQJHQWXSRQILUPV¶DELOLW\WRERUURZ 
Third, the basic and modified pecking order model is performed over 
subsamples of firms sorted according to each flexibility components ± cash, debt 
capacity, EEF index and credit rating. Debt constrained firms are found to hold more 
cash, use less debt, and more equity financing for their deficit requirements. On the 
other hand, firms with better equity position issue more equity to finance their 
deficit. However, firms with better equity position may not issue less debt, i.e. equity 
is not a substitute for debt. This suggests that firms issue equity if they are able to; 
and they are not forced to issue equity as the last resort as suggested by the financing 
hierarchy. 
Finally, the conventional leverage model and leverage change models are 
constructed with debt capacity and EEF index as additional determinants. The results 
confirm that there is no strict adherence to the financing hierarchy; rather the 
applicability of the pecking order is conditional on the amount of debt a firm is able 
WRLVVXH7KHUHIRUHHYLGHQFHDJDLQVWWKHSHFNLQJRUGHUPRGHOPLJKWEHGXHWRILUPV¶
incapacitated GHEW LVVXH UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLUSUHIHUHQFH IRUHTXLW\6XSSRUWLQJ0\HUV¶
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(2001) view, the pecking order model is shown to be a conditional theory based on a 
simple fact of whether or not firm has the capacity to issue debt when required. 
According to the trade-off theory, a strong mean reversion tendency RI ILUPV¶
leverage is observed. Supporting the practical findings in Graham and Harvey 
(2001), debt capacity and EEF index are the most important determinants of leverage 
in the two conventional models. 
The rest of this part of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter B2 provides 
a detailed literature review covering (i) conventional theories of capital structure, (ii) 
new financing theories with a focus on dynamic capital structure models, (iii) 
practicality issues of capital structure theories through non-conventional corporate 
finance studies, and finally (iv) a review of financial flexibility and its role and 
relevance in capital structure decisions. Chapters B3 and B4 describe the 
measurement and construction of flexibility variables, sample and variable 
specifications respectively. Chapter B5 presents the pecking order model hypotheses, 
specifications and results, while Chapter B6 reports the conventional leverage model. 
Chapter B7 then concludes the thesis by summarizing the key findings and making 
recommendations for future research direction.  
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CHAPTER B2. REVIEW OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
THEORIES 
 
The capital structure puzzle remains because existing theories are able to co-
exist and evidence on these theories is mixed. Current theories are only conditional 
RQHV WKDW DLG DFDGHPLFV¶ DQG SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ILUPV; financing 
decisions (Myers, 2001) whilst none is an all-embracing theory of capital structure. 
While theory and field evidence could adequately provide rational analysis of 
FRUSRUDWH ILQDQFHSUREOHPV WKH µVFLHQFH¶ LQFRUSRUDWH ILQDQFH KDV \HW WRSURYLGH D
satisfactory framework for unravelling all problems financial officers face (Jensen 
and Smith, 1984).  
Academics are still in hopeful search for a model of capital structure that 
EULQJVWRJHWKHUNH\HOHPHQWVDQGWKHRULHV IRUSUHGLFWLQJ ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJEHKDYLRXU
and explaining observed stylized facts in the imperfect capital market. Existing 
models of financing do not adequately describe leverage decisions and, aggravating 
the problem further, these models sometimes yield results that contradict observed 
VW\OL]HGIDFWVRIILUPV¶Iinancing behaviour (Frank and Goyal, 2007). To understand 
WKH UHDO PRWLYHV EHKLQG ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQVROGDQG QHZ WKHRULHVRIFDSLWDO
structure are reviewed in the light of recent dynamic modelling developments. The 
generalization and evidence obtained from previous models and theories are then 
compared with surveyed practical determinants of capital structure and empirically 
tested to seek its generality and usability. 
In brief, theories of capital structure date back to the conventional trade-off 
theory derived from debt tax advantage and bankruptcy costs, subsequent pecking 
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order theory based on information asymmetry, free cash flow principle and 
management entrenchment theory derived from the agency costs, to the more recent 
market timing and managerial inertia theories based on equity price variability and 
ILUPV¶ market timing actions. Recent capital structure models are developed in a 
dynamic and/or structural manner pooling together a range of important factors 
affecting leverage decisions. Empirically, there have been numerous capital structure 
models that range from the conventional pooled regressions to more complex models 
that make use of instrumental variables and GMM; and to the use of natural 
experiments and simulations of structural models. 
Practical determinants of capital structure have been highlighted since the 
survey by Graham and Harvey (2001), and there have been similar surveys done to 
identify the missing components in capital structure research. Whilst there is general 
support for the trade-off hypothesis by managers, considerations of practicality are 
found to play a much more important role in leverage decisions. Liquidity 
constraints and the need to preserve financial flexibility are the key considerations in 
making financing decisions because managers are forward looking and consider the 
expected liquidity position of firms in future periods. Evidence of the demand for 
flexibility is further documented in recent research (Bates et al., 2009, Byoun, May 
2008, Gamba and Triantis, 2008, Lemmon and Roberts, 2010, Sufi, 2009), but most 
focus on a single component of flexibility, either cash, debt capacity (tangibility) or 
supply constraints.  
Whilst financial flexibility is the most important determinant in capital 
structure, there are few papers analysing the relationship between leverage and 
flexibility, in contrast with those that focus on the conventional theories, trade-off 
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and pecking order. In addition, the lack of consensus on the definition and 
measurement of financial flexibility is a major caveat to future research. 
The rest of this Chapter will review the conventional and new theories of 
capital structure, followed by a discussion on the theory and practice gap in 
corporate finance and, finally, a look into the practical determinants of capital 
structure. 
 
B2.1 Conventional theories of capital structure 
B2.1.1 Trade-off theory 
Although financing decisions of firms have no effect on the firm value and 
cost of capital in the perfect world envisaged by Modigliani and Miller (1958), these 
decisions do matter in our imperfect world. Breaking away from the zero-tax 
assumption, Modigliani and Miller (1963) build corporate income tax into their 
perfect world and examine the effect of taxation on capital structure. After which, 
the expected bankruptcy costs are incorporated into the ILUP¶V ILQDQFLQJEHKDYLRXU
thereby deriving the well-known trade-off theory in corporate finance literature. The 
trade-off theory postulates a unique optimal capital structure with value-maximising 
goal of firms using cost-benefit analysis for financing decisions. Marginal benefits 
and costs of leverage stem primarily from the tax deductibility of debt interest and 
debt-related bankruptcy costs.  
The trade-RIIDUJXPHQWRI.UDXVDQG/LW]HQEHUJHUVWDWHVWKDW³WKHWD[DWLRQRI
corporate profits and the existence of bankruptcy penalties are market imperfections 
WKDW DUH FHQWUDO WR WKH SRVLWLYH WKHRULHV RI FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH´ (1973, p.911). The 
adjustment towards an optimum (target adjustment behaviour) is made distinct from 
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the conventional trade-off theory by Myers (1984) on important grounds49. Although 
the issues of taxes and bankruptcy costs are considered in detail by Miller (1977) and 
King (1974, 1977) respectively, the static trade-off theory is presented in Bradley et 
al. (1984) in the standard way. The term static trade-off theory was introduced to 
differentiate conventional trade-off models from the new and dynamic models where 
attempts are made to model more realistic tax structures and to take into account the 
issues of retained earnings and cash flow, and the mean reversion of leverage in a 
continuous-time framework. The dynamic models brought researchers back to the 
trade-off theory after years of turning away from the taxation-versus-bankruptcy 
cost-benefit analysis to the pecking order theory based on information asymmetry 
and agency costs in the 1990s (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
B2.1.2 Pecking order theory 
To search for the crucial missing piece in explaining leverage behaviour, 
researchers devoted years of attention to the pecking order theory. Hence, corporate 
finance research output has been populated by empirical work on both trade-off 
theory and pecking order hypotheses. Whilst the two theories have been subjected to 
extensive research in corporate finance academia, there has been mixed evidence on 
the existence or co-existence of both theories.  
Pecking order theory could be derived from either or both of the information 
asymmetry and agency costs arguments. The former is first used to describe the 
financing hierarchy where firms prefer internal funds over external financing and, if 
external funds are sought, debt over equity on the basis of adverse selection due to 
asymmetric information (Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984). The latter is 
                                                             
49
 Frank and Goyal (2007) provide related discussions. 
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derived from the conflicts of interest and agency costs in the nexus of contracts 
among stockholders, bondholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Due to imperfect information, managers are the only ones with knowledge of 
the true value of firms and future growth opportunities; and conveying this insider 
knowledge to external investors in a complete manner may not be feasible. 
Recognising this fact, external suppliers charge a premium for their funds and 
managers try to avoid such costs by utilising internal funds whenever possible. When 
external funds are sought, managers avoid issuing equity (except in cases where 
equity is overvalued) because such issuance entails signalling overvalued equity, 
whether or not equity is truly overvalued. Although debt is not explicitly considered 
in the pecking order analysis of Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984) 
hypothesizes debt to fall between internal funds and equity (Frank and Goyal, 2007). 
Adverse selection may be used to prove the financing hierarchy hypothesis; 
however, the presence of adverse selection does not dictate the pecking order theory 
because the pecking order remains a unique case of the former (Halov and Heider, 
2004).  
According to agency theory, conflicts of interests between prospective 
stockholders and owner-managers result in underinvestment because managers avoid 
equity issuance, with the aim of circumventing additional monitoring and evading 
profit sharing. As such, managers prefer retained earnings to external financing. On 
the other hand, conflicts between stockholders and bondholders may result in 
inefficient investment and operating decisions as managers (acting on behalf of 
shareholders) engage in risk-shifting activities and increase leverage to fund higher 
dividend issues. Whilst agency theory is not used to support the conventional 
pecking order hypotheses, a simple nexus of contract postulated by the agency 
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theory could be used to support the financing hierarchy (Myers, 2003). Agency 
theory is termed the third theory of capital structure ± free cash flow theory in Myers 
(2001), where distinction is made between the pecking order theory (based on 
asymmetry information) and the free cash flow perspective (based on agency 
theory). 
 
B2.2 New theories of capital structure 
In recent years, research has thrown light on the older theories of capital 
structure with new ideas. Recent developments include the management 
entrenchment theory by Zweibel (1996), the effect of market timing actions on 
leverage by Baker and Wurgler (2002), the managerial inertia theory by Welch 
(2004), and finally dynamic trade-off tests where adjustment costs and various 
market realisms are incorporated into the model. 
B2.2.1 Management entrenchment theory 
Instead of modelling a shareholder-maximisation goal, Zweibel (1996) 
models manageUV¶RSWLPDOLW\DQGGHYHORSs a capital structure model where managers 
optimally make leverage decisions to accomplish their empire-building desire. Cost-
EHQHILWDQDO\VLVEHWZHHQPDQDJHUV¶HPSLUH-building ambitions and adequate level of 
efficiency (to prevent unwarranted additional control) is performed when managers 
make financing decisions. High equity value allows managers to add equity to the 
firm, but simultaneously causes managers to be entrenched, thus resisting debt 
financing, even that necessary to restore the firm to the optimal leverage level. The 
management entrenchment theory is based on the agency theory where debt is used 
to constrain managers¶ behaviour. This new theory, however, casts some doubt on its 
own aptness since it implies an exploitation of existing equity holders rather than 
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external new investors, thereby defying previous earnings management theory and 
studies (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). 
B2.2.2 Market timing theory 
The market timing theory by Baker and Wurgler (2002) postulates capital 
VWUXFWXUH DV ³WKH FXPXODWLYH RXWFRPH RI ILUP¶V SDVW DWWHPSWV WR WLPH WKH HTXLW\
PDUNHW´ S FLUP¶V PDUNHW WLPLQJ DFWLYLWLHV KDYH ORQJ-term impact on the debt-
equity mix. Firms that seek funds when their market values are high eventually 
become lowly levered; while firms that raise funds when their market values are low 
become highly levered firms. Managers issue equity when they believe that current 
equity is overvalued, and this market timing behaviour is not reversed or undone by 
managers because it is costly to do so. Hence, deviation from the optimal capital 
structure LV H[SHFWHG DQG WKH ILUP¶V GHEW-equity mix then becomes dependent on 
market timing activities which are the result of market value fluctuations. 
Market timing theory is one of the few capital structure models that highlight 
the importance of the effect of the external capital market. Though not focusing on 
the capital market in terms of fund supply, market value of equity is taken into 
DFFRXQW DQG WKH ODWWHU LQFRUSRUDWHV LQYHVWRUV¶ VHntiment and equity valuation. In 
recent empirical papers on capital structure (Leary, 2009, Lemmon and Roberts, 
2010), the availability of funds and capital market conditions are important in 
dictating capital structure. Some suggest the observed firm leverage to be a function 
of both the demand and supply of debt; hence, studying debt ratios using only the 
demand factors tends to overestimate leverage ratios because firms may be 
constrained in their access to the external capital market (Faulkender and Petersen, 
2006).  
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B2.2.3 Managerial inertia theory 
Welch (2004) finds that stock returns and stock return-adjusted historical 
capitDO VWUXFWXUH DUH WKH EHVW GHWHUPLQDQWV LQ FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH SUHGLFWLRQ :HOFK¶V
findings giYHVXSSRUWWR%DNHUDQG:XUJOHU¶V(2002) market timing hypothesis of the 
long-WHUP HIIHFW VWRFN PDUNHW IOXFWXDWLRQV KDYH RQ D ILUP¶V FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUH EXW
differ from previous research LQIRFXVLQJRQILUPV¶IDLOXUHWRUHDGMXVWWKHLU OHYHUDJH
ratio subsequent to market value changes ± managerial inertia. The strong correlation 
between lagged equity returns and leverage show WKDW VWRFN UHWXUQV DUH WKH µILUVW
RUGHUGHWHUPLQDQW¶RIOHYHUDJH, and proxies used in past leverage models account for 
capital structure due to their correlation with stock price changes (Welch, 2004).  
Welch (2004) further found that financing decisions are not made to reverse 
stock-induced debt-equity ratio changes, and firms were not found to rebalance their 
capital structures after major stock price movements, thereby concluding that stock 
UHWXUQLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWµRPLWWHGG\QDPLFV¶LQIOXHQFLQJFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH  50  
To sum up, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Welch (2004) highlight the 
importance and impact of equity returns and variability on leverage decisions. 
However, as existing evidence remains mixed, this new focus requires more research 
WR DFFHVV WKH µUHDO¶ LPSDFW RI VWRFN SULFHV DQG UHWXUQV SRVVLEO\ LQ D G\QDPLF
framework with other endogenous variables affecting leverage. This leads us to the 
survey of dynamic capital structure models in the following section. 
B2.2.4 Dynamic capital structure models 
In a continuous-WLPH IUDPHZRUN ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJ EHKDYLRXU LV modelled in 
the dynamic framework using the expected financing requirement in the next period, 
coupled with other considerations for recapitalisation costs and differential tax 
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 Stock returns are omitted dynamics because they are generally not taken into account explicitly in conventional 
capital structure research. 
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treatment. Whilst the dynamic capital structure model has gained popularity only in 
the recent decade, it was first used in the 1980s in the firm valuation model of 
Brennan and Schwartz (1984) driven by debt tax incentive and agency costs. During 
the same period, Kane et al. (1984, 1985) PRGHO ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJdecision-making 
using an option valuation framework where ILUP¶VILQDQFLQJSROLF\LVGHULYHGIURP
the cost-benefit analysis using marginal cost of debt (i.e. bankruptcy costs) and 
marginal benefit of debt (which includes debt tax shield, extra rate of return and 
additional market premium over unlevered firms). Fischer et al. (1989) subsequently 
modelled firms¶ optimal leverage range as a function of firm-specific characteristics 
and recapitalisation costs.  
Subsequent to the above key papers in the 1980s, various dynamic models 
have been developed and these can be conveniently categorised under the following 
(non-exhaustive) themes ± (1) asymmetric information and agency costs (Boyle 
and Guthrie, 2003, Childs et al., 2005, Leland, 1998, Mauer and Ott, 2000, Mauer 
and Sarkar, 2005, Mello and Parsons, 1992); (2) bankruptcy and corporate 
restructuring (Goldstein et al., 2001, Leland, 1994, Leland and Toft, 1996, 
Strebulaev, 2007, Sundaresan and Wang, 2007); (3) liquidity and financial 
constraint problem (Boyle and Guthrie, 2003, Gomes, 2001, Hennessy and Whited, 
2005); (4) taxation (Hennessy and Whited, 2005, Schuerhoff, 2004); (5) 
adjustment and recapitalisation costs (Flannery and Rangan, 2006, Leary and 
Roberts, 2005); (6) real production and investment decisions (MacKay and 
Phillips, 2005, Mauer and Triantis, 1994, Titman and Tsyplakov, 2007). 
Over the years, researchers into capital structure developed the dynamic 
model by incorporating new elements and/or breaking away the restrictive 
assumptions in previous models. Since the late 1990s, development of the leverage 
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models has exhibited a significant upward trend. However, prevailing models have 
varying focus and each has its own advantages over the others; however each 
presents an incomplete version of the capital structure model with at least one 
important feature absent.  
Despite the emerging trend to incorporate diverse factors into the dynamic 
models of capital structure, Ju et al. (2005) return to the basics and develop a 
dynamic model that is solely based on the trade-off hypothesis of bankruptcy costs 
and debt tax shields, and the relatively straightforward model is able to exhibit 
RXWVWDQGLQJ SUHGLFWLYH DELOLW\ RI ILUP¶V ILQDQFLQJ EHKDYLRXU 7KLV OHDGV WR a new 
school of thought that emerging capital structure research trying to incorporate too 
many factors that seemingly affect leverage decisions produces models that are too 
complex for practical application.  
To seek the optimal balance between practicability and complexity, the next 
section reviews the capital structure models from another perspective and derives 
more important capital sWUXFWXUHGHWHUPLQDQWVIURPSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶RSLQLRQV 
 
B2.3 Theory-practice gap of capital structure research 
In spite of the extensive research into ILUPV¶FDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH LIRQHWDNHVD
step back and asks µKRZXVHIXODUHWKHVHWKHRULHVWRILUPVLQSUDFWLFH"¶WKHDQVZHULV
unclear. While we ought to avoid denying the contribution of the capital structure 
theories to practitioners, it is not clear how these theories and the hard-fought debate 
in academia eventually turn into practical use in the imperfect world. This gap 
between theory and practice has long been recognised by researchers (Donaldson, 
1961, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989, Scott and Johnson, 
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1982, Trahan and Gitman, 1995); and these qualitative papers use interviews and 
survey results to bridge the theory-practice gap.  
Evidently, most corporate finance research is quantitatively built on empirical 
tests or dynamic modelling using large samples of firms, with secondary data 
collected from reported financial statements and analysts¶ reports. During the recent 
decade, researchers have made use of the state-of-the-art techniques to simulate 
ILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQPDNLQJSURFHVVDORQJVLGHRWKHUFRUSRUDWHGHFLVLRQV:KLOH
these models excelled in statistical power and explained variability, they often have 
PRGHOVSHFLILFDWLRQZHDNQHVVHVZKLFKFRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\EHUHVROYHGXVLQJµH[FHOOHQW
TXDOLWDWLYHGHWDLOV¶IURPUHODWHGFOLQLFDOVWXGLHV(Graham and Harvey, 2001).51 These 
qualitative studies report some unique aspects of corporate behaviour from the 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ EHOLHIV DQG YLHZV WR FRPSOHPHQW VWDWLVWLFDO ILQGLQJV IURP previous 
quantitative models. It may be possible that, through this complement, more 
inference could be made from existing research findings; and more guidance could 
be extended to future capital structure research. SXFKµQRQ-FRQYHQWLRQDO¶UHVHDUFKLQ
corporate finance may be used as a tool to bridge the theory-practice gap. Trahan and 
Gitman (1995) suggested that the first step in closing the gap is to survey and 
communicate financial research needs of customers (financial practitioners) to 
researchers. Furthermore, gaining these views may help recognise previously 
unidentified yet important factors in financing decisions. The table below lists some 
examples of the clinical studies in corporate finance research.  
  
                                                             
51
 Clinical studies include case studies, interviews and surveys, etc. 
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Table B1 Examples of qualitative corporate finance research 
Area of research Examples of papers 
Capital structure Donaldson (1961), Scott and Johnson (1982), Pinegar 
and Wilbricht (1989), Trahan and Gitman (1995), 
Graham and Harvey (2001)52, Banceland Mittoo (2004), 
Brounen et al. (2004), Campello, Graham and Harvey 
(2010), Campello, Giambona, Graham and Harvey 
(2011) 
Capital budgeting Gitman and Forrester (1977), Oblak and Helm (1980), 
Stanley and Block (1984 ), Sangster (1993), Pike (1996), 
Arnold and Hatzopoulos (2000), Ryan and Ryan (2002) 
Cost of capital Gitman and Mercurio (1982), Poterba and Summers 
(1995), Bruner, Eades, Harris and Higgins (1998) 
Dividend policy Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985), Bierman (1993) 
Financial risk management Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998), Block (1999) 
The key findings from three of the capital structure surveys (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001, Pinegar and Wilbricht, 1989, Trahan and Gitman, 1995) highlight 
problems of current capital structure theories and models. According to the responses 
of practitioners, a capital structure model with realistic assumptions is needed. This 
model should be easy to understand and explained to top management and, at the 
same time, easy to apply with inputs that are readily available or can be easily 
estimated. It would be ideal if informal criteria such as financial flexibility and credit 
ratings could be considered for debt issuance models. Furthermore, financial 
SODQQLQJSULQFLSOHVPD\EHLQFOXGHGLQJXLGLQJILUPV¶UHILQDQFLQJGHFLVLRQV0RGHOV
of new finanFLQJ WKDWFRQVLGHU ILUPV¶ PDUJLQDODVVHWSHUIRUPDQFHDUHRI LQWHUHVW WR
practitioners in relation to their financing decisions. Finally, and most important of 
all, as investment and dividend policies are generally more binding and less flexible 
than capital structure decisions, the former should be considered when deriving the 
ultimate capital structure model.  
                                                             
52
 It may be also useful to note that Trahan and Gitman (1995) and Graham and Harvey (2001) covers not only 
capital structure issues but attempts to consider the important corporate finance issues that span over and beyond 
the above five categories. 
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Although it may be argued that such surveys represent beliefs and not 
necessarily actions, they should not be ignored since practitioners are the ultimate 
consumers of all finance research. Just as the frontiers of knowledge in corporate 
finance continue to expand at a fast rate, academic research results are of great worth 
in solving practical financing problems faced by firms if they are presented in an 
applicable and realistic manner (Jensen and Smith, 1984). Hence, the main aim of 
this thesis is to test and present the findings of the most important practical 
determinant of capital structure to fill a gap in capital structure research. The next 
section presents a detailed review the practical determinants of leverage, and 
reassesses the theoretical and research effort made on these determinants. 
 
B2.4 Practical determinants of capital structure 
As mentioned, practical determinants of capital structure have been in the 
light since the survey of 392 CFOs of the top US corporations by Graham and 
Harvey (2001). There have been surveys done in a similar respect in the European 
context (Bancel and Mittoo, 2004, Brounen et al., 2004) aiming to reinforce or to 
tease out cross-country differences in the practice of corporate finance. The top four 
debt policy factors from Graham and Harvey (2001) are (1) Financial flexibility 
(60%), (2) Credit rating (57%), (3) Earnings and cash flow volatility (47%), and (4) 
Insufficient internal funds (46%). All top four factors arHUHODWHGWRILUPV¶OLTXLGLW\
cash flow and the ability to secure future funds. Similar importance of liquidity 
factors are found in the other two surveys. However, whilst the cost of debt (interest 
rate) ranked fifth in the pioneering survey, subsequent surveys highlighted the 
importance of tax deductibility of debt interest with higher ranks. Both factors are 
tied to the conventional trade-off theory in determining the optimal debt ratio. 
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Further support is given to the trade-off hypothesis when more than 80% of 
the US practitioners surveyed had target debt level (either a flexible, range, or fixed 
ratio) in mind when making capital structure decisions (Brounen et al., 2004, 
Graham and Harvey, 2001). The percentage falls to between 60% and 75% in the 
European context in the latter survey. Nonetheless, we may say that more than 60% 
of firms make leverage decisions with target debt level in mind. The evidence 
indicates that theoretical factors of capital structure remain largely important and 
should not be forsaken given the rise of practical constraints faced by practitioners. 
Instead, capital structure theories and research should be modified accordingly 
WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWSUDFWLFDOLW\WREHWWHUSUHGLFWILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJEHKDYLRXU 
In reviewing the research on financial flexibility (hereafter denoted as FF), 
care has to be taken on whether the model tests solely on pecking order theory 
because some authors explicitly separate the impact of FF from the pecking order 
theory, while many combine them into a single proposition. The existence of 
financial slack due to the pecking order hypothesis of adverse selection problem 
VKRXOG FOHDUO\ EH GLVWLQJXLVKHG IURP PDQDJHUV¶ GHPDQG IRU )) EHFDXVH WKH ODWWHU
demand was statistically more important for dividend-paying firms with little 
information asymmetry problem, thereby refuting the pecking order imperfect 
information theory (Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
However, LWLVQRWHGWKDWWKHUHLVQRH[DFWGHILQLWLRQIRUµILQDQFLDOIOH[LELOLW\¶
or it should be better said that there is no exact or fixed measure for it because 
different studies placed focus on various proxies for flexibility. As mentioned, some 
have classified FF as part of the pecking order theory test. The two most common 
proxies or variables used to measure FF are cash-on-hand and leverage in terms of 
spare/unused debt capacity. In general, cash holdings and cash flow are used to 
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DVVHVVILUPV¶DELOLW\WRPHHWGRZQVLGHULVNZKLOHOHYHUDJHDQGGHEWFDSDFLW\DUHXVHG
LQDSSUDLVLQJILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQce through their investment ability at the upside. Past 
studies examine cash and leverage separately and little is known about the 
interaction between the two most important components of FF. Although there are 
different proxies used to measure flexibility and many theories covering flexibility 
partially in their hypotheses or assumptions, there is no single definite definition and 
measure of it. Nonetheless, financial flexibility is clearly part of a firm¶V OLTXLGLW\
and financial risk and an important determinant of capital structure. 
Defining FF is the most important initial task in this thesis; after which the 
PHDVXUHVRI))ZLOOEHGLVFXVVHG))UHODWHVWRDILUP¶VRYHUDOOILQDQFLDOVWUXFWXUH
and whether there is sufficient flexibility to take advantage of or counter unforeseen 
opportunities or conditions. Gamba and Triantis (2008) GHILQH))DVWKH³ability of a 
firm to access and restructure its financing at a low cost; these firms are able to avoid 
financial distress in the face of negative shocks, and to fund investment readily when 
SURILWDEOH RSSRUWXQLWLHV DULVH´ $ VLPLODU GHILQLWLRQ LV XVHG E\ %\RXQ (May 2008) 
ZKHUH LW LV WKH ³ILUP¶V FDSDFLW\ WR PRELOL]H LWV ILQDQFLDO UHVRXUFHV LQ RUGHU WR WDNH
preventive and exploitive actions in response to uncertain future contingencies in a 
WLPHO\ PDQQHU WR PD[LPLVH WKH ILUP YDOXH´ ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR QRWH WKDW IOH[LELOLW\
covers both upside and downside risks because valuable options are preserved by 
firms at each time period in order to cope with both positive and negative unforeseen 
events in the future. 
Using the general flexibility definition discussed above, FF here 
encompasses a broader meaning thaWFRQFHUQVILUP¶VILQDQFLDOSROLFLHV))PHDVXUHV
the ease at which a firm obtains its required funding; and the cost of acquiring 
funding in present and future not only includes direct cost of debt or equity but 
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includes opportunity cost, signalling cost, etc. FF is, thus, an optimal balance of the 
external and internal flexibilities of a firm, and at any single point in time giving a 
firm the flexibility to deal with both upside and downside risks. Here, external 
flexibility refers to the ease of access, liquidity and cost of  the ILUP¶V ILQDQFLDO
LQVWUXPHQWV LQWKHERQGDQGHTXLW\PDUNHWWKXVJLYLQJ LQIHUHQFHWRILUP¶VH[WHUQDO
capital market capacity and credit supply constraints. Contrasted with internal 
liquidity, external constraints are governed by factors not wholly within the control 
of managers. On the other hand, internal flexibility LQFOXGHVILUP¶Vliquid assets and 
cash holdings, and debt capacity (which has been in the light of capital structure 
research in recent years)53; and this internal component is influenced by the volatility 
RI FDVK DQG HDUQLQJV DQG PDQDJHULDO GLVFUHWLRQ DQG SUHIHUHQFH RYHU D ILUP¶V
liquidity position. In short, external flexibility measures the supply condition of 
ILUP¶V FUHGLW GLFWDWLQJ a ILUP¶V H[WHUQDO FDSLWDO FDSDFity, while internal flexibility 
represents the internal capacity deliberately preserved for future use.  
This study aims to investigate the interaction between FF and capital 
structure, i.e. whether capital structure decisions are affected by FF position of firm, 
and whether leverage and FF decisions are made jointly. By exploring the 
relationship between flexibility and capital structure, the study examines how capital 
VWUXFWXUH LV DIIHFWHG E\ ERWK L ILUP¶V LQWHUQDO DVVHW VWUXFWXUH ZKLFK LV FORVHO\
relaWHGWRGHEWFDSDFLW\DQGLLILUP¶VH[WHUQDOOLTXLGLW\ZKLFKVLJQDOVLWVFDSDFLW\LQ
the equity capital market. The two conventional theories of capital structure ± the 
pecking order and the trade-off models will be used as the base model to examine the 
impact of FF on capital. 
                                                             
53
 Proxies or measures of debt capacity include lagged leverage level, total assets, financial distress measures, 
and financial constraints index, e.g. Whited and Wu (2006). 
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Recent studies (e.g. Leary, 2009, Lemmon and Roberts, 2010) used the high 
cost of switching to explain the observed persistence in capital structure found in 
Lemmon et al. (Lemmon et al., 2008) ± because the net cost of switch for most firms 
is high, highly levered firms are observed to continue to issue more debt and remain 
highly levered for substantially long periods of time. Lemmon and Roberts (2010) 
find that firms significantly modify their financing and investment decisions 
following a change in supply shock in their specific capital market; and a contraction 
in credit supply in the debt market leads to a consequent reduction in debt use with 
no substitution to alternative sources of funding. 54 This VXJJHVWV ILUPV¶ KHDY\
reliance on a single source of credit that partly explains the leverage persistence 
HIIHFW REVHUYHG HPSLULFDOO\ 4XHVWLRQLQJ ILUPV¶ VWURQJ GHSHQGHQFH RQ a particular 
capital market, the high cost of switching due to transaction costs may only explain 
part of the reliance. As transaction costs form only a small proportion of the total 
FDSLWDO VRXJKW LQ HDFK PDUNHW WKHVH FRVWV E\ WKHPVHOYHV GR QRW H[SODLQ ILUPV¶
UHOLDQFH WRWDOO\5DWKHU ILUPV¶ OHYHUDJHSHUVLVWHQFHDQG UHOLDQFHRQ VSHFific capital 
market may be largely due to their core asset structure that determines fundamental 
debt capacity, where debt is collateralL]HGXVLQJILUPV¶WDQJLEOHDVVHWV:KLOVWDVVHW
structure determines ILUP¶VSULPDU\GHEWFDSDFLW\the ILUPV¶DELOLW\WR substitute debt 
with equity remains reliant on their flexibility position in the equity market and, 
therefore, WKHODFNRIVXEVWLWXWLRQREVHUYHGPD\EHGXHWRILUPV¶LQFDSDFLW\WRGRVR
and not their unwillingness to alternate between different sources of financing. 
                                                             
54
 Lemmon and Roberts (2007) investigate the response of financing and investment decisions from a change in 
supply of credit. 
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CHAPTER B3. MEASURING FINANCIAL 
FLEXIBILITY 
 
B3.1 Internal flexibility: Cash and debt capacity 
Internal flexibility comprises of two main components ± (1) liquid assets and 
cash holdings, and (2) unused debt capacity. Inflexibility is caused by the existence 
of issuance costs, distress costs and financing constraints (mainly a result of asset 
tangibility) because these costs cause firms to face difficulty or higher costs in 
seeking external funds when internal funds are insufficient in bad times or for 
unexpected growth opportunities. Flexibility, however, cannot be attained by holding 
large internal funds because there are both agency costs and tax disincentive in 
holding cash.55 Furthermore, there is an opportunity cost of cash since greater cash 
holdings reduce current positive investment (Almeida et al., 2004). In addition, 
evidence on preserved unused debt capacity is found in Sufi (2009), where firms 
have unused lines of credit twice the size of existing credit. 
Here, debt capacity is measured as the maximum borrowing capacity of a 
firm, estimated by the value of its assets in liquidation. Since debt capacity and 
optimal debt levels are constrained by asset illiquidity, the redeployability of assets 
in times of distress here measures assets liquidation value (i.e. capacity to command 
additional debt) instead of the usual accounting measure of tangible assets. Debt 
capacity is proxied using a firm-level measure of expected asset liquidation value 
                                                             
55
 There is tax disincentive to holding cash because interest on cash is taxed at a (higher) corporate level rather 
than personal level, (Gamba and Triantis, 2006); and the tax costs involved in repatriating foreign income are 
considerably higher (Hatzell et al., 2006). 
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from Berger et al. (1996), and used in Almeida and Campello (2007) and Hahn and 
Lee (2009).56 
Debt capacity, DC = Tangibility/Total assets  
= [0.715*Receivables (RECT[2]) + 0.547*Inventory (INVT[3])  
           + 0.535*PPE (PPENT[8])] / (AT[6]) 57 
 Cash plays a vital role in dictating total internal capacity and is found to have 
an important relationship with debt capacity in Part A. However, cash is an imperfect 
substitute of debt capacity (Bates et al., 2009, Sufi, 2009). Nevertheless, it gives 
flexibility to firms with differential access to external markets and different levels of 
risks. Whilst there have been numerous studies on the cash-holding policies of firms 
and the definition and value of cash are straightforward, there is no research studying 
KRZFDVKWRJHWKHUZLWKRWKHUOLTXLGLW\DVSHFWVDIIHFWVDILUP¶VFDSLWDOVWUXFWXUH. In a 
recent paper by Bates et al. (2009), a dramatic two-fold increase in the average cash 
ratio for the period 1980 to 2006 is found in the US.58 Precautionary motive to hold 
FDVKLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWRIGHPDQGRIFDVKEHFDXVH³ILUPVIDFHPDQ\
ULVNVWKDWWKH\FDQQRWKHGJHRUDUHUHOXFWDQWWRKHGJHZLWKGHULYDWLYHV´(Bates et al., 
2009). In part A, cash is dependent on level of debt capacity a firm owns; and this 
relationship is robust after taking into account other firm variables, and industry 
                                                             
56
 The previous two papers (Hahn and Lee, 2009, and Almeida and Campello, 2007) use the tangibility measure 
of existing assets as a proxy for tangibility of new investment. Rather than using the measure as a proxy, it is 
implicitly assumed here that it is, in fact, the tangibility of existing assets that matters because they provide 
collateral for total firm debt. In the initial measurement, cash variable is added into the basic measure of three 
variables with coefficient one because it represents a liquid asset that can be seized or recovered fully when a 
firm is liquidated. 
57
 The initials beside each parenthesis represent the variable labels in the CRSP/Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
database and its relevant item number in the square brackets. Many past papers use the Industrial Annual instead 
of Fundamentals Annual database, and represent data items using numbers, e.g. long term debt = Item 9 + Item 
34 and total assets = item 6. The variable item number is no longer updated and used by CRSP and Compustat 
after fiscal year 2006, when the sample data are extracted from the Fundamentals Annual database in the 
Xpressfeed format. As such, relevant variable labels are documented alongside with their old data item numbers. 
It should be noted that after the change in variable identification, there are some variables which are no longer 
available as they are combined with other items in the financial statements. Similarly, there are additional new 
variables which were conventionally reported as part of the variable in the old format, now reported separately as 
individual items. 
58
 The four main reasons documented for such significant increase is the fall of inventories and capital 
expenditure, and increase in cash flow risk and research and development expenses. 
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effects. Furthermore, debt capacity replaces previous empirical determinants of cash 
to be the most important determinant of cash. 
As shown in Figure B1, from 1970 onwards cash holdings exhibit a 
continuous increasing trend (also observed in Bates et al., 2009) until the recent one 
financial year (2008) due to the credit crisis. At the same time, debt capacity is found 
to exhibit a decreasing trend. However, average leverage remains rather stable, 
between 25-30% of total assets except for the slight dip after the 1997-1998 financial 
crisis and surge in the early 2000s. Evidence shows that cash is used as a substitute 
for debt capacity to maintain an optimal internal flexible position. 
 
Figure B1 Average cash holdings, debt capacity, and debt to total assets, 1970-2008.    
This figure shows the average cash holdings, debt and debt capacity variables plot over time from 1970 to 2008. 
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial 
(SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to 
total assets. Debt is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Debt capacity is the 
ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total assets; and unused debt capacity 
is debt capacity less debt only computed when firms report a positive debt capacity. Cash, debt and debt capacity 
ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. 
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Figure B2 Average cash holdings in each deciles of debt capacity to total assets, 1950-2008. 
This figure plots the average cash holdings of firms in each debt capacity percentile, where firms are ranked in 
ten groups according to their debt capacity level. Sample and variable specifications are reported in Figure B1. 
 
Firms balance debt and cash holdings with the aim of achieving optimal 
internal flexibility. This internal component is directly influenced by its external 
FRXQWHUSDUWWKDWPHDVXUHVILUPV¶H[WHUQDOFDSLWDOPDUNHWFDSDFLW\EHFDXVHILUPVZLWK
low debt capacities may not hold more cash if they can have easy access to external 
funds, subjected to the assumption that external funds are quickly and readily 
available when needed. As such, the internal substitution between cash and debt 
capacity may be influenced by the external flexibility ± firms with high external 
IOH[LELOLW\ZLOOH[SHULHQFHORZHUµLQWHUQDOVXEVWLWXWLRQHIIHFW¶DQGYLFHYHUVD 
B3.2 External flexibility measures: Debt and Equity market 
measures  
 
Higher liquidity in equity and bond markets lowers the need for preserving 
flexibility internally (i.e. unused debt capacity). However, there are only a handful of 
papers examining the relation between equity liquidity and capital structure (e.g. 
Frieder and Martell, August 2006, Lesmond et al., March 2008, Lipson and Mortal, 
2009). For bond liquidity, Kahl et al. (April 2008) provide evidence of the 
commercial paper market used by firms to enhance flexibility. In addition, credit 
rating is a major determinant of capital structure because firms are found to target 
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credit rating and make use of debt to target a specific rating (or at least a minimum 
rating) Kisgen (2006).59 
Previous studies of capital structure and FF (e.g. Byoun, May 2008, Denis 
and McKeon, March 2012) focuses PDLQO\ RQ ILUPV¶ LQWHUQDO RZQ GHPDQG IRU
flexibility trading off value of flexibility with tax disincentive of cash, agency costs 
and opportunity cost of debt. This internal demand has to be matched with external 
conditions of the credit market to obtain the net value of flexibility. The external 
component of FF is measured in terms of (1) bond and commercial paper market 
access and liquidity, and (2) equity market cost and liquidity.  
Examining the impact of FF with both internal and external conditions makes 
more sense since artificially preserving debt capacity internally without external 
availability of funds has no value. The role of excess debt capacity preserved 
becomes a questionable form of flexibility and has no true value unless these funds 
are readily sought and available when needed. Furthermore, shocks to specific 
capital markets have different impact on firms, especially when access from one 
market to the other (e.g. private to public debt market) is not straightforward, 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). In other words, substituting from one capital source 
to the other is limited (Lemmon et al., 2008) and this implies that external capital 
market considerations are more important in capital structure research than the 
current attention given to them. Recent empirical evidence supporting the 
importance of source of capital and access to capital markets are found in Leary 
(2009),  Faulkender and Pertersen (2006), and Kisgen (2006). 
 
                                                             
59
 Higher credit rating translates into direct benefits for firms in future, including (1) an expanded pool of eligible 
investors, (2) lower cost of debt due to signalling effect and having access to commercial paper market, (3) more 
favourable terms with other stakeholders and (4) the prevention of triggers and debt covenants.  
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B3.2.1 Debt market measures 
 
Although it is reasonable to consider both debt and equity market factors as 
equally important in determining external flexibility, there are particular 
characteristics of the debt market which make its measurement more straightforward 
yet flawed. Ideally, the flexibility in getting funds from the bond market is measured 
by the access to market, the cost of issuing bonds and, lastly, the liquidity of debt 
instruments. In practice, access to market, measured using long-term credit rating, by 
itself is capable of measuring the probability of firm going into the bond market. 
First, a firm¶s rating-targeting behaviour proves the firm¶s effort in protecting its 
source of funds through maintaining its credit rating (Kisgen, 2006). Second, as a 
high proportion of debt issued is not traded (through an exchange), the cost and 
liquidity of debt measured using exchange traded bonds are not indicative of the 
entire population because the spread and volume of data of these privately 
exchanged issues are not available. Third, bonds are usually held by a small number 
of large institutional investors that intend to buy-and-hold rather than to buy-and-
trade (Frieder and Martell, August 2006). Finally, Frieda and Martell (August 2006) 
suggest that because debt has a fixed income stream and is subjected to less adverse 
selection problems, the effect of higher liquidity on raising debt through better 
access is relatively smaller compared to the effect of equity liquidity on an equity 
issue. Taken together, the above points prove that it may suffice to measure bond 
market DYDLODELOLW\WKURXJKDILUP¶V credit rating alone.  
Furthermore, according to Faulkender and Petersen (2006) the high 
correlation between debt rating and issuance of public debt is proven in their study 
and evident in past research (Cantillo and Wright, 2000, Houston and James, 1996). 
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Thus, nuPHULWL]HG ORQJ WHUP FUHGLW UDWLQJ LV XVHG WR PHDVXUH ILUPV¶ DFFHVV WR WKH
public debt market. Whilst Byoun (May 2008)  rank credit ratings into groups of 
seven, in this thesis a second numeritized variable is created by assigning a different 
rank for each rating level. 60  This is because maintaining rating level is important to 
firms and any rating change will mean a significant change in the cost and 
availability of funding, as such firms are found to target specific credit rating and 
avoid any rating change (Kisgen, 2006). In a similar manner, short-term commercial 
paper rating is numeritized using increasing rank for each rating level.61  
$OWKRXJKFUHGLWUDWLQJLVDVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDQGFRQYHQLHQWPHDVXUHRIILUPV¶
ability to issue public debt, it is not without flaw. First, usage of credit rating 
eliminates the early observations prior to 1985, since ratings are only available from 
year 1985 onwards. Second, credit rating biases the sample towards larger and more 
reputable firms because younger and smaller firms generally do not have good credit 
standing. This potentially leads to a bias towards mature firms. Third, credit rating 
PHDVXUHV ILUPV¶ DELOLW\ WR LVVXH SXEOLF GHEW DQG GRHV QRW FRQVLGHU SULYDWH GHEW RU
bank debt. This narrows the measurement of debt access towards public debt and 
eliminates consideration to the most convenient and commonly used bank debt 
market. The above shows that credit rating may not be suitable for all analysis. With 
this in mind, it may be useful to first consider bond and equity measure separately 
for the external flexibility index construction and further tests of capital structure.  
                                                             
60
 In Byoun (2008), S&P Long-term credit rating (item number 280) is numeritized as follow: Rating AAA: 7, 
Rating AA+ to AA-: 6, Rating A+ to A-: 5, Rating BBB+ to BBB-: 4, Rating BB+ to BB-: 3, Rating B+ to B-: 2, 
All other ratings: 1, Missing or no rating: 0. Values 4 to 7 represent investment grade firms, while values less 
than 4 represent non-investment or junk bonds. In this paper, long-term credit rating is ranked from 0 to 21 for 
each level of rating, where 0 represents missing rating (NM and NR), defaulted (D) or selectively default (SD) 
ILUPVLVIRUUDWLQJµ&¶IRUUDWLQJµ&&¶IRUUDWLQJµ&&&-¶IRUUDWLQJµ&&&¶IRUUDWLQJµ&&&¶DQGLQD
similar respecWXSWRIRUUDWLQJµ$$$¶ 
61
 Short-term credit rating is ranked from 0 to 10 for each level of rating, where 0 represents missing rating or 
GHIDXOWHG'ILUPVLVIRUVHOHFWLYHGHIDXOW6'ILUPVIRUUDWLQJµ&¶IRUUDWLQJµ%-¶IRUUDWLQJµ%-¶
IRUUDWLQJµ%-¶IRUUDWLQJµ%¶IRUUDWLQJµ$-¶IRUUDWLQJµ$-¶IRUUDWLQJµ$-DQGIRUUDWLQJµ$-¶ 
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B3.2.2 Equity market measures 
 
In general, equity liquidity depends on the intensity of asymmetric 
information about the value of the underlying asset. Other determinants of liquidity 
include inventory and order-processing costs (Bharath et al., 2009). At the firm level, 
the ILUP¶VILQDQFLDOKHDOWKDQGSHUIRUPDQFHLVDPDMRUGHWHUPLQDQWRIOLTXLGLW\since 
LWDIIHFWVLQYHVWRUV¶FRQILGHQFH$V/LX(2006) suggests, firms themselves may be the 
cause of illiquidity of their equity; and liquidity risk may even be capable of 
capturing default premium ± similar to the hypothesis on how solvency constraints 
result in liquidity risk (Chien and Lustig, 2010).  
The relation between equity liquidity and leverage has been examined by 
relatively few researchers compared to the considerable research in capital structure. 
Liquidity is negatively related to leverage (Lipson and Mortal, 2009, and Frieda and 
Martell, 2006) due to lower issuance cost, since more liquid equity is subjected to 
lower bank charges and the time to complete a seasoned equity offering is shorter 
(Weston et al., 2005). Higher equity liquidity is related to lower information 
asymmetry. In the market microstructure literature, liquidity measures (e.g. bid-ask 
spread, trading volume, volatility) are used as proxies for the extent of adverse 
selection between informed and uninformed traders (Bharath et al., 2009). As such, 
lower information asymmetry results in higher equity liquidity and lower cost of 
HTXLW\DQGWKHUHE\JUHDWHUOHVVXVHRIHTXLW\GHEWE\ILUPV)XUWKHUPRUHILUP¶V
ability to raise external capital is affected by its equity liquidity (Weston et al., 
2005). Supporting this, Bharath et al. (2009) provide evidence that highly levered 
firms have lower liquidity in the equity market; and Lipson and Mortal (2009) find 
that liquid firms have higher probability in issuing equity (compared to debt) when 
raising external capital. On the other hand, there might be a reverse relation due to 
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the effect of leverage on equity liquidity. Lesmond et al. (March 2008) found that 
leverage explained more than 20% of the variation in liquidity costs, and concluded 
that increased debt use will eventually reduce equity liquidity. 
Empirical evidence on the bi-lateral relationship between leverage and 
liquidity is important because it identifies a crucial missing piece in capital structure 
research. Liquidity is assumed to have an effect on leverage largely due to the 
presence of adverse selection costs owing to information asymmetry. Thus, liquidity 
is an important determinant of leverage. However, a recent study (Bharath et al., 
2009) finds that a difference in degree of information asymmetry does not seemed to 
LPSDFWILUPV¶OHYHUDJHGHFLVLRQVDVPXFKDVLWdid in earlier years (1970s and 1980s). 
As noted in Bharath et al. (2009), evidence of increasing equity issue is provided by 
Fama and French (2005) where firms find increasing ways to issue equity (e.g. 
through mergers, private placements, convertible debt, warrants, direct purchase 
plans, rights issues and employee options, grants, and benefit plans) while avoiding 
adverse selection costs. In another recent study (Leary and Roberts, 2010), measures 
of information asymmetry and agency costs (incentive conflicts) are separated, and 
incentive conflicts are the main driver of financing hierarchy behaviour. On a 
theoretical note, this means that the financing hierarchy suggested by the pecking 
order theory has become less applicable in recent years; unless when additional 
determinants of leverage from other theories (e.g. trade-off) are included, then the 
pecking order together with other conditional theories are able to explain up to 80% 
of financing behaviour, (Leary and Roberts, 2010). 
In practice, liquidity and cost of equity issue include not only adverse 
selection costs, but floatation costs, SEO discounting and underpricing. As 
mentioned, liquidity is a broad concept and the resultant measure of many factors. 
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Although it is true that information asymmetry does affect liquidity, the latter is a 
broader concept with measurement partly determined by information problems.  
In the informational asymmetry literature, some of the direct measures of 
information asymmetry are quoted and effective proportional bid-ask spreads, the 
probability of informed trading (PIN) and the relation between daily volume and 
first-order return autocorrelation (Bharath et al., 2009). Although these proxies are 
derived from liquidity measures, they are adjusted to specifically identify the effect 
of costs of adverse selection, and differ from the conventional broader measures of 
liquidity. Bharath et al. (2009) combined four measures of information asymmetry 
and three proxies to form a measure of information asymmetry, and use this measure 
to test the conventional pecking order model. 
In the liquidity literature, there are a number of alternative measures of 
liquidity, each potentially measuring certain aspect of liquidity. This has prompted 
some studies to combine these measures to derive a combined measure or consider 
various measures jointly (2001, Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). To cover various 
aspects of the equity market, equity flexibility LV PHDVXUHG XVLQJ  +DVEURXFN¶V
PRGLILHG 5ROO HVWLPDWH IRU HTXLW\ FRVWV  $PLKXG¶V SULFH LPSDFW PHDVXUH 
/LX¶VWUDGing discontinuity measure, and (4) Turnover ratio.  
First, Hasbrouck (2009) finds the modified Gibbs sampler of the Roll model 
the best indirect (versus the direct TAQ measure) measure of effective trading cost. 
The effective cost of equity is estimated from the Basic Market-Adjusted model as: 
Modified Roll estimate, BMAit   ¥-FRY¨Si,t ¨Si,t-1).62  Accordingly, the estimate 
uses days on which trading occurs only and is set to zero if auto-covariance is 
positive. The Hasbrouck measure of equity cost is estimated at the end of each 
                                                             
62
 We thank Joel Hasbrouck for generously providing the Gibbs estimates of effective cost data for the sample 
period up to 2006. 
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calendar year using daily price data over the previous 12 months.  For firms with 
fiscal year end month other than December, the modified Roll estimate takes the 
SUHYLRXV\HDU¶VYDOXH 
Second, $PLKXG¶V  PHDVXUH RI LOOLTXLGLW\ is found to be the best 
measure of price impact (Hasbrouck, 2009). The price impact measure, computed as 
the daily absolute-return-to-dollar-volume ratio averaged over the prior 12 months 
(over one year for annual measure) with non-zero volume, is used. Following 
Bharath et al. (2009) and Lipson and Mortal (2009)\HDU LVGHILQHGDVILUP¶VILVFDO
(accounting) year period so market liquidity data match the accounting data 
measurement period. 
Third, /LX¶V (2006) trading discontinuity measure is the standardized 
turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months. 
The trading discontinuity estimate measures the probability of no trade, namely, the 
frequent absence of trading indicates illiquidity. This measure captures multi-
dimensions of liquidity such as trading costs, trading quantity, and trading speed, 
with particular emphasis on the latter. 
Finally, turnover ratio computed as average daily turnover over the prior 12 
months, where daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to 
the number of shares outstanding on that day. The construction of the final three 
measures of liquidity requires the availability of daily trading volumes in the prior 12 
months. 
Table B2 reports the summary statistics for the flexibility variables defined 
above over the sample period 1970-2008. Due to data availability, credit rating is not 
available prior 1985. Liquidity variables for NASDAQ firms have limited 
availability prior 1983, and Hasbrouck¶V measure is only available up to 2006. 
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Therefore, summary statistics are computed according to the years data are available 
for each variable. For equity measures, NASDAQ firms are reported separately from 
NYSE and AMEX firms because of the difference in trading system, and 
corresponding differences in liquidity characteristics. 
According to Table B2, the pooled statistics and the cross-sectional statistics 
do not differ much for the entire sample ± indicating that there is no significant year-
to-year change in these characteristics. On average, firms hold about 16% and 39% 
of total assets as cash and debt capacity respectively. Deficit is average at about 7% 
of total assets. An average firm has a non-investment grade or no long-term and 
short-term credit rating. Comparing NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX firms, NASDAQ 
firms generally have lower liquidity but higher turnover in the equity market. 
Furthermore, NASDAQ firms have lower credit rating compared other exchanges. 
When firm characteristics are analysed over different periods, some obvious 
trends are observed. First, cash increases significantly over time from 9% to 23% of 
total asset. Debt capacity to total asset falls from 47% to 30%; and cash flows exhibit 
a decreasing trend. Similar trends are displayed in Figure B3e and B3f. Notably, the 
fall in cash flows does not negatively impact cash holdings of firms; on the other 
hand, firms hold greater cash even though profitability falls. Deficit to total asset 
increases from 3% to 8%. Both long-term and short-term credit rating increases over 
time for all firms regardless of the exchange (see Figure B3c and B3d). This 
indicates an increase in access to public debt market by firms. For equity measures, 
firms in all three exchanges report increasing equity liquidity and turnover, but the 
magnitude of increase is larger for NASDAQ firms. 
Part B  Chapter B3. Measuring financial flexibility 
240 
 
Table B2 Summary statistics of flexibility and firm variables for period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports time-series (pooled) and cross-sectional summary statistics for firms in period 1970 to 2008. 
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial 
(SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Cash is the ratio of cash holdings and marketable securities to 
total assets. Debt capacity is the ratio of the ratio of (0.715*Receivables + 0.547*Inventory + 0.535*PPE) to total 
assets. Cash flow computed using earnings method (CFe) is the ratio of the sum of earnings less interest, tax and 
common dividend to total assets computed according to Bates et al. (2009). Net cash flow computed based on 
cash flow method (CFcf) is the ratio of net cash flow to total assets, computed according to Frank and Goyal 
(2009). Deficit is computed as the sum of total dividend, net investment, change in working capital and net cash 
flow. Deficit is winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Cash flow (CFe and CFcf) are winsorized at the bottom 
1%. Cash and debt capacity ratios are censored at [0,1] where ratio more than one is made equal to one. Long-
term credit rating (Ltrating) is a numeritized long-term S&P credit rating of firms following Byoun (May 2008) 
as follow: Rating AAA: 7, Rating AA+ to AA-: 6, Rating A+ to A-: 5, Rating BBB+ to BBB-: 4, Rating BB+ to 
BB-: 3, Rating B+ to B-: 2, All other ratings: 1, Missing or no rating: 0. Alternative long-term credit rating 
(Ltrating1) is a numeritized long-term S&P credit rating of firms taking values 0 to 21 for each rating grade. 
Short-term credit rating (Strating) is a numeritized short-term S&P credit rating of firms following: Rating A-1: 
9, Rating A-2: 8, Rating A-3: 7, Rating B: 6, Rating B-1: 5, Rating B-2: 4, Rating B-3: 3, Rating C: 2, All other 
ratings: 1, Missing or no rating: 0. Liquidity variables specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2. Cross-
sectional statistics are mean of the variables taken yearly, and pooled statistics are computed using the entire 
sample as a whole. Rating variables start from 1985 onwards, liquidity variables for NASDAQ firms start from 
1983 onwards, Hasbrouck measure (BMA) is not available for 2007 and 2008, and the rest of the variables are 
computed from 1970 to 2008. Number of firms, N, for cross-sectional statistics is the average number of firms 
recorded in each year over the sample period. 
Summary statistics for sample period 1970-2008 
 
Time series (pooled) statistics  
 
Cross-sectional statistics 
Internal flexibility measures Mean Median Std dev   N Mean Median Std dev 
CASH 0.157 0.073 0.198 
 
3825 0.153 0.081 0.177 
DC 0.392 0.430 0.141 
 
3760 0.398 0.419 0.120 
Cfe 0.006 0.061 0.226 
 
3827 0.011 0.060 0.194 
CFcf 0.047 0.091 0.211 
 
3781 0.051 0.091 0.189 
LTRATING 0.656 0.000 1.486 
 
2589 0.667 0.000 1.487 
LTRATING _ALT 1.455 0.000 4.075 
 
3827 1.346 0.000 2.970 
STRATING 0.346 0.000 1.705 
 
3827 0.318 0.000 1.265 
DEF 0.069 0.017 0.249 
 
3781 0.064 0.018 0.229 
External flexibility measures 
(NASDAQ)         
    Hasbrouck measure: BMA 
(%) 1.896 1.275 1.953 
 
2005 1.787 1.319 1.595 
Amihud measure: RTOV12 
(millions) 11.052 0.605 77.148 
 
2339 10.924 1.090 59.770 
Liu measure: LM12 23.523 0.996 45.373 
 
2301 23.584 5.601 38.840 
Turnover: TO12 (%) 0.623 0.364 0.881 
 
2301 0.619 0.413 0.725 
LTRATING 0.174 0.000 0.708 
 
2636 0.180 0.000 0.709 
LTRATING _ALT 0.443 0.000 2.054 
 
2636 0.607 0.000 2.343 
External flexibility measures          
    (NYSE & AMEX)         
    Hasbrouck measure: BMA 
(%) 0.814 0.467 1.022 
 
1544 0.866 0.520 1.005 
Amihud measure: RTOV12 
(millions) 4.510 0.159 28.526 
 
1576 4.937 0.341 23.309 
Liu measure: LM12 8.968 0.000 23.820 
 
1476 9.093 0.256 22.389 
Turnover: TO12 (%) 0.290 0.171 0.402 
 
1476 0.331 0.262 0.305 
LTRATING 1.522 0.000 2.025 
 
1511 1.525 0.000 2.017 
LTRATING _ALT 2.436 0.000 5.186   1511 4.971 0.000 6.469 
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Table B3 Summary statistics of flexibility and firm variables over different periods 
This table reports the summary statistics of flexibility and firm variables for firms in different periods, 1970s 
2000s, where firms from 1970 to 1979 will be under period 1970s. Sample and variable specifications are 
reported in Table B2.  
Internal flexibility measures/Period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
CASH Mean 0.087 0.137 0.171 0.225 
 
Median 0.055 0.068 0.075 0.127 
DC Mean 0.474 0.432 0.373 0.300 
 
Median 0.493 0.465 0.403 0.307 
Cfe Mean 0.066 0.002 -0.005 -0.028 
 
Median 0.069 0.053 0.063 0.058 
CFcf Mean 0.107 0.063 0.024 0.011 
 
Median 0.109 0.098 0.081 0.077 
LTRATING Mean . 0.570 0.598 0.791 
 Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTRATING _ALT Mean . 0.978 1.956 2.599 
 
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
STRATING Mean . 0.297 0.489 0.510 
 
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DEF Mean 0.027 0.057 0.101 0.075 
 Median 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.009 
External flexibility measures (NASDAQ) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Hasbrouck measure: BMA (%) Mean 2.333 1.883 2.300 1.162 
 
Median 1.972 1.452 1.653 0.788 
Amihud measure: RTOV12 (millions) Mean 29.750 13.820 14.259 4.242 
 
Median 29.750 1.860 0.883 0.071 
Liu measure: LM12 Mean . 40.331 25.853 7.174 
 
Median . 12.000 2.000 0.000 
Turnover: TO12 (%) Mean . 0.273 0.609 0.914 
 
Median . 0.188 0.395 0.596 
LTRATING Mean . 0.123 0.144 0.253 
 
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTRATING _ALT Mean . 0.235 0.484 0.849 
 
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
External flexibility measures (NYSE & AMEX) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Hasbrouck measure: BMA (%) Mean 1.015 0.823 0.919 0.669 
 
Median 0.651 0.494 0.474 0.380 
Amihud measure: RTOV12  Mean 8.368 2.988 4.841 3.435 
(millions) Median 0.840 0.157 0.044 0.006 
Liu measure: LM12 Mean 12.166 8.362 10.481 5.362 
 
Median 0.996 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Turnover: TO12 (%) Mean 0.136 0.233 0.306 0.666 
 
Median 0.099 0.187 0.235 0.492 
LTRATING Mean . 1.375 1.477 1.663 
 
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LTRATING _ALT Mean . 2.105 4.804 5.431 
  
Median . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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B3.3 External Equity Flexibility index construction 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, an external equity flexibility (EEF) index is 
constructed to assess a firm¶s position in the equity capital market. This measure 
includes all equity measures chosen as SUR[\ IRU ILUPV¶ IOH[LELOLW\ SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH
equity market. As seen from the Spearman rank correlation matrices in Table B4, all 
the variables exhibit substantial correlation with each other.63 Time-series plots of 
the variables show similar moving time trends (see Figure B3). The Hasbrouck 
measure of equity cost and turnover exhibits an increasing trend. As expected, the 
WXUQRYHUPHDVXUHVKRZVJUHDWHUYRODWLOLW\FRPSDUHGWRWKHHTXLW\FRVWHVWLPDWH/LX¶V
LOOLTXLGLW\PHDVXUHDQG$PLKXG¶VPHDVXUHRISULFHLmpact exhibit similar trends over 
time. This means that there is a high potential that a single common component can 
be extracted from the characteristics of the equity variables. Thus, following Bharath 
et al. (2009), the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method is performed on 
selected variables to derive a single joint component that explains the maximum 
variance of the variables, i.e. the variance of flexibility.  It is a simple and non-
parametric variable reduction tool that works well for a large sample when variables 
are highly correlated, subjected to the underlying assumptions.64 From Table B2, 
liquidity price impact (RTOV12) and illiquidity (LM12) are heavily skewed to the 
right with large standard deviation. This is due to the nature of the measurements. As 
the PCA requires normality assumption for all variables, the above two variables are 
                                                             
63
 Spearman ranking is performed on the standardized variables over the whole sample and each year (means of 
the correlations computed for yearly correlation) are reported in Table B4 Panel A and B respectively. The 
variables are standardized to ensure the scale of measurement is consistent as the liquidity measures, ratings and 
accounting ratios have different scales of measurement. As the credit ratings are only available after 1985, 
Spearman ranking is performed separately for the two rating variables after fiscal year 1985, while the 
correlations for the other variables are reported on the entire sample from 1950 to 2008.  
64
 Assumptions for PCA include the following: (1) An interval or ratio level measurement scale, (2) Random 
sampling, (3) Linear relationship between observed variables, (4) Normality assumption for each observed 
variable, and (5) Bivariate normal distribution for each pair of observed variables. 
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transformed by taking the square root of all observed values.65 To ensure the 
normality assumption is not violated due to the differences in the scale of 
measurements66, all variables are standardized with cross-sectional mean and 
standard deviation equals to zero and one respectively in each year to construct the 
corrected correlation matrix based on standardized variables (see Table B4).67 
Furthermore, the PCA is performed based on correlation matrix instead of 
covariance matrix of the standardized variables as this will reduce dissimilar 
variations amongst the variables when there are extreme variances, when variables 
have a common source of fluctuations (which may be evident in the four liquidity 
variables), or when different unit measurements are involved.  
Depending on the number of variables used, the PCA reduces the variables to 
a set of uncorrelated principal components (new variables) that account for most of 
the variance in the observed variables (Jolliffe, 2002). Ideally, only one principal 
component should be retained and this will represent the flexibility index. The 
selected principal component(s) is constructed linearly using the optimal weights 
produced by the eigenequation, satisfying the least squares principle. The weights 
(i.e. eigenvectors) computed are optimal weights such that no other set of weights 
would produce a set of components that accounts for greater variance in the observed 
variables (Hatcher, 1994). It is important to note that the PCA makes no assumption 
on the underlying causal relationship between variables, unlike the factor analysis 
where latent factors are assumed to drive the variance of observed variables.  
                                                             
65
 Following Hasbrouck (2005), square root transformation is used instead of log because the ratio of price 
impact (RTOV12) has both extreme values and zero values (Bharath et al., 2009). In a similar respect, square 
root transformation is applied to illiquidity measure (LM12) since the estimate displays similar tendencies of 
extreme and zero values. 
66
 It is noted that the four variables are expressed in different scales. Equity cost estimate (BMA) and turnover 
(TO12) are expressed in percentage, price impact (RTOV12) is in millions, and illiquidity (LM12) is in its actual 
value (not in an interval or ratio scale). 
67
 By default, the PROC PRINCOMP procedure in SAS performs the PCA on corrected correlation matrix with 
standardized variables. Computing the principal components (by including options such as NOINT and COV in 
the main procedure) based on covariance matrix of non-standardized variables may lead to misleading results 
unless all observed variables have the same scale of measurement (SAS Support).  
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Following Bharath et al. (2009), the flexibility index (i.e. component) is 
estimated every year by performing the PCA on the standardized variables to derive 
individual optimal weights for each variable in each year. The weights are based on 
the variance of each variable. In this case, time-series effect is eliminated from the 
index, and the index only measures cross-sectional variation amongst the variables 
used. In each year, there is one unique index for each firm. For ease of reference, 
Table B5 summarises the expected signs of the variables if included in the final 
flexibility index. Notably, if the final index measures inflexibility instead of 
flexibility, the signs should be reversed.  
The PCA decomposes the correlation matrix of the variables, where the 
diagonal of the matrix consists of only ones, and minimises the sum of squared 
perpendicular distance to the component axis. By construction68, the mean of the first 
component (flexibility index) over the whole sample and each year is zero. However, 
because the rest of the components are excluded, the index median and standard 
deviation are not zero and one respectively. Similar results are obtained and noted in 
Bharath et al. (2009). 
  
                                                             
68
 In the construction of the first component, optimal weights used can be either the basic eigenvectors or scaled 
eigenvectors computed using PROC PRINCOMP and PROC FACTOR functions in SAS respectively. As the 
underlying computations make the same assumptions of orthogonal rotation of variables and perform the same 
eigenequation on the correlation matrix with diagonal ones, eigenvalues produced are exactly identical with a 
XQLW\PHDQ7KHWUXHHLJHQYHFWRUVDOZD\VVDWLVI\WKHUHODWLRQVKLS9L¶9L ZKHUH9LLV the ith eigenvector. The 
VFDOHG HLJHQYHFWRU YDOXHV DUH FRPSXWHG DV /L ¥(L9L ZKHUH /L LV WKH YHFWRU RI ORDGLQJV LH VFDOHG
eigenvector) for ith factor and Ei is the ith eigenvalue. The scaled eigenvectors takes into account the specific 
eigenvalues aWWDFKHGWRWKHPDWULFHVRIHLJHQYHFWRUVE\HPSOR\LQJWKH³DYHUDJHURRW´WUXQFDWLRQWHVW,WLVQRWHG
that the median and standard deviation of the component computed using scaled eigenvectors will be exactly zero 
and one respectively as eigenvalues are taken into account in the computation. However, for the purpose of this 
paper only the first component is used, and using the scaled eigenvectors did not make any material difference to 
the final results and conclusions (test but not reported). 
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3c) Long-term credit rating (numeritized), 1985-2008 
 
 
Figure B3 Plots of flexibility variables over sample period 1950 to 2008 
Figures B3(a) to (h) show the plots of flexibility variables over the sample period 1950 to 2008 for which data is 
available for the respective variable. Sample and variable specifications are reported in Table B2. Liquidity 
variables specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2.  
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3d) Short-term credit rating (numeritized), 1985-2008 
 
 
 
 
3e) Cash and debt capacity ratio, 1950-2008 
 
 
     
 
3f) Net cash flow (CFcf) and cash flow (CFe), 1950-2008 
 
 
 
Figure B3 Plots of flexibility variables over sample period 1950 to 2008 (continued) 
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Table B4 Correlation matrices of standardized flexibility variables 
This table reports the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients of standardized flexibility variables. 
Variables labels are represented with a Z as the variables are standardized prior to the derivation of the 
correlation coefficients.  Sample and variable specifications are reported in Table B2. Liquidity variables 
specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Variable ZBMA 
ZRTOV12 
_SQRT 
ZLM12 
_SQRT ZTO12 ZCASH ZDC ZCF4 
ZLT- 
RATING1 
ZST-
RATING 
ZBMA 1 
        ZRTOV12_SQRT 0.825 1 
       ZLM12_SQRT 0.518 0.658 1 
      ZTO12 -0.154 -0.246 -0.349 1 
     ZCASH 0.000 -0.038 -0.047 0.164 1 
    ZDC 0.032 0.070 0.121 -0.143 -0.687 1 
   ZCF4 -0.237 -0.185 -0.068 0.001 -0.150 0.159 1 
  ZLTRATING -0.223 -0.182 -0.208 -0.003 -0.144 0.040 0.078 1 
 ZSTRATING -0.167 -0.124 -0.145 -0.044 -0.095 0.036 0.052 0.584 1 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
Variable ZBMA 
ZRTOV12 
_SQRT 
ZLM12 
_SQRT ZTO12 ZCASH ZDC ZCF4 
ZLT-
RATING1 
ZST-
RATING 
ZBMA 1                 
ZRTOV12_SQRT 0.784 1 
       ZLM12_SQRT 0.495 0.784 1 
      ZTO12 -0.167 -0.450 -0.518 1 
     ZCASH 0.056 -0.030 -0.063 0.169 1 
    ZDC 0.034 0.114 0.133 -0.162 -0.610 1 
   ZCF4 -0.322 -0.314 -0.143 0.043 -0.034 0.091 1 
  ZLTRATING -0.283 -0.304 -0.254 0.086 -0.094 0.022 0.043 1 
 ZSTRATING -0.152 -0.168 -0.116 0.036 -0.028 0.015 0.030 0.605 1 
 
 
Table B5 Expected relationship of observed variables with financing flexibility 
This table reports the expected sign of each flexibility variable in the final flexibility index. If the final index 
measures inflexibility, opposite signs is expected. Sample and variable specifications are reported in Table B2. 
Liquidity variables specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2. 
Flexibility variables Expected relationship with financing 
flexibility Cash + 
DC + 
Net cash flows (CFcf) + 
Long-term credit rating (LTRATING) + 
Short-term commercial paper rating (STRATING) + 
$PLKXG¶Vprice impact ratio (RTOV12) - 
/LX¶VLOOLTXLGLW\UDWLR/0 - 
+DVEURXFN¶VPRGLILHG5ROOHVWLPDWH%0$ - 
Average daily turnover (TO12) + 
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Table B6 reports the eigenvalues and cumulative explained variance of the 
principal components for the sample period 1970 to 2006 for EEF index performed 
using the pooled and yearly PCA.69 For the PCA performed yearly, only the first 
component has an eigenvalue significantly greater than one, while the eigenvalue of 
the second component is usually less than one or close to one (for the early years). 
The first component explains on average 60% of the variance in all four equity 
market variables, with a slight increase in variance explained over time. 
For the entire sample and each year, each equity market variable contributes 
to the first component with the correct sign and substantial weight, see Table B6 
Panel B. Due to the nature of the equity variables (where three out of four equity 
variables effectively measures illiquidity), the resultant component may be 
interpreted as an inflexibility index where a lower index value represents better 
equity position, and vice versa. The observed variables are generally evenly 
weighted (between 0.50 to 0.63) except for turnover ratio which has the lowest 
eigenvector magnitude (an average of -0.26) for all years.70  
 
  
                                                             
69
 The pooled PCA performs the analysis on the sample over the entire sample period, while the PCA performed 
yearly reports statistics in each year and the average of the yearly figures are reported in the table.  As the 
+DVEURXFN¶V *LEEV HVWLPDWHV RI HIIHFWive cost, BMA, has data availability only up to year 2006, the index 
construction is limited to the period up to 2006 only.  
70
 It is noted that turnover is the only measure that is negatively correlated with other variables and the final 
component constructed. As such, the ratio is transformed into an illiquidity measure by taking one minus the 
original value to make sure the weights used are not affected by the correlation signs. The inverse turnover 
effectively measures the number of shares not traded on a day out of the total number of shares outstanding on 
that day. The PCA performed for the whole sample period and each year yield the same eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors (with only the sign for turnover ratio changed). As expected, the component computed changes in 
magnitude but produces the same results and conclusion. For ease of interpretation, it is ideal to have all 
measures entering the component with the same positive or negative relationship with the final component. 
However, the difference in sign of turnover ratio may act as a check to ensure the PCA is performed correctly 
with the final component effectively measuring illiquidity or inflexibility. Hence, the original turnover ratio is 
included in the final component, and not replaced by its own inverse.  
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Table B6 Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of principal components of PCA for EEF index 
This table reports results of the Principal Component Analysis for the four equity liquidity variables. Variable 
definitions for the liquidity variables are detailed in Chapter B3.2.2. Panel A reports Eigenvalues of the principal 
components and the cumulative variance of each component. Panel B reports the eigenvector values for each 
liquidity variable for the computation of the first principal component which is identified as the EEF index. Both 
average and pooled values are reported. Pooled statistics use the whole sample from 1970 to 2006 when 
performing the PCA, while average statistics report the average values of the results of PCA performed yearly 
from 1970 to 2006. 
Panel A 
Period 
Eigenvalues of principal components   Cumulative variance explained 
Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4   Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4 
Average (1970-2006) 2.448 0.946 0.482 0.125   61% 85% 96% 100% 
Pooled (1970-2006) 2.457 0.952 0.434 0.157   61% 85% 96% 100% 
Panel B 
Period 
Eigenvector values of first principal component (Prin1) 
BMA 
RTOV12 
_SQRT   LM12 _SQRT TO12 
Average (1970-2006) 0.537 0.601 
 
0.525 -0.260 
Pooled (1970-2006) 0.560 0.594   0.533 -0.222 
 
The magnitude of the weights is generally stable over time, except for 
turnover ratio which has weights greater than 0.20 only after the early 1970s. In an 
unlisted test, the PCA is performed on the entire sample after 1971, and the 
magnitude of eigenvector for turnover ratio only increases slightly from 0.205 to 
0.227, while the weights for other variables remain about the same. The observed 
phenomenon in turnover ratio may be due to the developments in equity markets.71 
On the whole, the PCA results show that all variables contribute substantially to the 
final index and no one component is dispensable for the entire sample period and for 
each year. The first component of the PCA performed on the four equity variables is 
termed as EEF index and computed as follow.  
EEF = 0.537*BMA + 0.601*RTOV12 + 0.525*LM12 - 0.260*TO12 
Due to the nature of liquidity components in the index, the final EEF index 
HIIHFWLYHO\PHDVXUHVILUPV¶LOOLTXLGLW\LQWKHHTXLW\PDUNHW± a low index represents 
                                                             
71
 After the founding of NASDAQ in 1971, trading volume and activities increased significantly as more firms 
able to access the equity market due to the less stringent listing requirement (compared to NYSE). Prior to the 
introduction of NASDAQ, equity trading may be generally limited to larger and more reputable firms. In 
addition, the electronic trading system and fully automated trading data (in NASDAQ and NYSE respectively), 
further supported greater volume of trading activities after the early 1970s.  
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high liquidity and a high index represents low liquidity in the equity market. Table 
B7 reports summary statistics of the EEF index across the sample period from 1970 
to 2006. The EEF index has a median value of -0.6 ± this shows that the proportion 
of firms with lower equity liquidity (value of EEF greater than the mean zero) is 
greater than the proportion of firms with higher equity liquidity. This is further 
proven in the minimum and maximum values reported. EEF has a maximum value 
of 17 and minimum value of -7 for the pooled data. Consistent with prior analysis, 
EEF index shows firms have increasing liquidity in the equity market over time. 
From year 1971 to 2006, the median value of EEF index increases in magnitude 
from -0.372 to -0.612. 
 $V (() LQGH[ PHDVXUHV ILUPV¶ IOH[LELOLW\ LQ WKH HTXLW\ PDUNHW 7DEOH %
reports the correlation of EEF index with other flexibility variables across the years. 
EEF index has an increasing positive correlation with debt capacity ± suggesting that 
firms with greater debt capacity has lower liquidity in the equity market, and this 
relationship increases with time. Conversely, EEF index has positive correlations 
with both long-term and short-term credit ratings. This shows that firms with better 
credit rating generally have higher equity liquidity. As noted in Chapter B3.2.1, 
credit ratings are biased towards larger, more reputable firms and, accordingly, more 
established firms have greater liquidity in the equity market and, therefore, lower 
EEF index. In a similar respect, EEF index has a negative correlation with cash but 
there is no increasing relationship between the two variables. From Table B8, the 
most important observation is the increasing positive relationship between debt 
capacity and EEF index because this indicates that firms are increasingly reliant on 
internal debt capacity if they are unable to issue equity.  
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 Table B9 uses the three main flexibility variables to divide firms into 
subsamples of high and low flexibility according to the level of debt capacity, cash 
holdings and EEF index. High debt capacity firms hold very low cash (only 4% of 
total assets), have illiquid equity, higher net debt issue (and lower net equity issue) 
and leverage recorded on the books, and significantly lower financing deficit and 
growth opportunities. High debt capacity firms are slightly greater in firm size, better 
profitability, and older. The latter three, however, are slight differences. In a similar 
respect, the trend for high and low cash firms are the opposite for each firm 
characteristic in Table B9. The opposite trends prove the high negative relationship 
between debt capacity and cash as they are (to certain extent) substitutes for each 
other. For EEF index, the differences in firm characteristics for high and low EEF 
firms are not as obvious. The EEF index does not divide firm sample into distinct 
segments and the difference between firm characteristics are relatively small 
compared to debt capacity and cash measurements. This is due to the nature of EEF 
as an external market variable that does not measure any firm characteristics or use 
any firm ratios in its computation. Nevertheless, some differences are noted below. 
High EEF index (lower equity liquidity) firms have slightly larger debt capacity and 
leverage. This is important as it supports the EEF measure, since firms with lower 
equity liquidity use more leverage in their capital structure. High EEF index firms 
have slightly lower cash holdings, are slightly younger, have fewer growth 
opportunities and incur lower investment expenses. Finally, both net debt and equity 
issues are lower for illiquid firms. Whilst lower equity issue is expected for illiquid 
firms, debt issue is expected to be larger. Again, this might be due to measurement 
differences because debt issue is measured in net and not gross terms because 
leverage is higher (and according to expectation) for illiquid firms. 
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 In the final univariate analysis for flexibility components, firms are sorted 
according to their industry groups and their mean and median values of debt 
capacity, cash and EEF index are reported in Table B10. Table B10 shows 
substantial industry variation in flexibility across different industries. 
Communications and software and biotechnology firms have the highest equity 
flexibility and lowest debt capacity. Software and biotechnology firms hold the most 
cash. This suggests that these firms rely primarily on equity funds and cash (for 
software and biotechnology firms) for funding requirements. On the other hand, 
services, retail, wholesale and mining firms have the lowest equity flexibility 
position. Retail, wholesale and mining firms however have the highest debt capacity 
and lowest cash holdings ± suggesting a heavy reliance on debt funding compared to 
other industries. While significant industry variation is observed across industries, 
the difference in flexibility components generally provides results to support the 
measures of flexibility ± debt capacity, cash and external equity flexibility because 
apparent opposite trends are observed between debt users and equity (and cash) 
users.  
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Table B7 Summary statistics of External Equity Flexibility (EEF) Index 
This table reports summary statistics of the external equity flexibility (EEF) index across the entire sample, 
periods and years. EEF index is the first principal of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) performed on the 
four equity liquidity variables. Variable definitions for the liquidity variables are detailed in Chapter B3.2.2. The 
equity liquidity variables are standardized prior performance of PCA. By construction, the EEF index has mean 
equals zero and variance equals one. 
Statistics N Median Min Max 
Time series (pooled) statistics  85064 -0.571 -6.745 17.275 
Cross-sectional statistics 2299 -0.551 -3.505 11.547 
Across periods         
1970s 15610 -0.483 -4.900 11.990 
1980s 21236 -0.510 -6.745 15.994 
1990s 34626 -0.602 -6.020 17.275 
2000s 13592 -0.632 -5.416 15.859 
Across years         
1970 1576 -0.374 -1.773 7.502 
1975 1644 -0.515 -4.030 8.786 
1980 1448 -0.531 -2.597 9.281 
1981 1402 -0.527 -2.969 8.690 
1982 1368 -0.482 -3.160 10.380 
1983 1673 -0.525 -2.461 8.529 
1984 1938 -0.491 -3.076 14.917 
1985 2343 -0.515 -2.736 15.994 
1986 2626 -0.545 -4.052 10.607 
1987 2826 -0.504 -4.617 11.155 
1988 2864 -0.468 -6.745 10.742 
1989 2748 -0.514 -4.210 13.292 
1990 2731 -0.495 -3.756 13.668 
1991 2726 -0.566 -3.776 10.372 
1992 3196 -0.571 -3.621 12.130 
1993 3668 -0.566 -3.688 15.833 
1994 4055 -0.526 -3.476 16.237 
1995 4224 -0.556 -3.467 15.208 
1996 4000 -0.614 -3.309 17.275 
1997 3714 -0.649 -6.020 13.326 
1998 3344 -0.704 -4.735 12.113 
1999 2968 -0.739 -4.286 9.767 
2000 2656 -0.673 -4.479 10.546 
2001 2405 -0.685 -4.237 10.224 
2002 2247 -0.656 -5.416 11.060 
2003 2009 -0.623 -3.394 15.735 
2004 1979 -0.599 -1.345 15.859 
2005 1884 -0.586 -2.051 14.067 
2006 412 -0.612 -1.637 9.971 
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Table B8 Correlations of flexibility variables performed yearly for period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports the yearly Spearman rank correlation coefficients of EEF index with other flexibility variables 
± debt capacity, cash holdings, long-term and short-term credit rating. Sample and variable specifications are 
reported in Table B2. Liquidity variables specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2. 
FYEAR VARIABLE DC CASH LTRATING STRATING 
1970 EEF 0.087 0.030 - - 
1971 EEF 0.067 -0.013 - - 
1972 EEF 0.083 -0.045 - - 
1973 EEF 0.086 -0.063 - - 
1974 EEF 0.082 -0.002 - - 
1975 EEF 0.085 -0.038 - - 
1976 EEF 0.111 -0.087 - - 
1977 EEF 0.098 -0.029 - - 
1978 EEF 0.166 -0.064 - - 
1979 EEF 0.139 -0.028 - - 
1980 EEF 0.147 0.012 - - 
1981 EEF 0.118 0.059 - - 
1982 EEF 0.124 0.008 - - 
1983 EEF 0.180 -0.067 - - 
1984 EEF 0.092 -0.022 - - 
1985 EEF 0.102 -0.025 -0.335 -0.283 
1986 EEF 0.143 -0.075 -0.410 -0.315 
1987 EEF 0.144 -0.068 -0.430 -0.310 
1988 EEF 0.118 -0.033 -0.438 -0.326 
1989 EEF 0.133 -0.040 -0.430 -0.325 
1990 EEF 0.142 -0.072 -0.404 -0.317 
1991 EEF 0.198 -0.126 -0.361 -0.285 
1992 EEF 0.208 -0.117 -0.343 -0.250 
1993 EEF 0.173 -0.093 -0.362 -0.245 
1994 EEF 0.131 -0.064 -0.360 -0.237 
1995 EEF 0.157 -0.098 -0.344 -0.219 
1996 EEF 0.193 -0.140 -0.304 -0.192 
1997 EEF 0.153 -0.081 -0.326 -0.196 
1998 EEF 0.177 -0.057 -0.371 -0.225 
1999 EEF 0.235 -0.099 -0.374 -0.240 
2000 EEF 0.295 -0.189 -0.339 -0.235 
2001 EEF 0.240 -0.141 -0.401 -0.244 
2002 EEF 0.213 -0.093 -0.422 -0.234 
2003 EEF 0.205 -0.079 -0.418 -0.249 
2004 EEF 0.140 0.022 -0.539 -0.364 
2005 EEF 0.121 0.042 -0.509 -0.331 
2006 EEF 0.170 -0.053 -0.444 -0.235 
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Table B9 Firm characteristics according to high and low flexibility variables  
for period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports the pooled mean values of firm characteristics computed across subsamples of firms sorted 
according to high and low flexibility ± debt capacity, cash holdings, and EEF index. Firms are sorted into ten 
deciles according to each flexibility measurement. Low flexibility includes firms lying in the bottom three deciles 
of each flexibility measurement; and high flexibility includes firms lying in the top three deciles. As high (low) 
EEF index represents low (high) liquidity in the equity market, firms are named as illiquid (liquid) in the last two 
columns. Sample and variable specifications are reported in Table B2. Liquidity variables specifications are 
reported in Chapter B3.2.2. 
  Low DC High DC Low Cash High Cash 
Low EEF 
(liquid) 
High EEF 
(illiquid) 
Variable Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
DC 0.258 0.528 0.488 0.294 0.391 0.423 
CASH 0.342 0.042 0.019 0.391 0.163 0.148 
EEF -0.207 0.290 0.065 -0.159 -1.211 1.771 
BMA 1.206 1.362 1.207 1.229 0.426 2.426 
RTOV12 5.544 9.030 7.537 5.143 0.057 16.380 
LM12 12.934 21.409 17.429 14.069 0.048 38.397 
TO12 0.574 0.348 0.337 0.589 0.745 0.204 
BKDEBT 0.121 0.243 0.254 0.106 0.183 0.195 
LNAT 16.710 17.197 17.557 16.526 19.457 16.625 
PROFIT -0.078 0.043 0.037 -0.065 0.087 -0.002 
Q 2.175 1.423 1.388 2.245 1.979 1.364 
AGE 1.746 2.057 2.121 1.714 2.559 2.303 
CF4 -0.061 0.062 0.061 -0.056 0.100 0.015 
INVTMT 0.104 0.097 0.103 0.100 0.112 0.070 
DEF 0.215 0.053 0.047 0.226 0.059 0.052 
ѐLTDEBT 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.006 0.015 0.002 
ѐEQUITY 0.214 0.107 0.104 0.211 0.149 0.045 
DIVT 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.010 0.005 
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Table B10 Flexibility variables statistics across industry groups 
This table reports the pooled mean and median values of flexibility variables (debt capacity, cash holdings, and EEF index) computed across subsamples of firms sorted according industry 
groups. Industry groups are sorted according to their SIC codes as follow: 1=Retail and wholesale, 2=Manufacturing, 3=Mining, 4=Transportation, 5=Communication, 6=Software and Biotech, 
7=Services, 8=Healthcare, 9=Others. Sample and variable specifications are reported in Table B2. Liquidity variables specifications are reported in Chapter B3.2.2. 
 
DC   CASH   EEF 
Ind  Mean Median Min Max   Mean Median Min Max   Mean Median Min Max 
1 0.445 0.467 0.000 0.692 
 
0.094 0.051 -0.007 1.000 
 
0.138 -0.533 -4.735 15.859 
2 0.423 0.456 0.000 0.701 
 
0.134 0.064 -0.069 0.999 
 
-0.035 -0.584 -6.745 15.833 
3 0.435 0.471 0.000 0.665 
 
0.113 0.056 -0.022 0.993 
 
0.113 -0.602 -3.943 17.275 
4 0.438 0.461 0.001 0.662 
 
0.097 0.059 -0.006 0.995 
 
-0.203 -0.724 -3.780 13.518 
5 0.319 0.322 0.000 0.672 
 
0.103 0.040 0.000 1.000 
 
-0.412 -0.825 -3.394 9.515 
6 0.280 0.263 0.000 0.703 
 
0.336 0.290 0.000 0.999 
 
-0.315 -0.725 -4.479 13.613 
7 0.374 0.396 0.000 0.704 
 
0.154 0.084 -0.003 0.995 
 
0.241 -0.347 -4.617 16.237 
8 0.357 0.374 0.009 0.660 
 
0.137 0.072 0.000 0.978 
 
0.055 -0.490 -6.020 13.668 
9 0.401 0.437 0.000 0.688 
 
0.133 0.070 -0.020 0.998 
 
0.356 -0.295 -2.871 14.360 
All 0.413 0.446 0.000 0.704   0.135 0.065 -0.069 1.000   0.010 -0.571 -6.745 17.275 
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CHAPTER B4. SAMPLE AND VARIABLE 
SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Outliers for firm variables are winsorized in standard format following Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) and Bharath et al. (2009). Cash ratio is censored at [0,1] 
where ratio more than one is made equal to one, and ratio less than zero is made 
equal to zero. Debt capacity is censored at the top tier where ratio more than one is 
made equal to one.72 Cash flow ratio (CFe) and Q ratio are winsorized at the bottom 
1% level, and total dividend (DIVT, component in deficit ratio) is winsorized at the 
top 1% level. The rest of the accounting ratios (net cash flow to assets (CFcf), 
financing deficit (DEF), change in net working capital (WCCHANGE), net 
investment (NInvtmt), capital expenditure (Capex), true debt ratio (Tdebt), net debt 
LVVXH ¨LTDEBT QHW HTXLW\ LVVXH ¨EQUITY), and change in short-term debt 
¨6WGHEWDUHZLQVRUL]HGDWERWKWKHWRSDQGERWWRPOHYHO 
Computation of variables used in the thesis is as follows. 
19. Cash holdings, CASH, (CHE[1]) equals cash and cash equivalents (marketable 
securities) reported in the balance sheet of the financial statement. 
20. Debt capacity (DC) is measured as the maximum borrowing capacity of firm, 
estimated by the firm-level measure of expected asset liquidation value (less cash 
holdings) following Berger et al. (1996). Measurement of debt capacity 
implicitly assumes that it is in fact the tangibility of existing assets that matters 
because they provide collateral for total firm debt. 
  
                                                             
72
 No negative debt capacity is reported in the sample. 
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DC   = Tangibility/Total assets  
= [0.715*Receivables (RECT[2]) + 0.547*Inventory (INVT[3])  
+ 0.535*PPE (PPENT[8]) / (AT[6])73 
21. Unused debt capacity (UDC) is computed by netting leverage from debt capacity. 
UDC is only computed if DC is non-missing. If DC is zero, UDC is equal to 
negative of existing debt ratio. By construction, UDC has a minimum of negative 
one and is less than one, as such, no further winsorisation is required.  
22. Cash flow to assets (earnings method) (CFe) is  measured by the following 
CFe = [Earnings(EBITDA[13]) - Interest (XINT[15]) - Tax (TXT[16])  
 - Common dividend (DVC[21])] / Total assets (AT[6]) 
23. Net cash flow (CFcf) to assets can be measured as follow using the cash flow 
method following Frank and Goyal (2003). There are variations to the 
measurement of cash flow in the literature and the most popular and commonly 
used two methods are chosen. 
CFcf = [Income before extraordinary items (IBC[123]) + Depreciation and 
amortization (DPC[125]) + Extra items and discontinued operations 
(XIDOC[124]) + Deferred tax (TXDC[126]) + Equity in net loss(earnings) 
(ESUBC[106]) + Gains (loss) from sale of property, plant and equipment, and 
investment (SSPIC[213]) + Other 
24. 1HWGHEW LVVXHVWRWRWDODVVHWV¨LTDEBT) is measured by long-term debt issue 
(DLTIS[111]) less reduction in long-term debt (DLTR[114]) divided by total 
assets. If the two components are not available, net debt issue ratio is computed 
as the change in long-term debt (DLTT[9]) (current value less its lagged value) 
divided by total assets. 
                                                             
73
 The initials beside each parenthesis represent the variable labels in CRSP/Compustat Fundamentals Annual 
database and its relevant item number in the square brackets. Many past papers use the Industrial Annual instead 
of Fundamentals Annual database, and represent data items using numbers, e.g. long term debt = Item 9 + Item 
34 and total assets = item 6. The variable item number is no longer updated and used by CRSP and Compustat 
after fiscal year 2006, when the sample data are extracted from the Fundamentals Annual database in the 
Xpressfeed format. Relevant variable labels are documented alongside with their old data item numbers. It should 
be noted that after the change in variable identification, there are some variables which are no longer available as 
they are combined with other items in the financial statements. Similarly, there are additional new variables 
which were conventionally reported as part of the variable in the old format, now report separately as individual 
items. 
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25. Change in short-term debt ratio ¨STDEBT) is computed as the net change in 
short-term borrowings and current maturities of long-term debt (DLCCH[301])  
to total assets.74 
26. 1HWHTXLW\LVVXHVWRWRWDODVVHWV¨EQUITY) is measured by the sale of common 
and preferred equity (SSTK[108]) less the purchase of common and preferred 
equity (PRSTKC[115]) divided by total assets. If the two components are not 
available, net equity issue ratio follows Lemmon and Roberts (2010) and is 
computed as such, 
¨EQUITY (alternative) = Split-adjusted change in shares outstanding*Split- 
adjusted  average stock price/Beginning period total assets 
 = (CSHO-LAGCSHO[25])*(LAGAJEX/AJEX[27])     
 *(PRCC_F+LAGPRCC_F[199])*(AJEX/LAGAJEX[27])/AT 
27. Book value debt (BKDEBT) ratio is measured by the sum of long-term debt 
(DLTT[9]) and the long-term portion in current debt (DLC[34])75 divided by 
total assets. Leverage ratio measurement is taken at book value using total debt to 
total asset ratio. Support for the use of book value is sought from the practical 
reasons of managers seeking to use book value debt target instead of market 
value target, (Myers, 1984, Shyam-Sundera and Myers, 1991). Confirming the 
practical motives, managers surveyed reveal their preference for book value 
target (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Empirically, Barclay et al. (2006) found book 
value debt theoretically superior in the tests and regressions of leverage, 
(MacKay and Phillips, 2005).  
28. Market value debt ratio (MKTDEBT) is measured by the sum of long-term debt 
(DLTT[9]) and the long-term portion in current debt (DLC[34]) divided by 
                                                             
74
 If net change in short-term borrowings and current maturities of long-term debt (DLCCH[301]) is unavailable, 
LW LV HVWLPDWHGXVLQJ WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKLVSHULRG¶VGHEW LQ FXUUHQW OLDELOLWLHV '/&>@ DQG WKDWRI ODVW
period. 
75
 Following Frank and GoyDO¶VUHFRGLQJPHWKRGGHEWUHSRUWHGLQFXUUHQWOLDELOLWLHV'/&>@LVUHFRGHG
to zero if found to be missing because item may be unreported or combined with other variables on the financial 
statement. This is to prevent any observations from being eliminated unnecessarily. 
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market value assets, where market value assets (MVA) is computed as the sum of 
market value equity (PRCC_F[199]*CSHO[25]), book value assets (AT[6]), less 
book value equity (CEQ[60]) and deferred tax and investment credit 
(TXDITC[35])76. There are numerous papers supporting the use of market value 
leverage, e.g. Titman and Wessels  (1988), Fama and French (2002) and Welch 
(2004). For robustness, market value leverage is used in addition to the base 
results from book value leverage. 
29. True value debt ratio (TDEBT) is measured by the sum of long-term debt 
(DLTT[9]) and the long-term portion in current debt (DLC[34]) divided by total 
capital stock (ICAPT[37]), where total capital stock is defined as total financial 
capital of firm computed as the sum of total long term debt, preferred stock 
(carrying value), total common equity and minority interest, or 
(DLTT[9]+PSTK[130]+CEQ[60]+MIB[38]). Welch (2008) suggested using debt 
to capital ratio or liability to asset ratio where the converse is an equity ratio 
because the conventional measures of leverage (financial debt to asset ratio) are 
flawed as their converse comprises mainly non-financial liabilities.  
30. Long-term credit rating, (LTRATING) is the numeritized long-term S&P credit 
rating of firms following Byoun (May 2008) as follow: Rating AAA: 7, Rating 
AA+ to AA-: 6, Rating A+ to A-: 5, Rating BBB+ to BBB-: 4, Rating BB+ to 
BB-: 3, Rating B+ to B-: 2, All other ratings: 1, Missing or no rating: 0. 
Maintaining rating level is important to firms and any rating change will mean a 
significant change in the cost and availability of funding, as such firms are found 
to target specific credit rating and avoid any rating change (Kisgen, 2006). An 
alternative numeritized long-term credit rating (LTRATING_ALT) variable 
                                                             
76
 End of fiscal year price (PRCC_F[199]) is estimated using end of calendar year price (PRCC_C[24])if the 
former is unavailable. Deferred tax and investment credit (TXDITC[35]) is estimated using deferred taxes 
(TXDB[74]) if the former is reported to be missing, and recoded to zero if the latter is unavailable. 
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takes the value of 0 up to 21 where each credit rating is assigned to a number, 
e.g. AAA: 21, AA+: 20, AA: 19, etc. For comparison of debt capacity model 
following Campello et al. (2011), a dummy variable (CREDIT) is used where 
CREDIT equals one when firm has a rating ±BBB or above, and zero otherwise. 
31. Short-term credit rating, (STRATING) is the numeritized long-term S&P credit 
rating of firms following: Rating A-1: 9, Rating A-2: 8, Rating A-3: 7, Rating B: 
6, Rating B-1: 5, Rating B-2: 4, Rating B-3: 3, Rating C: 2, All other ratings: 1, 
Missing or no rating: 0. 
32. Q ratio or market-to-book ratio (MTB) measures growth opportunities of firm 
and is computed as follows. 
Q = [Total assets (AT[6]) ± Book value equity (CEQ[60]) + Market value equity 
(PRCC_F[199]*CSHO[25])] / Total assets (AT[6]) 
33. Capital expenditure ratio (CAPEX) is measured using capital expenditure 
(CAPX[128]) to total assets (AT[6]). 
34. Financing deficit (DEF) is used in the test of pecking order theory (Frank and 
Goyal, 2003), and is computed as DEF = DIV + I + WCCHANGE ± CFcf, where 
all items are scaled by  total assets and defined as follow. 
DIV is the amount of cash dividends distributed, where DIV = DV[127]. 
I is the net investment made during the period, computed in Section 4.2 as Net 
investment = [Capital expenditure (CAPX[128]) + Acquisitions (AQC[129]) - 
Sale of PPE (SPPIV[107]) + Increase in investment (IVCH[113]) - Sale of 
investment (SIV[109])] / Beginning period total assets (AT[6]). 
CFcf measures the cash flow after interest and taxes scaled by beginning period 
total assets instead of ending period total assets. 
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WCCHANGE is the change in net working capital computed as such, following 
Frank and Goyal (2003). For firms reporting standard cash flow format 1, 
WCCHANGE = WCPAC[236] + CHECH[274] + DLCCH[301]. For firms 
reporting standard cash flow format 2 and 3, WCCHANGE = - WCPAC[236] + 
CHECH[274] - DLCCH[301]. For firms reporting standard cash flow format 7, 
WCCHANGE = CHECH - DLCCH - RECCH -INVCH - APALCH - TXACH - 
AOLOCH - FIAO.77 Above items used are defined as such, 
WCPAC [236] : Change in operating working capital 
CHECH [274] : Change in cash and cash equivalent 
DLCCH [301] : Change in current debt 
RECCH [302] : Decrease (Increase) in accounts receivables 
INVCH [303] : Decrease (Increase) in Inventory 
APALCH [304] : Increase (Decrease) in accounts payable and accrued 
liabilities 
TXACH [305] : Increase (Decrease) in accrued income taxes 
AOLOCH [307]: Increase (Decrease) in other assets and liabilities 
FIAO [312] : Other financing activities 
In general, firms DGRSWHGWKH µ6WDWHPHQWRI &DVK)ORZV¶ &RPSXVWDW IRUPDW
after the 1988 accounting regulation changes. As such, firms with missing cash 
flow format on or after year 1988 is assumed to adopt format 7 for the purpose of 
computation above. Similarly, firms with missing cash flow format before year 
1988 are assumed to adopt format 1 as it is the generally adopted version of 
µ&DVK 6WDWHPHQW E\ 6RXUFHV DQG 8VH RI )XQGV¶ )ROORZLQJ )UDQN DQG *R\DO
(2003), firms with format code 4, 5 and 6 are disregarded because Compustat 
does not define format codes 4 and 6, and format code 5 is for Canadian 
reporting. 
                                                             
77
 The following firm variables are recoded to zero is reported to be missing ± AOLOCH, FIAO and DLC. The 
following variables are recoded to equal its current value less lagged (one period) value if found to be missing ± 
RECCH, INVCH, APALCH, TXACH, DLCCH and CHECH. 
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35. Tangibility (TANG) is the ratio of net property plant and equipment 
(PPENT[8]) to total assets (AT[6]). 
36. Firm size (SIZE) measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (AT[6]) or 
total sales (SALE[6]) and denoted as LNAT and LNSALE respectively. To 
ensure accuracy of measurement over time, total assets and total sales are 
scaled by Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Gross Domestic Price (GDP) at 
year 2004. Scaled total assets and total sales however are found to yield 
results that are similar to the original values. 
37.  Profitability (PROFIT) is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest 
and tax to total assets (AT[6]). 
38. Industry median leverage is the median book value debt (total long-term debt 
to total assets described in number 9) taken yearly based on 4 digit SIC code. 
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CHAPTER B5. THE PECKING ORDER MODEL 
B5.1 Pecking order model specification 
 
Following Frank and Goyal (2003) and Bharath at el. (2009), the base 
pecking order model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) is adapted.  
¨DEBTit  ĮD ȕD DEFit İDit (a) 
7RPHDVXUHHIIHFWLYHO\UHDOLQYHVWPHQWRUµWUXHYDOXH-DGGLQJ¶IXQGVVRXUFHGIURPWKH
debt market, deficit variable is disaggregated into its different components in the 
following disaggregated base pecking order model. 
¨DEBTit  ĮD ȕD1 DIVit ȕD2 Iit + ȕD3 WCCHANGEit ± ȕD4 CFcfit İDit (b) 
$GGLWLRQDOO\ WRH[DPLQH WKHGLIIHUHQWLDO LPSDFWRIGHEWFDSDFLW\DQG ILUPV¶
flexibility position on both debt and equity issues. Here, the dependent variable is 
changed to net equity issue in the following modified pecking order model. 
¨EQUITYit  ĮE ȕE DEFit İEit      (c) 
where change in equity is the ratio of net equity issue (SSTK[108] +PRSTKC[115]) 
scaled by total assets. According to the accounting identities, the sum of debt and 
equity issue should match the amount of deficit exactly. Hence, the modified model 
is expected to exhibit trends that are exact opposite of the original model. However, 
depending on the different subsamples the models are testing, results may be 
different for the basic and modified models because different factors have varying 
impact on debt and equity issues. In addition, the modified model is used to examine 
the disaggregated components of deficit and to compare the main use (e.g. for 
investment or dividend payment) of debt and equity issues. Similar to the original 
model, deficit variable is disaggregated for the modified model (disaggregated 
modified pecking order model). 
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¨EQUITYit  ĮE ȕE1 DIVit ȕE2 Iit ȕE3 WCCHANGEit ± ȕE4 CFcfit İEit  (d) 
According to the strict pecking oUGHUWKHRU\ȕD in equation (a) is expected to 
be close to or equals to one, because any deficit will be first funded by debt, with 
equity being the last resort. However, this is subject to the assumption that debt is 
unlimited or always has a cost lower than equity. In the modified pecking order 
(Myers, 1984, Myers and Majluf, 1984)FRHIILFLHQWȕE is postulated to less than one 
but still remain positive. This is because there is a trade-off between adverse 
selection and cost of financial distress when firm becomes highly-levered, and firms 
will then issue equity in place of debt to maintain both liquid assets and debt 
capacity for future investment (Bharath et al., 2009). 
,QSUDFWLFHȕD is not close to one because  
(1) 'HEW LV QRW XQOLPLWHG LH ILUPV DUH µGHEW FRQVWUDLQHG¶ 7Kere is a limit to 
ILUP¶V ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ DQG DW VRPH SRLQW GHEW EHFRPHV HLWKHU WRR
expensive to obtain or not available totally. Firms in the first place do not 
have equal access to debt financing. However, this is generally not taken into 
account properly in many studies.  
(2) Firms choose not to issue debt. Firms choose equity over debt because of 
many reasons, such as management entrenchment (Welch, 2004) or market 
timing (Baker and Wurgler, 2002) reasons. For instance, managers avoid debt 
WR DYRLG GHEW KROGHUV¶ PRQLWRULQJ DQG WKHUHE\ UHVWULFWLQJ WKHLU HPSLUH-
building desires. In addition, equity is preferred to debt financing when 
managers think equity is overvalued.  
Assuming the first reason dominates and that firm actually has little choice 
over its source of funds in practice, pecking order theory will be more applicable to 
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firms with high borrowing capacity, and this applicability should monotonically 
GHFUHDVHZLWKWKH OHYHORIGHEWFDSDFLW\GHFUHDVLQJȕD). In a similar respect, firms 
with higher cash holdings and/or greater equity liquidity are expected to issue less 
GHEWDQGȕD should fall as cash and liquidity increase. It is assumed that firms with 
low debt capacity have no choice but to resort to equity financing or seek funds 
internally through cash reserves. This suggests that firms do not choose to issue 
equity over debt, instead the majority have little choice over their source of funds. 
New capital structure theories of management entrenchment and market timing, 
ZKLFKVXJJHVWPDQDJHUV¶SUHIHUHQFH IRUHTXLW\ LVVXHPD\EHPRUHDSSOLFDEOH IRUD
small proportion of firms, e.g. large, reputable or older firms, and it is expected that 
the pecking order model is less applicable to financially flexible firms.  
Evidence of firms with low debt capacity holding substantially higher cash 
confirms the conjecture in that firms are somewhat forced to hold higher levels of 
cash in order to take advantage of unplanned investments because equity issue 
normally takes too much time and is market-dependent. However, this does not 
suggest that these firms do not issue equity. Rather, firms issue equity generally for 
planned investments or acquisitions. Therefore, depending on the level of cash held 
and the uncertainty of investments, the modified model (with equity issue instead of 
debt issue) may or may not hold for low debt capacity firms. It is predicted that firms 
witKKLJKHUFDVKZLOOKDYH ORZHUȕE in equation (c), and vice versa; and firms with 
JUHDWHUFHUWDLQW\LQLQYHVWPHQWVZLOOKDYHDKLJKHUȕE in the modified model. 
In the final stage of pecking order tests, the flexibility components ± debt 
capacity and EEF index are put into the original equation to examine the magnitude 
of the effect of flexibility on debt issue for every unit of financing deficit firm needs 
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finance. Following Bharath et al. (2009), flexibility components are multiplied to the 
deficit variable and put into the base pecking order model. 
¨DEBTit  ĮD ȕD DEFit ȖD DEFit*DCit İit     (e) 
¨DEBTit  ĮD ȕD DEFit ȖD DEFit*EEFit İit     (f) 
ZKHUHȖD measures that for every dollar of financing deficit to cover in a fiscal year, 
the difference in debt (how much less debt) issued by firm whose debt capacity and 
EEF is a unit greater than the mean that year. In a similar respect, the two flexibility 
components are put into the modified pecking order model to examine how much 
more equity is used by firm when debt capacity and EEF decrease.  
¨EQUITYit  ĮE ȕE DEFit ȖE DEFit*DCit İit (g) 
¨EQUITYit  ĮE ȕE DEFit ȖE DEFit*EEFit İit  (h) 
In the UHJUHVVLRQZLWKGHILFLWDQGGHEWFDSDFLW\LQWHUDFWLRQȖD is expected to 
EHJUHDWHUWKDQȖE; the opposite should be observed in the regression with deficit and 
EEF index interaction term, because debt capacity (EEF index) dictates the amount 
of debt (equity) issued by firms for financing deficit. 
 
  
Part B  Chapter B5. The pecking order model 
268 
 
B5.2 Univariate analysis  
,QWKLVVHFWLRQXQLYDULDWHDQDO\VLV IRU ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJYDULDEOHV LV reported. 
Table B11 reports descriptive statistics of the financing variables over the whole 
sample. Three measures of debt are used ± book value, market value and true value 
of debt. Market value of debt reports the lowest ratio as leverage is denominated by a 
ILUP¶VPDUNHWYDOXHZKLFKLVODUJHUWKDQWKHERRNYDOXH7UXHYDOXHRIGHEWLVODUJHVW
because it is denominated by financing capital which is only part of total book value 
of assets. Average net equity issue is significantly larger than net debt issue; 
supporting the fact that the nominal value of an equity issue is naturally larger (and 
more frequent) than a debt issue which may be only renewal of long-term loan in 
some years.  
Table B12 reports trends of financing variables over the sample period from 
the 1970s to the 2000s. Financing deficit increases about three fold from the 1970s to 
the recent two decades. A large proportion of financing deficit is financed by net 
equity issue, and the trend is increasing with time as average equity issue increased 
sharply from 0.9% to 10.4% from the 1970s to 1990s, and fall slightly to 9% in the 
recent decade. On the other hand, average net debt issue decreases from 1.5% to 
0.6% from 1970s to 2000s, indicating that increase in deficit is financed by a 
proportionately larger increase in equity (to net off effect of falling net debt issue). 
The sharp rise in net equity issue is also reported in Frank and Goyal (2003), where 
the trend is not due to a sharp rise in IPOs but an actual increase use of equity 
financing. Financing behaviour does not obey the pecking order theory because net 
equity issue tracks deficit better than net debt issue, suggesting that firms choose to 
issue equity rather than debt for financing needs (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Average 
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figures reported in Table B12 supports previous findings; and Figure B4a shows net 
equity issue tracking financing deficit very closely.78 
To examine if firms use proportionately more equity or debt for investment 
purposes (the real firm value-adding component of financing deficit), average net 
investment is plotted in Figure B4b. Net investment exceeds total deficit before 
1990, indicating that a substantial amount of investment is financed internally by 
cash reserves or cash flows. Nonetheless, net investment remains relatively stable 
over time ranging from 7% to 13% of total asset value. The increased deficit is likely 
to be due to the sharp decrease in net cash flows and increase in cash holdings over 
time reported in Table B1 Panel B. Figure B5 shows the average deficit and its 
components denominated by total assets. It is clear that the trend in deficit is driven 
primarily by net cash flows and change in working capital, with dividend payments 
and net investment relatively stable over time. However, when capital expenditure is 
denominated by the book value of property plant and equipment (PPE), there is an 
increasing trend of capital expenditure from 25% to 41%. This may be due to the 
general fall in value of net PPE (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
                                                             
78
 The trend reported in Figure B4 is qualitatively similar to Figure 1 reported in Frank and Goyal (2003). Slight 
quantitative difference arises due to difference in scaling variable ± ratios are scaled by net assets (total assets 
less current liabilities) in previous paper but scaled by total assets here; and reported ratios have lower values 
here. For robustness check, Appendix B-II reports the over time trend of financing and deficit variables 
denominated by net assets and the figure matches the previous paper almost identically. 
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Table B11 Summary statistics of financing and firm variables for period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports time-series (pooled) and cross-sectional summary statistics of financing and related firm 
variables for period 1970 to 2008. All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included 
with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variables specifications and 
winsorisation method are reported in Chapter B4. Cross-sectional statistics are mean of the variables taken 
yearly, and pooled statistics are computed using the entire sample as a whole. Number of firms, N, for cross-
sectional statistics is the average number of firms recorded in each year over the sample period. 
Summary statistics for sample period 1970-2008 
Financing Time series (pooled) statistics  
 
Cross-sectional statistics 
measures N Mean Median Std dev   N Mean Median Std dev 
Book value 
debt 149236 0.243 0.213 0.212 
 
3827 0.244 0.210 0.207 
Market value 
debt 149236 0.197 0.148 0.191 
 
3827 0.201 0.158 0.185 
True value 
debt 149236 0.388 0.309 0.469 
 
3827 0.388 0.304 0.442 
Deficit 147475 0.069 0.017 0.249 
 
3781 0.064 0.018 0.229 
Net debt issue 149236 0.011 0.000 0.100 
 
3827 0.011 -0.001 0.096 
Short-term 
debt issue 149236 0.000 0.000 0.077 
 
3827 0.000 0.000 0.074 
Net equity 
issue 149236 0.069 0.001 0.245 
 
3827 0.062 0.001 0.199 
Net investment  149236 0.100 0.073 0.138 
 
3827 0.099 0.072 0.128 
Capital 
expenditure 149236 0.071 0.048 0.076 
 
3827 0.071 0.049 0.072 
Q ratio 145175 1.735 1.285 1.286   3722 1.687 1.290 1.148 
 
Table B12 Summary statistics of financing and firm variables over different periods 
This table reports the summary statistics of financing and related firm variables for firms in different periods, 
1970s 2000s, where firms from 1970 to 1979 will be under period 1970s. All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 
11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-
4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are 
excluded. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4.  
Summary statistics over different periods 
Internal flexibility measures/Period 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Book value debt Mean 0.267 0.263 0.234 0.208 
 
Median 0.254 0.233 0.194 0.151 
Market value debt Mean 0.258 0.213 0.175 0.155 
 
Median 0.238 0.172 0.117 0.089 
True value debt Mean 0.409 0.437 0.378 0.323 
 
Median 0.359 0.339 0.286 0.218 
Deficit Mean 0.027 0.057 0.101 0.075 
 
Median 0.026 0.017 0.017 0.009 
Net debt issue Mean 0.015 0.012 0.010 0.006 
 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Short-term debt issue Mean -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Net equity issue Mean 0.009 0.058 0.102 0.087 
 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 
Net investment  Mean 0.098 0.126 0.098 0.074 
 
Median 0.074 0.089 0.071 0.054 
Capital expenditure Mean 0.077 0.086 0.069 0.053 
 
Median 0.057 0.059 0.046 0.032 
Q ratio Mean 1.175 1.634 1.989 1.973 
 
Median 0.953 1.233 1.475 1.504 
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Figure B4a 
 
Figure B4b 
Figure B4 Average net debt issue, net equity issue, deficit ratios and investment, 1970-2008      
This figure plots the yearly averages of net debt and equity issues, and deficit ratios over the period 1970 to 2008. 
All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial 
(SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in 
Chapter B4. 
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Figure B5 Average deficit and its components to total assets, 1970-2008. 
This figure plots the yearly averages of financing deficit and its individual components ± change in working 
capital, total dividend issued, net investment and net cash flow over the period 1970 to 2008. All public firms 
(i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), 
utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets 
and total sales are excluded. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. 
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B5.3 Pecking order model results 
B5.3.1 Base and modified pecking order model results 
 
The pecking order models (a) to (f) are estimated using OLS regressions and 
reported in Table B13. Panel A of Table B13 reports the results of basic and 
modified pecking order models (a) and (c). Results of the basic pecking order model 
in Panel A are generally consistent with Frank and Goyal (2003). The previous study 
reports pecking order model results based on sample from 1971 to 1998. Coefficient 
estimates for deficit and R-squared obtained for the models reported in Table B13 
are consistently lower than the previous study. This is due to the lower values of firm 
ratios due to difference in scaling variable used.79  
In accordance with expectations, deficit enters all regressions with positive 
and significant coefficient estimates; but different magnitude for both equations. 
With the exception of the 1970s, the basic pecking order model (a) with dependent 
variable net debt issuance reports lower R-squared compared to the modified model 
(c) with net equity issuance as the dependent measure. Similarly, with the exception 
of the 1970s, deficit has a lower estimate in all net debt issue regressions. Using the 
entire sample from 1971 to 2008, equity issuance is used proportionately much more 
than debt in financing deficit (coefficient estimate of 0.53 and 0.10 respectively), 
UHMHFWLQJ WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU¶V ILQDQFLQJ KLHUDUFK\ :KHQ WKH WHVWV DUH SHUIRUPHG
across different periods, debt is the preferred form of financing for deficit only in the 
1970s.  From 1980s onwards, there is a decline in debt use in 1980s and 1990s (and 
slight increase in debt use in the most recent decade but still remaining low in 
                                                             
79
 Frank and Goyal (2003) scale all firm values using net assets (total assets less current liabilities). Here, all 
ratios are denominated by total assets. Due to the larger denomination, firm ratios reported here are consistently 
lower than in the previous study. For comparison, Appendix B-III reports regression results for sample 1971 to 
1989 and 1990 to 1998 using different scaling variable, and results are both qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar to previous study even though the numbers of firms used are dissimilar. 
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proportion to equity use). On the other hand, there is a significant and consistent 
increase in equity use for deficit financing over time. Increase in equity use after the 
1970s is expected since the development in equity markets means more firms have 
access to equity funds than previously. Equity funding only became more widely 
available and more popular in the 1970s and 1980s with the formation of the 
NASDAQ the early 1970s and also during the longest bull market, which started in 
the early 1980s. Thus, equity financing may have been used by more firms in the 
1980s, making the trend more evident. Results support previous studies (Bharath et 
al., 2009, Frank and Goyal, 2003, Shyam-Sundera and Myers, 1991) where the 
pecking order model has declined importance and fails to explain the increased use 
in equity funds for financing purpose.  
 
B5.3.2 Disaggregated base and modified pecking order model results 
Next, the pecking order models are used with disaggregated financing deficit 
to provide important evidence of the use of debt and equity funds in financing each 
component. Panel B of Table B13 reports the results for equation (b) and (d), with 
the following findings. First, cash flow enters both models with the correct negative 
sign since part of deficit is funded by internal cash flows. As expected, profitable 
firms issue less debt and equity due to greater cash inflows in each period. Second, 
dividend paying firms are found to issue greater debt (with the exception of 1990s). 
This supports the trade-off theory where dividend paying firms are generally larger 
firms with high cash flow but less opportunity or need for investments, therefore 
issuing debt (rather than equity) to take advantage of the tax deductibility of interest. 
This is supported by the modified pecking order model where dividend paying firms 
issue less equity in all periods except for the 1990s. Third, debt funds are mostly 
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used for investment purpose followed by dividend payments; and the use of debt 
remains the same when regressions are performed across different decades. For the 
entire sample period and across different periods, low proportions of debt funds are 
used in funding working capital changes. Fourth, equity funds are mostly used for 
investments followed by funding working capital changes. However, as change in 
cash holdings is included in the change in working capital variable, it is highly likely 
that equity funds are kept as cash reserves at least in the same year of issue. Using 
the same conjecture, this also means that debt funds are used immediately in the 
same period and only a small proportion of debt funds is kept within the firm as cash 
reserves. Fifth, dividend payments do not significantly influence net equity issuance 
as dividend variable has negative coefficients in three out of four of the periods.80 
While firms issue debt to finance dividend payment, they do not issue equity for 
dividend purpose. Finally, the proportion of the use of funds remains the same for all 
periods for both debt and equity issues. The disaggregated models performed across 
time periods report similar decreasing trend for debt use in individual deficit 
components (i.e. similar to the decreasing debt use found in Panel A). Value-added 
components ± investment and change in working capital are funded by debt in 
decreasing proportions over time, while these components are increasingly funded 
by equity. Debt-funded dividends on the other hand remain similar over different 
periods (with the exception of the 1990s where dividends are largely funded by 
equity and insignificant in debt issuance). 
                                                             
80
 Regression estimates for dividend payment indicate that increase in equity issue does not lead to increase in 
dividend payment. Rather, the opposite is found where equity issues and dividend payment have a negative 
relationship in 1970s, 19880s and 2000s. For the entire sample as a whole, dividend issue is found to have 
insignificant relationship with net equity issuance.  
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B5.3.3 Base and modified pecking order model with DC interaction results 
Panel C of Table B13 reports regression results of the pecking order model 
with interaction effect between deficit and debt capacity. After adding the interaction 
term, deficit variable in the net debt issue regressions becomes unstable ± deficit 
becomes insignificant over the entire sample, changes sign (from positive to 
negative) in the 1980s and 1990s, and returns a very small estimate for the most 
recent decade 2000s. Instability of deficit variable is also reported when net debt 
issue model is estimated using fixed effects regression and Fama-McBeth method 
(see Appendix B-IV). Results suggest that the amount of debt issued to finance 
deficit no longer depends solely on the amount of deficit firm faces, but depends on 
WKHDPRXQWRIGHILFLWUHODWLYHWRILUP¶VERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\'HEWFDSDFLW\PHDVXUHV
ILUPV¶ERUURZLQJDELOLW\DQGLVexpected to have a positive impact on debt issuance. 
Accordingly, interaction between deficit and debt capacity is positive and significant 
for the pecking order regressions for the whole sample and across different periods. 
A decreasing trend for the estimates from the 1980s to the 2000s is found; and this is 
due to the fall in the use of debt to finance deficit over time. Taking the entire sample 
as a whole, the estimate for interaction term is 0.388 ± to finance an average deficit 
of 6.9% (out of total assets), firms at the 75th percentile of debt capacity to total 
assets (0.505) will issue 59% more debt compared to firms at the 25th percentile of 
debt capacity (0.318).81 The difference in debt issued between low and high debt 
capacity firms makes up about 45% of the average debt issued by all firms over the 
entire sample period. Comparing between firms at the 75th percentile of debt capacity 
                                                             
81
 Taking statistics from the entire sample (1970 to 2008), average deficit to total assets is 0.069, and debt 
capacity at the 25th and 75th percentile is 0.138 and 0.505 respectively. From Panel C of Table 13, the following 
equation is derived: Net debt issue to total assets = 0.388*Deficit*Debt Capacity. Accordingly, firms at the 25 th 
and 75th percentile of debt capacity will issue 0.85% and 1.35% debt out of total assets respectively ± this is 
equivalent to 59% more debt comparing firms at the 75th and 25th percentile of debt capacities, and 45% of the 
average net debt issued by firms over the entire sample. 
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and firms with no debt capacity, it will then be a decision of a full debt-funded 
deficit or a full equity-funded deficit (zero debt-funded deficit). Similar results are 
found when the latest decade (2000s) estimation results are considered in similar 
manner. A firm with the highest amount of debt capacity in 2000s issue about 60% 
more debt compared to firms with average level of debt capacity; and the difference 
makes up a significant 77% of the average net debt issued in 2000s.  82  Results from 
the base pecking order model show that the amount of debt firms issue to fund 
deficit is largely dependent on their ability to borrow, measured by debt capacity.  
For the modified pecking order models, estimates for deficit increase 
significantly after an interaction term is included in the regression and is close to 1 
for the entire sample. The increase in deficit coefficient, however, has to be adjusted 
for the negative coefficient of interaction term. The estimate for interaction between 
deficit and debt capacity is large, negative and significant for all net equity 
regressions. An increasing trend is exhibited over time for both deficit and 
interaction variable estimates. The coefficient for the interaction term in the modified 
pecking order model is of very large magnitude compared to the pecking order 
model. Converting the results in the second column into real terms, firms at the 25 th 
percentile of debt capacity issues about 85% more equity compared to firms at the 
75th percentile of debt capacity (because low debt capacity restricts borrowing and 
alternative equity financing has to be used). The difference in equity issued by low 
and high debt capacity firms makes up about 25% of the average equity issued.83  
The impact of debt capacity on equity issues is less than its impact on debt issues. 
                                                             
82
 In a similar respect, the following equation is derived for period 2000s: 0.056*Deficit + 0.254*Deficit*Debt 
capacity. Firms at the 25th and 75th percentile of debt capacity will issue 0.76% and 1.22% of debt out of total 
assets and this is equivalent to 60% more debt issued by firms at the 75th percentile compared to firms at the 25th 
percentile of debt capacity, and 77% of the average net debt issued by firms in 2000s. 
83
 Using results from column two of Panel C in Table 13, net equity issue is estimated as 9=0.957*Deficit - 
1.323*Deficit*Debt capacity. Firms at the 25th and 75th percentile of debt capacity issues 3.7% and 2.0% of 
equity out of total assets ± the difference in equity issue is 85% and this makes up about 25% of the average 
equity issued (6.9% out of total assets).  
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This is expected because debt capacity has a direct impact on borrowing and not 
equity issue, and firms are likely to make equity issuance decisions based on other 
factors, e.g. equity prices (overpriced equity induces equity issue) and liquidity. 
To sum up the results in Panel C, only firms with sufficient debt capacity 
appear to follow pecking order financing hierarchy, whereas firms with insufficient 
debt capacity do not follow the hierarchy because they simply cannot do so. This, 
however, does not suggest that the pecking order model has failed in explaining 
ILUPV¶FKRLFHRIILQDQFLQJEXWWKHPRGHOK\SRWKHVLVLVFRQWLQJHQWXSRQILUPV¶DELOLW\
to borrow. The modified pecking order model reports opposite results to support this. 
Although the effect on equLW\LVVXHLVVPDOOHUWKDQGHEWFDSDFLW\¶VGLUHFW LPSDFWRQ
debt issue, results in the modified pecking order model support the inference made.  
B5.3.4 Base and modified pecking order model with EEF interaction results 
Panel D of Table B13 reports regression results of the pecking order model 
with interaction effect between deficit and external equity flexibility index. 
Coefficient estimates on deficit variable remain largely similar even after the 
additional variable is put into the model. The interaction term enters the base and 
modified models with a negative and significant coefficient. The negative and 
significant interaction term indicates that firms with lower equity liquidity (i.e. 
higher EEF index) issue significantly less equity and debt.  
Although less equity issue is expected when EEF is higher, direct negative 
impact on debt issue is not hypothesized. Results suggest that whilst firms reduce 
equity financing when they become less flexible in the equity market, they might not 
increase debt financing at the same time, possibly because they may not be able to, 
and thus a reduction in debt issue.. Therefore, there is an important implication on 
both equity and debt issue when external flexibility changes. Firms are able to make 
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more external equity and debt issues when they have greater external equity 
flexibility. Conversely, when firms are inflexible in the equity capital market, they 
do not substitute debt for equity and, supporting Lemmon and Roberts (2010), there 
is no or low substitutability between debt and equity. 
Taking the sample as a whole (results in the first two columns of Panel D), to 
finance an average deficit of 6.9% (out of total assets), firms at 25th percentile of 
EEF (higher equity liquidity) will issue 20% more equity compared to firms at 75th 
percentile of EEF (lower equity liquidity). This is about 10% of the average amount 
of equity issued over the whole sample. While increase equity issuance is expected 
with increasing liquidity (decreasing EEF), an increase in debt issuance is not 
hypothesized. Results are consistent with Panel A. Here, a slight positive 
relationship is observed between net debt issue and equity liquidity. For the same 
level of deficit, firms at 25th percentile of EEF (higher equity liquidity) will issue 3% 
more debt compared to firms at 75th percentile of EEF (lower equity liquidity). 
Impact of EEF on net debt and equity issue is increasing over time.  
On the whole, EEF has lower impact on debt and equity issue compared to 
debt capacity (in Panel C). This confirms the conjecture in the previous section that 
GHILFLW LV ILUVW ILQDQFHG E\ GHEW EXW LV ODUJHO\ FRQWLQJHQW XSRQ ILUPV¶ ERUURZLQJ
FDSDFLW\ IROORZHG E\ ILUPV¶ DELOLW\ WR LVVXH HTXLW\ ZKHQ GHEW ILQDQFLQJ LV QRW
feasible. Furthermore, otheU IDFWRUV FRQWULEXWH WR ILUPV¶ HTXLW\ GHFLVLRQV DQG WKHVH
are reflected in the lower impact of EEF observed in Panel D. Finally, for robustness 
tests, regressions reported in Table B13 are repeated using fixed effects regressions 
and Fama-McBeth estimation method (see Appendix B-IV and B-V respectively). 
Results obtained are largely similar and supportive of the findings above.84  
                                                             
84
 Supportive results are obtained with the exception of the relationship between dividends and equity issues in 
the fixed effects regression. 
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Table B13 Pecking order models on the entire sample (1971-2008) and by periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of pecking order models (a) to (f) on the entire sample (1971 to 2008) and by periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in 
CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total 
assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variables are net long-term debt issue and net equity issue. Deficit ratio (DEF) is computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, 
change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. Panel A reports the basic pecking order model and modified 
pecking order model using net debt issue and net equity issue respectively. Panel B repeats the regressions with individual components of financing deficit. Panel C includes the interaction 
effect between deficit and external equity flexibility. OLS regressions are performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient 
estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
Model OLS regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering 
Period 1970-2008 
 
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
Dependent ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7< 
  Panel A 
Intercept 0.004*** 0.030*** 
 
0.008*** 0.005*** 
 
0.006*** 0.039*** 
 
0.003*** 0.035*** 
 
-0.001 0.028*** 
           . (14.51) (35.86) 
 
(17.43) (15.93) 
 
(10.22) (32.24) 
 
(5.13) (27.90) 
 
(-1.37) (17.56) 
DEF 0.101*** 0.534*** 
 
0.242*** 0.060*** 
 
0.104*** 0.333*** 
 
0.078*** 0.670*** 
 
0.110*** 0.780*** 
           . (43.43) (61.97) 
 
(42.10) (14.95) 
 
(25.62) (35.57) 
 
(25.37) (66.85) 
 
(20.91) (35.36) 
Adj R-Sq 0.061 0.298   0.191 0.035   0.067 0.239   0.038 0.379   0.072 0.344 
Cluster 13326 13326 
 
4342 4342 
 
7138 7138 
 
8512 8512 
 
4559 4559 
Obs 141519 141519   27715 27715   39300 39300   47196 47196   27308 27308 
  Panel B 
Intercept -0.011*** 0.044***   -0.010*** 0.003***   -0.022*** 0.042***   -0.006*** 0.048***   -0.010*** 0.048*** 
           . (-22.79) (35.49) 
 
(-10.28) (4.92) 
 
(-21.84) (25.60) 
 
(-8.55) (25.10) 
 
(-13.99) (19.14) 
DIV 0.164*** 0.026 
 
0.322*** -0.091*** 
 
0.269*** -0.699*** 
 
-0.020 0.565*** 
 
0.362*** -0.008 
           . (8.93) (0.59) 
 
(11.00) (-4.60) 
 
(6.98) (-11.04) 
 
(-0.60) (7.06) 
 
(8.57) (-0.08) 
I 0.238*** 0.500*** 
 
0.455*** 0.126*** 
 
0.300*** 0.426*** 
 
0.181*** 0.565*** 
 
0.219*** 0.585*** 
           . (57.02) (56.39) 
 
(48.35) (17.94) 
 
(41.25) (39.40) 
 
(30.67) (41.32) 
 
(27.70) (23.21) 
WCCHANGE 0.059*** 0.394*** 
 
0.167*** 0.039*** 
 
0.070*** 0.261*** 
 
0.025*** 0.558*** 
 
0.064*** 0.538*** 
           . (25.21) (51.17) 
 
(29.53) (9.54) 
 
(18.23) (30.08) 
 
(7.14) (46.89) 
 
(11.45) (24.37) 
CFcf -0.077*** -0.641*** 
 
-0.273*** -0.086*** 
 
-0.074*** -0.436*** 
 
-0.061*** -0.702*** 
 
-0.088*** -0.807*** 
           . (-28.24) (-60.90) 
 
(-24.66) (-10.16) 
 
(-14.50) (-34.80) 
 
(-15.88) (-53.23) 
 
(-16.50) (-34.42) 
Adj R-Sq 0.105 0.331   0.273 0.069   0.133 0.300   0.070 0.380   0.108 0.359 
Cluster 13326 13326 
 
4342 4342 
 
7138 7138 
 
8512 8512 
 
4559 4559 
Obs 141519 141519   27715 27715   39300 39300   47196 47196   27308 27308 
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Table B13 Pecking order models on the entire sample (1971-2008) and by periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
(continued) 
Model OLS regression with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering 
Period 1970-2008 
 
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
Dependent ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7< 
  Panel C 
Intercept 0.002*** 0.024*** 
 
0.007*** 0.004*** 
 
0.002*** 0.030*** 
 
0.002*** 0.032*** 
 
-0.001 0.024*** 
           . (9.70) (36.84) 
 
(16.38) (14.65) 
 
(2.80) (27.53) 
 
(4.23) (29.41) 
 
(-1.02) (15.88) 
DEF 0.002 0.957*** 
 
0.142*** 0.129*** 
 
-0.016** 0.634*** 
 
-0.002 0.955*** 
 
0.056*** 1.141*** 
           . (0.65) (65.64) 
 
(5.61) (5.28) 
 
(-2.00) (27.56) 
 
(-0.31) (58.59) 
 
(7.08) (31.02) 
DEF_DC 0.388*** -1.323*** 
 
0.254*** -0.138*** 
 
0.447*** -0.686*** 
 
0.324*** -1.072*** 
 
0.254*** -1.621*** 
           . (31.24) (-35.55) 
 
(4.68) (-2.76) 
 
(18.56) (-12.26) 
 
(16.88) (-21.05) 
 
(7.58) (-13.86) 
Adj R-Sq 0.095 0.373   0.209 0.041   0.120 0.308   0.058 0.415   0.083 0.383 
Cluster 13213 13213 
 
4292 4292 
 
7036 7036 
 
8440 8440 
 
4519 4519 
Obs 139015 139015   27364 27364   38264 38264   46428 46428   26959 26959 
  Panel D 
Intercept 0.005*** 0.019*** 
 
0.003*** 0.000 
 
0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
0.007*** 0.025*** 
 
-0.003*** 0.035*** 
           . (14.31) (21.48) 
 
(4.39) (0.07) 
 
(10.66) (10.31) 
 
(12.89) (20.96) 
 
(-5.83) (19.17) 
DEF 0.140*** 0.548*** 
 
0.316*** 0.085*** 
 
0.172*** 0.168*** 
 
0.129*** 0.611*** 
 
0.110*** 0.781*** 
           . (36.22) (40.72) 
 
(32.66) (17.21) 
 
(16.10) (14.78) 
 
(27.57) (43.66) 
 
(18.61) (31.32) 
DEF_EEF -0.003 -0.068*** 
 
-0.014*** -0.018*** 
 
0.005 -0.029*** 
 
-0.007* -0.080*** 
 
-0.005 -0.078*** 
           . (-1.48) (-11.36) 
 
(-2.60) (-7.32) 
 
(1.06) (-4.92) 
 
(-1.92) (-11.75) 
 
(-1.26) (-5.05) 
Adj R-Sq 0.093 0.273   0.265 0.091   0.118 0.137   0.082 0.318   0.075 0.341 
Cluster 10313 10313 
 
2278 2278 
 
4406 4406 
 
7565 7565 
 
4407 4407 
Obs 93726 93726   14034 14034   21241 21241   38746 38746   19705 19705 
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B5.4 Flexibility components in the pecking order models 
B5.4.1 Base and modified pecking order models and flexibility 
 
Next, we rank firms into different quintiles of flexibility variables and apply 
the basic pecking order model. Panel A of Table B14 shows that as debt capacity 
LQFUHDVHV WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU PRGHO¶V 5-squared and coefficient estimates increase, 
with the exception of firms in the 1970s period. As firms with lower debt capacities 
keep greater cash, the model is expected to exhibit an opposite trend and decrease in 
R-squared and coefficient estimate when cash holdings increase. Results in Panel B 
mirror the findings in Panel A and show that firms with higher cash issue less debt to 
fund deficit, and such trend is consistent over the entire sample except for firms in 
the 1970s.  Both panels report results that conform to the hypothesis that firms are 
debt constrained and their use of debt funds in deficit depends very much on the 
level of their actual debt capacity. Firms do not use debt financing because they do 
not have the opportunity to do so (due to low borrowing ability). Furthermore, firms 
with high cash (due to low debt capacity) are found to use less debt, and vice versa. 
(YLGHQFH VXJJHVWV WKDW ILUPV¶ GHEW XVH LV GHSHQGHQW RQ WKHLU DELOLW\ WR LVVXH
collateralized safe debt rather than their preference for debt over equity issues. 
0RYLQJ RQ WR ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLQJ IOH[LELOLW\ LQ WKH HTXLW\ PDUNHW firms are 
assumed to issue more equity (and conversely less debt) when there is greater equity 
liquidity (lower EEF index). However, such an hypothesis is not supported in the 
regression results in Table B13 since debt issues decrease along with equity issues 
when equity liquidity is lower. In a similar respect, when firms are sorted according 
to different quintiles of EEF index (reported in Panel C of Table B14), debt issue 
does not increase with inflexibility in the equity market. Firms with lower equity 
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liquidity do not issue more debt to compensate for lower equity issues, supporting 
previous findings in Lemmon and Roberts (2010). Although there is no specific 
trend between EEF and debt funded deficit, it is noted that firms at the two ends of 
EEF (higher or lower equity liquidity than average firms) tend to issue less debt to 
fund deficit; firms that use most debt funding in their deficits lie in the second 
quintile of EEF index (higher equity liquidity than average firms but not the highest 
liquidity group). Taking the average of the five quintiles, firms with more flexibility 
in the equity market (lower EEF index) issue slightly more debt ± however, this 
trend is not evident across the firms groups and is only a generalised conclusion 
taken on the average if sample is halved. Further conclusions on debt and equity 
funded deficit can only be drawn after the modified pecking order model is 
performed over the same groups of firms sorted according to EEF index. 
 
B5.4.2 Modified pecking order model and flexibility 
To examine whether the analysis on debt financing holds for equity issue, the 
modified pecking order model (c) is performed across groups of firms sorted 
according to debt capacity, cash and EEF index (reported in Table B15). According 
to theoretical predictions, the modified pecking order model should report the same 
result as the base pecking order model but in a reverse manner. Table B15 Panel A 
shows a strong relationship between debt capacity level and equity funded deficit. 
With the exception of the last decile (firms with largest debt capacity), equity issue is 
monotonically decreasing with the level of debt capacity ± firms with greater debt 
capacity issue less equity to fund their deficits. Results support the estimates 
reported in Panel A of Table B14. A slightly stronger relationship is found between 
debt capacity and equity funded deficit over different periods compared to that 
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between debt capacity and debt funded deficit. This shows that not only does debt 
capacity affects borrowing ability of firms but also LWKDVVLJQLILFDQWLPSDFWRQILUPV¶
equity issue. 
Table B15 Panel B reports a general trend of increasing equity issue with 
increased cash holdings. This is similar to the results in Table B14 where debt issue 
has a negative relationship with cash holdings. Results (reported in Table B17 and 
B18) from the modified model on different ranks of debt capacity and cash conforms 
to the hypothesis and are similar to that found in the original model where firms with 
high debt capacity and low cash use less equity financing, and vice versa. Together, 
both models show that firms which are more debt constrained hold more cash, use 
less debt, and at the same time use more equity financing for their deficit  
requirements.  
Contrary to the mixed results obtained for EEF index, when the modified 
pecking order tests are done on different deciles of external flexibility index, a 
stronger negative trend is observed ± where firms use less equity to fund a deficit 
when the EEF index increases and they are less flexible in the equity market. This is 
in sharp contrast with the mixed results obtained by the equity index in the basic 
model reported in Panel C. Here, it is found that firms with better equity position 
issue more equity to finance their deficit. The use of equity increases with equity 
flexibility, where firms in the lowest (highest) flexibility quintile always use the least 
(most) equity funds for their deficit needs. Not only does the model fit improve 
cross-sectionally as flexibility increases but also R-squared increases over time from 
1970s to 2000s. A consistent negative relationship is found between equity issue and 
EEF. While the previous evidence suggests that equity market flexible firms only 
tend to issue less debt, there is strong evidence that they issue more equity. Firms 
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with better equity position do issue more equity but at the same time may not issue 
less debt, i.e. equity is not a substitute for debt. This suggests that firms issue equity 
if they are able to; and they are not forced to issue equity as the last resort as 
suggested by the financing hierarchy. 
 
B5.4.3 Robustness tests 
For robustness tests, the following are performed. First, to ensure the 
consistency of results, firms are sorted into ten deciles according to levels of debt 
capacity, cash and EEF index (reported in Appendix B-VI and B-VII). The trends of 
the results observed are largely the same as firms sorted in five quintiles in Table 
B14 and B15, and this confirms the robustness of results even for smaller subsample 
of firms. 
Second, to test the impact of credit rating on debt issue, firms are sorted 
according to long-term rating and subject to the same pecking order and modified 
pecking order tests. Results are reported in Appendix B-VIII. As hypothesized, long-
WHUPFUHGLWUDWLQJLVQRWDJRRGSUR[\IRUILUPV¶GHEWDQGHTXLW\LVVXDQFHDELOLW\ ± 
firms are not found to issue more debt or less equity as rating improves. The largest 
debt issuers are firms in group 2 and 3 with credit rating B- to BB+, while the largest 
equity issuers are firms with no credit rating. Results support the decision to exclude 
credit rating in the initial construction of external flexibility index, and prove that the 
use of credit rating variable requires further subsampling of firms to yield useful and 
conclusive results. 
Third, to assess further whether any equity variable has a strong influence on 
the overall results, the base and modified pecking order model are performed on 
ranks of the equity market variables (equity cost estimate, BMA, liquidity price 
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impact, RTOV12, illiquidity, LM12, and turnover, TO12) individually and reported 
in Appendix B-IX. Four sets of results are reported for the pecking order model. For 
equity cost estimate (BMA), hypothesis is not supported and the estimate decreases 
monotonically with increasing equity cost. Increasing equity costs is associated with 
less equity issue, and firms are expected to issue more debt to meet financing 
requirements. However, there is no substitution between equity and debt, and results 
support Lemmon and Roberts (2010). There is no consistent trend for liquidity price 
impact (RTOV12), but a general trend is evident ± firms with greater liquidity (R=1 
and R=2) issue more debt for deficit funding. Similar to the first measure, BMA, 
substitution between debt and equity is not found. In a similar respect, illiquidity 
estimate (LM12) shows no consistent trend, but firms with the least equity liquidity 
issue the most debt. Results for LM12 is consistent with turnover (TO12) where 
firms with lower liquidity issue more debt because they have less ability to issue 
equity for funding needs. On the whole, none of the equity liquidity variable is 
driving the results reported in Table B14 ± while equity cost estimate and liquidity 
price impact measures support Lemmon and Roberts (2010) findings on the little 
substitution between different sources of capital, illiquidity estimate and turnover 
support the financial flexibility hypothesis where firms choose the financing source 
which provides them the best funding capacity.  
Moving on to the modified pecking order model, an opposite but stronger 
trend is expected as equity market variables impact amount of equity issue directly. 
First, for equity cost and price impact measure, an inverted U-shaped trend is 
reported where firms in the middle deciles used the most equity, and firms in the top 
and bottom deciles used the least equity. As expected, firms in the top few deciles 
with higher equity costs and price impact, use less equity financing. On the other 
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hand, for the bottom deciles of firms with lower equity costs and price impact, one 
plausible reason for their low equity usage may be due to firms¶ preference for debt 
rather than equity. Firms with lower equity costs and price impact may be larger and 
more established firms with access to both debt and equity financing. With greater 
flexibility (lower debt constraints), financing may be largely influenced by 
VKDUHKROGHUV¶ SUHIHUHQFH IRU GHEW WR GHFUHDVH DJHQF\ FRVWV DQG PDQDJHUV¶ FRQWURO
over firPV¶FDVKKROGLQJVILUPV¶SUHIHUHQFHWRVHL]HWD[GHGXFWLELOLW\RIGHEWLQWHUHVW
or even firms following the pecking order theory financing hierarchy. 
Notwithstanding the mixed results obtained from the first two variables, illiquidity 
and turnover measures produce expected results, where firms with greater liquidity 
use more equity. Illiquidity and turnover are found to display very similar consistent 
trends for equity issuance. The basic and modified pecking order model regressions, 
individual equity variables, show that firms with increased liquidity use more equity 
to finance deficits but do not decrease their use of debt. Although there is weak 
evidence for substitution between debt and equity use, firms have the tendency to 
choose the financing source which provides them with the best funding capacity.  
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Table B14 Pecking order model (a) on different ranks of flexibility over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of pecking order models (a) performed across subsamples of firms 
sorted according to debt capacity, cash holdings and EEF index for the period 1971 to 2008 and by periods 
(1970s to 2000s). In Panel A and B, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the lowest debt capacity and cash 
holdings, and group rank 5 (R_5) are firms with the highest debt capacity and cash holdings over the entire 
period and in difference periods (1970s to 2000s). In Panel C, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the highest 
equity liquidity, and group rank 5 (R_5) are firms with the lowest equity liquidity over the entire period and in 
difference periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included 
with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is net long-
term debt issue to total assets. Coefficient estimate is for independent variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as 
the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable 
specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient estimates where 
*** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-
values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of debt capacity (R_1=Low debt capacity and R_5=High debt 
capacity) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-
2008 
Estimate 0.058*** 0.116*** 0.168*** 0.199*** 0.223*** 
t-value (23.80) (24.34) (26.16) (27.31) (31.74) 
AdjRSq 3% 7% 10% 13% 15% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.229*** 0.260*** 0.322*** 0.301*** 0.213*** 
t-value (23.55) (22.65) (26.62) (26.44) (20.72) 
AdjRSq 19% 21% 27% 25% 15% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.064*** 0.147*** 0.191*** 0.254*** 0.240*** 
t-value (14.09) (16.20) (15.54) (17.65) (17.57) 
AdjRSq 4% 10% 13% 18% 17% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.035*** 0.076*** 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.214*** 
t-value (10.11) (10.95) (13.53) (13.70) (18.88) 
AdjRSq 1% 3% 7% 8% 13% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.070*** 0.112*** 0.144*** 0.151*** 0.218*** 
t-value (12.21) (10.42) (9.98) (9.23) (12.46) 
AdjRSq 5% 7% 9% 8% 13% 
Panel B: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_5=High cash holdings) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-
2008 
Estimate 0.217*** 0.212*** 0.163*** 0.100*** 0.037*** 
t-value (33.72) (31.64) (26.78) (20.05) (17.58) 
AdjRSq 14% 14% 10% 6% 2% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.249*** 0.290*** 0.306*** 0.277*** 0.156*** 
t-value (22.19) (25.24) (26.33) (25.03) (16.90) 
AdjRSq 18% 23% 25% 24% 13% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.168*** 0.182*** 0.167*** 0.119*** 0.034*** 
t-value (17.35) (17.21) (15.71) (12.93) (9.21) 
AdjRSq 11% 13% 12% 8% 2% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.258*** 0.225*** 0.132*** 0.068*** 0.025*** 
t-value (22.87) (18.64) (14.24) (9.17) (8.22) 
AdjRSq 16% 13% 7% 3% 1% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.271*** 0.228*** 0.160*** 0.082*** 0.056*** 
t-value (14.94) (14.26) (10.24) (7.02) (10.75) 
AdjRSq 18% 15% 9% 4% 4% 
 
Part B Chapter B5. The pecking order model 
289 
 
Table B14 Pecking order model (a) on different ranks of flexibility over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
(continued) 
Panel C: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of EEF  (R_1=High EEF and R_5=Low EEF) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.142*** 0.172*** 0.139*** 0.125*** 0.128*** 
t-value (23.71) (21.47) (22.43) (20.19) (19.48) 
AdjRSq 10% 12% 9% 8% 8% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.360*** 0.322*** 0.302*** 0.324*** 0.265*** 
t-value (20.32) (18.87) (17.32) (19.76) (16.28) 
AdjRSq 33% 31% 26% 28% 18% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.148*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 
t-value (10.81) (8.87) (11.08) (9.77) (10.80) 
AdjRSq 10% 12% 14% 11% 12% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.135*** 0.157*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.103*** 
t-value (16.70) (14.75) (15.53) (13.85) (11.17) 
AdjRSq 9% 11% 8% 8% 5% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.125*** 0.169*** 0.107*** 0.081*** 0.112*** 
t-value (10.31) (10.41) (9.23) (8.74) (9.38) 
AdjRSq 9% 12% 7% 5% 8% 
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Table B15 Modified Pecking order model (c) on different ranks of flexibility 
over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of modified pecking order models (c) performed across subsamples of 
firms sorted according to debt capacity, cash holdings and EEF index for the period 1971 to 2008 and by periods 
(1970s to 2000s). In Panel A and B, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the lowest debt capacity and cash 
holdings, and group rank 5 (R_5) are firms with the highest debt capacity and cash holdings over the entire 
period and in difference periods (1970s to 2000s). In Panel C, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the highest 
equity liquidity, and group rank 5 (R_5) are firms with the lowest equity liquidity over the entire period and in 
difference periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included 
with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) 
firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is net 
equity issue to total assets. Coefficient estimate is for independent variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as the 
sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable 
specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient estimates where 
*** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-
values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of debt capacity (R_1=Low debt capacity and 
R_5=High debt capacity) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.687*** 0.584*** 0.448*** 0.359*** 0.277*** 
t-value (74.98) (46.44) (30.91) (26.43) (22.41) 
AdjRSq 37% 31% 23% 20% 14% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.082*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.036*** 
t-value (8.75) (7.93) (7.32) (8.37) (4.20) 
AdjRSq 5% 4% 4% 5% 1% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.440*** 0.415*** 0.327*** 0.296*** 0.247*** 
t-value (31.77) (22.76) (16.01) (14.11) (12.05) 
AdjRSq 30% 32% 23% 20% 15% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.779*** 0.680*** 0.542*** 0.440*** 0.340*** 
t-value (59.99) (34.03) (23.81) (18.82) (16.11) 
AdjRSq 43% 34% 27% 22% 16% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.958*** 0.766*** 0.612*** 0.440*** 0.343*** 
t-value (36.40) (23.67) (14.19) (11.83) (9.74) 
AdjRSq 38% 33% 27% 21% 17% 
Panel B: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_5=High cash 
holdings) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.202*** 0.231*** 0.346*** 0.529*** 0.713*** 
t-value (20.82) (21.76) (28.56) (41.32) (78.40) 
AdjRSq 10% 12% 17% 26% 40% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.054*** 0.042*** 0.069*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 
t-value (6.79) (7.41) (8.71) (7.54) (6.67) 
AdjRSq 3% 3% 5% 4% 3% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.185*** 0.153*** 0.228*** 0.332*** 0.444*** 
t-value (13.66) (12.27) (14.86) (19.32) (32.97) 
AdjRSq 12% 11% 16% 24% 31% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.240*** 0.338*** 0.458*** 0.645*** 0.819*** 
t-value (14.75) (15.45) (22.11) (32.18) (62.89) 
AdjRSq 10% 16% 22% 32% 46% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.266*** 0.334*** 0.482*** 0.779*** 0.988*** 
t-value (6.98) (10.28) (12.16) (20.91) (40.83) 
AdjRSq 11% 14% 16% 28% 45% 
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Table B15 Modified Pecking order model (c) on different ranks of flexibility 
over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) (continued) 
Panel C: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of EEF  (R_1=High EEF and R_5=Low EEF) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.660*** 0.524*** 0.598*** 0.564*** 0.354*** 
t-value (35.28) (25.08) (32.34) (31.84) (20.87) 
AdjRSq 28% 25% 29% 29% 18% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.067*** 0.058*** 0.035*** 
t-value (10.68) (9.61) (7.87) (6.80) (5.53) 
AdjRSq 11% 13% 7% 6% 3% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.256*** 0.179*** 0.147*** 0.150*** 0.086*** 
t-value (12.82) (7.89) (9.21) (8.88) (6.42) 
AdjRSq 19% 13% 11% 12% 7% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.776*** 0.595*** 0.699*** 0.551*** 0.394*** 
t-value (32.06) (21.02) (28.85) (22.75) (16.34) 
AdjRSq 33% 28% 37% 29% 22% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.864*** 0.734*** 0.794*** 0.841*** 0.582*** 
t-value (18.33) (15.40) (18.76) (23.67) (13.47) 
AdjRSq 31% 31% 33% 40% 27% 
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CHAPTER B6. THE CONVENTIONAL LEVERAGE 
MODEL 
 
B6.1 Conventional leverage model specification 
The pecking order regression models (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999) are 
imperfect and subject to criticism in the literature (e.g. Chirinko and Singha, 2000). 
However, the models do allow us to compare the difference in proportion of debt and 
equity issues for firms with different levels of flexibility. To the extent that 
flexibility affects debt/equity financing, its impact on final leverage level will be 
evident. Conventional leverage regression is performed to examine the importance of 
flexibility in dictating debt level of firms. Determinants of leverage have been 
H[WHQVLYHO\ UHVHDUFKHGDQG WKHUHDUH VRPH µVWDQGDUG¶ ILUPFKDUDFWHULVWLFV WKDWKDYH
been theoretically and empirically tested as the main drivers of leverage. . The 
leverage model is adapted from Rajan and Zingales (1995) model used in Bharath et 
al. (2009).85   
Leverageit  Įȕ1 TANGit ȕ2 Qit ȕ3 SIZEit  
ȕ4 PROFITit Și İit (g) 
where leverage is measured by book value debt ± the ratio of total long-term debt 
(DLTT[9] + DLC(34))86 to total assets (AT[6]), tangibility is the ratio of net property 
plant and equipment (PPENT[8]) to total assets, Q (market to book assets) ratio is 
the ratio of market value assets (AT[6] + PRCC_F[199]*CSHO[25] - CEQ[60] -
TXDB[74]) to book value assets, firm size is the natural logarithm of CPI adjusted 
                                                             
85
 Following the survey of Rajan and Zingales (1995), the four main independent variables ± size, tangibility, 
profitability and market-to-book ratio are the standard firm characteristics used in leverage regression models. 
86
 )ROORZLQJ)UDQNDQG*R\DO¶VUHFRGLQJPHWKRGGHEWUHSRUWHGLQFXUUHQWOLDELOLWLHV'/&>@LVUHFRGHG
to zero if found to be missing because item may be unreported or combined with other variables on the financial 
statement. Doing so will prevent any observations from being eliminated unnecessarily. 
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total assets value, profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
(OIBDP[13]) 87 WR WRWDO DVVHWV DQG DUH Și firm fixed effects. For robustness, the 
conventional leverage regressions are performed using OLS regressions with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level, fixed effects 
regression controlling for firm and year fixed effects, and Fama-McBeth regressions 
performed yearly. The three estimation methods are used on three measures of 
leverage ± book value of debt, market value of debt and true value of debt, where the 
description on computation is detailed in Chapter B4. To test how financial 
flexibility affects leverage, flexibility components ± debt capacity, cash and EEF 
index are included in the leverage regression.  
Leverageit  Įȕ1 TANGit ȕ2 Qit ȕ3 SIZEit ȕ4 PROFITit 
+ ȕ5 DCit + ȕ6  EEFit + Și + İit (h) 
Finally, following Frank and Goyal (2003) and Bharath et al. (2009), the 
following adapted test of capital structure theory is introduced. The previous papers 
performed the conventional leverage regression in first differences to combine the 
tests of pecking order theory and trade-off theory. As financing deficit measures 
change in funding requirement in each financial year, the variable is added into the 
model directly. 
ǻ/HYHUDJHit  Įȕ1 ǻTANGit ȕ2 ǻ4it ȕ3 ǻ6IZEit ȕ4 ǻ3ROFITit 
ȕ5 ǻDCit ȕ6  ǻ(()it ȕ7 DEFit Și İit  (i) 
 
B6.2 Conventional leverage model results 
Table B16 reports the leverage model, equation (g), performed using OLS 
regressions, fixed effects regressions and Fama-McBeth estimation method for all 
three types of measures of leverage ± book value debt, market value debt and true 
                                                             
87
 Earnings before interest and tax (OIBDP[13]) is estimated to be earnings before interest, tax and depreciation 
(EBITDA[13]) less depreciation and amortization (DP[14]) if the former is reported to be missing. 
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value debt. Results obtained are similar to the leverage regressions in Bharath et al. 
(2009). Coefficient estimates are consistent with previous literature and theory. 
Tangibility and firm size have direct positive relationship with leverage, while 
growth opportunities (measured by Q ratio) have negative relationship with leverage. 
All signs of estimates are consistent across different estimation techniques and 
measurements of leverage, with the exception of the positive coefficient for positive 
profitability in the OLS estimate. The positive estimate for profitability is supported 
by the trade off theory as profitable firms increase debt to take advantage of interest 
tax savings. However, the pecking order theory postulates profitable firms to have 
more cash holdings and make use of less debt, thereby lowering leverage.  On the 
whole, Table B16 reports results that are robust across the three estimation methods 
and across the three different measures of leverage.  
For robustness and to ensure that the leverage model is appropriately 
specified, a second variation to the conventional model includes industry median 
book value leverage computed yearly based on 4-digit SIC code is performed and 
results are reported in Appendix B-XI. This follows Denis and Mckeon (March 
2012) and Frank and Goyal (2007), and partially considers the trade-off theory 
hypothesis while assuming that the debt target is industry determined. Inclusion of 
industry median leverage does not alter the initial estimates significantly but 
increases the model R-squared. This, however, does not alter the results and analysis 
of the conventional model; and the original model is used in subsequent tests. 
To the extent that debt capacity increases net debt issue and adds to total firm 
leverage, a positive coefficient for debt capacity is expected. Table B17 reports the 
expected positive coefficient when debt capacity is included in the leverage model.  
By construction, debt capacity and tangibility (measured by net property plant and 
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equipment) have a high positive correlation; therefore tangibility variable is excluded 
when debt capacity is put into the model. Appendix B-X confirms the high 
correlation (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.41) between the two variables and 
excluding one of them reduces potential endogeniety problem. Results in Table B17 
shows that all leverage determinants estimates remain quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar after the inclusion of debt capacity. Debt capacity is the most 
important independent variable with coefficient estimate up to 0.345 for OLS 
estimation on true value of debt ratio.88 Estimates for debt capacity are slightly larger 
than estimates for tangibility, indicating the importance of debt capacity in dictating 
level of leverage. The results confirm that the debt capacity variable used here is a 
good proxy for borrowing ability and has a true impact in influencing total debt used.  
Finally, external equity flexibility variable (EEF index) enters the leverage 
model with an expected positive relation because increased liquidity in the equity 
market (lower EEF index) reduces the need to issue debt and level of leverage. As 
such, level of debt is expected to increase with increased EEF index and decreasing 
equity liquidity. The strong positive relationship between leverage and EEF confirms 
the hypothesis. For ease of comparison, EEF index is transformed into a ratio 
variable (EEF10) by taking a division of ten. According to Table B6, EEF index 
ranges from -6.7 to 18, and division by 10 effectively reduces the range to between -
0.67 and 1.8 while keeping the variable standardized with constant mean at zero.  In 
Table B17, EEF index and debt capacity are equally important in their impact on 
level of leverage. Results are robust to different estimation techniques and leverage 
measurements. To the extent level of debt measures the amount of debt firms issue, 
the positive and significant relationship between EEF and leverage suggests firms 
                                                             
88
 In the leverage regression (h) with debt capacity (without EEF), coefficient estimate on debt capacity is 
reported to be up to 0.52 for OLS estimation on true value of debt (see Appendix B-XII). Again, this proves the 
importance of debt capacity in dictating the actual level of leverage firms keep on their books. 
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may not follow the strict financing hierarchy postulated by the pecking order theory. 
This is supported by findings in Chapter B5 where there is a positive relationship 
between net debt issue and equity liquidity. Together, the results confirm that there is 
no strict adherence to the financing hierarchy; rather the applicability of the pecking 
order is conditional on the amount of debt a firm is able to issue. Therefore, evidence 
DJDLQVW WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU PRGHO PLJKW EH GXH WR ILUPV¶ LQFDSDFLWDWHG GHEW LVVXH
rather than their preference for equity. Myers (2001) suggests that current theories of 
capital structure, including the pecking order model, are only conditional models to 
KHOSH[SODLQ ILUPV¶FDSLWDO VWUXFWXUHGHFLVLRQV6XSSRUWLQJ0\HUV¶YLHZ LW LV IRXQG
that the pecking order model is a conditional theory based on a simple fact of 
whether or not firm has the capacity to issue debt when required. To the knowledge 
of the author, this is not tested and documented in the literature. 
 
B6.3 Conventional leverage change model results 
In the final leverage test, the conventional leverage model is run in first 
differences according to Frank and Goyal (2003) and Bharath et al. (2009) to 
combine the test of pecking order and conventional leverage determinants. 
Dependent variables are the change in book value debt, change in market value debt 
and change in true value debt. As the leverage change model requires firms to have 
at least two consecutive years of financial data, the sample is reduced to the 80,245 
observations reported in Table B18. The usual leverage variables obtain estimates 
that are in line with theories and comparable to previous studies ± negative on Q 
ratio, profitability and lagged leverage, and positive on debt capacity (in previous 
studies, tangibility is used) and firm size. The pecking order model is not entirely 
supported, since the estimate for financing deficit for book and market value of debt 
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regression is not unity or close to one. Similar results are found in previous studies ± 
although consideration of the pecking order model does preclude the trade-off theory 
and conventional determinants of leverage, financing deficit is a statistically 
significant determinant of leverage. However, when debt is scaled by total capital 
(where the reverse is equity) in model 4 to 6 of Table B18, estimates for financing 
deficit becomes statistically insignificant in the OLS and Fama-McBeth regressions, 
DQGQHJDWLYHLQWKHIL[HGHIIHFWVUHJUHVVLRQ7KLVVXJJHVWVILUPV¶LQFOLQDWLRQWRZDUGV
using equity (instead of debt) to finance deficit ± possibly owing to the greater 
accessibility to the equity market (as observed in Chapter B3).  
Addition of debt capacity and EEF index do not alter the estimates of 
conventional leverage determinants. Large estimates for a lagged leverage variable 
are observed and this represenWVDVWURQJPHDQUHYHUVLRQWHQGHQF\RIILUPV¶OHYHUDJH
supporting the trade-off theory (to the extent that mean reversion is towards the 
lagged value of leverage and firm has a debt target based on past levels of leverage). 
Debt capacity and EEF index obtain estimates that are larger than lagged leverage, 
suggesting the importance of both internal and external flexibility in determining 
leverage level. Estimates for flexibility components remain large and significant 
even after firm and year fixed effects are considered; and results remain robust to 
different estimation techniques and measurements of leverage. 
To sum up, leverage regression results support the trade-off theory but less 
convincing evidence is found for the pecking order theory. To the extent debt 
capacity and EEF measure internal and external financial flexibility, results from the 
conventional leverage and change in leverage model support practical findings in 
Graham and Harvey (2001) where financial flexibility is the most important 
consideration when firms make capital structure decisions. 
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Table B16 Conventional Leverage model (g) over sample period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports the conventional leverage model (g) on the entire sample (1971 to 2008). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of 
financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent 
variables are three measures of leverage ± book value debt, market value debt and true value debt ratios. Independent variables include tangibility (Tang) measured as the ratio of net property, 
plant and equipment to total assets, Q ratio measured as market to book value assets, firm size (Lnsale) measured as the natural logarithm of total sales, and profitability (Profit) measured as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. Model 1, 4 and 7 report results of OLS regressions performed 
with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. Model 2, 5 and 8 reports fixed effects regression controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Model 3, 6 and 9 reports 
results of Fama-McBeth regressions performed yearly. All regressions include a constant term. Goodness of fit statistic ± R-squared is not reported for fixed effects regression. The table reports 
coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS FE FM OLS FE FM OLS FE FM 
Dependent BKDEBT BKDEBT BKDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT TDEBT TDEBT 
Intercept 0.196*** - 0.199*** 0.240*** - 0.248*** 0.380*** - 0.374*** 
        . (44.02) - (12.66) (59.22) 
 
(10.02) (43.48) 
 
(11.03) 
TANG 0.239*** 0.270*** 0.222*** 0.195*** 0.228*** 0.183*** 0.225*** 0.283*** 0.187*** 
        . (32.99) (66.26) (20.30) (30.77) (65.91) (18.80) (18.02) (25.45) (7.22) 
Q -0.021*** -0.010*** -0.018*** -0.058*** -0.040*** -0.065*** -0.041*** -0.023*** -0.032*** 
        . (-22.87) (-23.15) (-11.09) (-76.50) (-112.31) (-7.84) (-23.18) (-20.30) (-7.37) 
LNSALE 0.003*** 0.012*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.025*** 0.009*** 
        . (4.63) (29.14) (3.12) (2.70) (18.99) (4.13) (2.78) (21.59) (2.74) 
PROFIT 0.010*** -0.026*** -0.126** 0.012*** -0.017*** -0.125** 0.012** -0.041*** -0.256** 
        . (3.87) (-21.12) (-2.17) (6.24) (-16.09) (-2.07) (2.14) (-12.44) (-2.35) 
R-sq 0.099 - 0.118 0.238 - 0.243 0.031 - 0.065 
Obs 139248 139248 139248 139248 139248 139248 139248 139248 139248 
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Table B17 Leverage model (h) with debt capacity and EEF index over sample period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports the leverage model (h) with EEF index on the entire sample (1971 to 2008). Sample and model specifications are reported in Table B16. Variable specifications and 
winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. All regressions include a constant term. Goodness of fit statistic ± R-squared is not reported for fixed effects regression. The table reports 
coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS FE FM OLS FE FM OLS FE FM 
Dependent BKDEBT BKDEBT BKDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT TDEBT TDEBT 
Intercept 0.146*** 
 
0.184*** 0.168*** 
 
0.222*** 0.139*** 
 
0.182*** 
        . (19.17) 
 
(8.26) (26.97) 
 
(7.66) (10.91) 
 
(6.48) 
DC 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.140*** 0.172*** 0.155*** 0.126*** 0.345*** 0.304*** 0.332*** 
        . (11.80) (25.52) (7.11) (16.40) (29.50) (6.53) (15.47) (19.10) (11.44) 
EEF10 0.159*** 0.154*** 0.121*** 0.177*** 0.183*** 0.157*** 0.422*** 0.333*** 0.369*** 
        . (15.04) (32.67) (4.20) (18.73) (45.34) (7.11) (19.08) (27.19) (8.86) 
Q -0.020*** -0.007*** -0.025*** -0.052*** -0.036*** -0.072*** -0.024*** -0.014*** -0.027*** 
        . (-15.98) (-13.82) (-6.79) (-53.96) (-80.28) (-6.35) (-11.12) (-10.41) (-7.04) 
LNSALE 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 
        . (14.83) (27.29) (3.58) (14.80) (22.86) (5.86) (16.84) (24.40) (6.24) 
PROFIT 0.018*** -0.018*** -0.122** 0.014*** -0.013*** -0.138** 0.005 -0.032*** -0.263** 
        . (6.33) (-13.56) (-2.11) (6.40) (-10.93) (-2.17) (0.89) (-8.99) (-2.53) 
R-sq 0.077 - 0.093 0.226 - 0.232 0.062 - 0.092 
Obs 92992 92992 92992 92992 92992 92992 92992 92992 92992 
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Table B18 Leverage change model (i) with debt capacity and EEF index over period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports the leverage change model (i) with debt capacity and EEF index on the entire sample (1971 to 2008). Sample and model specifications are reported in Table B16. Variable 
specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. All regressions include a constant term. Goodness of fit statistic ± R-squared is not reported for fixed effects regression. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS FE FM OLS FE FM OLS FE FM 
Dependent ǻ%.'(%7 ǻ%.'(%7 ǻ%.'(%7 ǻ0.7'(%7 ǻ0.7'(%7 ǻ0.7'(%7 ǻ7'(%7 ǻ7'(%7 ǻ7'(%7 
Intercept 0.026*** 
 
0.023*** 0.020*** 
 
0.018*** 0.122*** 
 
0.093*** 
           . (38.81) 
 
(7.32) (41.84) 
 
(10.27) (30.76) 
 
(5.41) 
ѐDC 0.205*** 0.165*** 0.257*** 0.130*** 0.109*** 0.214*** 0.299*** 0.158*** 0.429*** 
           . (15.82) (25.41) (6.49) (13.26) (19.11) (3.96) (7.70) (7.57) (4.96) 
ѐEEF10 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.117*** 0.161*** 0.167*** 0.156*** 0.247*** 0.214*** 0.243*** 
           . (17.30) (25.59) (11.09) (25.94) (42.03) (12.82) (9.30) (14.76) (7.97) 
ѐQ -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.039*** -0.015*** -0.008*** 0.001 
           . (-8.11) (-10.41) (-0.58) (-42.94) (-60.88) (-6.98) (-7.68) (-5.92) (0.06) 
ѐLNSALE 0.013*** 0.007*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.021*** 0.013*** -0.003 
           . (7.08) (8.65) (-0.31) (11.29) (12.61) (0.06) (4.53) (4.78) (-0.22) 
ѐPROFIT -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.083*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.078*** -0.040*** -0.029*** -0.152*** 
           . (-11.94) (-18.19) (-3.80) (-11.34) (-14.91) (-3.14) (-6.38) (-8.40) (-3.87) 
DEF 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.154*** 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.142*** -0.000 -0.027*** 0.163* 
           . (16.75) (31.65) (3.67) (17.68) (29.29) (3.06) (-0.03) (-3.46) (1.80) 
LAGBKDEBT -0.112*** -0.350*** -0.103*** 
      
           . (-40.35) (-118.11) (-14.65) 
      LAGMKTDEBT 
   
-0.101*** -0.341*** -0.097*** 
   
           . 
   
(-48.33) (-118.29) (-9.78) 
   LAGTDEBT 
      
-0.312*** -0.628*** -0.239*** 
           . 
      
(-29.52) (-156.35) (-6.51) 
R-sq 0.092 0.324 0.193 0.156 0.357 0.251 0.129 - 0.190 
Obs 78954 78954 78954 78954 78954 78954 78954 78954 78954 
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CHAPTER B7. CONCLUSION 
Financial flexibility is the most important determinant of capital structure in 
SUDFWLFH7KHLPSDFWRIILQDQFLDOIOH[LELOLW\RQILUPV¶ILQDQFLQJFKRLFHLVWHVWHGXVLQJ
two main components of flexibility ± debt capacity and external equity flexibility. 
The two components are used to predict different forms of financing ± debt and 
equity issuance, using the pecking order models. The importance of debt capacity 
and external equity flexibility are assessed in the conventional leverage model with 
three measures of leverage. The following findings are obtained. 
For internal flexibility, evidence shows substantial substitution effect 
between cash and debt capacity, and firms are found to have decreasing level of cash 
when debt capacity increases. For external flexibility, the newly constructed external 
equity flexibility variable (EEF index) shows that equity liquidity increases over 
time (while debt capacity decreases over time), suggesting increased reliance on 
equity funds as developments in the equity market promote greater accessibility. 
However, firms are increasingly reliant on internal debt capacity if they are denied 
access to equity funding. Lower equity liquidity firms have slightly larger debt 
capacity and more leverage in their capital structure. These firms have slightly lower 
cash holdings, are slightly younger, have fewer growth opportunities, and incur 
lower investment expenses. Substantial industry variation in flexibility 
characteristics is observed. 
Financing deficit increases about three fold from the 1970s to the recent two 
decades. A large proportion of this deficit is financed by net equity issue and the 
trend is increasing with time. Supporting Frank and Goyal (2003), net equity issue is 
found to track deficit better than net debt issue, suggesting that firms choose to issue 
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equity rather than debt for financing needs. In the 1970s and 1980s, a substantial 
amount of investment is financed internally by cash reserves or cash flows (as net 
investment exceeds total deficit). When financing deficit is disaggregated, the trend 
over time in deficit is driven primarily by net cash flows and change in working 
capital. Value-added components ± investment and change in working capital are 
increasingly funded by equity. Debt funded dividends on the other hand remained 
similar over different periods. Results indicate that the amount of debt issued to 
finance the deficit no longer depends solely on the amount of deficit a firm faces but 
depends on the amount of deficit relative to the ILUP¶VERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\ 
It is found that only firms with sufficient debt capacity appear to follow the 
pecking order financing hierarchy, whereas firms with insufficient debt capacity do 
not follow the hierarchy because they simply cannot do so. Therefore, the pecking 
RUGHUWKHRU\ LVFRQWLQJHQWXSRQ ILUPV¶DELOLW\ WRERUURZ2Q WKHZKROH(() LQGH[
has lower impact on debt and equity issue compared to debt capacity variable. This 
suggests that pecking RUGHUILQDQFLQJKLHUDUFK\UHPDLQVXVHIXO LQH[SODLQLQJ ILUPV¶
financing preference ± deficit is first financed by debt but is largely contingent upon 
ILUPV¶ ERUURZLQJ FDSDFLW\ IROORZHG E\ ILUPV¶ DELOLW\ WR LVVXH HTXLW\ ZKHQ GHEW
financing is not feasible 6XEVHTXHQWO\ ILUPV¶ HTXLW\ GHFLVLRQV DUH LQIOXHQFHG E\
ILUPV¶IOH[LELOLW\LQWKHHTXLW\PDUNHW± reflected in EEF index.  
Debt constrained firms hold more cash, use less debt and at the same time use 
more equity financing for their deficit requirements. Equity issue is monotonically 
decreasing with the level of debt capacity ± firms with greater debt capacity issue 
less equity to fund their deficits. On the other hand, firms with better equity position 
issue more equity to finance their deficit, and the use of equity increases with equity 
flexibility. However, firms with better equity position may not issue less debt, i.e. 
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equity is not a substitute for debt. This suggests that firms issue equity if they are 
able to; and they are not forced to issue equity as the last resort as suggested by the 
financing hierarchy. Findings from the basic and modified pecking order model 
regressions, with individual equity variables, show that firms with increased liquidity 
use more equity to finance deficit but do not decrease their use of debt. Although 
there is weak evidence for substitution between debt and equity use, firms have the 
tendency to choose the financing source which provides them the best funding 
capacity. 
Finally, the conventional leverage model results show that firms may not 
follow the strict financing hierarchy postulated by the pecking order theory, since a 
positive and significant relationship between EEF and leverage is found. The results 
confirm that there is no adherence to the financing hierarchy; rather the applicability 
of the pecking order is conditional on the amount of debt a firm is able to issue. 
7KHUHIRUH HYLGHQFH DJDLQVW WKH SHFNLQJ RUGHU PRGHO PLJKW EH GXH WR ILUPV¶
incapacitated debt issue, rather than their preference for equity. SupporWLQJ0\HUV¶
(2001) view, evidence suggests that the pecking order model is a conditional theory 
based on a simple fact of whether or not firm has the capacity to issue debt when 
required. The conventional leverage change model reports a strong mean reversion 
tendency of firPV¶ OHYHUDJH VXSSRUWLQJ WKH WUDGH-off theory. Furthermore, debt 
capacity and EEF index are the most important determinants of leverage in the two 
conventional models, supporting the practical findings in Graham and Harvey (2001) 
where financial flexibility is the most important consideration when firms make 
capital structure decisions. Estimates for flexibility components remain large and 
significant even after firm and year fixed effects are considered; and results remain 
robust to different estimation techniques and measurements of leverage.  
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As financial flexibility has been proven to be a very important factor in 
financing decisionV IXUWKHU VWXGLHV RQ ILQDQFLDO IOH[LELOLW\ RQ ILUPV¶ LQYHVWPHQW
decisions and firm value would add valuable insights into the impact of financial 
IOH[LELOLW\ RQ ILUPV¶ UHDO YDOXH )XUWKHUPRUH WKH FRPELQDWLRQ RI WKH ILQDQFLDO
flexibility components (cash, debt capacity, equity and bond measures and credit 
rating) into a single index or measure will contribute greatly to the academic and 
practice as a single standardized measure of financial flexibility can be used to 
DFFHVVILUPV¶IOH[LELOLW\SRVLWLRQGLUHctly.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Appendix B-I Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of principal components of PCA performed yearly for EEF 
index 
This table reports results of the Principal Component Analysis for the four equity liquidity variables. Variable 
definitions for the liquidity variables are detailed in Chapter B3.2.2. Panel A reports Eigenvalues of the principal 
components and the cumulative variance of each component. Panel B reports the eigenvector values for each 
liquidity variable for the computation of the first principal component which is identified as the EEF index. Both 
average and pooled values are reported. Pooled statistics use the whole sample from 1951 to 2006 when 
performing the PCA, while average statistics report the average values of the results of PCA performed yearly 
from 1951 to 2006. 
  
EIGENVALUES OF PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS   
EIGENVECTORS OF EEF INDEX 
(PRIN1) 
FYEAR Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4   BMA 
RTOV12 
_SQRT 
LM12 
_SQRT TO12 
1951 2.253 1.183 0.389 0.176 
 
0.590 0.630 0.477 0.167 
1952 2.215 1.087 0.527 0.172 
 
0.564 0.632 0.528 -0.054 
1953 2.230 1.167 0.499 0.103 
 
0.572 0.648 0.501 0.043 
1954 2.205 1.071 0.574 0.149 
 
0.554 0.640 0.527 -0.078 
1955 2.105 1.148 0.567 0.180 
 
0.542 0.652 0.530 0.025 
1956 2.325 1.063 0.462 0.150 
 
0.561 0.622 0.544 -0.044 
1957 2.288 1.009 0.583 0.120 
 
0.552 0.635 0.533 -0.089 
1958 2.250 1.130 0.498 0.122 
 
0.566 0.641 0.518 -0.006 
1959 2.212 1.124 0.520 0.144 
 
0.545 0.643 0.538 0.011 
1960 2.216 1.037 0.609 0.139 
 
0.562 0.643 0.520 0.013 
1961 2.094 1.190 0.585 0.130 
 
0.573 0.660 0.450 0.185 
1962 2.070 1.134 0.682 0.114 
 
0.571 0.672 0.471 0.003 
1963 2.312 1.075 0.529 0.084 
 
0.564 0.637 0.516 -0.103 
1964 2.259 1.087 0.570 0.084 
 
0.566 0.645 0.506 -0.085 
1965 2.261 1.107 0.529 0.103 
 
0.574 0.639 0.505 -0.083 
1966 2.210 1.082 0.613 0.095 
 
0.565 0.650 0.497 -0.107 
1967 2.138 1.180 0.569 0.113 
 
0.561 0.660 0.497 -0.056 
1968 1.776 1.358 0.643 0.223 
 
0.507 0.705 0.485 0.104 
1969 1.796 1.336 0.660 0.208 
 
0.396 0.705 0.582 -0.087 
1970 2.030 1.002 0.830 0.137 
 
0.519 0.675 0.523 -0.032 
1971 2.092 1.015 0.782 0.111 
 
0.546 0.670 0.500 -0.063 
1972 2.150 1.057 0.676 0.117 
 
0.529 0.653 0.507 -0.193 
1973 2.355 0.971 0.577 0.098 
 
0.521 0.617 0.511 -0.294 
1974 2.478 0.940 0.509 0.073 
 
0.537 0.605 0.513 -0.287 
1975 2.585 0.903 0.444 0.068 
 
0.524 0.593 0.520 -0.321 
1976 2.479 0.946 0.494 0.081 
 
0.534 0.604 0.515 -0.289 
1977 2.460 0.965 0.491 0.084 
 
0.537 0.609 0.519 -0.267 
1978 2.364 1.059 0.498 0.079 
 
0.536 0.628 0.526 -0.206 
1979 2.285 1.061 0.556 0.098 
 
0.528 0.637 0.524 -0.204 
1980 2.410 1.011 0.486 0.093 
 
0.498 0.617 0.539 -0.285 
1981 2.344 1.020 0.540 0.096 
 
0.482 0.624 0.538 -0.296 
1982 2.335 0.961 0.591 0.113 
 
0.489 0.618 0.526 -0.318 
1983 2.192 1.050 0.612 0.147 
 
0.449 0.636 0.550 -0.303 
1984 2.303 0.973 0.584 0.140 
 
0.510 0.618 0.511 -0.313 
1985 2.476 0.908 0.484 0.132 
 
0.549 0.589 0.509 -0.304 
1986 2.547 0.866 0.457 0.129 
 
0.538 0.580 0.512 -0.335 
1987 2.553 0.868 0.437 0.142 
 
0.534 0.577 0.519 -0.336 
1988 2.568 0.872 0.421 0.139 
 
0.545 0.571 0.518 -0.330 
1989 2.553 0.878 0.433 0.136 
 
0.550 0.570 0.514 -0.328 
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Appendix B-I Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of principal components of PCA performed yearly for EEF 
index (continued) 
 
  
EIGENVALUES OF PRINCIPAL 
COMPONENTS   
EIGENVECTORS OF EEF INDEX 
(PRIN1) 
FYEAR Prin1 Prin2 Prin3 Prin4   BMA 
RTOV12 
_SQRT 
LM12 
_SQRT TO12 
1990 2.545 0.899 0.424 0.132 
 
0.556 0.569 0.515 -0.319 
1991 2.604 0.869 0.396 0.131 
 
0.553 0.567 0.522 -0.317 
1992 2.588 0.890 0.394 0.127 
 
0.552 0.571 0.523 -0.309 
1993 2.578 0.923 0.382 0.117 
 
0.559 0.577 0.528 -0.275 
1994 2.559 0.911 0.394 0.136 
 
0.555 0.575 0.527 -0.291 
1995 2.544 0.912 0.386 0.157 
 
0.558 0.573 0.533 -0.276 
1996 2.576 0.929 0.371 0.124 
 
0.555 0.580 0.534 -0.265 
1997 2.608 0.915 0.359 0.119 
 
0.556 0.581 0.536 -0.257 
1998 2.565 0.928 0.371 0.135 
 
0.559 0.584 0.538 -0.237 
1999 2.593 0.942 0.372 0.094 
 
0.554 0.595 0.541 -0.215 
2000 2.523 0.928 0.418 0.130 
 
0.540 0.595 0.535 -0.259 
2001 2.637 0.859 0.384 0.119 
 
0.556 0.574 0.524 -0.295 
2002 2.602 0.872 0.413 0.113 
 
0.559 0.579 0.520 -0.286 
2003 2.551 0.919 0.372 0.157 
 
0.563 0.580 0.537 -0.242 
2004 2.342 1.002 0.488 0.168 
 
0.562 0.617 0.542 -0.101 
2005 2.303 0.985 0.505 0.206 
 
0.549 0.613 0.547 -0.150 
2006 2.287 0.986 0.500 0.227 
 
0.524 0.608 0.549 -0.233 
Average 2.448 0.946 0.482 0.125   0.537 0.601 0.525 -0.260 
 
 
Appendix B-II Financing and deficit variables graph to match with Frank and Goyal (2003) 
This figure plots the yearly averages of net debt and equity issues, and deficit ratios denominated by net assets 
(total assets less current liabilities)s over the period 1970 to 2008, to match with Frank and Goyal (2003) Figure 
B1. All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial 
(SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or 
negative total assets and total sales are excluded. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in 
Chapter B4. 
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Appendix B-III Base pecking order model and disaggregated pecking order model for period 1971 to 1989 
This table reports OLS regression results of the base pecking order model (a) for sample period 1971 to 1989 and 
1990 to 1998 to match with Table B3 and B4 of Frank and Goyal (2003). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 
11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-
4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are 
excluded. The dependent variable is net long-term debt issue scaled by total assets. Deficit ratio (DEF) is 
computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. 
Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with 
heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered by firm and year. The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. 
T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Period 1971 - 1989   1990 - 1998 
 
Frank and Goyal 
(2003) Firm sample 
 
Frank and Goyal 
(2003) Firm sample 
Dependent ѐLTDEBT ѐLTDEBT   ѐLTDEBT ѐLTDEBT 
Intercept -0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
0.007*** -0.023*** 
              . 
 
(3.08) 
  
(-25.84) 
DEF_NA 0.283*** 0.173*** 
 
0.148*** 0.153*** 
              . 
 
(124.02) 
  
(76.15) 
Adj R-Sq 0.265 0.187   0.12 0.120 
Obs 89883 67015   57687 42396 
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Appendix B-IV Pecking order models on the entire sample (1971-2008) and by periods (1907s ± 2000s) using fixed effects regression 
This table reports fixed effects regression results of pecking order models (a) to (f) on the entire sample (1971 to 2008) and by periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 
in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total 
assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variables are net long-term debt issue and net equity issue. Deficit ratio (DEF) is computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, 
change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. Panel A reports the basic pecking order model and modified 
pecking order model using net debt issue and net equity issue respectively. Panel B repeats the regressions with individual components of financing deficit. Panel C includes the interaction 
effect between deficit and external equity flexibility. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled in the following regression estimates. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents 
significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model Fixed effects regression 
Period 1970-2008 
 
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
Dependent ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7< 
  Panel A 
DEF 0.128*** 0.406*** 
 
0.259*** 0.047*** 
 
0.146*** 0.294*** 
 
0.091*** 0.541*** 
 
0.147*** 0.533*** 
           . (99.31) (171.33) 
 
(74.00) (24.99) 
 
(57.79) (88.52) 
 
(37.23) (109.83) 
 
(44.74) (67.75) 
Obs 141521 141521   27715 27715   39300 39300   47198 47198   27308 27308 
  Panel B 
DIVT 0.138*** 0.872*** 
 
0.356*** -0.188*** 
 
0.343*** 0.351*** 
 
-0.440*** 2.054*** 
 
0.512*** 0.287** 
           . (5.63) (18.97) 
 
(5.37) (-4.90) 
 
(4.30) (3.24) 
 
(-9.16) (20.95) 
 
(10.72) (2.47) 
I1 0.268*** 0.458*** 
 
0.568*** 0.083*** 
 
0.376*** 0.344*** 
 
0.193*** 0.538*** 
 
0.238*** 0.530*** 
           . (119.97) (109.56) 
 
(87.01) (22.14) 
 
(72.05) (48.53) 
 
(49.92) (68.18) 
 
(49.83) (45.58) 
WCCHANGE 0.074*** 0.364*** 
 
0.181*** 0.038*** 
 
0.101*** 0.283*** 
 
0.039*** 0.504*** 
 
0.085*** 0.480*** 
           . (55.91) (146.90) 
 
(53.78) (19.71) 
 
(41.69) (85.93) 
 
(14.94) (95.33) 
 
(24.75) (57.62) 
CF4 -0.120*** -0.359*** 
 
-0.332*** -0.046*** 
 
-0.143*** -0.221*** 
 
-0.101*** -0.396*** 
 
-0.119*** -0.418*** 
           . (-59.50) (-94.99) 
 
(-48.13) (-11.54) 
 
(-32.76) (-37.21) 
 
(-25.55) (-49.22) 
 
(-26.57) (-38.24) 
Obs 141519 141519   27715 27715   39300 39300   47196 47196   27308 27308 
  Panel C 
DEF 0.011*** 0.757*** 
 
0.153*** 0.103*** 
 
-0.019*** 0.541*** 
 
-0.001 0.807*** 
 
0.093*** 0.884*** 
           . (4.18) (159.32) 
 
(9.41) (11.62) 
 
(-3.16) (68.97) 
 
(-0.14) (90.40) 
 
(16.38) (66.92) 
DEF_DC 0.410*** -1.066*** 
 
0.235*** -0.123*** 
 
0.519*** -0.639*** 
 
0.340*** -0.950*** 
 
0.234*** -1.463*** 
           . (55.25) (-79.02) 
 
(6.78) (-6.47) 
 
(33.19) (-30.64) 
 
(24.78) (-34.74) 
 
(12.11) (-32.41) 
Adj R-Sq 0.223 0.556   0.360 0.438   0.314 0.590   0.295 0.623   0.296 0.640 
Obs 139015 139015   27364 27364   38264 38264   46428 46428   26959 26959 
  Panel D 
DEF 0.180*** 0.388*** 
 
0.339*** 0.074*** 
 
0.257*** 0.179*** 
 
0.156*** 0.461*** 
 
0.154*** 0.523*** 
           . (101.84) (121.68) 
 
(65.92) (27.85) 
 
(61.41) (51.70) 
 
(52.39) (83.65) 
 
(38.22) (53.51) 
DEF_EEF -0.004*** -0.057*** 
 
-0.013*** -0.017*** 
 
0.006*** -0.025*** 
 
-0.008*** -0.072*** 
 
-0.013*** -0.064*** 
           . (-4.31) (-34.53) 
 
(-4.53) (-11.41) 
 
(2.80) (-14.31) 
 
(-5.22) (-25.04) 
 
(-6.41) (-13.10) 
Obs 93726 93726   14034 14034   21241 21241   38746 38746   19705 19705 
Part B Appendix 
309 
 
Appendix B-V Pecking order models on the entire sample (1971-2008) and by periods (1907s ± 2000s) using Fama-McBeth regressions 
This table reports the Fama-McBeth regression results of pecking order models (a) to (f) on the entire sample (1971 to 2008) and by periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 
or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative 
total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variables are net long-term debt issue and net equity issue. Deficit ratio (DEF) is computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, 
change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. Panel A reports the basic pecking order model and modified 
pecking order model using net debt issue and net equity issue respectively. Panel B repeats the regressions with individual components of financing deficit. Panel C includes the interaction 
effect between deficit and external equity flexibility. Fama-MacBeth regressions are performed using Newey and West (1987) standard errors controlling for autocorrelation. The table reports 
coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Model Fama-McBeth regression 
Period 1970-2008 
 
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
Dependent ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7< 
  Panel A 
Intercept 0.004* 0.025*** 
 
0.007*** 0.005** 
 
0.006*** 0.037*** 
 
0.002 0.034*** 
 
0.000 0.021 
           . (1.82) (4.88) 
 
(6.01) (2.92) 
 
(3.66) (7.12) 
 
(0.27) (28.70) 
 
(0.05) (1.72) 
DEF 0.137*** 0.453*** 
 
0.248*** 0.062*** 
 
0.110*** 0.328*** 
 
0.075*** 0.652*** 
 
0.124*** 0.762*** 
           . (6.72) (4.99) 
 
(24.46) (4.13) 
 
(9.82) (6.11) 
 
(10.54) (22.89) 
 
(12.29) (11.20) 
Adj R-Sq 0.095 0.266   0.196 0.039   0.073 0.240   0.036 0.410   0.083 0.361 
Obs 141521 141521   27715 27715   39300 39300   47198 47198   27308 27308 
  Panel B 
Intercept -0.012*** 0.034***   -0.009*** 0.003*   -0.021*** 0.043***   -0.007 0.046***   -0.011*** 0.042*** 
           . (-4.54) (5.38) 
 
(-6.53) (2.10) 
 
(-6.88) (9.11) 
 
(-1.19) (11.46) 
 
(-3.99) (3.99) 
DIVT 0.260*** -0.099 
 
0.348*** -0.129*** 
 
0.292*** -0.672*** 
 
0.056 0.414* 
 
0.364*** -0.002 
           . (4.71) (-0.56) 
 
(9.56) (-3.43) 
 
(5.17) (-3.37) 
 
(0.55) (2.04) 
 
(6.93) (-0.01) 
I1 0.292*** 0.416*** 
 
0.459*** 0.115*** 
 
0.303*** 0.409*** 
 
0.172*** 0.565*** 
 
0.244*** 0.558*** 
           . (8.64) (7.10) 
 
(47.62) (4.88) 
 
(28.19) (18.72) 
 
(11.69) (25.85) 
 
(10.82) (11.27) 
WCCHANGE 0.086*** 0.348*** 
 
0.171*** 0.043*** 
 
0.075*** 0.260*** 
 
0.027*** 0.540*** 
 
0.077*** 0.538*** 
           . (5.09) (4.93) 
 
(19.70) (3.78) 
 
(7.28) (5.43) 
 
(4.67) (16.94) 
 
(7.34) (7.95) 
CF4 -0.129*** -0.501*** 
 
-0.286*** -0.066** 
 
-0.083*** -0.446*** 
 
-0.059*** -0.679*** 
 
-0.099*** -0.799*** 
           . (-4.50) (-5.58) 
 
(-21.23) (-2.42) 
 
(-9.79) (-25.13) 
 
(-10.59) (-21.96) 
 
(-11.79) (-12.10) 
Adj R-Sq 0.151 0.300   0.275 0.072   0.144 0.311   0.067 0.415   0.128 0.386 
Obs 141519 141519   27715 27715   39300 39300   47196 47196   27308 27308 
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Appendix B-V Pecking order models on the entire sample (1971-2008) and by periods (1907s ± 2000s) using Fama-McBeth regressions  (continued) 
Model Fama-McBeth regression 
Period 1970-2008 
 
1970s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
Dependent ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7<   ǻ/7'(%7 ǻ(48,7< 
  Panel C 
Intercept 0.002 0.021*** 
 
0.006*** 0.004** 
 
0.001 0.027*** 
 
0.001 0.032*** 
 
0.000 0.019 
           . (0.92) (4.58) 
 
(4.00) (2.63) 
 
(0.24) (3.81) 
 
(0.20) (26.55) 
 
(0.06) (1.66) 
DEF 0.040** 0.688*** 
 
0.134*** 0.118*** 
 
-0.016 0.613*** 
 
-0.006 0.942*** 
 
0.060*** 1.061*** 
           . (2.12) (5.55) 
 
(5.27) (3.54) 
 
(-0.82) (4.77) 
 
(-1.12) (45.86) 
 
(8.66) (10.56) 
DEF_DC 0.353*** -0.806*** 
 
0.292** -0.112** 
 
0.466*** -0.629*** 
 
0.324*** -1.065*** 
 
0.321*** -1.408*** 
           . (9.99) (-4.69) 
 
(3.04) (-2.52) 
 
(13.16) (-3.71) 
 
(14.59) (-21.34) 
 
(5.20) (-6.55) 
Adj R-Sq 0.125 0.305   0.217 0.047   0.133 0.312   0.056 0.452   0.100 0.393 
Obs 139015 139015   27364 27364   38264 38264   46428 46428   26959 26959 
  Panel D 
Intercept 0.004** 0.014*** 
 
0.003** -0.000 
 
0.009*** 0.008*** 
 
0.005 0.023*** 
 
-0.002 0.028** 
           . (2.11) (3.24) 
 
(3.14) (-0.25) 
 
(7.36) (3.68) 
 
(0.91) (7.53) 
 
(-0.56) (2.98) 
DEF 0.187*** 0.378*** 
 
0.319*** 0.083*** 
 
0.176*** 0.151*** 
 
0.122*** 0.558*** 
 
0.128*** 0.823*** 
           . (7.12) (3.89) 
 
(21.21) (5.13) 
 
(16.44) (8.96) 
 
(19.07) (9.36) 
 
(10.06) (10.18) 
DEF_EEF -0.008** -0.049*** 
 
-0.014*** -0.019** 
 
0.002 -0.028*** 
 
-0.008** -0.082*** 
 
-0.013** -0.070*** 
           . (-2.04) (-5.15) 
 
(-4.49) (-3.29) 
 
(0.22) (-7.77) 
 
(-2.85) (-10.28) 
 
(-2.86) (-7.30) 
Adj R-Sq 0.144 0.232   0.268 0.092   0.135 0.137   0.075 0.351   0.095 0.378 
Obs 93726 93726   14034 14034   21241 21241   38746 38746   19705 19705 
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Appendix B-VI Pecking order model (a) on different ranks of flexibility components over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of pecking order models (a) performed across subsamples of firms sorted according to debt capacity for the period 1971 to 2008 and by periods (1970s 
to 2000s). Group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the lowest debt capacity and group rank 10 (R_10) are firms with the highest debt capacity over the entire period and in difference periods (1970s 
to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-
9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is net long-term debt issue to total assets. Coefficient estimate is for independent 
variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is 
reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents 
significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of debt capacity (R_1=Low debt capacity and R_10=High debt capacity) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.046*** 0.083*** 0.111*** 0.122*** 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.194*** 0.205*** 0.252*** 0.197*** 
t-value (16.01) (18.00) (18.09) (16.31) (18.67) (18.30) (18.94) (19.70) (24.67) (20.54) 
AdjRSq 3% 5% 7% 7% 10% 11% 12% 13% 17% 12% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.214*** 0.250*** 0.236*** 0.287*** 0.311*** 0.333*** 0.319*** 0.284*** 0.256*** 0.177*** 
t-value (16.43) (17.30) (15.54) (16.57) (17.94) (19.68) (18.84) (18.58) (17.11) (12.78) 
AdjRSq 18% 21% 18% 23% 25% 29% 27% 23% 19% 11% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.049*** 0.098*** 0.138*** 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.218*** 0.263*** 0.245*** 0.289*** 0.193*** 
t-value (9.07) (11.52) (12.29) (10.60) (10.58) (11.39) (12.78) (12.23) (14.69) (10.50) 
AdjRSq 3% 6% 10% 11% 12% 15% 19% 17% 22% 12% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.026*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.090*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.135*** 0.171*** 0.224*** 0.205*** 
t-value (6.33) (8.12) (7.56) (7.92) (10.38) (8.79) (8.96) (10.52) (13.42) (13.29) 
AdjRSq 1% 2% 3% 4% 7% 6% 7% 9% 13% 12% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.060*** 0.085*** 0.133*** 0.088*** 0.148*** 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.158*** 0.233*** 0.204*** 
t-value (8.77) (8.10) (8.52) (6.08) (7.21) (6.91) (6.36) (6.68) (9.84) (8.07) 
AdjRSq 4% 6% 9% 4% 9% 8% 8% 9% 15% 12% 
Panel B: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_10=High cash holdings) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.202*** 0.234*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.180*** 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.083*** 0.062*** 0.027*** 
t-value (23.63) (24.13) (22.12) (22.64) (20.83) (17.27) (15.81) (12.60) (13.58) (11.46) 
AdjRSq 13% 16% 14% 14% 11% 9% 7% 4% 4% 2% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.246*** 0.252*** 0.287*** 0.292*** 0.297*** 0.314*** 0.279*** 0.276*** 0.221*** 0.114*** 
t-value (15.76) (15.69) (17.91) (17.89) (18.14) (19.11) (17.63) (17.82) (15.32) (9.49) 
AdjRSq 17% 19% 22% 24% 24% 26% 24% 24% 19% 9% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.157*** 0.183*** 0.167*** 0.197*** 0.179*** 0.154*** 0.148*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.020*** 
t-value (12.28) (12.29) (11.29) (13.08) (12.52) (9.76) (10.82) (7.50) (8.22) (5.11) 
AdjRSq 10% 13% 11% 15% 13% 10% 10% 5% 4% 1% 
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Appendix B-VI Pecking order model (a) on different ranks of flexibility components over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) (continued) 
Panel B: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_10=High cash holdings) (continued) 
1990s 
Estimate 0.245*** 0.271*** 0.238*** 0.213*** 0.142*** 0.123*** 0.084*** 0.055*** 0.037*** 0.020*** 
t-value (15.74) (16.66) (14.03) (12.57) (10.40) (9.82) (7.29) (5.71) (5.66) (5.52) 
AdjRSq 15% 18% 14% 12% 7% 6% 4% 2% 2% 1% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.244*** 0.304*** 0.252*** 0.206*** 0.219*** 0.114*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.048*** 
t-value (10.74) (10.42) (10.40) (9.81) (9.84) (5.64) (4.96) (4.96) (6.97) (8.08) 
AdjRSq 16% 20% 18% 13% 14% 6% 4% 4% 6% 4% 
Panel C: Pecking order model (a) on deciles of EEF  (R_1=High EEF and R_10=Low EEF) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.132*** 0.159*** 0.173*** 0.172*** 0.157*** 0.124*** 0.117*** 0.134*** 0.119*** 0.136*** 
t-value (17.96) (15.36) (14.95) (15.43) (16.67) (15.15) (13.82) (14.77) (13.50) (14.07) 
AdjRSq 9% 11% 13% 12% 11% 8% 7% 8% 7% 8% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.380*** 0.328*** 0.290*** 0.355*** 0.308*** 0.296*** 0.327*** 0.322*** 0.275*** 0.254*** 
t-value (15.26) (14.16) (11.87) (15.41) (11.95) (12.63) (13.42) (14.52) (11.16) (11.82) 
AdjRSq 34% 30% 29% 33% 27% 24% 27% 28% 19% 17% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.217*** 0.161*** 0.184*** 0.166*** 0.137*** 0.203*** 
t-value (9.16) (6.09) (6.54) (5.98) (8.57) (7.13) (6.80) (6.99) (6.74) (8.69) 
AdjRSq 10% 9% 12% 12% 17% 11% 12% 10% 9% 15% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.112*** 0.176*** 0.154*** 0.159*** 0.139*** 0.117*** 0.110*** 0.145*** 0.098*** 0.108*** 
t-value (11.31) (12.86) (10.00) (10.86) (11.26) (10.78) (9.14) (10.56) (7.71) (8.06) 
AdjRSq 7% 13% 10% 11% 9% 7% 6% 9% 5% 6% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.189*** 0.153*** 0.127*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.125*** 0.099*** 
t-value (8.57) (5.66) (7.23) (7.56) (6.90) (6.13) (6.53) (5.83) (8.03) (5.44) 
AdjRSq 10% 6% 15% 11% 9% 6% 6% 5% 10% 6% 
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Appendix B-VII Modified Pecking order model (c) on different ranks of flexibility components over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of modified pecking order models (c) performed across subsamples of firms sorted according to debt capacity for the period 1971 to 2008 and by 
periods (1970s to 2000s). Group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the lowest debt capacity and group rank 10 (R_10) are firms with the highest debt capacity over the entire period and in difference 
periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and 
government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is net long-term debt issue to total assets. Coefficient 
estimate is for independent variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications 
and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient 
estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Panel A: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of debt capacity (R_1=Low debt capacity and R_10=High debt capacity) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.695*** 0.648*** 0.606*** 0.553*** 0.455*** 0.441*** 0.394*** 0.323*** 0.265*** 0.288*** 
t-value (58.80) (44.35) (35.78) (29.40) (23.74) (20.06) (19.53) (18.03) (15.66) (16.10) 
AdjRSq 37% 34% 31% 30% 23% 23% 21% 18% 13% 15% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.088*** 0.052*** 0.024* 0.047*** 
t-value (6.18) (6.49) (4.67) (7.08) (5.07) (5.28) (6.73) (5.04) (1.96) (3.85) 
AdjRSq 4% 5% 3% 6% 4% 4% 7% 3% 1% 2% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.437*** 0.423*** 0.424*** 0.402*** 0.336*** 0.316*** 0.297*** 0.295*** 0.213*** 0.279*** 
t-value (24.50) (20.19) (17.63) (14.30) (11.99) (10.61) (9.83) (10.12) (8.53) (8.73) 
AdjRSq 28% 31% 33% 29% 24% 22% 19% 22% 13% 17% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.783*** 0.746*** 0.724*** 0.618*** 0.526*** 0.560*** 0.468*** 0.408*** 0.330*** 0.349*** 
t-value (45.99) (35.96) (27.02) (20.66) (17.80) (16.06) (14.23) (12.43) (11.45) (11.40) 
AdjRSq 42% 41% 37% 30% 25% 28% 24% 21% 16% 17% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.994*** 0.875*** 0.771*** 0.758*** 0.663*** 0.560*** 0.537*** 0.340*** 0.365*** 0.323*** 
t-value (29.35) (20.45) (16.85) (16.64) (11.63) (8.62) (9.50) (7.81) (6.95) (6.86) 
AdjRSq 40% 34% 29% 39% 29% 26% 26% 17% 18% 15% 
Panel B: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_10=High cash holdings) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.214*** 0.187*** 0.202*** 0.258*** 0.298*** 0.391*** 0.487*** 0.562*** 0.658*** 0.718*** 
t-value (15.08) (14.65) (13.78) (16.92) (18.19) (22.22) (25.43) (32.59) (43.65) (62.05) 
AdjRSq 11% 9% 11% 12% 13% 20% 25% 27% 35% 40% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.046*** 0.063*** 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.051*** 0.073*** 
t-value (4.33) (5.36) (5.28) (5.21) (6.85) (5.74) (4.75) (5.92) (4.53) (5.07) 
AdjRSq 2% 5% 3% 2% 5% 4% 4% 5% 2% 3% 
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Appendix B-VII Modified Pecking order model (c) on different ranks of flexibility components over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) (continued) 
Panel B: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of cash (R_1=Low cash holdings and R_10=High cash holdings) (continued) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
 
Estimate 0.193*** 0.174*** 0.138*** 0.168*** 0.184*** 0.278*** 0.301*** 0.359*** 0.454*** 0.420*** 
1980s t-value (9.98) (9.50) (7.93) (9.40) (9.71) (11.45) (12.25) (15.02) (20.74) (25.44) 
 
AdjRSq 12% 11% 9% 12% 13% 21% 22% 27% 36% 28% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.252*** 0.226*** 0.281*** 0.388*** 0.439*** 0.476*** 0.615*** 0.666*** 0.768*** 0.835*** 
t-value (11.65) (9.24) (9.39) (12.38) (14.54) (16.69) (21.11) (24.06) (33.39) (49.64) 
AdjRSq 11% 9% 14% 17% 19% 25% 32% 32% 39% 45% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.308*** 0.213*** 0.315*** 0.353*** 0.372*** 0.567*** 0.730*** 0.811*** 0.824*** 1.045*** 
t-value (5.14) (5.43) (6.62) (7.95) (6.86) (9.99) (11.98) (17.26) (19.88) (35.04) 
AdjRSq 14% 8% 15% 13% 11% 20% 27% 29% 35% 46% 
Panel C: Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of EEF  (R_1=High EEF and R_10=Low EEF) 
PERIOD DECILE R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 R_8 R_9 R_10 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.720*** 0.538*** 0.502*** 0.544*** 0.605*** 0.592*** 0.614*** 0.505*** 0.435*** 0.273*** 
t-value (29.28) (18.90) (16.96) (18.54) (22.51) (23.23) (24.68) (20.29) (16.83) (12.72) 
AdjRSq 28% 26% 24% 26% 29% 29% 32% 26% 22% 15% 
1970s 
Estimate 0.135*** 0.125*** 0.154*** 0.110*** 0.075*** 0.059*** 0.053*** 0.061*** 0.028*** 0.042*** 
t-value (8.06) (7.09) (7.18) (6.38) (5.09) (7.34) (4.26) (5.32) (3.64) (4.33) 
AdjRSq 11% 11% 15% 11% 7% 6% 5% 7% 2% 3% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.286*** 0.203*** 0.148*** 0.217*** 0.137*** 0.157*** 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.114*** 0.059*** 
t-value (10.75) (6.94) (5.33) (6.01) (6.34) (6.72) (5.73) (6.98) (5.55) (3.45) 
AdjRSq 21% 16% 12% 16% 9% 13% 13% 11% 10% 3% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.851*** 0.612*** 0.605*** 0.584*** 0.709*** 0.690*** 0.612*** 0.474*** 0.438*** 0.349*** 
t-value (26.12) (18.34) (14.55) (15.16) (20.66) (20.27) (17.85) (14.29) (12.97) (10.19) 
AdjRSq 34% 30% 30% 27% 39% 35% 32% 25% 24% 19% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.879*** 0.804*** 0.698*** 0.766*** 0.842*** 0.755*** 0.846*** 0.834*** 0.782*** 0.378*** 
t-value (14.96) (9.87) (10.62) (11.15) (13.14) (13.37) (18.04) (15.33) (12.05) (7.50) 
AdjRSq 29% 35% 28% 35% 33% 33% 41% 39% 35% 19% 
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Appendix B-VIII Base and Modified Pecking order model on different ranks of long-term credit rating over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of pecking order model (a) and modified pecking order model (c) performed across subsamples of firms sorted according to long-term rating for the 
period 1985 to 2008 and by periods (1980s to 2000s). Group rank 0 (R_0) are firms with the lowest long-term credit rating and group rank 7 (R_7) are firms with the highest long-term credit 
rating over the entire period and in difference periods (1980s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-
6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variable is net long-term debt 
issue to total assets. Coefficient estimate is for independent variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total 
assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The 
table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in the parentheses. 
Pecking order model (a) on deciles of long-term rating  (R_1=Low rating and R_7=High rating) 
PERIOD DECILE R_0 R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.090*** 0.152*** 0.380*** 0.330*** 0.265*** 0.194*** 0.109*** 0.125*** 
t-value (48.51) (3.90) (19.27) (15.89) (11.20) (7.91) (4.14) (2.93) 
AdjRSq 5% 8% 29% 22% 16% 11% 8% 13% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.099*** 0.165 0.294*** 0.169*** 0.198*** 0.175*** 0.093*** 0.262** 
t-value (29.77) (1.63) (8.18) (4.90) (2.79) (2.97) (3.03) (2.09) 
AdjRSq 6% 6% 24% 10% 10% 9% 9% 16% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.064*** 0.241*** 0.428*** 0.413*** 0.270*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.115*** 
t-value (23.37) (4.15) (15.64) (15.00) (9.43) (6.57) (3.86) (3.54) 
AdjRSq 3% 18% 31% 31% 18% 9% 11% 12% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.090*** 0.048 0.418*** 0.378*** 0.294*** 0.272*** 0.071 0.103 
t-value (20.01) (1.24) (14.28) (10.84) (7.89) (8.40) (0.74) (1.53) 
AdjRSq 6% 1% 33% 25% 17% 19% 1% 14% 
Modified Pecking order model (c) on deciles of long-term rating  (R_1=Low rating and R_7=High rating) 
PERIOD DECILE R_0 R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 R_6 R_7 
1970-2008 
Estimate 0.553*** 0.116*** 0.160*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.138*** 0.079*** 0.221*** 
t-value (97.61) (3.06) (9.80) (8.27) (6.88) (6.72) (3.28) (2.79) 
AdjRSq 31% 4% 6% 3% 3% 6% 3% 7% 
1980s 
Estimate 0.345*** 0.021 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.090*** 0.034 0.043* 0.382*** 
t-value (45.78) (0.82) (3.21) (2.87) (3.43) (1.02) (1.85) (4.00) 
AdjRSq 25% -0% 2% 1% 6% 1% 2% 10% 
1990s 
Estimate 0.692*** 0.132*** 0.207*** 0.171*** 0.091*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.271 
t-value (79.34) (2.84) (7.52) (7.62) (3.30) (5.47) (3.07) (1.55) 
AdjRSq 39% 7% 7% 6% 2% 5% 3% 7% 
2000s 
Estimate 0.825*** 0.189* 0.256*** 0.116*** 0.164*** 0.297*** 0.203* 0.159** 
t-value (47.93) (1.96) (6.18) (3.64) (6.42) (7.26) (1.80) (2.26) 
AdjRSq 37% 5% 8% 2% 3% 15% 5% 5% 
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Appendix B-IX Base and Modified Pecking order model on different ranks of equity liquidity variables over different periods (1970s ± 2000s) 
This table reports OLS regression results of pecking order model (a) and modified pecking order model (c) performed across subsamples of firms sorted according the four equity liquidity 
variable for the period 1971 to 2008 and by periods (1970s to 2000s). For BMA, RTOV12 and LM12, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the highest liquidity and group rank 10 (R_10) are firms 
with the lowest liquidity debt capacity over the entire period and in difference periods (1970s to 2000s). For TO12, group rank 1 (R_1) are firms with the lowest liquidity and group rank 10 
(R_10) are firms with the highest liquidity debt capacity over the entire period and in difference periods (1970s to 2000s). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are 
included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are 
excluded. The dependent variable is net long-term debt issue to total assets for Pecking Order model and net equity issue to total assets for Modified Pecking Order model. Coefficient estimate 
is for independent variable deficit ratio (DEF), computed as the sum of cash dividends, net investment, change in working capital less cash flows to total assets. Variable specifications and 
winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. OLS regressions are performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. The table reports coefficient estimates 
where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
  Pecking Order Model (a)   Modified Pecking Order Model (c) 
Decile Stat R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5   R_1 R_2 R_3 R_4 R_5 
BMA Estimate 0.215*** 0.139*** 0.108*** 0.098*** 0.100***   0.374*** 0.550*** 0.550*** 0.581*** 0.475*** 
t-value (24.24) (21.87) (21.70) (20.41) (18.95) 
 
(8.41) (11.15) (10.60) (18.70) (19.74) 
AdjRSq 15% 9% 7% 6% 6%   1% 2% 3% 5% 9% 
RTOV12 Estimate 0.208*** 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.126*** 
 
0.393*** 0.542*** 0.617*** 0.516*** 0.349*** 
t-value (26.17) (27.04) (23.76) (24.22) (22.67) 
 
(6.52) (11.60) (19.49) (20.85) (17.76) 
AdjRSq 15% 11% 8% 8% 7% 
 
1% 3% 5% 7% 8% 
LM12 Estimate 0.126*** 0.139*** 0.148*** 0.127*** 0.153***   0.610*** 0.491*** 0.490*** 0.476*** 0.301*** 
t-value (25.85) (22.68) (23.04) (21.57) (23.51) 
 
(14.43) (12.89) (16.46) (18.78) (13.31) 
AdjRSq 9% 9% 10% 8% 10%   3% 3% 3% 6% 5% 
TO12 Estimate 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.137*** 0.125*** 0.120*** 
 
0.232*** 0.371*** 0.502*** 0.528*** 0.628*** 
t-value (22.23) (23.20) (21.66) (22.83) (25.99) 
 
(11.17) (14.04) (15.90) (16.15) (15.92) 
AdjRSq 10% 11% 9% 8% 8%   1% 3% 4% 4% 4% 
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Appendix B-X Conventional leverage regressions (with industry median leverage) over sample period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports conventional leverage model with additional independent variable (industry median leverage) on the entire sample (1971 to 2008). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in 
CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total 
assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variables are three measures of leverage ± book value debt, market value debt and true value debt ratios. Independent variables include 
tangibility (Tang) measured as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets, Q ratio measured as market to book value assets, firm size (LNSALE) measured as the natural 
logarithm of total sales, profitability (Profit) measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets, and industry median leverage (SIC_Median_Bkdebt) computed yearly based 
on 4-digit SIC code. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in Chapter B4. Model 1, 4 and 7 report results of OLS regressions performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors clustered at firm-level. Model 2, 5 and 8 reports fixed effects regression controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Model 3, 6 and 9 reports results of Fama-McBeth regressions 
performed yearly. All regressions include a constant term. Goodness of fit statistic ± R-squared is not reported for fixed effects regression. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** 
represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS FE FM OLS FE FM OLS FE FM 
Dependent BKDEBT BKDEBT BKDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT TDEBT TDEBT 
Intercept 0.068*** 
 
0.080*** 0.126*** 
 
0.140*** 0.168*** 
 
0.182*** 
                . (14.86) 
 
(12.24) (32.39) 
 
(10.06) (18.93) 
 
(11.83) 
TANG 0.146*** 0.248*** 0.143*** 0.112*** 0.210*** 0.113*** 0.076*** 0.249*** 0.063*** 
                . (21.23) (62.75) (18.10) (18.99) (62.53) (15.02) (6.17) (22.84) (3.01) 
Q -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.047*** -0.037*** -0.057*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
                . (-10.92) (-19.57) (-5.33) (-67.28) (-110.96) (-6.94) (-12.96) (-18.17) (-3.97) 
LNSALE 0.003*** 0.016*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.010*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.030*** 0.006** 
                . (4.61) (38.13) (2.99) (2.33) (28.50) (3.37) (2.52) (27.02) (2.37) 
PROFIT -0.006** -0.025*** -0.124** -0.003* -0.016*** -0.122** -0.011** -0.039*** -0.251** 
                . (-2.58) (-21.97) (-2.35) (-1.66) (-16.98) (-2.20) (-2.35) (-12.50) (-2.50) 
SIC_MEDIAN 0.603*** 0.432*** 0.595*** 0.528*** 0.396*** 0.526*** 0.993*** 0.727*** 0.952*** 
BKDEBT (50.61) (72.55) (49.02) (52.24) (78.42) (23.35) (44.06) (44.20) (27.35) 
R-sq 0.206   0.216 0.335   0.334 0.091   0.127 
Obs 145020 145020 145020 145020 145020 145020 145020 145020 145020 
 
  
Part B Appendix 
318 
 
Appendix B-XI Correlation coefficients of leverage model variables 
This table reports correlation coefficients of independent variables used in leverage models (g) and (h) over the sample period 1970 to 2008. All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in 
CRSP/Compustat) are included with the exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total 
assets and total sales are excluded. The dependent variables are three measures of leverage ± book value debt, market value debt and true value debt ratios. Independent variables include debt 
capacity (DC) measured as the ratio of debt capacity to total assets, external equity flexibility (EEF) index, tangibility (Tang) measured as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total 
assets, Q ratio measured as market to book value assets, firm size (LNSALE) measured as the natural logarithm of total sales, profitability (Profit) measured as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets, and industry median leverage (SIC_Median_Bkdebt) computed yearly based on 4-digit SIC code. Variable specifications and winsorisation method is reported in 
Chapter B4.  
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
  BKDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT DC_NOCASH EEF TANG Q LNSALE PROFIT 
SIC_MEDIAN_ 
BKDEBT 
BKDEBT 1 
         MKTDEBT 0.823 1 
        TDEBT 0.692 0.581 1 
       DC  0.208 0.292 0.182 1 
      EEF 0.096 0.172 0.117 0.111 1 
     TANG 0.277 0.294 0.127 0.407 -0.036 1 
    Q -0.183 -0.432 -0.136 -0.335 -0.191 -0.170 1 
   LNSALE 0.077 0.150 0.050 0.166 -0.470 0.109 -0.199 1 
  PROFIT 0.082 0.145 0.058 0.285 -0.060 0.139 -0.203 0.265 1 
 SIC_MEDIAN_BKDEBT 0.411 0.453 0.281 0.281 0.060 0.337 -0.271 0.119 0.208 1 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
  BKDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT DC_NOCASH EEF TANG Q LNSALE PROFIT 
SIC_MEDIAN_ 
BKDEBT 
BKDEBT 1 
  
              
MKTDEBT 0.877 1 
        TDEBT 0.915 0.819 1 
       DC 0.274 0.347 0.288 1 
      EEF 0.065 0.139 0.066 0.136 1 
     TANG 0.311 0.330 0.253 0.377 -0.065 1 
    Q -0.219 -0.527 -0.226 -0.336 -0.294 -0.176 1 
   LNSALE 0.127 0.200 0.153 0.075 -0.570 0.166 -0.080 1 
  PROFIT -0.057 -0.039 -0.049 0.211 -0.217 0.122 0.067 0.310 1 
 SIC_MEDIAN_BKDEBT 0.430 0.453 0.403 0.275 0.056 0.347 -0.291 0.135 0.118 1 
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Appendix B-XII Leverage model (h) with debt capacity variable over sample period 1970 to 2008 
This table reports leverage model (h) with debt capacity variable on the entire sample (1971 to 2008). All public firms (i.e. share code 10 or 11 in CRSP/Compustat) are included with the 
exception of financial (SIC=69000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and government (SIC=9000-9999) firms. Firms with missing or negative total assets and total sales are excluded. The 
dependent variables are three measures of leverage ± book value debt, market value debt and true value debt ratios. Independent variables include debt capacity (DC) measured as the ratio of 
debt capacity to total assets, tangibility (Tang) measured as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets, Q ratio measured as market to book value assets, firm size (LNSALE) 
measured as the natural logarithm of total sales, and profitability (Profit) measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets. Variable specifications and winsorisation method 
is reported in Chapter B4. Model 1, 4 and 7 report results of OLS regressions performed with heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors clustered at firm-level. Model 2, 5 and 8 reports fixed 
effects regression controlled for firm and year fixed effects. Model 3, 6 and 9 reports results of Fama-McBeth regressions performed yearly. All regressions include a constant term. Goodness of 
fit statistic ± R-squared is not reported for fixed effects regression. The table reports coefficient estimates where *** represents significance at 1% level, and ** and * represents significance at 
5% and 10% respectively. T-values are reported in parentheses. 
VARIABLE MODEL1 MODEL2 MODEL3 MODEL4 MODEL5 MODEL6 MODEL7 MODEL8 MODEL9 
Model OLS FE FM OLS FE FM OLS FE FM 
Dependent BKDEBT BKDEBT BKDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT MKTDEBT TDEBT TDEBT TDEBT 
Intercept 0.163*** 
 
0.170*** 0.196*** 
 
0.220*** 0.217*** 
 
0.211*** 
        . (26.74) 
 
(10.41) (38.96) 
 
(9.69) (20.77) 
 
(9.87) 
DC 0.240*** 0.223*** 0.218*** 0.231*** 0.189*** 0.185*** 0.519*** 0.440*** 0.514*** 
        . (21.40) (44.12) (6.09) (26.56) (43.99) (6.98) (26.08) (32.24) (7.98) 
Q -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.055*** -0.040*** -0.063*** -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
        . (-19.95) (-24.72) (-7.22) (-71.44) (-112.58) (-8.52) (-16.77) (-20.17) (-4.99) 
LNSALE 0.004*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.026*** 0.006* 
        . (5.90) (28.47) (3.44) (3.92) (18.81) (4.46) (2.70) (22.08) (1.72) 
PROFIT 0.005* -0.030*** -0.132** 0.005*** -0.021*** -0.131** -0.013** -0.047*** -0.264** 
        . (1.79) (-24.65) (-2.19) (2.58) (-19.79) (-2.11) (-2.34) (-14.34) (-2.45) 
R-sq 0.058 - 0.082 0.213 - 0.214 0.039 - 0.074 
Obs 137036 137036 137036 137036 137036 137036 137036 137036 137036 
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